Rafale and other european jets [English only]

[g4lly]

29 minutes ago, Patrick said:

The pdf is protected meaning instead of copy paste it to DeepL or google translate, it would take a while to recopy and translate the content by hand.

What particular themes or passages are you interested about? There's a lot of info.

Ouvre le avec LibreOffice puis réexporte le ...

[Patrick]

il y a une heure, g4lly a dit :

Ouvre le avec LibreOffice puis réexporte le ...

Merci du tip ça fonctionne nickel!

Pour la peine et parce que j'aime être mesquin, voilà le .pdf ré-exporté en non protégé pour que n'importe qui puisse piocher dedans et faire du copier-coller.
C'est un document de 2018 mais il est intéressant parce que confirmant certaines pistes entreprises au début du FCAS franco-allemand.

Source originale (protégé contre la copie)
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/noel_paglia_tenenbaum_armees_menaces_2018.pdf

Fichier réexporté (non protégé contre la copie)
https://www.mediafire.com/file/gufjg25lreqvq5e/noel_paglia_tenenbaum_armees_menaces_2018.pdf/file

 

***

 

So, @DrSomnath999 here is the DeepL translate of the parts you wanted, with a few corrections here and there.

I added some cross-translations for acronyms to make the whole thing easier to understand.

After a bit of proof-reading, the text should make some sense at least (you can never be sure I've been told I wasn't capable of translating english recently, so I'm extra cautious now ).

 

What impact for France?

Limitations of the French SEAD model

Like the White Papers on Defence and National Security of 2008 and 2013, the 2017 Strategic Review reaffirmed France's ambition to have the capacity to "go in first", i.e. to "penetrate these disputed areas and reduce the threat level in order to conduct military operations". In order to achieve this, it is imperative to upgrade capabilities for the reduction, neutralisation or destruction of enemy air defences (SEADs), a field that has been largely disinvested by France and its European partners since the end of the cold war, leading to major capability shortfalls. With the withdrawal of the AS-37 Martel from service in 1999, France no longer has any resources dedicated to SEAD.

This loss of dedicated assets does not mean that the French Air Force is today unable to carry out such missions. A relatively original model based on a combination of survivability, precision strikes and tactical manoeuvres has enabled the French forces to ensure a form of "poor man's SEAD" that is sometimes innovative but whose sustainability in the face of a changing environment is open to doubt.

The absence of anti-radar means and offensive jamming does not leave the pilot completely helpless in the face of ground-to-air defence. Low altitude flights, below the minimum threshold of the engagement radar and the use of terrain masks are usual methods that allow missions to be carried out within the theoretical envelope of a ground-to-air defence that would be devoid of air surveillance aircraft. Similarly, diversionary tactics exist to reduce the predictability of raid trajectories. 

Finally, signals intelligence allows the threat to be nuanced by indicating the inactivity of a ground-to-air system. During the operation in Libya, the French forces (combat aircraft and helicopters) thus sometimes decided to operate close to enemy ground-to-air systems considered inactive with regard to the Electronic Order of Battle (OdBE), a risk that their American counterparts would have refused to take. However, this risk-taking quickly reaches its limits when faced with integrated and multi-layered systems that make evasive manoeuvres extremely risky. The recent case of the destruction of an Israeli F-16I is an illustration: caught in the chase by 27 ground-to-air missiles fired by the Syrian air defence (SA-3, SA-5, SA-17), the crew chose to continue its mission, wrongly judging that it could avoid the threat.

The propensity of the French model to take risks is partly reinforced by the attention paid to survivability. The latter is now based on the advanced measures of the Système de Protection et d'Évitement des Conduite de Tir du Rafale (SPECTRA). The electronic suite developed by Thales and MBDA operates on a combination of multispectral detectors (radar, laser and infrared) and countermeasures (defensive jammers with a wide active antenna, modular decoy launchers and intelligent Spiral chaff launchers). The ability of SPECTRA to ensure the survivability of the Rafale in the face of an advanced ground-to-air threat was debated. Indeed, while the echoes of exercises MACE XIII (2012) and MACE XIX (2018), which took place in Slovakia and during which the fighter and experimental squadrons (FETS) and electronic warfare programming and training squadrons (EPIGE) were able to rub shoulders with an S-300P (SA-10), seem to reveal the Rafale's good performance, caution is called for. First of all, the Slovakian SA-10 is a fairly old version that is not equivalent to an SA-20 or SA-21 such as those deployed by Russia in Syria or the Crimea. It should also be borne in mind that in joint exercises participants are often reluctant to show the full performance of their systems. In any case, it remains clear that despite its qualities SPECTRA is not intended to be an instrument for penetrating a sophisticated ADSL envelope and cannot offer a sustainable SEAD solution.

In addition to self-protection, the French model has precision strike capabilities that allow, in the absence of SEAD, the destruction of air defence sites (DEAD). The most appropriate means of doing so, given its range, is the SCALP-EG cruise missile and its navalised version, the MdCN. Both, however, suffer from extremely small stocks which make it impossible to envisage an autonomous "first entry". Of the 500 SCALP-EGs ordered in the 2000s, only 250 are concerned by the mid-life refurbishment, suggesting that by 2025 there will be an extremely limited stock of ammunition for use against a SDAI (typically the 200 or so Tomahawks fired by the Americans in the first 24 hours of Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya). This weakness would be partly compensated qualitatively by the superior accuracy of the SCALP-EG, which allows a smaller number of missiles to be fired at each target than the Tomahawk. Finally, the non-renovation of half of the SCALP-EG stock should be partly compensated for by the gradual arrival of the 200 billion CNN which finally came to equip the FREMM (with a baptism of fire in April 2018 off the coast of Syria) and should soon join the Suffren class SNAs.

Finally, it should be recalled that cruise missiles are not the only precision strike means available to the French forces to deal with the ground-to-air threat. In particular, the Libyan experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of modular air-to-ground weaponry (AASM) against relatively old systems (SA-3 and SA-8). The latter is particularly effective when combined with SPECTRA, which detects, triangulates and refines the coordinates of the threat before transmitting them to the optronic front sector (OSF), which can guide the strike discreetly without switching on the RBE2 radar. Again, however, one must be careful not to conclude that this mode of action is feasible in the face of high-performance ADSI. The extension of the AASM is thus 70 km at high altitude and up to 20 km at low altitude, which would imply, depending on the flight profile, entering the SAM envelope - even when faced with short- or medium-range systems if we consider the most recent models (SA-17, SA-22, HQ-16, etc.).

This brief table of French capabilities to deal with opposing surface-to-air defences shows that our armies are far from having a range of means guaranteeing them strategic autonomy for first-entry operations, even against a "second-tier" adversary with a relatively solid SDAI. The consequences of this capability shortfall are increased dependence on American assets, which could one day prove problematic as transatlantic disagreements multiply and the ground-to-air threat spreads to theatres where France used to act autonomously.

In operational terms, failure to confront anti-aircraft threats would have dire consequences, obviously for air, naval and air combat forces, but also for all surface units, naval or land. Having long taken Western air superiority for granted, Western air forces have since adopted modes of action and even force models that make them largely dependent on it. Whether it be intelligence and surveillance missions, support for strategic (inter-theatre) or even tactical (intra-theatre) mobility, tactical communications, fire support and health support, naval and land forces are today structurally threatened by the modernisation and spread of surface-to-air systems. 

 

***

 

Air Force

The air forces are logically the most directly concerned by the surface-to-air threat. With a view to increasing and sustaining the ability to enter first, it will be important to upgrade air superiority missions in general, and SEAD in particular, which should be at the forefront of the capabilities of the Future Air Combat System (FCAS). In this context, the development of a reduced SER combat UAV combining advanced manoeuvrability and data link capabilities should play a role in the penetration of high-performance SDAI. Such a system could have the function of acquiring targets within the surface-to-air threat envelope, retransmitting them to manned platforms at a safe distance. Another option would be to turn it into a fully-fledged strike system capable of carrying a sufficient quantity of ammunition in the hold. Before such a system is available, other more or less long-term steps can be taken by the air force.

One of the first qualities of an air force is its level of training for a given type of mission or threat. However, even before mentioning the material shortcomings of SEAD, it has to be said that training in a degraded ground-to-air environment does not seem to be satisfactory within the French air force. The Franco-German Electronic Warfare Range (PGE) specifically dedicated to this type of mission is only equipped with a SA-8 system and SA-6 and ZSU 23/4 simulators, three threats that are now largely outdated. The disbanding in 2014 of the 48.530 Electronic Warfare Squadron, which was contributing to the PGE, was not good news in this respect.

While a renovation of the PGE seems to have been initiated recently with a modest budget of $16 million from NATO funds, it would be appropriate to continue it with a view, for example, to acquiring certain Chinese or Russian ground-to-air systems from third countries, thereby using threat dissemination for the benefit of force preparation. In the longer term, the identification of a new training area (in mainland France or elsewhere) with dimensions large enough to accommodate real or simulated long-range systems would be a real added value for force preparation. Such a facility would have to be adapted to the organisation of large-scale complex (possibly combined) exercises to simulate a first-entry operation involving a number of different types of aircraft. 

Another key factor in the success of a mission to reduce ground-to-air defences is the availability of high-quality electronic intelligence (EOD) enabling a complete OdBE (Ordre de Bataille Electronique) of potential adversaries to be established in advance of an operation and the libraries of combat aircraft self-protection systems to be kept up to date. In this respect, the acquisition planned by the LPM of three strategic reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a universal electronic warfare charge (CUGE) must be top priorities for the French Air Force with a view to replacing the Gabriel C-160 Transall C-160s and the ASTAC pods adapted in 2016 for the Mirage 2000Ds. Similarly, the adaptation of a ROEM payload on Reaper and, eventually, on the EuroDrone MALE seems entirely appropriate, as the persistence of UAVs makes them particularly well suited to this collection function. The acquisition of a HALE UAV system could in this respect prove very useful for a strategic intelligence gathering capability at a safe distance. 

Once the operation is triggered, the need for ISR, not only radar but across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, will be even greater. It is thus estimated that the need for ISR is three times greater in the case of a first entry operation (30% versus 10% for operations in a more permissive environment). In addition to the strategic and tactical ROEM (Renseignement d'Origine Electro-Magnétique, SIGINT in english, SIGnal INTelligence) assets already mentioned, the implementation of SAR/GMTI sensors to detect dynamic targets are critical capabilities in the face of an increasingly mobile surface-to-air threat. Here again, UAVs should prove to be suitable platforms for carrying out these dangerous missions in a contested environment. 

Once the force has been trained and the information collected, the means must be available to strike surface-to-air systems. As described above, the French Air Force has several means at its disposal in this respect that should be modernised to meet France's stated ambition of a first-in-first-out capability. The revival of the production of the renovated SCALP-EG appears in this respect to be the most important point and probably the easiest to implement given the existence of the technology. As a second step, other measures can be taken, particularly in the face of the modernisation of short- and medium-range threats (SA-17, SA-22), consisting of further increasing the length of the AASM in order to sustain the DEAD capacity. In the longer term, research on hypervelocity, already initiated in the context of the renovation of the nuclear deterrent, should be continued and accelerated. The development and acquisition, even in small numbers, of hypersonic missiles should then profoundly call into question the dangerousness of ground-to-air interceptors. Finally, it would be legitimate to explore the advisability of developing an anti-radar missile, possibly based on existing armaments, such as the Meteor air-to-air missile, whose range, terminal guidance system and interoperability already correspond in part to the need. 

Another area to be explored for the air force concerns electronic attack means. While multiple PEA (Plan d'Étude Amont, or "upstream study plan") have been launched several times in the past with a view to developing an offensive jamming pod on Rafale, none of them have led to equipment programmes. In view of the know-how of French manufacturers in this area, and capitalising on the encouraging results of SPECTRA in terms of self-protection and the potential of the AESA RBE2, it would seem appropriate to look into such an opportunity, possibly jointly with European partners.

Finally, the FCAS development framework should imperatively include a reflection on the acquisition of a saturation capacity for surface-to-air defences, in particular through the use of unmanned platforms. The aim here would be to regain a numerical advantage that the current balance between the small fleets of combat aircraft and munitions on the one hand and SAM systems on the other no longer allows. This approach would be based, among other things, on the use of air-launched mini-UAVs operating in collaboration with manned aircraft or in swarms from "mother ships" outside the SDAI bubble. The challenge is to maintain the UAV at a reasonable cost while providing it with sufficient capabilities (range, autonomous guidance, various types of decoy, GE or explosive payloads), which argues in favour of modular devices. These concepts, which have already inspired experiments such as DARPA's Gremlins, should be a source of inspiration for SCAF. In the shorter term, France could consider the off-the-shelf purchase of a fleet of ADM-160 MALDs. These consumable UAVs benefit from a SER augmentation system to simulate a fighter or bomber squadron in attack formation. Developed by Raytheon and ordered in more than 3,000 units by the US Air Force, this device would make it possible to saturate the radars, thus acting as a "smoke screen", or even exhaust enemy missile stocks.

 

***

 

Hope you will enjoy!

Cheers.

Modifié le 9 août 2020 par Patrick

[DrSomnath999]

4 hours ago, Patrick said:

Merci du tip ça fonctionne nickel!

Pour la peine et parce que j'aime être mesquin, voilà le .pdf ré-exporté en non protégé pour que n'importe qui puisse piocher dedans et faire du copier-coller.
C'est un document de 2018 mais il est intéressant parce que confirmant certaines pistes entreprises au début du FCAS franco-allemand.

Source originale (protégé contre la copie)
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/noel_paglia_tenenbaum_armees_menaces_2018.pdf

Fichier réexporté (non protégé contre la copie)
https://www.mediafire.com/file/gufjg25lreqvq5e/noel_paglia_tenenbaum_armees_menaces_2018.pdf/file

 

***

 

So, @DrSomnath999 here is the DeepL translate of the parts you wanted, with a few corrections here and there.

I added some cross-translations for acronyms to make the whole thing easier to understand.

After a bit of proof-reading, the text should make some sense at least (you can never be sure I've been told I wasn't capable of translating english recently, so I'm extra cautious now ).

 

What impact for France?

Limitations of the French SEAD model

Like the White Papers on Defence and National Security of 2008 and 2013, the 2017 Strategic Review reaffirmed France's ambition to have the capacity to "go in first", i.e. to "penetrate these disputed areas and reduce the threat level in order to conduct military operations". In order to achieve this, it is imperative to upgrade capabilities for the reduction, neutralisation or destruction of enemy air defences (SEADs), a field that has been largely disinvested by France and its European partners since the end of the cold war, leading to major capability shortfalls. With the withdrawal of the AS-37 Martel from service in 1999, France no longer has any resources dedicated to SEAD.

This loss of dedicated assets does not mean that the French Air Force is today unable to carry out such missions. A relatively original model based on a combination of survivability, precision strikes and tactical manoeuvres has enabled the French forces to ensure a form of "poor man's SEAD" that is sometimes innovative but whose sustainability in the face of a changing environment is open to doubt.

The absence of anti-radar means and offensive jamming does not leave the pilot completely helpless in the face of ground-to-air defence. Low altitude flights, below the minimum threshold of the engagement radar and the use of terrain masks are usual methods that allow missions to be carried out within the theoretical envelope of a ground-to-air defence that would be devoid of air surveillance aircraft. Similarly, diversionary tactics exist to reduce the predictability of raid trajectories. 

Finally, signals intelligence allows the threat to be nuanced by indicating the inactivity of a ground-to-air system. During the operation in Libya, the French forces (combat aircraft and helicopters) thus sometimes decided to operate close to enemy ground-to-air systems considered inactive with regard to the Electronic Order of Battle (OdBE), a risk that their American counterparts would have refused to take. However, this risk-taking quickly reaches its limits when faced with integrated and multi-layered systems that make evasive manoeuvres extremely risky. The recent case of the destruction of an Israeli F-16I is an illustration: caught in the chase by 27 ground-to-air missiles fired by the Syrian air defence (SA-3, SA-5, SA-17), the crew chose to continue its mission, wrongly judging that it could avoid the threat.

The propensity of the French model to take risks is partly reinforced by the attention paid to survivability. The latter is now based on the advanced measures of the Système de Protection et d'Évitement des Conduite de Tir du Rafale (SPECTRA). The electronic suite developed by Thales and MBDA operates on a combination of multispectral detectors (radar, laser and infrared) and countermeasures (defensive jammers with a wide active antenna, modular decoy launchers and intelligent Spiral chaff launchers). The ability of SPECTRA to ensure the survivability of the Rafale in the face of an advanced ground-to-air threat was debated. Indeed, while the echoes of exercises MACE XIII (2012) and MACE XIX (2018), which took place in Slovakia and during which the fighter and experimental squadrons (FETS) and electronic warfare programming and training squadrons (EPIGE) were able to rub shoulders with an S-300P (SA-10), seem to reveal the Rafale's good performance, caution is called for. First of all, the Slovakian SA-10 is a fairly old version that is not equivalent to an SA-20 or SA-21 such as those deployed by Russia in Syria or the Crimea. It should also be borne in mind that in joint exercises participants are often reluctant to show the full performance of their systems. In any case, it remains clear that despite its qualities SPECTRA is not intended to be an instrument for penetrating a sophisticated ADSL envelope and cannot offer a sustainable SEAD solution.

In addition to self-protection, the French model has precision strike capabilities that allow, in the absence of SEAD, the destruction of air defence sites (DEAD). The most appropriate means of doing so, given its range, is the SCALP-EG cruise missile and its navalised version, the MdCN. Both, however, suffer from extremely small stocks which make it impossible to envisage an autonomous "first entry". Of the 500 SCALP-EGs ordered in the 2000s, only 250 are concerned by the mid-life refurbishment, suggesting that by 2025 there will be an extremely limited stock of ammunition for use against a SDAI (typically the 200 or so Tomahawks fired by the Americans in the first 24 hours of Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya). This weakness would be partly compensated qualitatively by the superior accuracy of the SCALP-EG, which allows a smaller number of missiles to be fired at each target than the Tomahawk. Finally, the non-renovation of half of the SCALP-EG stock should be partly compensated for by the gradual arrival of the 200 billion CNN which finally came to equip the FREMM (with a baptism of fire in April 2018 off the coast of Syria) and should soon join the Suffren class SNAs.

Finally, it should be recalled that cruise missiles are not the only precision strike means available to the French forces to deal with the ground-to-air threat. In particular, the Libyan experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of modular air-to-ground weaponry (AASM) against relatively old systems (SA-3 and SA-8). The latter is particularly effective when combined with SPECTRA, which detects, triangulates and refines the coordinates of the threat before transmitting them to the optronic front sector (OSF), which can guide the strike discreetly without switching on the RBE2 radar. Again, however, one must be careful not to conclude that this mode of action is feasible in the face of high-performance ADSI. The extension of the AASM is thus 70 km at high altitude and up to 20 km at low altitude, which would imply, depending on the flight profile, entering the SAM envelope - even when faced with short- or medium-range systems if we consider the most recent models (SA-17, SA-22, HQ-16, etc.).

This brief table of French capabilities to deal with opposing surface-to-air defences shows that our armies are far from having a range of means guaranteeing them strategic autonomy for first-entry operations, even against a "second-tier" adversary with a relatively solid SDAI. The consequences of this capability shortfall are increased dependence on American assets, which could one day prove problematic as transatlantic disagreements multiply and the ground-to-air threat spreads to theatres where France used to act autonomously.

In operational terms, failure to confront anti-aircraft threats would have dire consequences, obviously for air, naval and air combat forces, but also for all surface units, naval or land. Having long taken Western air superiority for granted, Western air forces have since adopted modes of action and even force models that make them largely dependent on it. Whether it be intelligence and surveillance missions, support for strategic (inter-theatre) or even tactical (intra-theatre) mobility, tactical communications, fire support and health support, naval and land forces are today structurally threatened by the modernisation and spread of surface-to-air systems. 

 

***

 

Air Force

The air forces are logically the most directly concerned by the surface-to-air threat. With a view to increasing and sustaining the ability to enter first, it will be important to upgrade air superiority missions in general, and SEAD in particular, which should be at the forefront of the capabilities of the Future Air Combat System (FCAS). In this context, the development of a reduced SER combat UAV combining advanced manoeuvrability and data link capabilities should play a role in the penetration of high-performance SDAI. Such a system could have the function of acquiring targets within the surface-to-air threat envelope, retransmitting them to manned platforms at a safe distance. Another option would be to turn it into a fully-fledged strike system capable of carrying a sufficient quantity of ammunition in the hold. Before such a system is available, other more or less long-term steps can be taken by the air force.

One of the first qualities of an air force is its level of training for a given type of mission or threat. However, even before mentioning the material shortcomings of SEAD, it has to be said that training in a degraded ground-to-air environment does not seem to be satisfactory within the French air force. The Franco-German Electronic Warfare Range (PGE) specifically dedicated to this type of mission is only equipped with a SA-8 system and SA-6 and ZSU 23/4 simulators, three threats that are now largely outdated. The disbanding in 2014 of the 48.530 Electronic Warfare Squadron, which was contributing to the PGE, was not good news in this respect.

While a renovation of the PGE seems to have been initiated recently with a modest budget of $16 million from NATO funds, it would be appropriate to continue it with a view, for example, to acquiring certain Chinese or Russian ground-to-air systems from third countries, thereby using threat dissemination for the benefit of force preparation. In the longer term, the identification of a new training area (in mainland France or elsewhere) with dimensions large enough to accommodate real or simulated long-range systems would be a real added value for force preparation. Such a facility would have to be adapted to the organisation of large-scale complex (possibly combined) exercises to simulate a first-entry operation involving a number of different types of aircraft. 

Another key factor in the success of a mission to reduce ground-to-air defences is the availability of high-quality electronic intelligence (EOD) enabling a complete OdBE (Ordre de Bataille Electronique) of potential adversaries to be established in advance of an operation and the libraries of combat aircraft self-protection systems to be kept up to date. In this respect, the acquisition planned by the LPM of three strategic reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a universal electronic warfare charge (CUGE) must be top priorities for the French Air Force with a view to replacing the Gabriel C-160 Transall C-160s and the ASTAC pods adapted in 2016 for the Mirage 2000Ds. Similarly, the adaptation of a ROEM payload on Reaper and, eventually, on the EuroDrone MALE seems entirely appropriate, as the persistence of UAVs makes them particularly well suited to this collection function. The acquisition of a HALE UAV system could in this respect prove very useful for a strategic intelligence gathering capability at a safe distance. 

Once the operation is triggered, the need for ISR, not only radar but across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, will be even greater. It is thus estimated that the need for ISR is three times greater in the case of a first entry operation (30% versus 10% for operations in a more permissive environment). In addition to the strategic and tactical ROEM (Renseignement d'Origine Electro-Magnétique, SIGINT in english, SIGnal INTelligence) assets already mentioned, the implementation of SAR/GMTI sensors to detect dynamic targets are critical capabilities in the face of an increasingly mobile surface-to-air threat. Here again, UAVs should prove to be suitable platforms for carrying out these dangerous missions in a contested environment. 

Once the force has been trained and the information collected, the means must be available to strike surface-to-air systems. As described above, the French Air Force has several means at its disposal in this respect that should be modernised to meet France's stated ambition of a first-in-first-out capability. The revival of the production of the renovated SCALP-EG appears in this respect to be the most important point and probably the easiest to implement given the existence of the technology. As a second step, other measures can be taken, particularly in the face of the modernisation of short- and medium-range threats (SA-17, SA-22), consisting of further increasing the length of the AASM in order to sustain the DEAD capacity. In the longer term, research on hypervelocity, already initiated in the context of the renovation of the nuclear deterrent, should be continued and accelerated. The development and acquisition, even in small numbers, of hypersonic missiles should then profoundly call into question the dangerousness of ground-to-air interceptors. Finally, it would be legitimate to explore the advisability of developing an anti-radar missile, possibly based on existing armaments, such as the Meteor air-to-air missile, whose range, terminal guidance system and interoperability already correspond in part to the need. 

Another area to be explored for the air force concerns electronic attack means. While multiple PEA (Plan d'Étude Amont, or "upstream study plan") have been launched several times in the past with a view to developing an offensive jamming pod on Rafale, none of them have led to equipment programmes. In view of the know-how of French manufacturers in this area, and capitalising on the encouraging results of SPECTRA in terms of self-protection and the potential of the AESA RBE2, it would seem appropriate to look into such an opportunity, possibly jointly with European partners.

Finally, the FCAS development framework should imperatively include a reflection on the acquisition of a saturation capacity for surface-to-air defences, in particular through the use of unmanned platforms. The aim here would be to regain a numerical advantage that the current balance between the small fleets of combat aircraft and munitions on the one hand and SAM systems on the other no longer allows. This approach would be based, among other things, on the use of air-launched mini-UAVs operating in collaboration with manned aircraft or in swarms from "mother ships" outside the SDAI bubble. The challenge is to maintain the UAV at a reasonable cost while providing it with sufficient capabilities (range, autonomous guidance, various types of decoy, GE or explosive payloads), which argues in favour of modular devices. These concepts, which have already inspired experiments such as DARPA's Gremlins, should be a source of inspiration for SCAF. In the shorter term, France could consider the off-the-shelf purchase of a fleet of ADM-160 MALDs. These consumable UAVs benefit from a SER augmentation system to simulate a fighter or bomber squadron in attack formation. Developed by Raytheon and ordered in more than 3,000 units by the US Air Force, this device would make it possible to saturate the radars, thus acting as a "smoke screen", or even exhaust enemy missile stocks.

 

***

 

Hope you will enjoy!

Cheers.

@Patrick    Merci ami 

[DrSomnath999]

https://www.meta-defense.fr/en/2020/08/03/will-the-remote-carrier-drone-of-the-scaf-program-be-at-the-heart-of-the-f5-burst-standard/

[DrSomnath999]

 

The video is in Hindi language

 

Zist of the video

 

-talks about various radars of s400 and it's jam proof capability and detection range

- mountain terrains will inhibit line of sight for s400 radar detection against rafale in Himalayan region of ladakh

- elint role can be done by sending UAVs or through satellite.

- samyukta ground electronic warfare system with rafale low flying terrain hugging capabilities and spectra active cancellation tech will be useful  in s400 sead operations after updating it threat library system with elint data recorded from UAVs and satellites.

-even if detected it can use xgaurd towed decoys to dodge missiles

-long range anti radiation missile plus in future

hypersonic /supersonic cruise missile will be used for sead role.

-tells also about Israeli jammer on su 30 mki to jam its radar and use brahmos to destroy it and but degrades it's role to be risky as non stealthy

Lack of low flying capability in hilly areas unlike

rafale.

 

P.S one thing one should remember AWACS can somewhat compensate the line of sight issue in mountain region if not full.though will have reduced detection range as close terrain hugging feature in mountain region will inhibit line of sight for any radar either air borne or ground

CHEERS

Modifié le 9 août 2020 par DrSomnath999

[DrSomnath999]

Indian Rafales practise mountain night flying for Ladakh in Himachal Pradesh

The first batch of Rafale fighter jets inducted in Indian Air Force’s Golden Arrows squadron are ‘fully operational’.

Updated: Aug 10, 2020 12:28 IST
By Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times New Delhi

https://m.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indian-rafales-practise-mountain-night-flying-for-ladakh-in-himachal-pradesh/story-4pQA6tKKXDsgHYLyaKdq1H_amp.html

[wagdoox]

One tool has be ignored, ceres will be a huge boost to the air forces capability to enter first. 

[Patrick]

Il y a 4 heures, wagdoox a dit :

One tool has be ignored, ceres will be a huge boost to the air forces capability to enter first. 

Can you be more specific?

[Bon Plan]

Il y a 1 heure, Patrick a dit :

Can you be more specific?

CERES (Capacité d'Ecoute et de Renseignement Electromagnétique Spatiale)

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/CERES_(satellite)

Le 08/08/2020 à 20:45, Cougar133 a dit :

intéressant la ligne ou ils parlent du combo Meteor/RBE2 AESA et la réallocation de cible en plein vol ... de quoi faire fermer leur gueule aux proTyphoon-Gripen et le two-way link soit disant absent du Rafale ? .... 

ca n'a rien a voir.  N'importe quel missile avec une liaison avion missile peut  se voir affecter une autre cible en cours de route. Evidement celle ci doit etre dans le domaine de vol du missile.

Modifié le 10 août 2020 par Bon Plan

[Patrick]

il y a 20 minutes, Bon Plan a dit :

CERES (Capacité d'Ecoute et de Renseignement Electromagnétique Spatiale)

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/CERES_(satellite)

Yes I know, my question was how this would specifically help during first-entry missions.

[DrSomnath999]

This article is from combat aircraft monthly feb 2020 edition regarding 
france maritime revolution by Frederic Lert

[wagdoox]

Il y a 3 heures, Patrick a dit :

Can you be more specific?

Ceres will be able to detect where the radars are, that allows you to have a « safe » way into enemy territory by avoiding defense system.
it can also analyse the waves to give identification and prepare missions and counter measures accordingly. 
And even help boost spectra by adding to the library.  
a mcdn could be lock on radar without any ally plane in the air (if the radar doesnt move)
im oversimplifying to keep it short. Threat keep appear or movie and getting actived after ceres’s passage. 
hope i was specific enough. If not ... please be more specific as well ;)

Modifié le 10 août 2020 par wagdoox

[Boule75]

 

Il y a 12 heures, DrSomnath999 a dit :

Indian Rafales practise mountain night flying for Ladakh in Himachal Pradesh

The first batch of Rafale fighter jets inducted in Indian Air Force’s Golden Arrows squadron are ‘fully operational’.

Updated: Aug 10, 2020 12:28 IST
By Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times New Delhi

https://m.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indian-rafales-practise-mountain-night-flying-for-ladakh-in-himachal-pradesh/story-4pQA6tKKXDsgHYLyaKdq1H_amp.html

Even though we were expecting India to be happy with this plane, one cannot miss to notice how enthusiastic it is! For sure, Rafale is clearly used in a kind of PR campaign to deter China as it was moving troops in a somewhat peculiar way along the border, and the IAF will try to have more planes of that kind. Anyway, IAF enthusiasm must be delightful for engineers by Dassault's, and for its salesmen too...

Now, for a very practical appreciation of the feat described in this article, how long have those pilot trained in France with the plane? My idea is that the pace at which Indian pilot have learned to fly it - including in very high moutaineous terrain - may seem quite mind boggling to some proud F-35 trainee. Do you know of some comparisons in this field?

[DrSomnath999]

http://www.opex360.com/2020/08/11/airbus-a-teste-avec-succes-une-technologie-cle-pour-le-systeme-de-combat-aerien-du-futur/#

[DrSomnath999]

Here’s Why The IAF Has Chosen The Hammer For Its Rafale


With just days to go before India’s first Rafale jets arrive in country, the Indian Air Force has exercised emergency procurement powers to contract the French Hammer AASM precision strike weapon system for the aircraft. In a decision fully in keeping with an emerging conflict scenario with China in eastern Ladakh — and with disengagement efforts hitting multiple roadblocks — choosing the Hammer isn’t surprising. But you’re a Livefist reader, and obviously you expect context. So let’s begin.

To begin with, the Hammer, developed by French conglomerate Safran (which also builds the Rafale’s M88 turbofan engines) has always officially been an option to the IAF in the Rafale package. In 2017, months after India had contracted 36 Rafale jets, Livefist reported details of what India had chosen, noting that the IAF had optioned the Hammer system for a possible decision once Rafale deliveries begin, but that it would hit the ground running with Israeli Spice guidance kits to begin with. Read that full report here.

In October last year, on the day the first Rafales were handed over to the Indian Air Force, Livefist reported the list of add-on weapons and systems that the IAF could opt for now that the jets were flying in Indian colours.

The IAF’s 2016 decision to choose the Israeli Spice precision bomb kits over the Hammer was based on cost — the French system is significantly more costly, but brings to bear additional capabilities, including effective deployability in low-level flight. It wasn’t the first time the Hammer had lost out to the Israeli Spice weapons family.

In 2012, the Hammer and Spice went head to head in an Indian Air Force quest for new 1,000 kg precision strike weaponry for its Mirage 2000 jets that were being separately upgraded. There too, the Israeli won out on cost (the Hammer didn’t have a 1,000 kg version for test, and therefore had to be tested on a 250 kg unit). Spice 2000 bombs would go on to see action in India’s air strikes on a Pakistani terror camp in Balakot in February 2019. The Indian Air Force, incidentally, has also used Ladakh-triggered emergency procurement powers to order more Spice 2000 weapons for its Mirage 2000s.

But if the IAF had chosen the Spice on its Rafales in 2016, why the need to order the Hammer system now? To understand the decision, it must be known that acquiring weapons have three broad cost components — the cost of the weapon itself, the cost of integration (software and hardware), and finally the cost of testing & certifying the system. A senior IAF officer tells Livefist that while work on integrating Spice weapons on the IAF Rafales has been underway in France in terms of software code, the bulk of the integration and crucial testing will necessarily take place in India. But how long would that take from the time the aircraft arrive? To provide perspective, it took 18 months to fully integrate, test and clear the Spice on IAF Mirages. The IAF’s rationale, therefore, in acquiring the Hammer system now, is that savings made on integration and testing the weapon — the Hammer is already fully certified on the Rafale — will justify the higher cost of the system itself. Once contracted, Hammer systems will likely begin deliveries quickly, possibly from production inventory intended for the French forces.

In France, Indian Air Force pilots have had extensive exposure to the the Hammer system already. In 2017, Livefist conducted a series of interviews with French Navy Rafale pilots who had deployed Hammer bombs on targets in Iraq. Read that full story here.

While the Hammer procurement has clearly been green-lit keeping in view the current India-China tensions in Ladakh, and the fact that inbound Rafales would be bereft of a tactical stand-off strike weapon for some time, there are likely to be more weapons contracts for the Rafale fleet going forward. The IAF Rafale’s more capable weapons — the Meteor BVRAAM and SCALP cruise missile — have been contracted in fairly modest numbers, part of an effort to keep overall costs down. It is expected, therefore, that the IAF will look to add numbers of both these systems in the near term as Rafale deliveries add up.

The IAF’s decision to push through an emergency purchase of the Hammer was scooped by India Today executive editor Sandeep Unnithan,who made a mention of it on Livefist Editor Shiv Aroor’s news show 5ive Live on Wednesday, a day before the story was reported on other media. Watch that full broadcast here:

https://www.livefistdefence.com/2020/07/heres-why-the-iaf-has-chosen-the-hammer-for-its-rafale.html

 

 

Modifié le 11 août 2020 par DrSomnath999

[DrSomnath999]

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: French Rafales sent to Cyprus?

BY LAURENT LAGNEAU AUGUST 11, 2020

 

In recent hours, Athens has denounced the sending by Turkey of the ship Oruç Reis to an area between the islands of Crete [southern Greece] and Cyprus, near the [Turkish] city of Antalya, as part of a new hydrocarbon prospecting campaign. Clearly, this vessel will navigate in Greek and Cypriot waters, Ankara relying on an agreement signed last November with the Libyan government of national unity relating to its maritime borders.

 

Obviously, the Turkish authorities did not skimp on the means to ensure the protection of this research boat. Indeed, via Twitter, the Turkish Ministry of Defense published photographs on which the Oruc Reis was seen being escorted by 4 Avisos A69 [France in 6 delivered to the Turkish Navy between 2000 and 2002, editor's note] and a frigate Meko. It is possible that a submarine completes this device [we believe in guessing on one of the aerial shots].

Anyway, on August 10, Greece accused Turkey of "threatening peace" in the eastern Mediterranean and assured that it will defend "its sovereignty and sovereign rights. In addition, the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, met with Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, as well as with Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO.

Regarding the discussion with the latter, the head of the Greek government must have been disappointed. "This situation must be resolved in a spirit of solidarity among allies and in accordance with international law", declared Mr. Stoltenberg via Twitter.

 

 

In any case, this August 11, Athens requested the urgent holding of a European Union summit to discuss the case of Turkey, which, through the head of its diplomacy, Mevlut Cavusoglu, put a plus oil on the fire by asserting that it would expand its prospecting operations "near the western borders of its continental shelf." "

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will submit a request for an emergency summit of the Council of Foreign Affairs of the European Union," said Mr. Mitsotakis.

 

In Cyprus , the same concerns are expressed. Thus, on August 10, Nicosia declared Turkish activities “illegal”. The Cypriot Ministry of Defense issued a Navtex in which it explains that the actions carried out by the ship Oruç Reis constitute a "violation of international law and maritime security procedures" as well as a "criminal offense under the laws of the Republic of Cyprus ”.

And to demand, therefore, the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish boat. And this also applies to the Barbaros Hayredin, another prospecting vessel sent by Ankara to the Cypriot exclusive economic zone.

In this matter, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus can count on the support of France. A strategic partnership agreement is in fact being finalized between Paris and Athens. And a defense agreement with Nicosia has just entered into force.

In addition to increased cooperation in the fields of armaments and defense technologies, this text provides for the training of Cypriot soldiers in France, joint exercises, exchanges and authorizations aimed at allowing French ships and planes to call at Cyprus.

“The rise of tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and its surroundings, and particularly Turkish pressures, can only lead the Cypriots to be more than in the past asking for signs of reassurance. It is in this sense that we can analyze the possibilities of deepening Franco-Cypriot military cooperation opened up by the intergovernmental agreement ”, explained a French parliamentary report, on the occasion of the examination of This agreement.

 

Obviously, and while the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean has increased a notch in recent days, the Cypriot press has indicated that two French Rafales, probably coming from the projected air base [BAP] in Jordan, have been spotted in Andreas Papandreou Airport, near the town of Paphos, located in the south-west of the island. The two aircraft are a priori accompanied by a C-135FR tanker aircraft. A Transall C-160 was also spotted by air traffic monitoring systems. But there is nothing to say with certainty that it landed in Cyprus.

 

 

The "in-Cyprus" site, linked to the daily Phileleftheros, claims that the two Rafales took part in an exercise which mobilized, during one day, the Cypriot army and four helicopters of the Israeli air force. "The French planes must remain at the military base of Andreas Papandreou in Paphos for a while because they will carry out patrols in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean", he specifies, by relying on "well-informed sources. "

As a reminder, the airborne group [GAé] of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier took part in exercises which consisted in testing the Cypriot air defense last February. More recently, the light stealth frigate [FLF] Aconit took part in naval maneuvers organized by the Cypriot Ministry of Defense and involving the frigates Kanaris [Greece] and Alpino [Italy].

Photo: Archive - EMA / French Air Force

http://www.opex360.com/2020/08/11/tensions-en-mediterranee-orientale-des-rafale-francais-envoyes-a-chypre/

 

Modifié le 11 août 2020 par DrSomnath999

[Bon Plan]

Le 10/08/2020 à 16:43, Patrick a dit :

Yes I know, my question was how this would specifically help during first-entry missions.

To elaborate an electronic battle order.

[Kelkin]

Il y a 1 heure, Bon Plan a dit :

battle order

"order of battle" is the usual English phrasing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_battle

 

[Lordtemplar]

On 8/10/2020 at 9:09 PM, Boule75 said:

how long have those pilot trained in France with the plane? 

The Indian pilots, who flew the Rafales from France to India recently, trained for 3 years in France.  That is a from an article i read about the recent delivery, can't remember which.

[DrSomnath999]

Two French Rafales land in the Greek Cypriot sector

According to information from the Politis newspaper, as part of the agreement concluded between France and the Greek Cypriot sector which entered into force on August 1, two Rafale and a C-130 arrived at the Andreas Papandreu air base in Paphos.

08/12/2020 ~ 08/12/2020

 

Two French Rafale type combat aircraft as well as a C-130 transport aircraft landed in the Greek Cypriot sector.

According to information from the Politis newspaper, under the agreement between France and the Greek Cypriot sector entered into force on 1 st August, two Rafale and a C-130 arrived at Andreas Papandreou airbase in Paphos.

The Rafales, which will stay in Paphos for a few days, will carry out patrols in the so-called exclusive economic zone unilaterally proclaimed by the Greek Cypriot sector in the Mediterranean and will cooperate with the French naval forces in the region.

In addition, a joint France-Greek Cypriot sector air exercise should take place in September. Other countries could also join the exercise.

According to news published in the Greek Cypriot press on August 6, the Defense Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in 2017, entered into force at the beginning of August.

 

 

https://www.trt.net.tr/francais/europe/2020/08/12/deux-rafale-francais-atterrissent-dans-le-secteur-chypriote-grec-1471311

[DrSomnath999]

IAF test fires air-to-air missiles ahead of Rafale integration
By Hemant Kumar Rout| Express News Service |    Published: 19th August 2020 08:00 AM

BHUBANESWAR: Amid a protracted stand-off along the LAC, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has accomplished a secret mission by conducting several rounds of air-to-air missiles that have recently been acquired from France and Russia from a frontline fighter aircraft off Odisha coast.

Defence sources said anti-air multi-target MICA missile fired from Sukhoi-30 MKI for the first time successfully destroyed expendable aerial targets (EATs), demonstrating its stealth capabilities. Ahead of the planned integration with multi-role combat aircraft Rafale, the IAF test fired two rounds of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missile MICA fighter aircraft on Monday and Tuesday.   

The fighter aircraft took off from Kalaikunda airbase in West Bengal and fired the missile, successfully neutralising the aerial target drone mimicking enemy aircraft at low altitude.  “All mission parameters have been met as the target was destroyed validating the missile’s launch envelope. The missile will equip both Sukhoi and Rafale fighter jets,” a defence official told ‘The Express’.

Acquired from France, MICA is an all weather missile system available in both short and medium ranges. The fire-and-forget missile can be used both by air platforms as well as ground units and ships.

The 3.1 metre long missile having a diameter of 0.16 m weighs around 112 kg. It can neutralise targets within a range of 500 metre to 60 km. Of its two variants guided by radio frequency (RF) and infrared (IR), MICA-RF has an active radar homing seeker and MICA-IR has an imaging infra-red homing seeker. Both seekers are designed to filter out counter-measures.

Last week, the IAF had conducted two rounds test of R-77 air-to-air missile acquired from Russia. The multi-purpose missile can be used against a range of aircraft, both tactical and strategic and from hovering helicopters to high-speed at different altitudes. The medium-range air-to-air guided missile R-77 is about 3.6 metre in length and 200 mm in diametre. It weighs around 175 kg. It has an operational range of 80 km to 100 km.  Both the missions were conducted by the IAF while the DRDO provided the logistic support. After the successful trial of Dhruvastra last month, the twin missions during the Covid-19 pandemic proved the readiness of the test range.           

“The IAF is in the process of upgrading its squadrons. It is also in process of procuring Meteor missile from the European weapon maker MBDA. Rafale will be equipped with MICA and Meteor,” the official added.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/2020/aug/19/iaf-test-fires-air-to-air-missiles-ahead-of-rafale-integration-2185422.amp

[Kelkin]

Il y a 2 heures, DrSomnath999 a dit :

Defence sources said anti-air multi-target MICA missile fired from Sukhoi-30 MKI

Eh? They integrated the MICA on a Sukhoi? When did that happen?

[DrSomnath999]

7 hours ago, Kelkin said:

Eh? They integrated the MICA on a Sukhoi? When did that happen?

we indians can integrate anything .We can integrate r73 on mirage 2000 .We indians can integrate alien tech on our planes 

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/iafs-french-mirage-2000-fly-with-russian-r-73-missiles-thanks-to-israeli-jugaad-2067318#:~:text=The Russian R-73 missile,air-to-air missile.

 

just waiting whether meteor will be integrated on Su -30mki or not .Sounds impossible but after  hearing this news anything can happen

 

CHEERS

Modifié le 19 août 2020 par DrSomnath999

[Kelkin]

Since from what I heard the Meteor's seeker was derived from the MICA's, and the aircraft link protocol is compatible (which is why on the Rafale the Meteor is basically treated as a long-range MICA and that's why it doesn't the famous two-way link that the Typhoon and Gripen boast), integrating the Meteor ought to be possible on any aircraft that integrates the MICA.

Edit: that's true for the radar-guided MICA, and apparently it's the IR-guided MICA they shot, which is probably much easier to integrate since it doesn't need to talk to the radar.

Modifié le 20 août 2020 par Kelkin

[DrSomnath999]