Armée de l'Air Marocaine

[Seguleh I]

Ah!! merci pour les photos.

Donc avec camo et nez noir, parfait. Pour l'ECM, aucune idée de celui equipé.

[FULCRUM]

Ce sont des détecteurs IR pour les Manpads certainement, il en a surement d'autres sur les fesses

[xav]

Donc l'Armée de l'Air Marocaine  utilise a la fois les Casa et les C27? C'est une premiere non?

Qu'est ce qui justifie cela? (c'est un peut comme avoir une Clio et une 207, un horizon et un T45, un Iphone et un Blackberry etc...)

[xav]

ça ne repond pas tout a fait a la question mais un gars de MP.net a raison:

They are going to operate at the same time amraam/mica, jdam/aasm, sidewinder/magic2, Sniper/ Damocles pods, they really don´t care too much about logistics

:lol:

[docleo]

ou bien d avoir deux technologies différentes au cas ou un des fournisseurs n est pas d accord sur une action que les FAR comptent entreprendre

[TooNs]

ça ne repond pas tout a fait a la question mais un gars de MP.net a raison:

They are going to operate at the same time amraam/mica, jdam/aasm, sidewinder/magic2, Sniper/ Damocles pods, they really don´t care too much about logistics

:lol:

cela fait 2 de chaque... franchement je ne vois pas trop oú est le probleme de logistique lá dedans?

[collectionneur]

TOUT LES UTILISATEURS D'ARMEMENT AMERICAIN ne doivent en aucun cas les utiliser contre un allié des etats unis ,tout le monde le sais sa ,et apres tu parle d'economie..envahir..gaz .. algerie

Désolé, je prend la discution en cours de route mais je rappelle que lors de l'affaire de Chypre, les armées grecques et turcs étaient équipés made in USA, cela ne l'est pas empêché de faire usage de leur armements l'une contre l'autre...

[Seguleh I]

ça ne repond pas tout a fait a la question mais un gars de MP.net a raison:

They are going to operate at the same time amraam/mica, jdam/aasm, sidewinder/magic2, Sniper/ Damocles pods, they really don´t care too much about logistics

Il parlait pas des grecs sur MP net? (ou des emiratis/taiwanais/egyptiens) Plus serieusement, c'est une jolie ambivalence qui nuit peu la logistique et qui apporte une solution de repli en cas de pepin avec tel ou tel fournisseur. En plus, c'est pas de jolis couples que t'as cié plus haut?  ;)

[T800]

The first Moroccan F-16 is scheduled to fly this fall. Morocco, the twenty-fifth nation to operate the F-16, ordered twenty-four Block 52 aircraft in 2009. The two-tone beige color scheme with gray underside is unique to the Moroccan Air Force.

Morocco, the twenty-fifth nation to operate the F-16, ordered twenty-four Block 52 aircraft in 2009. The two-tone beige color scheme with gray underside is unique to the Moroccan Air Force.

The first Moroccan F-16C block 52 #08-8001, seen here on September 21, 2010, is scheduled to fly in the fall of 2010. Morocco, the 25th nation to operate the F-16, ordered twenty-four Block 52 aircraft in 2009. The two-tone light brown scheme with grey underside is unique to the Moroccan Air Force.

[AESA]

le nez en gris parfait pour minimiser les interférences radars ! northrop&grumman n'a pas confirmé la commande des 24 AN/APG68V9

[T800]

les F16 Marocains seront donc livrés sans radars ?

[AESA]

mais non impossible ! mais ça fait quand même bizarre que rien n'est filtré du côté de northrop, ça peut cacher des surprises le SABR....

[TooNs]

les F16 Marocains seront donc livrés sans radars ?

(j'adore)

[T800]

(j'adore)

mon deuxieme surnom c est la fausse ingénue  ;)

[TooNs]

mon deuxieme surnom c est la fausse ingénue  ;)

Je vais meme te donner une autre info: Ils seront livrés sans pneus

[T800]

C' est surement vrai vu que LM n a pas fait mention de leur livraison ( dixit le raisonnement d AESA ) . Pour rester serieux le SABR n existe que sur le papier , les premiers AESA d Afrique ont plus de chance d etre Lybiens ou Algeriens

[AESA]

le SABR et déjà opérationnel et équipera bientôt l'ensemble des BLock52/52 de la flotte US , les autres plus vétustes auront l'APG68V9 (http://www.armybase.us/2009/07/scalable-agile-beam-radar-sabr-fit-check-aboard-u-s-air-force-f-16-fighter/)

bof oui les libyens avec leur SU35 seront probablement les premiers, quant à l'Algérie je m'en doute vraiment à moins que le MIG35 est en route

en tout cas on aura qu'à installer un nouveau radar pour y faire face ça nous fera des économies

[arctor]

le SABR et déjà opérationnel et équipera bientôt l'ensemble des BLock52/52 de la flotte US

Le SABR, tout comme le RACR (l'équivalent chez Raytheon), n'est pas opérationnel, et n'a été commandé par personne. Des démonstrateurs d'antenne ont volé sur banc d'essai et sur F-16, point barre. Aucune décision ferme n'a été prise pour le retrofit des avions américains.

[AESA]

Maroc: Premier F-16D Block 52+ est en Vol

Code One, magasine du geant américain Lookhead Martin, a publié hier la photo du premier F16 D marocain, en vol d'essai

Le premier F-16D Block 52+ destiné à l'armée de l'air marocaine ( FRA ) a fait ses vols d'essais à Fort Worth. Une photo a été publiée hier par le constructeur Lookhead Martin.

A rappeler que le Maroc est le vingt-cinquième opérateur de ce chasseur, en 2008 il a passé commande pour 24 F16, dont 8 biplace, F16D.

http://www.atlas-defense.com/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1290090332&archive=&start_from=&ucat=5&

[FULCRUM]

PUTAIN il claque!! vivement des tofs avec CFT

[scorpion-rouge35]

une des conséquence des fuite sur wikileaks un document secret très détailler sur l'état de l'armée marocaine et de son fonctionnement publier par la presse espagnole notamment .

ID: 164775

Date: 2008-08-04 16:13:00

Origin: 08RABAT727

Source: Embassy Rabat

Classification: SECRET

Dunno:

Destination: VZCZCXYZ0001

PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0727/01 2171613

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 041613Z AUG 08

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8947

INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000727

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2028

TAGS: MARR, MASS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, KCOR, KPKO, MO

SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S MILITARY: ADEQUATE, MODERNIZING, BUT

FACING BIG CHALLENGES

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4

(a) and (b).

1. © Summary: The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) are

modernizing but remain weighed down by long-standing

problems. King Mohammed VI, who in 1999 inherited a military

in need of professionalization, has implemented some needed

reforms, but much remains to be done. Civilian control, if

ascribed to the person of the King, is complete, but there is

no real Defense Ministry. Outside the FAR, there is only a

small administration. The military remains plagued by

corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels of

education in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization of

some of its soldiers, political marginalization, and the

deployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.

There have been some indications of pending changes in the

leadership. In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust

military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in

the future. The health of the relationship is evident by

increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and

Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. to

include 24 F-16s this year. We anticipate that the

U.S.-Moroccan military relationship will continue to flourish

but Morocco's ability to absorb its new high-end military

purchases and restrictions on high quality Moroccan

information sharing with our attaches represent two

challenges ahead. This mission-coordinated report draws

heavily on valuable reporting and analysis from the embassy's

military components, the Defense Attache Office and the

Office of Security Cooperation. End Summary.

------------------

All the King's Men

------------------

2. © As Commander-in-Chief of the Moroccan Royal Armed

Forces and Minister of Defense, King Mohammed VI maintains a

highly centralized role over the military. No troop

movements, exercises, or even travel of officers domestically

or abroad happens without the King,s approval. As a result

of the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts by the Moroccan Army and

Air Force respectively, the Palace increased control over the

military, marginalized it from policy making, and restricted

its interaction with foreign military interlocutors and the

press. The Alaouite dynasty depends upon, among other

things, a strong military, the leadership of which, however,

must remain sufficiently docile so as not to arouse

suspicions of disloyalty. The only civilian structure

responsible for the FAR is not a Defense Ministry but rather

an entity under the Prime Minister responsible for the

Administration of the National Defense. It is headed by

Minister-delegate Abderrahmane Sbai, whose role is

essentially restricted to that of comptroller. As far as we

can tell, political-military policy on issues such as

peacekeeping appears centered in the Foreign Ministry. All

other major defense matters are decided in the Palace.

3. © Over the past decade, Morocco has transitioned from a

conscript to an all-volunteer military force of approximately

218,000 soldiers. Of the three services, the Army is

dominant with approximately 175,000 personnel. There are

approximately 13,000 personnel in the Air Force and 7,800 in

the Navy. Though nominally subordinate within the military

structure but answering directly to the King, the

Gendarmerie, which consists of approximately 22,000

personnel, conducts paramilitary, royal guard, and internal

and border policing missions. Though a few legacy conscripts

remain in the military, professional reforms have made

voluntary military service an attractive career option for

Moroccans with opportunities for a steady income and some

upward mobility. The average military salary for enlisted

soldiers is approximately 2,000 dirhams (USD 270) per month.

An officer's starting salary is approximately 6,000 dirhams

(USD 850) per month. With benefits, such as free housing,

these are reasonably competitive in the Moroccan context.

4. © The top military commanders include Military

Inspector General and Army Commander, Lieutenant General (Lt

Gen) Abdelaziz Benanni; Operations Chief Lt Gen Boughaid

Arroub; and Gendarmerie Commander Lt Gen Housni Benslimane.

Benanni, who has become mired in suspicion of corruption,

will reportedly be retired soon. Arroub, who came out of

recent retirement, is tipped by some to succeed Benanni.

Arroub, historically pro-French, appears to have become

increasingly pro-U.S. in the last 5 years. Another rising

star in the FAR is General Mohamed Larbi Tamdi, who is

responsible for army logistics and force sustainment. There

is some military staff in the Palace, likely influent, about

which little is known.

5. © King Hassan II and his son, King Mohammed VI, have

maintained the Gendarmerie as a force relatively independent

from the FAR since 1972, in part as a check against a

military coup. While it most visibly serves as a State

Police/Highway Patrol, it has a wide range of units. Its

commander, Lt Gen Benslimane, likely reports in some way

directly to the King. He also leads the Moroccan National

Soccer League, making him a popular figure inside and out of

military circles. While there is no direct proof of

Benslimane being involved in corrupt activity, low ranking

Gendarmerie assigned to highway patrols are expected to pay

approximately 4,000 dirhams (USD 540) to their immediate

supervisors with extralegal earnings from motorists above

which they can keep for themselves, according to one credible

anecdote.

--------------------------------------------- --

Military Operations Dominated by Western Sahara

--------------------------------------------- --

6. © The FAR is composed of over 200,000 soldiers and

outclasses most militaries in Africa but has significant room

for improvement. Along with concerns regarding aging

equipment and an overtaxed force, the FAR is plagued by

institutional corruption, leadership that will not step

aside, and low morale among mid-level officers. The FAR is

preoccupied with operations in the Western Sahara region with

between 50 and 70 percent of its total strength deployed

there at any one time. The force in Western Sahara -- a

landmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- is

considered to be stretched thin with a reported estimated

operational readiness rate of just 40 percent. Morocco does

not consider the POLISARIO -- the ethnically Sahrawi

resistance based in Tindouf, Algeria, seeking to make the

Western Sahara an independent state -- to be a conventional

military threat. However, the FAR remains vigilant in

guarding against a renewed POLISARIO insurgency effort.

Morocco built a berm or sand wall along the eastern and

southern borders of the Sahara in the 1980s, which

effectively eliminated the POLISARIO's ability to launch hit

and run raids, leading to the 1981 cease-fire, which has been

fully respected. The POLISARIO continues to maintain a

small, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads in

the small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.

Despite occasional expressions of concern, the GOM almost

certainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses no

current threat that could not be effectively countered. The

POLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terrorist

bombings, etc. Although the specter is sometimes raised,

there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activity

among the indigenous Sahrawi population.

7. © While the border between Morocco and Algeria is

closed, and relations remain cool, we do not believe that

Algeria poses an imminent conventional military threat to

Morocco. Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and

"wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerian

attack, but the FAR does not have troops deployed along the

border. Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,

hundreds of kilometers away from the border, from which they

could deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursion

into Morocco. Any confrontation between the two countries

would likely take place through the proxy of the POLISARIO,

which Algeria has supported materially in the past and could

do so again if hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIO

recommenced.

------------

Peacekeeping

------------

8. © Motivated to win over other countries to its claims

to Western Sahara, Morocco is active in United Nations (UN),

engages in peacekeeping activities, and occasionally sends

troops to assist friendly countries. Morocco is an

experienced contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts, deploying

to countries like Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti and

Somalia. It currently has over 1,500 peacekeepers deployed

to Cote d,Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC). Morocco also supports a military hospital in Kosovo

under NATO command. Morocco has sent medical personnel to

Niger to assist with famine relief and recently re-deployed

military forces to Senegal for an annual five-month &cloud

seeding8 operation for drought relief. Peacekeeping

contributions in recent years have been tarnished by

allegations of sexual wrongdoing in the DRC and Cote

d,Ivoire.

--------------------------------------------- ---

Corruption Remains the Single Greatest Challenge

--------------------------------------------- ---

9. © Corruption is prevalent at all levels of Moroccan

society and the military is also plagued by it, particularly

at the highest levels. This may partly reflect a grand

bargain struck by King Hassan II following at least two

nearly successful coups in the 1970's: remain loyal, and you

can profit. (Those whose loyalty was in question were

subject to sometimes decades of harsh imprisonment.)

Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using his

position as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skim

money from military contracts and influence business

decisions. A widely believed rumor has it that he owns large

parts of the fisheries in Western Sahara. Benanni, like many

senior military officers, has a lavish family home that was

likely built with money gleaned from bribes. Leadership

positions in regional sectors are a significant source of

extralegal income for military leaders. There are even

reports of students at Morocco's military academy paying

money to increase their class standings in order to obtain

positions in lucrative military postings. Command in the

southern sector, i.e., Western Sahara, given the predominance

of military activity there, is considered to be the most

lucrative of the sectors in this regard. Because command in

the southern sector is also considered critical to high level

advancement in the FAR, positions there are highly sought

after. Consequently, positions in this sector are often

jealously "guarded" by a number of influential families in

the military. The GOM seems to be looking for ways to stop

corruption, especially among the formative military ranks of

Colonel and below, but not much is being done to stop the

corruption in the general officer ranks.

-------------------------------------------

Retiring High Level Officers Also a Problem

-------------------------------------------

10. © Senior officers refusing to retire to allow younger

officers to move up the ranks has become a significant

problem for the FAR. Officers nearing the mandatory

retirement age do not want to retire since this would mean

relinquishing bribes, money-skimming, and some related

sources of income. Even for those officers not &on the

take,8 giving up government positions and paychecks is

economically difficult for a sustained retirement. This

"gerontocracy" problem, coupled with the King's notorious

micro-management of the military has had a negative impact on

the morale of mid-level military leaders.

--------------------------------------------- ------

Radicalization: Under Control But Lingering Menace

--------------------------------------------- ------

11. © Though now viewed as a minor problem, reporting

suggests that small numbers of FAR soldiers remains

susceptible to Islamic radicalization. The GOM first

encountered this problem following the 2003 Casablanca

bombings when investigators identified military members as

co-conspirators. Following the bombings, the FAR undertook

steps to identify extremists and implement preventative

measures, such as closing prayer halls on military bases, to

address the problem. Subsequently, Morocco,s internal

security services have identified and apprehended several

military and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells,

some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases for

terrorism. Acknowledging this threat in a speech to the

armed forces in May 2008, the King stated his desire to

"immunize" the armed forces from the threat of radicalization

and to promote the values of tolerance and moderation in the

ranks. During this same time frame the military forced 30

officers to retire early, allegedly because they were deemed

potentially radical and hostile to the Government.

Subsequently, the FAR removed all mosques from army bases and

deployed military counterintelligence, i.e., 5th Bureau,

undercover officers to monitor local "off-post" mosques for

potentially radical activities. These officers refer cases

to the Gendarmerie if criminal charges can be pursued.

---------------

Winds of Change

---------------

12. © Since the 1970's the military itself has been

perceived as the greatest threat to the throne and internal

security in Morocco, not surprising given Morocco's own

history and the broader context of the coup-ridden Middle

East and Africa. Of late, however, there is a general

perception that the relationship between the Palace and the

FAR is beginning to change to one of greater trust. The

King's growing confidence is partly signaled by a recent

significant increase in military spending, particularly for

modern hardware, although this is primarily a function of the

GOM's perceived threat from Algeria and the fact that it is

cost prohibitive at a certain point to maintain older

military equipment. The GOM increased the military's

operating budget to more than USD 2 billion in 2007,

significantly more than in previous years. Likewise, the FAR

is undergoing a significant modernization process, paying

over USD 2 billion for 24 F-16 aircraft and over USD 300

million for T-6 training aircraft from the U.S. The GOM has

commercially financed these transactions, thus far, but the

upfront payments have come from the treasury, which has also

committed to cover monthly payments. The King recently

allowed armed military flights north of Ben Guerir (located

approximately 200 kilometers south of Rabat), an act not

permitted in the past due to the King,s desire to keep the

military far away from the Palace in Rabat. The GOM is also

looking to make significant purchases of M-1 Abrams battle

tanks in the future.

--------------------------------

U.S.-Moroccan Military Relations

Strong but Could Be Better

--------------------------------

13. © In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust

military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in

the future. The health of the relationship is evidenced by

increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and the

aforementioned military sales. Morocco has also increased

its activities under a partnership arrangement with the Utah

National Guard, which regularly deploys to Morocco to conduct

joint training and humanitarian relief operations. We have

submitted draft proposed language for the Moroccans to

consider for an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement

(ACSA) and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and have

received comments on the ACSA draft from the GOM. In the

future, the Embassy hopes to see improvements in the FAR's

information sharing and accessibility to military units and

facilities with our Defense Attache Office. Although the FAR

regularly dialogues with our attaches, quality information is

lacking. The FAR also does not recognize the Embassy Attache

circle, an organization of Military Attaches from various

countries residing in Morocco who elect a president to

discuss issues of collective concern with the FAR. It is

apparent that the Palace continues to tightly control the

FAR's interactions U.S. and other foreign governments.

---------------------------

AFRICOM Viewed with Caution

---------------------------

14. © Previous interactions with GOM officials indicate

that military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing a

headquarters element in Morocco. However, Morocco has

offered to send a military liaison officer to the AFRICOM

headquarters in Germany and has offered to assist U.S.-led

efforts engaging with African countries. Morocco has also

approached AFRICOM representatives to solicit AFRICOM support

in providing chemicals needed for their cloud-seeding

operations in Senegal and providing logistics to assist with

a proposed locust control program.

-------

COMMENT

-------

15. © The Mission is optimistic that the U.S.-Moroccan

military relationship will continue to improve, but there are

potential speed bumps in future. We anticipate that

cooperative joint training exercises will continue to occur

at a robust pace, although the vast majority of this activity

will likely take place in Morocco because of continued

restrictions on the travel of FAR personnel. While we

anticipate that the Palace will continue to modernize the

military, with the notable possible acquisition of M-1 Abrams

tanks, we are increasingly concerned that Morocco, not used

to the high operating costs of these high end items (and

other budgetary pressures) may make it increasingly difficult

for the Moroccans to make payments on purchases. If payments

become a problem for the GOM, this could sour relations

temporarily. While we believe that there are some signs of

the King's increased confidence in the FAR, we believe that

the monarchy still calculates that the military represents

the biggest potential threat to the crown. FAR officers

will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making

input and restricted from engaging in detailed discussions

about Moroccan military strength and intentions with foreign

military officers, including our attaches.

Riley

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/califica/ejercito/Marruecos/corrupto/poco/operativo/elpepuint/20101202elpepuint_32/Tes

[AESA]

Ignat-ER pris en photo au Maroc

[AESA]

Lockheed Martin F-16CJ Fighting Falcon Block 52D+ n°08-8001 + AIM9 sidewinder+ ATP sniper

Lockheed Martin F-16DJ Fighting Falcon Block 52D+ n°08-8017

Lockheed Martin F-16DJ Fighting Falcon Block 52D+ n°08-8018

[AESA]

Maroc: Livraison de 4 premiers T-6C Texan II

Les Forces Royales Air (FRA) marocaines prennent réception de 4 premiers avions d'entrainement turbo-propulsé T-6C Texan II...

Les quatres premiers appareils font partie d'une commande globale de 24 unités commandés par le Maroc en décembre 2007 pour un montant de 200 millions de dollars US.

cette commande s'incrit dans le programme de modernisation de la flotte des FRA, ces nouveaux avions d'entrainement trubo-propulsé vont permettre la formation des futures pilotes de F16block52

leur mise en service permettra enfin de retirer du service les Cessna T-37 vieillissant

17 01 2011

http://www.atlas-defense.com/actu/actu.php?subaction=showfull&id=1295292896&archive=&start_from=&ucat=5&

[FRENCHSKY]

Bordeaux, le 26 janvier