[USA] Programmes ABM

[Henri K.]

Un article un peu prétentieux mais tout de même intéressant.

Can the GMD System Defend Against a Chinese Attack? Three Answers (sort of).

June 5, 2015.

The most interesting information to come out of a Congressional Hearing sometimes is contained in the responses to written questions submitted by members of the Congressional Committee. Usually you have to wait until the full hearing is printed up by the Government Printing Office to see these questions and answers but frequently the answers are worth waiting for. Here’s one example from the March 25, 2014 House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Ballistic Missile Defense, in which Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chair Representative Mike Rogers asks three witnesses whether or not the U.S. national missile defense system could defend the United States against a (accidental or unauthorized) Chinese ballistic missile attack. To summarize their responses: (1) It’s classified; (2) It’s complicated (and classified); and (3) No, it’s not technically financially feasible to defeat a full-scale Chinese attack, but the defense would be employed to defend against a limited attack from China (or from anywhere else).

The three witnesses were Vice Admiral James Syring, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General David L. Mann, Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Elaine M. Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

Representative Rogers asked Admiral Syring and General Mann, “The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999 requires that we deploy national missile defenses capable of defending the United States from ‘‘accidental or unauthorized’’ ballistic missile attack, among other attacks. Can you please tell me, are we protected from an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack from a Chinese ballistic missile submarine, which, as you know, the Chinese are now deploying? If not, when will we?” (Another way to view these questions is: “When will be able to defend ourselves against the most survivable portion of China’s nuclear deterrent?)

Admiral Syring’s response is printed as: “The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.”

General Mann’s response is somewhat more expansive, but still ultimately relies on classification: “It is difficult to provide a specific assessment. The Ballistic Missile Defense System is not designed to counter peer or near-peer ballistic missile threats. The level of residual capability to defend against such an incident would be influenced by the degree of indications and warnings, the location of the launch and target impact area, and the accessibility of sensors and interceptors. Upon request, further details could be provided via a classified session or paper.”

Representative Rogers asked Secretary Bunn a somewhat different question: “From a policy perspective, can you please help me understand why we deploy missile defenses to protect our aircraft carriers from Chinese ballistic missiles but we do not deploy missile defenses to protect our cities from Chinese nuclear missiles?”

Her response: “We have the capability to protect our aircraft carriers from ballistic missiles in order to ensure freedom of action and the ability to project power around the globe to protect U.S. interests. The DOD is committed to ensuring defense of the U.S. homeland against limited long-range missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. With regard to China and Russia, our homeland missile defenses are not designed to counter their advanced long-range missile capabilities because defending against the quantity and quality of their ICBMs would be technologically impractical and cost prohibitive. We remain confident that Chinese and Russian ballistic missile attacks on the U.S. homeland are deterred by other means. Despite not being capable of coping with large-scale Chinese or Russian missile attacks, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches from any source.”

Henri K.

[Desty-N]

J'imagine que si un sous-marin chinois tirait ses missiles depuis la limite du plateau continental américain, les engins s'avéreraient impossibles à intercepter. Mais une fois l'agresseur identifié, les USA le rayeraient de la carte. C'est le principe de la dissuasion.

Mais encore faudrait-il que le sous-marin réussisse à se positionner. Jusqu'ici Pékin ne brillait pas par la discrétion de ses submersibles. De plus Washington redoute ce genre d'action depuis la guerre froide et a déployé des lignes de sonar pour y remédier (système SOSUS) D'ailleurs ses alliances avec la Corée, le Japon, Taïwan et les Phillipines pourraient même lui permettre de déployer une surveillance continue au plus près des cotes chinoises.

Comme on peut le lire souvent sur ce forum, une bonne défense ne repose pas sur une barrière unique et intangible, mais sur plusieurs lignes successives. On peut comprendre que les gradés de l'US Army ne souhaitent pas en dire trop publiquement, mais peut-être en va-t-il différemment lors des auditions à huis-clos?

[Henri K.]

Le détroit de Bashi est le passage à contrôler absolument, que ce soit pour la marine chinoise ou pour l'US Navy, depuis que les Type 094 et les JL-2 sont pleinement opérationnels en 2014.

Les nombreux incidents depuis sont les témoignes de son importance.

Pour atteindre le côte Ouest des Etats Unis, il n'y a pas besoin d'être dans la limite du plateau continental américain. La zone de patrouille des Type 094 étant limité par la distance des stations de communication SLF, la portée des SLBM, la vitesse de patrouille, le cycle de sortie de mer...etc. C'est donc relativement facile à déterminer cette zone.

On voit bien que les SOSUS ne couvrent pas le passage des Type 094.





De maintenant jusqu'à 2030, le Pacifique de l'Ouest sera la zone du tir à la corde entre ces 2 puissances, entre la 1ère et la 2ème chaîne d'îles. Le contrôle de la mer de Chine méridionale est l'une des clés dans les manœuvres chinoises.

 

Quand JL-3 sera sorti, comme son développement a déjà commencé chez CASIC, la zone de patrouille pourrait encore de rapprocher de la Chine, vers la gauche.

Henri K.

[Desty-N]

Pour coller au sujet de cette page, je me plaçais sans le cas d'une trajectoire balistique courte, qui laisserait peu de temps de réaction à d'hypothé-tiques systèmes américains d'interception.

J'ignorais l'existence des sous-marins de type 094, merci pour l'information (c'est grâce à ce genre de decouverte, que je me réjoui de mon inscription sur Air-Def !)

Merci également pour les précisions concernant le détroit de Bashi. Je pense qu'il vaudrait mieux déplacer la discussion vers le fil approprié, mais comme j'écris depuis mon téléphone, je ne dispose pas des outils pour transférer les derniers messages.

J'estime que les tensions en Mer de Chine ne constituent qu'une facette du problème. Les ports de l'Empire du Milieu ne débouchent pas direc-tement sur l'océan. Du point de vue de Pékin, on peut même estimer faire l'objet d'une politique américaine de containment: bases de l'US Army, tant au Japon qu'en Corée, soutien sans ambi-guïté à Taïwan. De plus, depuis 2008, on assiste à une nouvelle alliance militaire avec les Philippines, sans oublier un spectaculaire rappro-chement avec le Vietnam. Certes ces nations trouveraient sûrement moins d'attrait à l'Oncle Sam, si, par exemple, la situation se calmait dans les Spratleys. Mais, on peut comprendre que les successeurs de Mao se sentent corsetés.

Reste à savoir, s'ils adoptent la bonne tactique pour y remédier, ou si, peut-être pour des raisons de politique intérieure, ils adoptent une attitude qui braque de plus en plus leurs voisins?

[collectionneur]

Au niveau des réseaux SOSUS, si ceux ci fixes ne couvrent peut être pas toutes les chaines d'îles, cela fait bien des années que des réseaux mobiles sont en service embarqué par des petits navires styles chalutiers.

Modifié le 13 juin 2015 par collectionneur

[Henri K.]

THAAD ?

Entre 3300 à 4000 km environ.

Henri K.

Modifié le 28 octobre 2015 par Henri K.

[collectionneur]

Je signale cette petite carte montrant les sites et garnisons des unités de défense antiaérienne aux USA, bon, il faut le remettre à jours avec le dirigeables JLENS qui s'est planté aujourd'hui. Mais j'ai lu qu'il y en avait un 2e en réserve :

http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/maps/missile-defense-systems-in-the-u-s-map

http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/US_BMD_Infographic.pdf

Et  a t'on des infos sur un exercice naval dans l'Atlantique Nord impliquant 9 marines occidentales dans la défense antimissiles - dont la France  - ? :

http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/our-armada/

The non-NATO Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum (MTMD) At Sea Demonstration concluded this week and demonstrated exponential force projection from the sea and the interoperability to share information to between a Dutch DeZeven Provinces-class frigate and a U.S. Aegis BMD-class destroyer to intercept a target representing a ballistic missile while a Canadian Halifax-class frigate and a separate U.S. Aegis destroyer also intercepted cruise missile targets. The other involved ships: a Spanish F105 frigate, United Kingdom Type 45 destroyer, Norwegian Nansen-class frigate,  Italian Orizzonte-class destroyer, French Fremm-class frigate,  Dutch DeZeven-class frigate and US BMD Aegis-class destroyer, also worked on providing critical tracking and for incoming threat target missiles and ran simulations through shared data links. Other ships involved with the exercise included the Australian ANZAC-class frigate.

Modifié le 29 octobre 2015 par collectionneur
Image impossible à copié

[ascromis]

Je crois que le lien vers la carte a été zappé.

[collectionneur]

J'ai mit le lien direct sur le site US, je n'arrive pas à copié collé l'image.

[Henri K.]

Le MDA (The U.S. Missile Defense Agency) a mené un nouveau tir d'essai FTO-02 E2A (Flight Test Operational 02 Event 2A) le 31 Octobre 2015, impliquant à la fois l'Aegis BMD et le THAAD..

Vers 11:05 EDT, un C-17 a d'abord largué une cible SRALT, qui a été intercepté avec succès par un missile THAAD.

Un autre C-17 a ensuite largué un eMRBM, puis l'USS John Paul Jones a également lancé une cible BQM-74E. Le système THAAD et le navire ont engagé la cible eMRBM en même temps, le SM-3 Block 1B a manqué la cible, qui fut détruit par la suite par un missile THAAD.

Le BQM-74E a été détruit par un SM-2 Block IIIA.

L'investigation est en cours pour comprendre pourquoi le SM-3 Block 1A a présenté une anomalie très tôt dans son vol.

Ballistic Missile Defense System Demonstrates Layered Defense While Conducting Multiple Engagements in Operational Test

15-NEWS-0008
November 1, 2015

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational Test Agency, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command conducted a complex operational flight test of the BMDS demonstrating a layered defense architecture.

The test, designated Flight Test Operational-02 Event 2a, was conducted in the vicinity of Wake Island and surrounding areas of the western Pacific Ocean. The test stressed the ability of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon systems to negate two ballistic missile threats while Aegis BMD simultaneously conducted an anti-air warfare operation.

This was a highly complex operational test of the BMDS which required all elements to work together in an integrated layered defense design to detect, track, discriminate, engage, and negate the ballistic missile threats.

BMDS assets included: a THAAD battery consisting of a THAAD Fire Control and Communications (TFCC) unit, THAAD launcher, and an Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) radar in terminal mode; a second AN/TPY-2 radar in forward-based mode; Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC); and the USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG-53) Aegis BMD-configured ship with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar.

At approximately 11:05 pm EDT (October 31), a Short Range Air Launch Target (SRALT) was launched by a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft southeast of Wake Island. The THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar in terminal mode detected the target and relayed track information to the TFCC to develop a fire control solution and provide track information for use by other defending BMDS assets. The THAAD weapon system developed a fire control solution, launched a THAAD interceptor missile, and successfully intercepted the SRALT target.

While THAAD was engaging the SRALT, an extended Medium Range Ballistic Missile (eMRBM) was air-launched by another Air Force C-17. The eMRBM target was detected and tracked by multiple BMDS assets including the AN/TPY-2 in forward-based mode, and the USS JOHN PAUL JONES with its AN/SPY-1 radar. Shortly after eMRBM launch, a BQM-74E air-breathing target was also launched and tracked by the USS JOHN PAUL JONES.

As a demonstration of layered defense capabilities, both Aegis BMD and THAAD launched interceptors to engage the eMRBM. The USS JOHN PAUL JONES successfully launched a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB Threat Upgrade guided missile, but an anomaly early in its flight prevented a midcourse intercept. However, the THAAD interceptor, in its terminal defense role, acquired and successfully intercepted the target. Concurrently, Aegis BMD successfully engaged the BQM-74E air-breathing target with a Standard Missile-2 Block IIIA guided missile. A failure review is currently underway to investigate the SM-3 anomaly.

Several other missile defense assets observed the launches and gathered data for future analysis. Participants included the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) Experimental Lab (X-Lab), C2BMC Enterprise Sensors Laboratory (ESL), and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstrators (STSS-D).

The MDA will use test results to improve and enhance the BMDS.

Pour comprendre où se trouvait l'essai, il suffit de regarder la carte Google Earth que j'ai posté mercredi dernier, un peu en haut, et vous focalisez sur les 3 zones rouges à gauche.

A noter que les 2 essais ABM de la Chine et des Etats Unis sont espacés de 24h : les Américains le 31 Octobre et les Chinois le 1er Novembre.

Henri K. 

Modifié le 3 novembre 2015 par Henri K.

[Henri K.]

THAAD ?

Entre 3300 à 4000 km environ.

Henri K.

Mon hypothèse précédente est foireuse, il ne s'agit pas d'un essai THAAD, mais le lancement de SPARK (Spaceborne Payload Assist Rocket - Kauai) avec à bord 13 CubeSats : HiaKaSat (HawaiiSat 1), Argus (SLU 02) et EDSN1 à 8.

Une défaillance du 1er étage a fait dévier la fusée de sa trajectoire, moins d'une minute après le lancement. Après une forte oscillation la fusée s'est brisée en vol.

Personnellement, sans entrer plus en détail, le premier défaut vient du Programme management. AJR était au courant qu'il y a des risques et des problèmes dans la conception du 1er étage mais ne parvient pas à les résoudre au bout de 2 ans, mais l'Université de Hawaï ne veut plus attendre et a forcé la main. Le risque est mal maîtrisé, et la loi de la Physique a une fois de plus triomphé.

En fait, c'est plutôt la loi de Murphy : "Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong." qui a eu la peau de la fusée...

The ORS-4 mission on an experimental Super Strypi launch vehicle failed in mid-flight shortly after liftoff at 5:45 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (7:45 p.m. PST; 10:45 p.m. EST) today from the Pacific Missile Range Facility off Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Additional information will be released as it becomes available.

La vidéo du lancement : http://us.sinaimg.cn/002rXeyBjx06WJxJDk1y0504010146Fw0k01.mp4

Une autre remarque : Avec cet échec, le dernier projet de réaction rapide de DoD ( United States Department of Defense ) vient de tomber à l'eau, alors que le programme Kuaizhou, son équivalent chinois, enchaîne 2 succès et parle déjà de lancer une version plus grosse, Kuaizhou-11, avec une capacité de 1t @ 700 km SSO, d'ici fin 2016.

ORS (Operationally Responsive Space) est un programme militaire qui vise à fournir la capacité d'accès rapide à l'espace, avec très peu de temps de préparation, afin de restaurer la capacité spatiale en temps de guerre.

Dommage, j'ai bien aimé l’ancêtre de SPARK, la fusée sonde Strypi...

Henri K.

Modifié le 4 novembre 2015 par Henri K.

[Henri K.]

U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development Project Conducts Successful Flight Test of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA

15-NEWS-0009
December 8, 2015

The Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, announced the successful completion of a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA flight test from the Point Mugu Sea Range, San Nicolas Island, California. This test, designated SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development Controlled Test Vehicle-02, was a live fire of the SM-3 Block IIA. The missile successfully demonstrated flyout through kinetic warhead ejection. No intercept was planned, and no target missile was launched. 

Program officials will evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.

The SM-3 Cooperative Development Project is the joint U.S.-Japan development of a 21-inch diameter variant of the SM-3, designated Block IIA, to defeat medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is the naval component of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The MDA and the U.S. Navy cooperatively manage the Aegis BMD program.

U.S.-Japan funded Raytheon SM-3 missile aces second test: Pentagon

World | Tue Dec 8, 2015 9:12pm EST
WASHINGTON | BY ANDREA SHALAL

The United States and Japan on Tuesday conducted a second successful test of Raytheon Co's new Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA missile that is being jointly developed by the two countries, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said.

During the test off the coast of Southern California near Malibu, the missile opened its new sensor seeker in space for the first time and used new altitude control rockets to target a star, said a source familiar with the test, who was not authorized to speak publicly.

No intercept was planned for this test and no target missile was launched, but several intercept tests will follow in coming years, MDA said in a statement.

The agency said program officials would evaluate the missile's performance based on telemetry and other data from the test.

The United States has spent just over $2 billion on the SM-3 IIA weapons program, while Japan contributed about $1 billion, according to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

The new missile is a 21-inch variant of an earlier SM-3 missile and works with the U.S. Aegis combat system built by Lockheed Martin Corp to destroy incoming ballistic missile threats in space.

Tuesday's test marked another milestone toward deployment of the missile on U.S. Aegis destroyers and Japan's Kongo ships in coming years, as well as the U.S. Aegis Ashore site in Poland in 2018.

The test also validated the new sensor seeker developed for the redesigned kill vehicle, or warhead, that will eventually replace the ones now used on the U.S. fleet of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California that are part of the U.S. homeland missile defense system, said the source.

Neither Raytheon nor the U.S. Missile Defense Agency had any immediate comment.

Raytheon's new SM-3 IIA missile has bigger rocket motors and a more capable kill vehicle that would allow the missile to engage threats sooner and protect larger regions from short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats.

On Tuesday, the Pentagon announced that Raytheon was awarded a contract for more than $543 million for 17 SM-3 IIA missiles.

Tuesday's test will also pave the way for Japan to buy more of the missiles, said the source.

(Additional reporting by Idrees Ali; Editing by David Gregorio and Lisa Shumaker)

La zone d'essai se situe comme illustrer en bas :

NAVAREA XII    398/2015(18,21). 
EASTERN NORTH PACIFIC.
MISSILES.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 080900Z TO 081800Z DEC,
   ALTERNATE 0900Z TO 1800Z DAILY 09 AND 10 DEC
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 33-25-58N 119-25-31W, 33-17-08N 120-42-53W,
      32-39-02N 121-34-03W, 28-37-58N 123-32-07W,
      28-21-38N 123-03-43W, 31-35-51N 119-31-14W,
      32-35-20N 119-09-15W.
   B. 18-43-32N 128-28-09W, 20-13-09N 130-58-21W,
      23-32-49N 128-41-55W, 21-59-59N 126-10-18W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 101900Z DEC 15.

!CARF 12/016 ZAK AIRSPACE DCC RAVEN STATIONARY ALTITUDE RESERVATION
WITHIN AN AREA DEFINED AS 3250N11915W TO 3244N11909W TO 3212N11942W
TO 3150N11942W TO 3050N12040W TO 3039N12050W TO 3035N12100W TO
2825N12100W TO 2542N12220W TO 2151N12418W TO 2048N12510W TO
1812N12739W TO 2020N13111W TO 2321N13030W TO 2448N12950W TO
2748N12705W TO 3044N12359W TO 3158N12238W TO 3235N12155W TO
3154N12133W TO 3211N12016W TO POINT OF ORIGIN
SFC-UNL 1512081330-1512081830

Henri K. 

Modifié le 9 décembre 2015 par Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Premier essai d'interception du système SM-3 au sol, avec un eMRBM largué par un C-17.

Standard Missile Completes First Intercept Test from Aegis Ashore Test Site

15-NEWS-0011
December 10, 2015

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational Test Agency, in conjunction with U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, successfully conducted the first intercept flight test today (December 9, Hawaii Standard Time) of a land-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) weapon system and Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade guided missile, launched from the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Kauai, Hawaii.  

During the test, a target representing a medium-range ballistic missile was air-launched from a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft over the broad ocean area southwest of Hawaii.  An AN/TPY-2 radar in Forward Based Mode, located at PMRF, detected the target and relayed target track information to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communication (C2BMC) system.  The Aegis Weapon System at the Aegis Ashore site received track data from C2BMC and used its component AN/SPY-1 radar to acquire, track, and develop a fire control solution to engage the target.  The Aegis Weapon System then launched the SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade guided missile from its Vertical Launch System.  The SM-3’s kinetic warhead acquired the target reentry vehicle, diverted into its path, and destroyed the target using   the kinetic force of a direct impact.

The primary purpose of the test, designated Flight Test Operational-02 Event 1a, was to assess the operational effectiveness of the Aegis Ashore capability as part of a larger BMDS architecture.  Aegis Ashore uses a nearly identical configuration of the Vertical Launch System, fire control system, and SPY-1 radar currently in use aboard Aegis BMD cruisers and destroyers deployed at sea around the world.

Vice Admiral James D. Syring, MDA Director, said, "Today's test demonstrated that the same Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense capability that has been fielded at sea and operational for years, will soon be operational ashore as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 2 capability in Romania.  I am very proud of the tremendous effort by the entire government/industry team in executing this vitally important mission for our Nation and our allies."

This flight test demonstrates Aegis Ashore capability as an important component of Phase 2 of the EPAA, of which MDA plans to announce a technical capability declaration by the end of this month.  

The MDA and the U.S. Navy cooperatively manage the Aegis BMD program.

Henri K. 

[Henri K.]

Enhanced PAC-3 Missile Intercepts Tactical Ballistic Missile Target

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, N.M., Dec. 10, 2015 – A Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) missile successfully engaged and intercepted a tactical ballistic missile target today at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, as part of a U.S. Army-led missile defense test.

Two PAC-3 MSE missiles were launched to defend against the incoming target, with the first interceptor hitting the target, as planned.

“This successful test is another strong demonstration of the PAC-3 MSE interceptor’s proven reliability and advanced capability,” said Scott Arnold, vice president of PAC-3 programs at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “With enhanced capability and range, we anticipate these innovative interceptors will play an increasingly critical role in defending against evolving missile threats around the globe.”

The PAC-3 MSE Missile is a high velocity interceptor that uses hit-to-kill technology to defend against incoming threats including tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.

Building on the battle-proven PAC-3 missile, the PAC-3 MSE brings a larger, dual-pulse solid-rocket motor, larger control fins and upgraded support systems. With the enhancements, Lockheed Martin nearly doubled the missile’s reach and dramatically improved performance against today’s increasingly sophisticated ballistic- and cruise-missile threats.

Three for Three:

The intercept was the third successful PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE test since November.
On Nov. 12, a PAC-3 interceptor destroyed an airborne target as part of the U.S. Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System fight test; and on Nov. 19, a PAC-3 successfully intercepted a Patriot-as-a-Target (PAAT) at White Sands Missile Range.

For additional information, visit our PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE web pages.

About Lockheed Martin

Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that – with the addition of Sikorsky – employs approximately 126,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services.

Henri K. 

Modifié le 12 décembre 2015 par Henri K.

[collectionneur]

Les défenses antimissiles et le contrôle des armements nucléaires stratégiques

Les défis technologiques et politiques

Article d'une quinzaine de pages sur les difficultés que fait pesaient les programmes ABM sur la réduction des armements nucléaire par la négociation. Avec un arsenal réduit, il y a de moins en d'options pour les utilisés et la présence de défense antimissiles complique la donne :

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/aspj_f/digital/pdf/articles/2015_4/lowther_f.pdf

http://www.amc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123464942

Au fait, voici l'engin cible simulant un MRBM largué par un C-17 - peut il servir comme arme offensive ?, les B-52 et autres sont ''spottés'' dés qu'ils décollent de leurs base, un avion cargo utilisé pour une attaque surprise me semble une ''bonne idée'' - :

Modifié le 17 février 2016 par collectionneur

[Henri K.]

Ground-based Midcourse Defense System Conducts Successful Flight Test

Citation

16-NEWS-0002
January 28, 2016

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force 30th Space Wing, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and U.S. Northern Command, today conducted a non-intercept flight test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). A long-range ground-based interceptor was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., successfully evaluating performance of alternate divert thrusters for the system’s Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. 

During the test, a target representing an intermediate-range ballistic missile was air-launched from a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft over the broad ocean area west of Hawaii. An Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) radar in Forward Based Mode, located at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii, detected the target and relayed target track information to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communication system. The Sea-Based X-band radar, positioned in the broad ocean area northeast of Hawaii, also acquired and tracked the target. The GMD system received track data and developed a fire control solution to engage the target. The test also included a demonstration of technology to discriminate countermeasures carried by the target missile.

A three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor was launched from Vandenberg AFB, performed fly-out, and released a Capability Enhancement-II Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. The kill vehicle performed scripted maneuvers to demonstrate performance of alternate divert thrusters. Upon entering terminal phase, the kill vehicle initiated a planned burn sequence to evaluate the alternate divert thrusters until fuel was exhausted, intentionally precluding an intercept. 

Program officials will evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test. Engineering data from this test will be used to increase confidence for future GMD intercept missions. This test is designated Ground-based Midcourse Defense Controlled Test Vehicle-02+. 

The GMD element of the integrated BMDS provides Combatant Commanders the capability to engage and destroy limited intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile threats in space to protect the United States. 

Additional information about all elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System can be found here.

MDA Media Contact:

Rick Lehner, 571-231-8212, richard.lehner@mda.mil

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Je ne cautionne pas tout, mais le point de vue est recevable.

[Interview] Missile defense systems expert says THAAD could prove useless

Citation

Posted on : Feb.14,2016 07:37 KSTModified on : Feb.14,2016 07:37 KST

The propellant explosion technology seen in N. Korea’s latest rocket launch can render the interceptor unable to identify a potential warhead

A expert in missile defense systems said the propellant explosion technology seen in North Korea’s recent long-range rocket launch on Feb. 7 could render useless the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system South Korea and the US have all but officially decided to deploy on the Korean Peninsula.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) emeritus professor Theodore Postol explained the situation in a series of email and telephone interviews with the Hankyoreh in the wake of the launch and the announcement that South Korea and the US have begun official discussions on THAAD deployment.

Postol, who earned a doctorate in physics from MIT and previously served as senior adviser to the US chief of naval operations, is a noted expert in missile defense systems who has explored the area for over 30 years academically and for the US Department of Defense, Argonne National Laboratory, and Congress.

One point Postol particularly noted about North Korea’s recent launch was the first stage’s explosion and separation into hundreds of scattered fragments. Indeed, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense noted on Feb. 9 that Aegis radar showed tracks from some 270 exploded fragments from the first stage.

“The explosion is believed to have been carried out through a self-destruct mechanism to prevent South Korea from collecting the propellant,” the ministry said at the time.

Postol said use of the same self-destruct technology with North Korea’s Nodong missile would prevent THAAD radar from identifying an actual warhead. At the moment THAAD launches an interception missile, North Korea could explode its own warhead-carrying missile into multiple fragments.

“Once the rocket completes its powered flight, it is at very high altitude where for all practical purposes there is no air-drag to slow up light objects relative to heavy objects,” Postol observed.

“Thus, if a missile is cut into many pieces after it has completed its powered flight, all of the pieces will float along with its warhead payload on the same general trajectory,” he continued.

“Cutting the missile into many pieces simply makes it possible for an adversary to create many false targets that a distant infrared homing interceptor would not be able to see in any detail.”

In short, an interception missile would be rendered useless because of the large number of more or less identical targets.

“All the interceptor sees are unresolved points of light, any one of which could be the warhead,” Postol explained.

In particular, he noted that “[objects that are elongated and tumbling . . . will appear to change their brightness when they rotate from orientations that present a large projected area to the interceptor relative to orientations that present a small projected area.”

“However, this information is not useful to the sensor because any of the objects, including the warhead, could be tumbling,” he concluded.

Postol went on to note that “this technology could be applied to a North Korean Nodong ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead aimed at South Korea.”

Postol was also highly critical of Seoul and Washington’s public claims that THAAD would not pose a threat to China.

“To suggest that the THAAD radar is not capable of the FB [forward-based] mode is the same as suggesting that a tank that can travel 100 km to a destination and then return from that destination . . . is not capable of traveling 200 km to a more distant location,” he said in response to the argument that THAAD radar on the Korean Peninsula could not be used in FB mode.

“It is the right of the South Korean government and people to choose to deploy THAAD in spite of this technical situation, but they should not take this action under the mistaken belief that China will not correctly assess the THAAD radar as a potential danger to its nuclear deterrent forces,” he added.

In closing, Postol noted that he has “extensive experience with general officers at the levels” of USFK Commanding General Eighth Army Maj. Gen. Thomas Vandal and USFK Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti.

“It is very disturbing for me as an American citizen to see two senior US general officers improperly attempting to interfere with the domestic political decision-making in South Korea by stoking unfounded fears about long-range rockets and nuclear weapons developments,” he said.

By Yi Yong-in, Washington correspondent

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

Henri K.

[ascromis]

Le 17/2/2016à23:09, Henri K. a dit :

Les Nord-Coréens essaieraient-ils de reproduire volontairement ce que les Irakiens avaient réussi à obtenir de façon involontaire durant la guerre du Golfe ?

[Henri K.]

il y a 1 minute, ascromis a dit :

Les Nord-Coréens essaieraient-ils de reproduire volontairement ce que les Irakiens avaient réussi à obtenir de façon involontaire durant la guerre du Golfe ?

A savoir ?

Henri K.

[collectionneur]

Les Scuds bricolé irakiens se dégragréché durant l'approche faisant que la charge utile était mêlé à une pluie de débris.

[Henri K.]

il y a 2 minutes, collectionneur a dit :

Les Scuds bricolé irakiens se dégragréché durant l'approche faisant que la charge utile était mêlé à une pluie de débris.

Même concept donc que les ogive-leurres pour les IRBM et les ICBM.

Henri K.

[ascromis]

il y a 22 minutes, Henri K. a dit :

A savoir ?

Henri K.

Les missiles Al-Hussein lancés par les Irakiens étaient une version du scud-B (R-17 Elbrus) à portée augmentée par le biais d'augmentation de la capacité en propergol, se qui c'est traduit par une augmentation de la longueur du scud-B original.

Malheureusement (heureusement devrais-je dire), le fait de modifier le design originel du scud-B a eu pour effet de compromettre l'intégrité structurelle du Al-Hussein, notamment lors de sa rentrée dans l'atmosphère durant sa phase de vol terminale.

Le constat fût que, lors de la ré-entrée dans l'atmosphère le missile se désintégrait en plusieurs parties, ce qui compliquait grandement le travail des batteries Patriot PAC-1 présentes.

L'AN/MPQ-53 en charge de la désignation d'objectif "remontait" aux opérateurs la cible présentant la meilleure SER (cad l'étage de propulsion ou la case gouvernes), ce qui permettait à la charge utile de passer au travers des mailles du filet.

Le PAC-1, bien qu'il n'est jamais été conçu pour traiter ce type de menaces, réussit à s'en tirer de façon honorable, bien qu'il fallut envoyer entre 8 et 10 MIM-104A sur un seul missile pour être sûr de traiter la tête du missile.

Edit: grillé par Collectioneur

Modifié le 21 février 2016 par ascromis

[Henri K.]

L'identification des objets a connu des progrès très significatif depuis les 10 dernières années, que ce soit au niveau des moyens ou des algorithmes, on peut quasiment écrire un bouquin entier là dessus. Je vais donc m'arrêter là.

Mais pour répondre à la question du départ, je pense qu'ils essaient surtout de réussir à mettre le satellite en orbite et de le faire stabiliser. Le reste c'est un peu trop demandé pour le moment, mais je peux me tromper.

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

PAC-3 MSE Intercepts Missile Target in Flight Test

Citation

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, N.M., March 17, 2016 – A Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) Missile successfully detected, tracked and intercepted a tactical ballistic missile (TBM) target today at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, as part of a U.S. Army-led flight test.

“The PAC-3 MSE continues to demonstrate its reliability and hit-to-kill capability,” said Scott Arnold, vice president of PAC-3 programs at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “The enhancements of the MSE will provide the warfighter with the tools needed to defend against current and evolving threats.”

The PAC-3 Missile is a high-velocity interceptor that uses hit-to-kill technology to defend against incoming threats, including TBMs, cruise missiles and aircraft.

Building on the battle-proven PAC-3 Missile, the PAC-3 MSE brings a larger, dual-pulse solid rocket motor, larger control fins and an upgraded support system. These enhancements nearly double the missile’s reach, and dramatically improve performance against missile threats.

For more information, visit our website:http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/PAC3MissileSegmentEnhancement.html

About Lockheed Martin
Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that – with the addition of Sikorsky – employs approximately 126,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services.

Henri K.

[collectionneur]

Site AEGIS en Roumanie inaugurée hier en grande pompe (bien qu'étant ops depuis la fin de l'année dernière et cries d'orfais de la part de Moscou :

Voici la page de la 6e flotte sur cette installation qui à l'air assez petite. Tout regroupé dans un seul batiment me semble risqué. Je pensais que les silos de lancement seraient éloignés du PC à l’origine de ce programme mais il ont simplement copié la configuration d'un destroyer :

http://www.c6f.navy.mil/news/what-you-need-know-about-aegis-ashore-romania