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Il existe du "footage" de la bataille dans la baie de San Carlos ou un missile de la RN intercepte quelque chose...je ne sais pas si il etait une bombe ou un missile ou si c etait bien un sea dart? La video est sur youtube, je vais essaye de la retrouve.

Aussi les T42 etaient limites en 1982 par leur radar, une version de un radar des annees 1950s. Seul Exeter avait un radar "moderne", et elle a abbatue 2 A4s des argentins.

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En tout cas, ca montre bien que les rumeurs sur la mise en retrait du Southampton et Exeter que j'avais rapporte il y a quelques-mois, et que Robert avait nie, etaient partiellement vraies. Ils sont toujours en service, mais sans capacite de faire une mission de combat...

Non, tu as dit ils ne sont pas en service, c'etait faux. J'ai eu raison. Je n'ai jamais dit une choose sur leurs missiles si je remembre correct.

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Will,

dans un certains sens la RN a raison de ne pas dépenser f'argent pour maintenir à grand frais(?) un système vraisemblablement complétement obsolète puisquil avait déja failli il y a 25 ans de cela en n'interceptant aucun éxocet aux Malouines.

Avec les  T-45 et leurs ASTER la RN revient dans le jeu.

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Ce systeme obsolete a fait tres plaisir aux gens sur USS Missouri au GW1. Mais tu as raison, il est temps de le remplace et "to up our game". Avec 6-8 T45 je dirai plutot "la RN reste en jeu", pour le moment...

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Allez, on va dire qu'ils sont en "demi-service" ... Azn Tout le monde est d'accord ?

Non. Ils sont en service en moment, dans un autre role, mais en service.

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L'Exeter avait le 1022 en 1982 alors que les autres T42 avaient le 965

(radars de veille air) le navire a abattu 2 A4 un Learjet et peut être un Camberra

Au delà des différences de cultures, face aux problèmes budgétaires les anglais et les français sont soumis aux mêmes contraintes et emploient souvent les mêmes recettes.

Le Sea Dart est ancien, les T42 (qui ont toujours été considérés comme trop petits) le sont aussi...

Mais ces systèmes ont le mérite d'être éprouvés ... et d'exister. L'Exeter même sans Sea Dart reste un destroyer de premier rang qui représente la Navy qui a ses radars son système de combat rodé... bref il fait son boulôt.

Souhaitons à nos F70 AA le même destin en 2020 avec des SM1 qui atteindront bravement les ... 60 ans (je vous rappelle que les deux SM1 des Cassard et Jean Bart sont les systèmes débarqués des T53 Kersaint et Bouvet... personne n'était né quand ces systèmes sont entrés en service dans la Marine sauf Jo et Fufu).

En revanche je viens de lire un truc dans Navires et Histoire de juin que j'ignorais les ASTUTE auraient pris 700 tonnes au cours de leur construction.

Ils disent aussi autre chose mais là Rob va pas être content c'est que leur nombre serait réduit à ... 4 et la Navy semblerait à nouveau envisager des SSK...

A confirmer mais avec Gibraltar c'est pas mal pour la Med...

Pas sur la tête Robert :-X

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Fusilier,

4 Astute ? Non. Rob te dira non. Pourquoi ? Je ne sais pas. Mais Rob te dira : non.

Je vais dire non a sa place. La cible officielle depuis le debut 2008, et ceci est de la bouche de Bob Ainsworth (Minister for Armed Forces), est de 7 Astute au final...pour le moment. Mais je pense si ils veullent aussi nous donner quelques SSKs je dis pas non  =D

@Fusillier

comme le SM1, peut etre plus le plus rapide et agile, mais "tried and tested" avec le temps. Comme du bon vin? ;)

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@ Will. Le problème avec les SM1, c'est que l'on a plutôt affaire à des vins californiens... Suis pas sur que la teneur en tanins permette un vieillessement optimum. Ce ne sont pas des "vins" de garde, plutôt à boire rapidement... :lol:

@ Alskandre. Rob est un patriote, parfois aveuglé par son patriotisme. Par moments, il me fait penser à un Français... :lol:

rob pas sur la tête .... :-[

nb Je suis un partisan acharné des flottes mixtes SNA / SSK ; si l'on avait les moyens.... O0

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Je suppose le probleme est "a quoi ils vont servir". Un SSK est plus lent et doit aller a la surface plus que un SSN. Les grands utilisateurs de SSK j ai l'impression ne veullent pas ceux-ci comme partie d'une flotte "blue water" pour agir n'importe ou mais comme "chien de garde" d'une zone en particuliers, je pense aux Collins des ozzies et aux tres grands SSK japonnais aussi.

Je suppose que si la RN pouvait en avoir quelques, cela permettrait de mettre des SSK par exemple aux Falklands ou a controler le detroit de Gibraltar (et comme ca ceci "libere" les SSN), mais je ne pense pas que ceci est tres probable pour le moment  :rolleyes:

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Rob est un patriote, je ne cesse de le dire. Il faut lui pardonner. Je suis moi-même un patriote ...

Et tu n'es pas le seul français patriote ici (c'est bien pour ça que sur les fils dédiés aux FREMM, au PA2, aux Baraccudas etc..., on s'acharne à discuter des jours entiers sur des hypothèses ou des rumeurs : parce que l'avenir de notre marine nous tient vraiment à coeur).

On ne saurait donc en vouloir à Rob : "May God forgive him, as he does for us ?" =) ;)

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7 Astute

6-8 T45

2 CVF

Cela c'est le rêve, mais le budget ne le permettra pas selon beaucoup d'experts. Voir un des derniers DSI par exemple. ;) Les deux derniers T45 ne seront pas commandés et le 7° Astute non plus. Par contre c'est ok pour les deux CVF.
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Cela c'est le rêve, mais le budget ne le permettra pas selon beaucoup d'experts. Voir un des derniers DSI par exemple. Wink Les deux derniers T45 ne seront pas commandés et le 7° Astute non plus. Par contre c'est ok pour les deux CVF.

Long leads items sont commandes pour A4-7, c'est un reve? ROFLMAO. Tu sais plus que le NAO? T45 7-8 ne sont pas annuler et reste en le planning round.

DSI, un magazin francais qui ne connait pas beaucoup sur le R-U.  :lol:

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Le National Audit Office a plus de savoir que tu ou DSI sur les Astutes, c'est totallement claire.

Un nouveau 30mm pour St. Albans?

St Albans set for sea trials as the most capable frigate

An Equipment and Logistics news article

5 Jun 08

Following a year long refit, HMS St Albans is ready to take to the water again for sea trials which will put the multi million pound raft of upgrades through their paces.

HMS St Albans

HMS St Albans

This work included some significant firsts for a Type 23 at Rosyth; challenges which saw industry and MOD teams come together to answer promptly and successfully.

The MOD contract, worth around £10M, engaged Babcock Marine in Rosyth on the ship’s year long docking period which included:

    * installing the Sonar 2087 - enabling the ships to detect the much quieter modern submarines that operate in inshore waters;

    * mounting a new Defence Information Infrastructure communications system;

    * updates to the ship’s globalisation vent systems;

    * fitting radial filters;

    * the addition of a new 30mm automatic small calibre gun; and

    * converting the ship’s aviation facilities to facilitate Merlin helicopters.

An extension to the scope of the original contract was negotiated to add yet further to the Type 23 frigate’s capabilities as a first class warship, which was turned around in rapid time.

Defence Equipment and Support’s Surface Combatants Director Commodore Graham Peach said:

“This was a significant work package which puts HMS St Albans, the newest of the Type 23s, at the forefront of the fleet of frigates.

“Babcock Marine has done a sterling job to deliver the significant additions to what was already a substantial package within a demanding schedule. We can be proud of the very constructive working relationship between the MOD and BM which has made this achievement possible.”

This was a significant work package which puts HMS St Albans, the newest of the Type 23s, at the forefront of the fleet of frigates

Commodore Graham Peach

The refit contract was awarded to Babcock as part of the Surface Ship Support (SSS) project under which the MOD works with industry to allocate work packages to achieve affordable, sustainable support for the fleet.

Ready for Sea Date inspections were successfully completed on 30 May 08 and HMS St Albans will now embark upon six weeks of sea trials.

The Type 23 is the largest class of frigate constructed for the Royal Navy since the Leander class and provides the backbone of the Royal Navy’s anti-submarine frigate force.

Designed to carry out anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic using towed array sonar to locate targets, they were the first ‘stealthy’ ships to enter service in the RN – equipped with electric motors they are able to cruise slowly and extremely quietly while hunting submarines and have a hull and superstructure angled off the vertical to reduce radar reflectivity.

Link.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/StAlbansSetForSeaTrialsAsTheMostCapableFrigate.htm

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Vous connaissez ma propension à estimer que de part et d'autre du Channel on rencontre le même genre de contraintes...

Voici un article de NAVY MATTERS du mois de mai, un mélange anglais de Mer et Marine et du Portail des sous-marins...

Vous noterez au passage que Beedall estime que Mer et Marine est souvent lieux informée de la situation (notament des PA) que nombre de sources anglaises.

Grey Elephants?

23 May 2008

I have been following the progress of the Future Aircraft Carrier project (CVF) this and my previous websites ever since the much lauded Strategic Defence Review  stated way back in July 1998:

"... we plan to replace our three small carriers with two larger carriers from around 2012. Work will now begin to refine our requirement but present thinking suggests that these might be of the order of 30,000-40,000 tonnes and capable of deploying up to 50 aircraft, including helicopters". 

Overall it has proved to be a pretty depressing task - and frustratingly drawnnnnn out.  Rumours of cancellation have constantly haunted the project.  With affordability a key issue, huge efforts have been made since 2003 to to reduce costs, realistically this has resulted in just preventing any further cost growth rather than any cost reduction - although this is actually a significant achievement when compared to other major defence projects.  The CVF manufacture phase is now expected to cost about £4.1 billion, this excludes the £600 million spent during the the previous Assessment and Demonstration Phases - in real terms the Royal Navy's two new aircraft carriers will cost double the "about £2 billion" being suggested in 1998 when the mantra was "steel is cheap and air is free".

The difficulty in getting hard news has often been teeth-grinding to say the least.  At first the competing BAE Systems and Thales PR teams were fairly co-operative, but they shut up shop in January 2003 when the Thales/BMT design concept was selected for further development.  Since then all questions have been referred to the MOD - who's vow of silence would honour a monastery.  In recent years French sources such as the website Mer et Marine have often been better informed about the status of CVF than any UK based journalist or defence analyst.

On 20 May 2008 the Ministry of Defence fed us the latest occasional drip of CVF news:

"The Ministry of Defence today gave industry the green light that it was ready to go-ahead with contract signature for the two new super aircraft carriers. ...we are moving closer [emphasis added] to signing the contracts for the manufacture of the carriers." 

There seems to be good grounds for believing that the main contracts for the manufacture of the now 65,000 tonnes carriers - to be called HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales - will finally be signed soon, perhaps as early as 18 June - by which date the time elapsed since SDR will be almost exactly that required for the defeat of Germany in two World Wars. 

The actual contract signature will be justification for a "splice the main brace" spirit in RN establishments, but the celebration should be muted for the services senior officers.  There is little doubt that over the last few years the consensus opinion within the MOD's portals has become negative towards CVF, with a belief that the money could be better spent elsewhere - although the Army and RAF have rather differing views on exactly where!  The survival of the CVF project in recent years has not been due not to the fervent arguments of four successive First Sea Lords since 1998 - and their enforced offering of sacrifices elsewhere - but rather due to the intervention of the Prime Minister Gordon Brown whose constituency of Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath neighbours the Rosyth dockyard where the carriers will be completed, thus maintaining some 2000 jobs for five years. 

As I've pointed out many times in the recent past, the construction of the CVF's without adequate provision for their air group's is a rather ludicrous situation - building aircraft carriers without embarked aircraft is rather like building hospitals with no doctors. 

A picture of the 27,000 tonnes HMS Hermes in the late 1960's

A graphic of the 65,000 tonnes HMS Queen Elizabeth set some time after 2017.  At the moment it seems that her flight deck will rarely be so crowded

Originally CVF, Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) and Future Organic Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (FOAEW) were lock-stepped towards a simultaneous 2012 in service date - but that sensible approach has been long been dropped.  Old hands watching the current ITV2 series Warship featuring HMS Illustrious will have struggled to reconcile the frequent references to her "strike carrier" role with a flight deck and hanger empty of all but a few Merlin helicopters.  She does actually briefly embark four Harrier GR.7's of the Naval Strike Wing, but that's hardly a daunting force to most possible enemies of the UK.  When HMS Queen Elizabeth enters service in 2014 (or more realistically 2015 or 2016), it can only be hoped that the similar number and type of aircraft likely to be initially dispersed over her vastly larger bulk doesn't quickly result in many 'white elephant' (grey elephant?) media stories, particularly when compared to her ambitious mission statements such as to be "a coercive presence that can promote conflict prevention through deterrence".

Maybe the RAF (including the Naval Strike Wing) will indeed eventually own enough operational F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to fill a CVF to its capacity (36 JSF's plus 4 helicopters), but if that actually happens only once every ten years the bean counters will have an obvious target when more economies are being demanded now.  If and when the two new carriers are completed - will they have then served their political purpose and be candidates for early retirement, like so many other Royal Navy warships in recent decades?

The emphasis on the new aircraft carriers has also led to a worrying neglect by the Royal Navy - at least in public - of its need for other capabilities.  In recent years independent groups (e.g. the UK National Defence Association) and union led efforts (e.g. Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign - KOFAC) seem to have been more vocal and possibly more successful than the Royal Navy in justifying why the UK has to retain strong and broadly based maritime military capabilities.

Depressingly the combination of urgent operational demands in Afghanistan and Iraq, a hopelessly inadequate defence budget and the preservation of CVF seems to have made the Royal Navy proportionally the biggest loser in Planning Round 08.  The latest equipment cuts include one Astute-class nuclear attack submarine and two Type 45 destroyers.  To anyone used to the much larger Royal Navy of yore that doesn't sound too bad - but the axed Astute represents a 14% cut in the non-deterrent submarine force and the Type 45's a 25% reduction in the destroyer force.  The dropped Astute also means a binning of the promise made in the 2006 Defence Industrial Strategy to maintain a 22-month 'drum beat' of submarine construction. 

It's perhaps worth comparing the new fleet being promised to the Royal Navy by the Labour government in 1998/9 with the actual current situation:

Project Situation 1999 Situation 2008

Num. planned In service date Num. planned In service date

Ships

CVF 2 2012-2014 2 2014-2016

CNGF / Type 45 12 2007-2015 6 2010-2014

FE / FSC 20 2012-? ? 2019-?

Astute / FASM 10 2005-? 6 2009-?

PCRS / JCTS 2 2005 0 N/A

Aircraft / helicopters

FCBA / JCA 60 (RN owned) 2012 ? (RAF owned) 2017   FOAEW / MASC 12 (for planning) 2012 ? 2022

FASH / FRC (lift) 70 2010 ? ?

The Royal Navy had 35 escorts in service (aka commissioned frigates and destroyers) in 1998 and SDR promised a long term strength of 32.  The Royal Navy currently has an actual strength of 24 and by 2018 it will have at best 19 escorts in service - 6 new Type 45 destroyers and 13 aging Type 23 frigates.  By comparison, the RN averaged nearly 70 destroyers and frigates in service during the 1970's - many of these were smaller than their modern counterparts, but three small ships can be in two more places than one large ship.

A sheer lack of numbers now cripples the Royal Navy's.  Four years ago (with 31 escorts left) the Royal Navy still made a valiant effort to patrol the worlds oceans with destroyers and frigates assigned to seven geographically widely dispersed "directed tasks".  Those days have now gone.  Indeed, in recent months it has become clear that Royal Navy is no longer able or even expected (that would justify the RN asking for additional funding) to perform once fundamental activities such as the protection of UK flagged merchant ships from piracy.  In the future the top priority when allocating very scare operational escorts will inevitably be escorting the ready carrier and the amphibious task group, other deployments will have to be rationed to requirements deemed in extremis worthy of a short term surge effort.

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Richard B. est un expert sur le RN - c'est claire - mais il est un pessimiste extreme. Avant quelques mois Navy Matters a dit "CVF va annuler, c'est sur, etc...".

Je dit encore une fois, le MoD a deja commande des long lead items pour Astute 4-7.

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Richard B. est un expert sur le RN - c'est claire - mais il est un pessimiste extreme. Avant quelques mois Navy Matters a dit "CVF va annuler, c'est sur, etc...".

Je dit encore une fois, le MoD a deja commande des long lead items pour Astute 4-7.

moi j'attends toujours la vente "immediate" des 4 T22s et le declaration que la RN va vendre 2 Darings aux saudis (without replacements no doubt), aussi predit sur Navy Matters...

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