[ CVF ]

[Philippe Top-Force]

Apparement l'histoire de "les CVF pourront etre adapté pour du CATOBAR" n'aurait été qu'un mensonge/que du marketing ... ?

Source:

some answers to how we went from £900m per carrier to over £ 2 Billion by Peter Luff

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?163878-Queen-Elizabeth-Class-Aircraft-Carriers-News-and-Discussion&p=6269000&viewfull=1#post6269000

ça ressemble plus à un service commandé et un exercice de contre fumée communication pour mieux faire accepter la pilule.A mettre en parallèle avec l'article de Bruxelles2 ici http://www.air-defense.net/forum/index.php/topic,3766.msg632777.html#msg632777

[g4lly]

@Spéciale dédicace a Chevalier Gilles :lol:

Bernard Gray: Let us leave aside the start and end point. On the component parts that build up the change, the cost-in particular of the catapult system-proved, on further dialogue with the US, to be significantly higher. I cannot remember the exact figure for that component, but it was of the order of 50% higher than the original estimate for that piece of equipment, largely because of the assumptions, made broadly at the time of the defence review, that we would be procuring half of a US system. The US system has four catapults on a Ford-class aircraft carrier; we would have two. Broadly speaking, therefore, the assumption was that the cost of the equipment would be about half.

In practice, there is a lot more common equipment that is required to drive the system overall, regardless-up to a point-of the number of catapults that went into that. There was also a significant component of additional technical advice, which the contractors in the US were recommending was required. That was of the order of over £150 million. Additional aircraft launch and recovery equipment was required, on top of the cats and traps, which had not been included in the original estimate. The cost of going through the FMS purchasing route and some inflation adjustments were further components. The final component was the degree of invasiveness into the ship that was required to install the cats and traps. I think that we gave the numbers last week: it went from 80 to 280 major compartment changes, as we got into the detailed design. Those are the component parts of how you get from A to B.

To take on your second point about the conversion of the second carrier being even more expensive, that arises out of the fact that having built the Queen Elizabeth, you then have to take her back in, refit her, and take her apart again in order to put that in. Our estimate, which was very preliminary, suggested that it was between £2.5 billion and £3 billion to retrofit it to a fully built carrier, as opposed to just shy of £2 billion to insert it into the Prince of Wales in build. So that is the delta, if you like-the difference between the two.

As for why you get from one to the other, the team worked with and got initial estimates from the United States around EMALS, and had dialogue with people in the Aircraft Carrier Alliance, during the defence review, to come up with a feel for what that cost was. There had always been envisaged a development process that went on over two years, in order to determine exactly what those costs were going to be. Immediately after the defence review concluded, the people working in the Ships Operating Centre in Defence Equipment and Support started that work, and there was a set of approval processes to go through. It has become clear, over the course of that period, that some of the initial assumptions being made were too aggressive, which has led to some of these changes.

One of the reasons why we have effectively cut that two-year process short at 18 months is that we would have been required to commit ourselves to long-lead items for the catapult system, and indeed to commit ourselves to the course of action on the aircraft over the next two or three months. We were looking at a situation where, had we decided to proceed, we would have bought over £100 million-worth of long-lead items for the catapults, for example. That forced us into a situation of evaluating all those data prior to making that choice, because clearly, we would not want to waste any more money.

From that perspective, the decision that was made at the time worked on the best data at the time, which had been discussed with industry. However, when you do all the additional work, it turns out that this job was substantially more difficult than was originally thought, and therefore, changing that decision seems to me to be entirely the appropriate thing to do.

...

Q154 Chair: Having been "designed for conversion", and conversion having proved far more expensive than we expected, do we have any comeback against those companies that did the design?

Peter Luff: It is not my belief that they were genuinely designed for conversion, or that the contract allowed them to be designed for conversion. It was an assertion that was probably unfounded. That is my view.

Bernard Gray: They had the physical space. They are, as we all know, very large. However, because the decision to go STOVL was taken in, from memory, 2002, no serious work had been done. It had been noodled in 2005, but no serious work had been done on it. It was not a contract-quality offer; it was a simple assertion that that could be done, but nobody said, "It can be done at this price", and certainly nobody put that in a contract.

[Chaps]

ah ça, y a toujours une différence quand on lance une idée en réunion entre décideurs et quand les techniciens commencent à aligner les données réelles...

[Chevalier Gilles]

fin je dis ca je dis rien mais ca me semble quand meme une excuse de politiciens, quand on sait comment ils s'y connaissant dans le domaine

car sur mp net on avait reussit a dialoguer a goeff searle le directeur du programme a l'epoque et il nous avait bien dit qu'il avaient prevu au design une conversion.

mais bon, la verite in ne le saura surement jamais

[Philippe Top-Force]

Et dire que l'on pouvait leurs revendre les plans de Thales Naval France et DCNS pour un PA CATOBAR s'ils en voulaient vraiment. :lol:

[Chevalier Gilles]

Et dire que l'on pouvait leurs revendre les plans de Thales Naval France et DCNS pour un PA CATOBAR s'ils en voulaient vraiment. :lol:

surtout qu'ils avaient eu acces aux plans definitifs du pa2 au moment de la cooperation franco-anglaise

[Asgard]

Question conne et totalement HS mais ... ils en font quoi des maquettes de salon une fois celui ci terminé ? (j'en ramenerai bien un PADSX chez moi °°)

[xav]

Question conne et totalement HS mais ... ils en font quoi des maquettes de salon une fois celui ci terminé ? (j'en ramenerai bien un PADSX chez moi °°)

Ils les montrent à d'autre salon... ou parfois les mettent à l’accueil de leur bureaux

[Chevalier Gilles]

Question conne et totalement HS mais ... ils en font quoi des maquettes de salon une fois celui ci terminé ? (j'en ramenerai bien un PADSX chez moi °°)

tiens je vois que je suis pas le seule a vouloir sortir avec des souvenirs de salons

[pascal]

çà dépend ... j'ai sur mon bureau de très belles maquettes d'exposition récupérée par la bande ...  =)

Selon la taille çà fini dans la poussière, à la poubelle ou dans vitrines

[Philippe Top-Force]

surtout qu'ils avaient eu acces aux plans definitifs du pa2 au moment de la cooperation franco-anglaise

Non là, tu t'avances  :lol: tu dois confondre. ;)

[xav]

Construction en blocks pour le CVF

[pascal]

Le fauteuil de Colbert (comme d'habitude excellent) sur le choix britannique contre la solution CATOBAR je vous recommande la fin de l'article

http://lefauteuildecolbert.over-blog.fr/article-le-gouvernement-anglais-a-t-il-sciemment-torpille-la-refonte-catobar-des-queen-elizabeth-105328334.html

J'espère que çà n'a pas déjà été posté

[Kovy]

L'argument porte-aeronef est un peu tiré par les cheveux.

Il y a quand même une difference notable entre le F-35B et le harrier and terme de rayon d'action et charge militaire.

Dans ce cas, les foch, clem et CDG pre-rafale étaient aussi des porte-aeronefs avec le sue/sem comme seul vecteur d'attaque.

[pascal]

oui mais à l'époque du SUE et du Harrier on ne pouvait envisager ce que seraient F 35B et Rafale et lA différence de tempo opérationnel entre porte aéronefs et porte avions est importante question d'organisation et de mensurations

[alexandreVBCI]

La Royal Navy pourrait conserver ses 2 futurs porte-avions

Le ministre britannique de la défense, Philip Hammond, a mis tout son poids pour que la Royal Navy conserve ses 2 futurs porte-avions de la classe Queen Elizabeth, lors de leur mise en service à la fin de la décennie.

Hammond a rappelé qu’aucune décision ne sera prise avant la revue stratégique de 2015, quant à savoir si la Royal conservera le 2è porte-avions. Mais il a indiqué que le cout annuel supplémentaire « relativement modeste » (70 millions £) pour la disponibilité des 2 porte-avions est un « investissement extrêmement intéressant », a-t-il déclaré lors d’une conférence du Royal United Services Institute.

La décision prise cette année par le gouvernement britannique de revenir à la version décollage court du F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, implique qu’il y a désormais une « possibilité réaliste que les 2 porte-avions entrent en service », a déclaré Hammond....

La suite de l'article : http://www.corlobe.tk/article30833.html

[pascal]

2 CVF et 48 F 35B partagés entre RAF et FAA

La flotte de chasseurs F-35 sera commune aux 2 armées. Le nombre total d’avions achetés n’en pas encore fixé, la presse évoque le chiffre de 40 à 48.

Des bâtiments de 65 000 t embarquant 12 F 35B en temps normal

avec la possibilité d’augmenter ce chiffre en période de tension

Augmentation qui sera ce qu'elle sera avec un nombre d'avion relativement peu élevé, réparti entre 2 CVF

Donc résumons en cas de crise ce sera un CVF avec une trentaine de zincs ou deux avec 15 avions ...

Effectivement à ce tarif là on peut envisager le PA 2...

A suivre en tout cas cette intervetion de circonstance semble destinée surtout à cintrer une RAF qui s'alarme de la situation de son parc avec des livraisons de Typhoon revues à la baisse, des GR 4 qui seront ferraillés en 2025 et des F 35 dont on lui dit qu'il faudra les partager avec les pingouins et en plus les déployer sur PA

La joie !

[Eise]

C'est plutôt une bonne nouvelle pour eux. Par contre les deux en même temps j'y crois pas trop.

48 F-35 maximum, c'est quasi ridicule. Surtout à partager entre la RAF et la RN. Les pilotes devront être de la RN sinon impossible de les faire apponter en cas de gros conflits et procédures surement différente. C'est de la mutualisation à l'extrême  :lol:

[Philippe Top-Force]

Les questions à se poser sont plutôt quel avion va remplacer les camions à bombes Tornado? , et DE combien de chasseurs bombardiers veulent les anglais? Vont-ils garder un TCD ou LPH pour leur Brigade Royal Marine?

Parce que 48 F35B STOVL ça fait vraiment juste pour UK.

Et ce n'est pas avec 10/12 ou plus MQ-9 Reaper qu'ils vont combler la capacité frappe en profondeur et air strike.Bon ils les ont pour le CAS/COIN le Reaper armés.

Vous aurez compris, je fais l'impasse sur leur Typhoon que j'attribue plus à air dominance, air interdiction et PO.

Par contre sur leurs CVF, la Royal Navy pour y armer une composante hélicoptère d'assaut avec 70 AW101 Merlin (les 28 Merlin RAF passent à la RN) ainsi que ses 28 AW159 WildCat Lunx ,la RAF pourra les armer à partir des 60 Chinook et la BA apporter ses Apache.

Donc, un CVF avec une GAE* de 12 à 24 F35B + 8 Apache armés Hellfire et 8 AW159 armés de Brimstone et de LMM + 8 Chinook et Merlin c'est quand même supérieur aéronautiquement parlant au PA Cavour Italien ou BPE Espagnol.

*Il faudra à Londres de choisir et désigner rapidement ce que sera son Avion de guet aérien. Un MV22 Osprey AEW, un Merlin AEW ou un autre aéronef AEW.

Plus des hélidrones qui seront de la partie voire les UCAV à l'époque de la sortie du CVF en mer vers 2020.

http://t0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSP-vYimIoVXOtLosEaQw67cExbSKKNNaM-ABCcBgrkUVphicdu

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121101/DEFREG01/311010003/Hammond-Keep-Both-Carriers-Royal-Navy-Service?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

[aviapics]

vont avoir besoin de le rendre serieusement multirole leur Typhoon...

[zx]

Philip Hammond, the carriers, the strategy

http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.fr/

Philip Hammond has delivered a relevant speech  at the RUSI Air Power conference yesterday, and delivered some reassuring observations. Mainly, he seems to have finally grasped the full relevance and strategic importance of the aircraft carriers, of their flexibility, of the indipendent action capability that they offer.

Relevantly, he promised that the aircraft carrier will routinely embark a full squadron of F35B jets whenever she sails "outside of home waters". On operations, it is assumed that the number would increase, potentially all the way up to 36.

Of course, he does not expand on the difficulties connected with trying to deploy a full 36-strong wing from a fleet that is now projected to number only 48 in total.

I can think of only one example of such an ambitious force generation, and that's the successful effort of the Fleet Air Arm for the Falklands War, when over 90% of the total Sea Harrier fleet was sent to the fight.

This (renewed) promise is significant, because it expands and precises the nature of the "routine": whenever the carrier goes outside home waters. Again, it is a relevant promise because the Royal Air Force is reportedly trying to secure a mostly land-based life for the F35 fleet (unsurprisingly), with leaked information that suggests the RAF tried to have the "routine" airgroup cut back all the way to just 6.

12 is already a small number, 6 would be just laughable, so it is comfortable that the minister's position goes in favor of logic and operational reasoning.

Philip Hammond also strongly suggested that both aircraft carriers shall be put in service. He said that the additional cost would be around 70 million a year, and described it, very correctly in my opinion, as an extremely good deal.

Putting both in service gives the Navy the ability to have a carrier countinously available throughout the operational life of the class, and the possibility, in emergency time, to sail both to a warzone. He of course said, once more, that the firm decision is left for the SDSR 2015, but he clearly expressed his belief that operating both ships is the way to go.

I will add, personally, that operating one or both vessels does not only impact the capability to deploy air power at sea continuously, but it also impacts the Navy's amphibious capability. Operating a single CVF risks to be a death blow to the amphibious capabilities of the UK, since by 2022 at the latest, and probably much earlier, HMS Ocean will be gone, and with no replacement LPHs planned, the Queen Elizabeth class carriers are going to be simply crucial not so much as carriers, but as "Landing Helicopter - Aviation" ships.

With HMS Illustrious bowing out in 2014 and HMS Ocean possibly following in 2018, or anyway sometime before 2022, unless there is a dramatic rethink, the Queen Elizabeth class vessels will be the only big flat tops available to the navy, and they will have to be there to carry not just airplanes, but the Marines with their helicopters, in what has been called, ever since the publication of the SDSR 2010, "Carrier Enabled Power Projection".

It is absolutely crucial to ensure that both carriers enter service, to restore airpower at sea and to ensure the long term viability of the british amphibious capability, which would be massively depleted otherwise, with a further, massive reduction in the number of deployable Marines and with the near nullification of the amphibious force's rotary wing capability, as the LPDs and LSDs all come without hangars and thus with a quite small helicopter capability overall.

It is intended that the Royal Navy Response Force Task Group will have extensive aviation capability and room for a good 1800 Marines with their vehicles and supporting helicopters.

The presence of the Carrier in the task group is vital to ensure the whole thing remains viable. Early in last October, rear admiral Cunningham briefed  the audience of the Maritime Security Challenges 2012 conference, and in his slides it can be noted that the assumption is that the Carrier task group will be always at 5 days notice to move.

If this is the planning assumption, there is no alternative to having both in service.

The much publicized anglo-french expeditionary force will instead be at 30 days notice to move, and it is planned that at least one aircraft carrier will always be part of the force, notionally being provided by each country, rotationally for one year at a time.

It is very important that the investment made on the carriers is not wasted: these are incredibly useful and relevant vessels, and it essential to use them well.

Mr. Hammond was also brought, albeit briefly, on the theme of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft, and he exposed himself justifying the Nimrod decision with a very strong description of the MRA4, which he argues had very low probabilities to ever fly, and would only be a money sink.

Frankly, i think this is gross exaggeration, and so far, while it had emerged that the Nimrod MRA4 still had some issues to iron out when it was cancelled, no one ever dared trying to say that it could not be made to work. And this is being generous: i'm assuming Hammond intended "flying" as operationally serving the RAF exactly as planned, because the Nimrod MRA4 had been flying in the more general sense of the word for many years, actually, and it tackled succesfully many trials, including torpedo releases.

Hammond of course tried to minimize the extent of the problem, but to anyone listening, the MPA situation of the UK just cannot make sense.

Even more so as Hammond (rightfully, in my opinion) underlined the "ISTAR lesson" derived from the Libya experience and the need for Europe to stand up to the security challenges of the Mediterranean, north Africa and Middle East, as we'll see further ahead.

I make no mystery of my position, which is to give great priority to the Maritime Patrol Aircraft need as part of the next SDSR. Worth reporting is also the quite clear thought of the chief of staff  of the french navy about the MPA problem:

"They don’t have a maritime patrol aircraft. I don’t know if they are desperate, but if you took my MPA away, I’d be in a desperate state."

I'm under no illusion: for the Royal Navy, it isn't any more desirable to be without MPA than for the french.

Regarding the "ISTAR lesson", Hammond notes, quoting an observation already made by US Defense Secretary R. Gates, that the most advanced fighter aircraft are little use if allies do not have the means to identify, process, and strike targets as part of an integrated campaign.

The insufficient ISTAR resources available to NATO, along with insufficient air-to-air refuelling capability were the two most evident issues over Libya, followed by issues of insuffient interoperability and even difficulties in communications between allied assets. 

The full extent of the problem is still struggling to come to light, but the issues are very serious, so much so that Denmark, which had earlier opted out of the NATO AGS drone system, now has re-joined the program, after having assessed first hand the difficulties in Unified Protector (Denmark has been a major contributor, flying a surprising number of sorties and expending the near totality of its precision-guided bomb stocks). In the UK, Libya has served to re-ignite interest in systems such as Sentinel and Sea King MK7 and Sentry, so much so that while uncertainties still remain over the future of Sentinel post-Afghanistan, there is now the expectation of seeing it confirmed as part of the future force.

The ISTAR lesson seem to have surprised many in Europe, but i want to hope that the military planners, if not the politicians, only faked ignorance because "forced" to abandon investments in these areas by governments calling for cuts.

Because the ISTAR lesson should not have been a surprise. To me, it certainly was. I've been arguing for strategic enablers in forever, and ISTAR platforms featured prominently in all my calls. I'm not a genius at all, yet i had easily seen where the real problems were. I'd like to think that military professionists can see things better than i do, sincerely. 

I deem it absolutely fundamental that proper attention is paid to the unique Strategic Enablers, those capabilities that the UK can bring to the table that no other country in Europe can, with the exception of France for some of these.

So i'm thinking about Sentinel, a good-sized fleet of drones (Reaper and Watchkeeper, then Scavenger replacing Reaper), Airseeker, AWACS, the large fleet of Voyager air tankers, the carriers with their embarked aviation and AEW/ISTAR platforms, the amphibious force, the RFA (alone, it makes up 34% of the strategic at sea logistics capability available in Europe!) and Maritime Patrol Aircrafts too, a capability that has been gapped, but that should be restored as quickly as possible. And also, of course, the strategic mobility offered by an unmatched fleet of 6 Point class RoRo and 8 C17s, something that no one else in Europe has.

The "ISTAR lesson" is closely connected to the topic of multinational collaboration, and to the "new role" for a more mature, more active Europe, which far from meaning unified armed forces is anyway the only possible path to follow to achieve political and military relevance in the future.

Hammond notes:

But in the case of Libya it shone a bright light on relative military and political capabilities in terms of who "could but wouldn't"; and who "would but couldn't".

With the United States reflecting, in its strategic posture, the growing importance of the developing strategic challenge in the Pacific, the nations of Europe must find the political will to take on more responsibility for our own back yard, and fund the capabilities to allow that.

Certainly that means, shouldering the major burden in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

But also being prepared, if necessary, to take a bigger role in relation to North Africa and the Middle East.

The bottom line is that Europe, as a whole, needs to do more, at a time when the reality is that, across the continent, aggregate defence expenditure is certain to fall in the short term and, at best, recover slowly in the medium term.

So the challenge is stark: if we can't spend more, we must do things differently;

Maximising the capability we can collectively squeeze out of the resources we have;

Increasing interoperability, closing capability gaps through joint working and greater specialisation.

For example, the UK is overhauling its ISTAR, strategic lift and combat air capabilities as part of the transition to Future Force 2020 with the new Atlas and Voyager fleets operating alongside the C17, Sentry, Sentinel, and Airseeker as well as a range of remotely piloted air systems.

These forces will allow us to offer capacity to share with our international partners in new, innovative and mutually beneficial ways.

And, for the time being at least, we will depend on others for support with maritime patrol aircraft, when we need them.

It is not so much the number of Tornado jets that matters. What the UK can and should bring to the table to really matter, is a series of unique capabilities that are pretty much without equal in Europe and that can form the skeleton sustaining a multinational force with little to no US involvment.

That buys power for the UK in three ways:

First, by making the UK more "indipendent", because more realistically capable to mount an operation on its own, albeit on a small to medium scale.

Second, by making the UK less dependent on US help, and more relevant to other allies, allowing the country to pursue and craft other strategic relationships.

Third, by gaining more US support, because such a "UK leader of the willing Europe" can be a driving force for the european side of NATO, making it capable to shoulder more of the tasks connected to the Mediterranean and Middle East, allowing the US forces to concentrate more on the Pacific.

In the coming years, a CVF task group deployed to the Gulf to replace a US CVBG that can so go to the Pacific is going to be very, very appreciated.

After what Hammond said, i can proudly observe that professor Lindley-French and, to a lesser but important degree, I, were right in our analysis of the situation. Read this (long) but highly recommended old article  of mine about giving a grand strategy to the UK to see what i mean.

The new enduring relationship-I will avoid the "special relationship" phrase-is ultimately, in Washington’s mind, with both Republicans and Democrats, built on our ability to leverage other partners, primarily Europeans but also Commonwealth members. If we lose that ability because of a profound perception of our decision not to be a major second-rank power, our influence in Washington will decline further. There will be very clear strategic, practical implications.

The specific impact will be on NATO, because what is generating and becoming very clear in Washington is that the Americans are increasingly becoming an Asia-Pacific power. What they will look for - in a sense, Libya is increasingly the test case - is Europeans under Anglo-French leadership to look after our bit of the world, which is a pretty rough neighbourhood, while an overstretched America deals with the epicentre of change in south and east Asia. If we cannot step up to that leadership role, and we are choosing not to adopt it, the fundamental assumption in the NSS that the Americans will always ultimately be there for our security and our defence is being undermined.

The question then becomes: what level of capability does Britain require to ensure that the Americans feel that they can invest in our future security defence because it is part of the overall whole? I was at a meeting in Tallinn a couple of weeks ago, and a German MP seriously said that Germany would not modernise its deployable armed forces, and that it would not even conceive of modernising nuclear forces, but that it might allow the Americans to pay for and put in place a missile defence system that protects Germany in Europe. The inference is that if we are moving inadvertently into that camp - the Dutch are certainly going into that camp - our loss of influence in Washington and, I would suggest, elsewhere, will be profound. The French, frankly, have a lot more traction than we do these days because they talk a better show than we do.

The tragedy, for me, for London is that after all the sacrifices of the past 10 years of our armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are almost snatching contempt from the jaws of respect, on the Hill in particular. I am not overstating this; that is the consequence of these two documents on the American political mind that considers these issues.”

[...]

I fully recognise that there are a lot of European countries-mainly because of the German position, I have to say-that have been in retreat for a long time, aided and abetted by poor American leadership. I have made that point in the US several times-that the Americans have a responsibility to lead well, not just lead. Our interest is to renovate a strategic concept in Europe that ensures that there is a genuine European pillar of the alliance stabilising this turbulent world. That is our mission; and we are not stepping up to that plate. Any chance of bringing Europe back on strategic line, if you like, is, I fear, in danger of being lost.” 

 

[...]

A very, very senior person told me on Friday that the trajectory of these two documents could mean that the United Kingdom loses D-SACEUR-to the French, on current trajectory-because we are perceived as an unreliable ally, which is unfair but how it is being perceived. [D-SACEUR: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe – the SACEUR is a US officer]

The Americans will not go on funding this bill, and there is going to be a row over missile defence. Congress has not woken up to the fact yet that the missile defence system currently proposed is one that the Americans will pay for that can protect Europe but cannot protect the United States. Already, a high-level congressional delegation last week at NATO asked the specific question, "Are there any US enablers being used for operations over Libya?" The US MilRep jumped in and said, "No." That is not the correct answer , and Congress will soon learn that. There are all sorts of implications. Whereas for the US, alliances are extremely useful but not critical, for the UK our influence in functioning alliances and international organisations is absolutely critical“.

“I think they [uSA] would abandon Europe [if the UK and France stop being useful partners]. They would say, reasonably, "Look, Europe, you’re a strategic backwater right now. If you are not prepared to work with us to stabilise the world and our grand strategic mission, you can look after your own neighbourhood." The logical consequence of that is that this neighbourhood is rough. We would end up spending more, or we would take a much higher level of risk-probably the highest level of risk we have taken since the 1930s. That is the choice that we face.”

 

Professor Lindley-French, speaking to the Parliamentary Defence Committee

[pascal]

It is absolutely crucial to ensure that both carriers enter service, to restore airpower at sea and to ensure the long term viability of the british amphibious capability

Pour garantir cela sur la durée de vie des PA il faudra des avions beaucoup d'avions.

Un des arguments de la non réalisation du PA2 c'est aussi (mais pas seulement) le faible nombre de Rafale Marine 58 (-4) qui rend illusoire le déploiement simultané de deux PA (au moins théoriquement).

L'argument de Hammond très centré sur les CVF passe sous silence la problématique du nombre d'aéronefs or la question ne manquera pas de se poser, même avec des Chinook et des Apache

[Kovy]

Pour garantir cela sur la durée de vie des PA il faudra des avions beaucoup d'avions.

Un des arguments de la non réalisation du PA2 c'est aussi (mais pas seulement) le faible nombre de Rafale Marine 58 (-4) qui rend illusoire le déploiement simultané de deux PA (au moins théoriquement).

C'est un non argument.

La crise Lybienne, pourtant de faible intensité, l'a parfaitement démontré.

Il faut 2 PA pour qu'ils puissent se relayer en continu pendant une crise qui dure plus d' 1 mois. C'est ce qui s'est passé avec les 2 BPC qui n'ont connu aucune rupture d'emploi alors que le CdG devait faire des pauses régulierement.

Si le CdG avait eu un grave pepin en milieu de crise on perdait quasi 50% de nos capacités de frappe.

Les seuls arguments valables pour le 2e PA c'est la permanence (des capacités de projection ET de formation) et l'étalement du potentiel (au rythme actuel le CDG sera bon pour la casse dans 15 ans). 2 arguments qui auraient du etre les 2 premieres specs tout en haut de la fiche programme du remplacement des Foch/Clem.

Quand on n'a qu'un PA "physiquement", on n'a en fait qu'un d'1/2 PA "opérationnellement" qui s'use 2 fois plus vite.

Si t'as plusieurs calcifs dans ta garde robe, c'est pas pour les porter tous en même temps.... O0

[Philippe Top-Force]

vont avoir besoin de le rendre serieusement multirole leur Typhoon...

En tous cas, il ne sera pas navalisé et apte à apponter avant bien longtemps  :lol:

Un des arguments de la non réalisation du PA2 c'est aussi (mais pas seulement) le faible nombre de Rafale Marine 58 (-4) qui rend illusoire le déploiement simultané de deux PA (au moins théoriquement).

C'est ce je me tue à dire  :lol: lancer un second PA n'a de sens que si tu peux y avoir le bon format parc aéronautique à pouvoir déployer/embarquer dessus et avec l'autre PA.

Car certes si disposer d'un second PA permet d'assurer une permanence/alternance à 100% donc une "capacité dissuasion conventionnelle" à ne pas négliger et à mettre en avant, avoir tout autant sinon plus de Rafale M aptes à embarquer ( au moins 70 à 86 Rafale M), entrainant ainsi ce parc supplémentaire à être aussi une "capacité de projection et dissuasion conventionnelle" .Non négligeable à mettre sur la table de la diplomatie navale.

[pascal]

Nous sommes d'accord sur la question du tuilage.

Mieux vaut avoir deux coques pour pouvoir 365 j/an pouvoir envoyer 20 Rafale à 3 000 nautiques avec un préavis de 96 heures. Il n'y a AUCUN DOUTE là dessus.

Le soucis c'est qu'aujourd'hui un tel argument ne passe plus. Alors que l'on a pas l'argent pour mettre des Sadral sur le Forbin, les bonnes âmes te disent: "dépenser 2.5 milliards € pour construire un bâtiment qui sera utilisé à pleine capacité 140 jours par an c'est inacceptable".

Certes 58 avions c'est insuffisant pour faire évoluer deux porte-avions de concert. Mais quand tu regardes bien, 58 avions c'est AU MIEUX trois flottilles de 14 çà signifie une flottille de permanence H24 une autre en repos et une à l'entraînement, pas sûr qu'avec les moyens actuels on y arrive, de même pour le PA je ne suis plus sûr qu'on ai les ressources en personnel ne serait-ce que pour avoir une seule coque à la mer en permanence que ce soit dans les flottilles ou au sein de la Force d'Action Navale.

Déjà qu'on ne met que 94 matafs sur les Frégates je ne vois pas comment on aurait de quoi fournir un PA en permanence opérationnelle durant 30 ans.

Mais nous sommes bien d'accord sur le fond l'outil aéronaval est d'une importance plus que sensible, dès lors il faut pouvoir être en mesure de l'utiliser de manière permanente, avec les moyens adéquats c'est à dire à pleine capacité.

Si t'as plusieurs calcifs dans ta garde robe, c'est pas pour les porter tous en même temps....

çà dépend qui je côtoie  :-\