Bulgarie

[Paschi]

Il n'y a pas de fil dédié à ce pays, donc...

Pendant longtemps, la Bulgarie a perçu la Russie de façon positive en raison de sa proximité linguistique et religieuse. Aujourd’hui, le pays connaît une crise politique en raison du mouvement russophile d’un parti de droite qui a recueilli 14 % des suffrages aux dernières élections, après une succession de cinq gouvernements en deux ans. Depuis la capitale bulgare, Caroline de Camaret reçoit la vice-présidente de ce pays balkanique de 6,5 millions d'habitants, Iliana Iotova. 

https://www.france24.com/fr/émissions/ici-l-europe/20230428-iliana-iotava-le-conflit-en-ukraine-éloigne-l-idée-d-une-défense-européenne

[Wallaby]

https://www.eurotopics.net/fr/308113/bulgarie-un-journalisme-entre-dans-l-arne-politique (26 septembre 2023)

Le parti GERB de l'ancien Premier ministre Boïko Borissov a nommé comme candidat à la mairie de la capitale nul autre que le chef de la rédaction du journal télévisé de la chaîne bTV, Anton Hekimyan. La presse bulgare redoute les conséquences de ce tour de passe-passe pour la crédibilité du journalisme en général.

[Wallaby]

https://www.euractiv.fr/section/charbon/news/abandon-du-charbon-en-bulgarie-les-mineurs-continuent-de-protester/ (2 octobre 2023)

Cela fait trois jours que les mineurs bulgares protestent en bloquant les autoroutes et les routes clés du sud de la Bulgarie.

Les députés de la majorité parlementaire ont promis que les centrales électriques au charbon en Bulgarie seraient progressivement fermées d’ici 2038.

La Bulgarie attend 1,8 milliard d’euros de la part de l’UE pour réaliser la transition écologique dans ses régions charbonnières sans perdre d’emplois.

Chaque mineur ou travailleur d’une centrale électrique au charbon qui se retrouve sans emploi s’est vu promettre 36 mois de salaire à titre de compensation, soit 75 000 euros. Ce montant équivaut à 75 salaires moyens en Bulgarie, qui est le pays le plus pauvre de l’Union européenne.

 

[Wallaby]

https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/un-rapport-pointe-a-nouveau-le-manque-d-independance-de-la-cedh-20230420 (20 avril 2023)

Parmi les exemples cités par le rapport, celui du juge bulgare Yonko Grozev attire l'attention : membre éminent de l'Open Society de Georges Soros, le juge Grozev a fondé et dirigé pendant vingt ans le Comité Helsinki en Bulgarie, une instance issue de l'open Society et engagée pour la défense des droits de l'homme. Or le Comité Helsinki a été confronté au gouvernement bulgare dans plusieurs contentieux, dont certains ont été jugés par la CEDH. À quatre reprises, le gouvernement bulgare a demandé à la Cour le déport du juge Grozev, considéré comme étant juge et partie dans ces affaires : chaque fois ce déport a été refusé, et Yonko Grozev a siégé à la Cour lors des délibérations au sujet d'affaires impliquant l'ONG dont il était le fondateur. Chaque fois, du reste, le Comité Helsinki a obtenu gain de cause et le gouvernement bulgare a été condamné.

[Wallaby]

https://www.eurotopics.net/fr/338648/bulgarie-le-president-s-oppose-a-l-introduction-de-l-euro (12 mai 2025)

La Bulgarie pourrait intégrer la zone euro début 2026. Le 4 juin prochain, il est attendu en effet que la Commission européenne présente un rapport de convergence positif, confirmant que les critères d'adhésion ont été remplis et donnant son feu vert. Or le président bulgare, Roumen Radev, s'y oppose : il s'est dit favorable à la tenue d'un référendum, susceptible de stopper l'introduction de l'euro.

[Wallaby]

https://neweasterneurope.eu/2025/05/20/bulgarias-eurozone-games/

Les sondages réalisés plus tôt cette année par Myara ont montré que 51,7 % des Bulgares s'opposent en principe à l'entrée de la Bulgarie dans la zone euro, tandis que 39 % la soutiennent en principe. Par ailleurs, lorsqu'on leur rappelle que l'adhésion à la zone euro est l'une des obligations du pays en vertu des traités de l'UE et compte tenu des efforts actuels pour adopter l'euro le 1er janvier 2026, 41,4 % des personnes interrogées affirment que la Bulgarie ne devrait « jamais » adhérer à la zone euro, tandis que 30,8 % déclarent qu'elle devrait le faire à un stade ultérieur.

Une série de scandales de corruption ainsi qu'un raid contre la présidence de Radev le 9 juillet 2020, perçu comme une tentative de coup d'État, ont déclenché des manifestations anticorruption massives contre le troisième gouvernement de Borissov, qui ont duré plus de cent jours. Par coïncidence, le lendemain, 10 juillet 2020, la Commission européenne a fait l'annonce surprenante que la Bulgarie (et la Croatie) avaient été incluses dans le Mécanisme de taux de change II (MTC II), également connu sous le nom de « salle d'attente » de la zone euro.

Sans surprise, le gouvernement et le parlement « Zhelyazkov » actuels sont mal notés : 27 % des citoyens ont confiance dans le gouvernement et 46 % ne lui font pas confiance ; 13 % des citoyens font confiance au parlement et 64 % ne lui font pas confiance. Deux facteurs principaux expliquent cette crise de confiance. Les dernières élections législatives d'octobre 2024 ont été marquées par des irrégularités si flagrantes que même la Cour constitutionnelle, qui est connue pour sa partialité en faveur de Borissov, les a déclarées, en partie, illégales. Plus important encore, le président Radev est l'un des rares hommes politiques à avoir mis le doigt sur le véritable problème sous-jacent du gouvernement officiellement dirigé par Rossen Zhelyazkov : « Au lieu d'un gouvernement Zhelyazkov, nous avons un gouvernement Borissov et Peevski... Nous avons des résultats visibles, tels que l'accaparement des institutions et des ressources ». C'est un secret de polichinelle que Borissov et Peevski, qui a été sanctionné pour corruption par les gouvernements américain et britannique, respectivement en 2021 et 2023, sont partenaires en coulisses. Comme le montrent les tendances de vote actuelles, la survie du gouvernement « Zhelyazkov » est assurée par le parti « Nouveau départ » de Peevski, qui s'est détaché du parti DPS, une fois que l'ADLE et Reuniou ont menacé de mettre fin à l'adhésion du DPS si Peevski restait à la tête du parti.

Comme l'adhésion à la zone euro implique le respect des critères de Maastricht, qui sont de nature macroéconomique, les inquiétudes ne sont qu'exacerbées par les antécédents de la Bulgarie en matière de manipulation des données.

Tout d'abord, la Bulgarie a toujours été en proie à des scandales concernant des manipulations du PIB.

Jusqu'à récemment, même en se basant sur des statistiques modifiées, on pensait que le principal obstacle à l'adhésion de la Bulgarie à la zone euro était l'inflation. Les données de la Banque mondiale montrent que l'inflation s'élevait à 15,3 % en 2022, à 9,4 % en 2023 et à 2,4 % en 2024. Bien que l'on ne sache pas quelle stratégie la Bulgarie aurait pu adopter pour réduire l'inflation, les citoyens ordinaires se demandent comment leurs factures continuent d'augmenter alors que les institutions affirment que l'inflation a été maîtrisée.

Dans ce contexte et compte tenu du fait que la valeur du lev bulgare est artificiellement appréciée en raison des spécificités de la caisse d'émission du pays, il n'est pas surprenant que de nombreux citoyens ordinaires et macroéconomistes craignent que l'adhésion à la zone euro en 2016 soit prématurée et puisse déboucher sur une crise financière. Le souvenir de la récente crise de la Grèce voisine, qui a été déclenchée, entre autres, par la découverte que la Grèce avait rejoint la zone euro avec des statistiques faussées et une dette cachée, est encore très présent dans les mémoires et alimente encore plus le scepticisme.

À cet égard, il est assez révélateur que des membres éminents du PPDB ne se soient pas engagés dans un débat de fond sur la proposition de référendum de Radev, mais qu'ils se soient plutôt appuyés sur une propagande simpliste, un étiquetage et des spéculations flagrantes. Ivaylo Mirchev, co-dirigeant de « Oui, la Bulgarie », a affirmé que M. Radev tentait de plaire au Kremlin. Néanmoins, il n'a pas expliqué ce que Poutine gagne en retardant l'entrée de la Bulgarie dans la zone euro et il a omis de mentionner que Borissov et Peevski, qui soutiennent l'entrée immédiate de la Bulgarie, entretiennent depuis longtemps des liens avec la Russie.

[collectionneur]

@Wallaby ...craignent que l'adhésion à la zone euro en "2016" ? Oups, le stagiaire ne sais pas relu ;)

[Wallaby]

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/12/11/le-premier-ministre-bulgare-annonce-la-demission-de-son-gouvernement_6656894_3210.html

Le premier ministre démissionne après des semaines de manifestation contre la corruption

Selon le directeur de l’agence de sociologie MarketLinks, Dobromir Zhivkov, « la société bulgare est très largement unie contre le modèle de gouvernance du pays ». « Plus de 70 % soutiennent la vague de protestation dans le pays », a-t-il ajouté, citant une étude publiée jeudi.

[Wallaby]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/wave-of-gen-z-unrest-fells-its-first-european-government/ar-AA1SaB0b (11 décembre 2025)

The Wall Street Journal

La fin du gouvernement pro-européen de Zhelyazkov devrait entraîner des élections anticipées dans les prochains mois, ce qui pourrait redessiner les perspectives géopolitiques du pays.

L'un des bénéficiaires potentiels est le président Rumen Radev, chef de l'État élu et homme politique le plus populaire du pays, qui devrait former son propre parti et pourrait se présenter aux prochaines élections législatives. Ancien pilote de l'armée de l'air, M. Radev a souvent critiqué le soutien occidental à l'Ukraine dans sa guerre avec la Russie, qualifiant notamment les perspectives de Kiev de « vouées à l'échec » au début de l'année.

[Wallaby]

https://www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20260119-en-bulgarie-démission-du-président-avant-les-législatives-du-printemps

Le président bulgare Roumen Radev a démissionné lundi

Certains analystes lui prêtent l'intention, avec cette démission inédite d'un président en Bulgarie, de participer aux législatives anticipées du printemps, attendues fin mars ou en avril.

Avec comme but pour M. Radev d'arriver, avec une nouvelle formation politique, en tête aux législatives afin d'être nommé à la tête du gouvernement.

Selon le politologue Parvan Simeonov, directeur de l’institut de sondage Myara, Roumen Radev pourrait ainsi espérer bénéficier de "l'élan lié aux manifestations", qu'il soutient.

Depuis le soulèvement d’une partie des Bulgares contre la corruption, ce pays des Balkans — membre de l’Otan et, depuis le 1er janvier, de la zone euro — est plongé dans l'instabilité politique.

Ces législatives seront les huitièmes organisées en cinq ans dans ce pays des Balkans, le plus pauvre de l’Union européenne, confronté à une corruption jugée endémique.

Avant d’être élu président pour la première fois en 2016, le général Radev avait commandé l'armée de l’air bulgare.

Sa candidature avait été soutenue par les socialistes, aux positions pro-russes.

Lors des premières manifestations anticorruption en 2020, il avait aussi soutenu les protestataires, ce qui lui avait valu des sympathies chez une partie des électeurs des formations libérales pro-européennes.

Ce soutien l’a aidé à décrocher un second mandat en 2021, avec près de 67% des voix au second tour, face au candidat soutenu par GERB.

Mais son opposition à l’aide militaire à l'Ukraine a conduit nombre de ses détracteurs à le présenter comme prorusse.

Dans un entretien accordé à CNN en juin dernier, il s'était dit "déçu" du faible soutien observé au sein de l'Union européenne pour "les efforts de paix" du président américain Donald Trump.

[Polybe]

https://www.novinite.com/articles/236563/NATO+Pilot%2C+Putin+Sympathizer%2C+or+Something+Else+Who+Is+Rumen+Radev+and+Why+Did+He+Just+Blow+Up+Bulgarian+Politics

"NATO Pilot, Putin Sympathizer, or Something Else? Who Is Rumen Radev and Why Did He Just Blow Up Bulgarian Politics

Bulgaria just witnessed something that's never happened before - a sitting president resigned to jump into the political arena. Rumen Radev, who's been running the show at the presidential office for nearly a decade, stepped down on January 19th, handing the reins to Vice President Iliana Yotova (making her Bulgaria's first female president, by the way). In his farewell speech, he said: "I would like to first ask for forgiveness. Time has put your trust to the test."

So what's the deal? Elections are coming up in late March or early April, and Radev's making it pretty clear he's not done with politics - he's just getting started on a new chapter.

From Fighter Pilot to Political Fighter
Before we dive into what Radev might do next, let's talk about who he actually is. Born in 1963 in Dimitrovgrad, Radev wasn't the typical politician grinding through party ranks. The man flew MiG-29s for a living. We're talking over 1,400 flight hours, performing aerobatic stunts like "Cobra" and "Bell" at air shows that had crowds going wild. He worked his way up from junior pilot to Major General and Commander of the Air Force. This is the kind of resume that screams discipline and strategic thinking.

His military credentials are serious. Trained at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, graduated top of his class from multiple academies, and earned a doctorate in military sciences.

When the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) came knocking in 2016 looking for a presidential candidate, Radev took the offer but made one thing clear: he wasn't going to be anybody's puppet. He won that election convincingly, 58% in the second round, and again in 2021.

The Socialist Connection That Fell Apart
Here's where Radev's political origins get interesting (and messy). The BSP didn't just support him; they created him as a political figure. Back in 2016, the party's leader, Kornelia Ninova, had a strategy: find popular independent candidates who shared socialist worldviews but weren't tainted by the party's communist-era baggage. Radev, the non-partisan Air Force commander, was perfect. He ran nominally as an independent, but everyone knew the BSP machinery was behind him. His running mate, Iliana Yotova, was a leading socialist.

The formula worked brilliantly. Radev crushed GERB's candidate and became president. The BSP had their man in the presidential palace, and Radev had a political platform. Win-win, right?

Not quite. The relationship started souring almost immediately. Radev made it clear during his 2021 re-election bid that while he'd accept BSP support, he wasn't their creature. He demanded what he called "emancipation" from the party, insisting on complete independence. The socialists could support him, sure, but he wasn't taking orders from anyone.

By his second term, the split became a full-blown divorce. Ninova's BSP entered into a coalition government with GERB and other parties in 2023-2024 - the very establishment Radev had spent years attacking. For the president, this was betrayal. How could the party that nominated him twice as their anti-corruption champion now be governing alongside Boyko Borissov, the man Radev had called the face of Bulgaria's oligarchic problem?

Radev didn't hide his disgust. He publicly condemned the BSP for abandoning its principles and joining what he saw as a corrupt establishment coalition. The party that created his political career was now, in his view, part of the problem. Ninova, for her part, entered into what observers called "open conflict" with the president she'd nominated. The two most prominent BSP-affiliated figures in Bulgaria were at war.

The situation got so bad that when Ninova was eventually pushed out as BSP leader in 2024, one of the new leadership's first priorities was trying to reconcile with Radev. The party's new acting chairman, Atanas Zafirov, made it clear they wanted to repair the relationship with the president. Recent statements from BSP figures suggest they're hoping Radev will partner with them for the upcoming elections, essentially hoping to recapture the magic of 2016.

But here's the thing: Radev learned something crucial from his BSP experience. He saw that a traditional party structure can become a liability, forcing compromises that undermine your core message. The BSP's decision to join GERB and Delyan Peevski's DPS destroyed their anti-corruption credibility with voters, and the party's electoral support has been collapsing ever since.

If Radev does launch his own political project, expect him to keep it as far from traditional party structures as possible. He'll want the organizational benefits of a political movement without the baggage of party discipline, internal factions, and the kind of compromises that destroyed his relationship with the BSP. Think Macron's En Marche or Italy's Five Star Movement in its early days - a personalized political vehicle that can claim to be above traditional party politics.

The Record Breaker
Here's where things get interesting. During his time as president, Radev absolutely shattered some records that previous heads of state probably didn't aspire to break. He appointed seven caretaker governments - more than any president since 1990. He also vetoed legislation 46 times, another record in Bulgaria's modern democratic history.

Translation? Radev didn't play nice with parliament, and Bulgaria's political scene has been an absolute mess throughout his tenure. Governments kept collapsing, parties couldn't form stable coalitions, and Radev kept appointing temporary cabinets while everyone figured their stuff out (spoiler: they never really did).

The War With GERB and Boyko Borissov
If we want to understand Radev's political identity, we need to understand his relationship with Boyko Borissov and GERB. This was full-scale institutional warfare.

It started almost immediately after Radev's 2016 election victory over GERB's candidate Tsetska Tsacheva. Borissov, who'd dominated Bulgarian politics for years, suddenly had a president who wouldn't rubber-stamp his decisions. The first major clash? Fighter jets. Radev, the former Air Force commander, vetoed the government's F-16 deal in 2019, accusing Borissov of accepting downgrades to get a lower price – a move he called against Bulgaria's interests. Eventually, the jets were bought anyway, but the battle lines were drawn.

Then came 2020, and things got really messy. Leaked photos appeared showing what looked like Borissov lying half-naked in his bedroom next to stacks of euros and a handgun (and some gold bars for good measure). Borissov claimed they were fake and accused Radev flew a drone into his residence to take the pictures. Radev's response was classic: "My drone is so good that it can enter bedrooms, make recordings, open drawers and stuff them with bundles of euros. For me, this is paranoia."

Radev officially withdrew confidence from Borissov's government in February 2020, accusing the prime minister of using state services for political purposes.

Radev positioned himself as the anti-corruption crusader standing against oligarchic control, while GERB accused him of trying to orchestrate early elections and install his own people through caretaker governments. The accusations flew both ways: GERB claimed Radev was using caretaker cabinets as "pre-election headquarters," while Radev hammered away at Borissov and his ally Delyan Peevski as symbols of everything wrong with Bulgarian politics.

The bitter rivalry continued through both of Radev's terms. Borissov and Radev accused each other of leading the country into crisis, trading barbs about corruption, legitimacy, and whose vision for Bulgaria was the real one. When Radev's caretaker governments made changes to the civil service, Borissov screamed they were implementing "Radev's orders" to eliminate GERB.

Anti-Corruption Crusader or Power Player?
Radev built his political brand on one thing above all else: fighting corruption. And he didn't just talk about it, he went after the big names. Beyond Borissov, he repeatedly called out Delyan Peevski, the controversial oligarch sanctioned by both the US and UK for corruption, as the face of everything wrong with Bulgarian politics.

The summer of 2020 was when things got really spicy. Massive protests erupted against Borissov's government and Prosecutor General Ivan Geshev. The President went down to the streets and joined the protests. His message was blunt: organized crime had infiltrated politics, and it needed to be kicked out.

But here's where it gets complicated. That same anti-corruption stance came under scrutiny when his own caretaker government signed a gas deal with Turkish company Botas that's now costing Bulgaria about 1 million leva (roughly €511,000) daily in transmission fees. The country pays for capacity it can't even fully use due to terminal limitations. Critics called it either gross incompetence or "amateurish corruption." Radev defended the contract, though parliament and energy experts have been tearing it apart ever since.

The Russia Question - It's More Complicated Than You Think
Here's where we need to clear up some misconceptions. Yes, Radev's been labeled "pro-Russian" by his critics, and his statements on Ukraine haven't exactly aligned with mainstream EU thinking. But reducing him to just "pro-Russian" misses something crucial: this is a guy who spent his entire career as a NATO pilot.

Think about that for a second. Radev didn't just serve in the Bulgarian Air Force, he was trained at Maxwell Air Force Base in the United States. Twice. He flew familiarization flights on F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18 Hornets, Eurofighter Typhoons, SAAB Gripens, and Dassault Rafales. His name is literally written on the Glory Alley at the Air War College in Alabama. He was pushing for Bulgaria to buy modern Western fighters to replace Soviet-era MiGs long before he entered politics.

This isn't someone whose worldview was shaped in Moscow. His entire professional identity was built within NATO structures and Western military institutions. Which makes his positions on Ukraine all the more interesting.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Radev's taken positions that put him way out of step with mainstream EU and NATO thinking. He's questioned whether military aid to Ukraine actually helps, portrayed sanctions against Russia as misguided, and framed NATO involvement as potentially risky for Bulgaria. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Bulgaria in 2023, Radev opposed sending weapons and talked about the conflict in notably neutral terms.

His actions speak even louder. In 2024, he skipped a NATO summit in Sofia, in his own country's capital, to meet with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban instead. He's criticized EU leaders for expecting Ukraine to reclaim territories Russia occupied since 2014, calling their stance naive. On Crimea, he's essentially suggested it's Russian territory now, whether people like it or not.

However, even back in 2016, defending his positions, Radev made a point of saying he was proud to have served in NATO's armed forces and received his education in the United States. His argument isn't "NATO bad, Russia good" – it's more like "Bulgaria needs to protect its own interests, and blindly following every Western policy isn't necessarily in our interest."

Is that pro-Russian? Pragmatic? Self-interested? Maybe all three. What's clear is that it's not as simple as the "Kremlin puppet" label his opponents throw around.

Not Quite the Eurosceptic He Seems
Similarly, painting Radev as hardcore anti-EU doesn't quite capture the full picture. Let's be real about the euro referendum stunt in May 2025 - that was pure populism. He tried to organize a referendum on adopting the euro, arguing there wasn't national consensus. The Constitutional Court shut it down, parliament rejected it, but Radev got what he wanted: headlines and testing the eurosceptic crowd in the country, potentially "stealing away" voters of the hardline pro-Russian and eurosceptic party "Revival".

But we need to look at his actual positions more carefully. Throughout both terms, Radev never questioned Bulgaria's EU membership itself. He's criticized specific policies – eurozone accession without proper preparation, Schengen integration that didn't deliver promised benefits, Brussels imposing rules without considering Bulgarian realities. That's not the same as wanting to leave the EU.

In fact, if you strip away the rhetoric, Radev's positions on most issues are fairly centrist. He's not calling for Bulgaria to exit the EU like some hard-right nationalists. He's not proposing radical economic reforms. He's essentially saying: "The current system isn't working for ordinary Bulgarians, we need to renegotiate our relationship with Brussels to get a better deal, and we shouldn't sacrifice national interests for abstract European solidarity."

Sound familiar? That's basically what Giorgia Meloni has done in Italy.

The Meloni Model, Not the Orban Path
Everyone's quick to compare him to Viktor Orban because he's met with the Hungarian leader and shares some positions on Russia and conservative values. But the better comparison might actually be Giorgia Meloni.

Meloni came to power in Italy in 2022 amid fears she'd blow up Italy's relationship with the EU, start a spending spree, and cozy up to Russia. She had a far-right background, campaigned on nationalist rhetoric, and seemed poised to become another Orban-style leader. Instead? She's governed as a pragmatist who maintains strong Atlanticism, works constructively with EU institutions when it serves Italian interests, and positions herself as a bridge between conservative values and European mainstream politics.

Her secret? Playing to her base on cultural issues (family values, immigration, traditional identity) while being entirely flexible on the stuff that actually matters for governing: fiscal policy, EU relations, NATO commitments. She talks tough for domestic consumption but operates pragmatically on the international stage.

Radev's euro referendum was populist theater that played well with skeptical voters but had zero chance of actually happening. His anti-corruption crusade targets popular villains like Peevski and Borissov while the actual policy record of his caretaker governments is decidedly mixed. His Russia positions sound contrarian but stop well short of actually undermining Bulgaria's NATO or EU membership.

Meloni's approach has been described as "sovereigntist in rhetoric, pragmatic in practice" - and that might be exactly what Radev has in mind. Use nationalist and anti-establishment rhetoric to build a coalition, maintain flexibility on actual policy, position yourself as defending Bulgarian interests against both domestic corruption and foreign pressure.

The Hungarian comparison falls apart when you look closer. Orban has systematically dismantled democratic institutions, captured the media, changed electoral rules to favor his party, and genuinely reoriented Hungary's foreign policy away from the West. Radev hasn't shown any interest in that level of institutional capture. His entire brand is defending institutions against political manipulation.

Meloni, on the other hand, has maintained Italy's democratic structures, worked within EU frameworks while pushing for Italian priorities, and balanced conservative social positions with pragmatic governance. That seems much more like the model Radev might follow: enough populist edge to differentiate himself from GERB and the establishment, enough pragmatism to actually govern, and enough flexibility to work with whoever holds power in Brussels and Washington.

Conservative Values, But How Conservative?
On social issues, Radev positioned himself firmly in the conservative camp. In 2024, he signed a joint declaration with the presidents of Hungary and Serbia emphasizing "family protection policies." He's backed legislation restricting LGBT discussions in schools and opposed the Istanbul Convention on combating violence against women.

This isn't accidental. Radev's clearly tapping into conservative sentiment among Bulgarian voters who feel cultural change is happening too fast. But again, compare the substance to the style. He hasn't launched Orbаn-style culture wars or systematically targeted civil society organizations. He's signaled conservative positions without making them the centerpiece of his political project.

Interestingly, Radev also expressed support for Donald Trump's approach to international affairs. He praised Trump's peace efforts regarding Ukraine and his willingness to meet with Russian leadership, characterizing him as a pragmatic businessman opposed to endless wars. With Trump back in the White House, Radev might see this as an opportunity to position himself as someone who can work with the new American administration while maintaining ties with Moscow.

So What's Next?
Radev hasn't officially announced his party's platform yet, but based on nearly a decade of public statements and actions, and understanding that he's more likely to follow a Meloni-style pragmatism than Orbаn-style radicalism, we can sketch out what to expect:

Anti-establishment, anti-corruption rhetoric will be front and center. Radev will position himself as the guy who stood up to oligarchs like Peevski and challenged the traditional political class. Whether that squares with the Botas gas deal is something his opponents will definitely hammer on, but expect him to argue the establishment tried to sabotage him at every turn.

Selective euroscepticism on issues where it's popular - criticizing Brussels bureaucracy, questioning whether EU integration has delivered for ordinary Bulgarians, pushing for better terms on various agreements. But don't expect actual threats to leave the EU or derail major integration projects if he's in power.

A "pragmatic" (read: flexible) approach to Russia will differentiate him from pro-Western parties. Radev will likely argue that Bulgaria needs to maintain working relationships with all major powers, that sanctions hurt Bulgaria more than they hurt Russia, and that forcing Ukraine to reclaim all territories isn't realistic. But unlike actual pro-Russian politicians, expect him to stop well short of undermining Bulgaria's NATO or EU membership - those are too important for Bulgarian security and economics.

Conservative social policies will appeal to traditional voters worried about cultural change, but implemented with a light touch. Family values, skepticism of progressive gender policies, and protection of national identity.

Nationalist economic messaging around protecting Bulgarian interests, ensuring EU funds actually benefit ordinary people, and standing up to both foreign pressure and domestic oligarchs. The Botas fiasco complicates this narrative, but expect Radev to frame it as an exception or blame opposition sabotage.

Will It Work?
Radev's got some real advantages. He's recognizable, he's built a reputation as someone willing to confront the establishment, and he's tapping into genuine frustrations with how Bulgaria's democracy has functioned (or not functioned) over the past decade. A recent poll gave him a 44% approval rating, which is a solid number to build on.

But he's also got vulnerabilities. His caretaker governments haven't exactly been corruption-free success stories. His positioning requires balancing contradictions: the NATO officer who questions Western policy, the anti-corruption fighter whose government signed the Botas deal, the EU member who campaigns on eurosceptic themes.

What's certain is that Radev will shake things up. Bulgaria's political landscape has been fragmented and chaotic for years now. Adding a well-known figure with clear positions on controversial issues won't make things calmer, it'll probably make the mess even messier.

For voters skeptical of both the traditional parties and the reformist movements that have emerged since 2021, Radev offers something different: a strong leader with military credentials, conservative-leaning values, and a willingness to challenge both Brussels and the domestic establishment, but without the institutional radicalism of an Orban or the genuine pro-Russian orientation of someone like "Revival".

If he governs like Meloni - nationalist rhetoric, conservative social positions, pragmatic on economics and foreign policy, flexible enough to work within EU and NATO structures while claiming to fight for national interests - he might actually pull it off. That would make him Bulgaria's first successful populist-pragmatist hybrid, carving out a space between the discredited GERB establishment and the more radical nationalist parties.

Whether that's what Bulgaria actually needs right now is the question voters will have to answer in March. One thing's for sure - the former fighter pilot isn't planning a quiet retirement. He's gearing up for what might be the biggest political dogfight of his career, and he's bringing a playbook that looks a lot more like Rome than Budapest.

This text is published as an opinion piece; the title has been added by our editorial team; the article does not necessarily reflect the views of Novinite.com"

Modifié vendredi à 14:51 par Polybe