[Turboprop] de combat

[Darkjmfr]

Désolé mais ça fait trop de fois que je la vois... le bouleau est un arbre ! faire le travail = faire le boulot. Encore désolé pour mon intolérance orthographique :p

[pascal]

@Chris

Escorte contre quoi ?

Menace air air, menace air sol ?

escorter les MH-47, par exemple, au 160th SOAR, vu qu'actuellement, aucun hélico d'attaque ne peut suivre... Ou aussi pour ravitailler les troupes, l'appareil pouvant voler à haute altitude, ce qui élimine la plupart des risques dûs à l'artillerie sol-air légère... Bien sûr, au dessus d'un pays où il n'y a pas (trop) de couverture radar...

Intérêt de voler à haute altitude pour un appareil sensé justement voler bas ? On fait quoi contre un adversaire qui dispose de couverture radar, ou bien d'une bonne DCA (Apaches à Kerbala)

Il y a deux volets dans ce débat:

-volet opérationnel celà vaut-il le coup notamment au regard des risques de pertes (difficilement acceptables dans les conflits assymétriques actuels)

-volet financier: coût de tels programmes venant s'ajouter aux programmes en cours

[Chris.]

30'000 pieds, ça fait 10'000 mètres d'altitude l'altitude de croisière de certains avions de ligne.

Donc, par exemple en Afghanistan (ou en Irak, en Afrique (sauf vers l'Ethiopie et l'Erythrée, vu la présence de chasseurs "modernes"...), etc.), ou la menace sol-air est assez faible à ces altitudes, ça permetterait de faire le transit hors d'atteinte des menaces puis de se poser STOL.

pour l'escorte, plutot contre les menaces air-sol, comme au Vietnam, quoi (les hélicos CSAR ont souvent étés escortés par des A-1 Skyraider je le rappelle). Mais contre les menaces air-air (genre hélico ou drône, pas chasseur, bien sûr...), pourquoi pas, s'il peut embarquer des Stinger ou des Sidewinder.

Pertes:

un AH-64/OH-58D qui se prend un missile, c'est la loterie pour l'équipage. S'ils arrivent à poser la machine en catastrophe, ils ont une chance de survie. Sinon, il y a de fortes chances qu'il y ait des pertes...

un OV-10D qui se prend un missile, les chances pour l'équipage (sauf s'il y a des pax derrière...) sont plus grandes, car ils disposent de sièges éjectables zéro-zéro.

En plus, l'OV-10 dispose de 2 moteurs séparés, donc s'il y en a un qui est touché par des tirs ou autres, il y a une chance de survie... Sur un hélico, si le rotor principal, le rotor de queue ou une partie de la transmission est touchée, c'est la fin. Surtout que les deux turbines (s'il y en a) sont rapprochées, donc le risque qu'elles morflent les deux est plus grand...).

[alexandreVBCI]

Pourquoi un avion COIN au lieu d'un hélicoptère ? 

On peut poser la question :

-aux équipages des gazelles incapables de voler à l'altitude souhaitée par l'EM en afghanistan...

-aux troupes au sol pour savoir s'ils ne souhaitent pas avoir en cas de problème un tucano de soutien en 10 minutes ou un hélico en 30 minutes !

Je ne critique pas les hélicoptères : il faut les deux sur le terrain... et c'est dommage mais on n'a pas les moyens financiers, d'où le choix de l'hélicoptère seul. Le Tigre va apporter un vrai soutien.

Durant la guerre en Algérie, on était mieux équipés avec des appareils variés adaptés à différentes missions :  http://avions-de-la-guerre-d-algerie.over-blog.com/

[Chris.]

je viens de penser à une mission supplémentaire:

la surveillance de l'espace aérien métropolitain.

Actuellement, en France (et aux USA aussi probablement), c'est soit hélico, soit jet de chasse. un OV-10 pourrait se caler entre les deux, voir remplacer les hélicos.

L'autonomie serait meilleure (2 à 3 fois meilleure suivant l'hélico utilisé !) et on garderait la possibilité d'intercepter des engins peu rapides, en ayant en plus la possibilité d'arriver plus vite sur zone (meilleure vitesse de pointe qu'un hélico).

[Invité BPCs]

Pourquoi un avion COIN au lieu d'un hélicoptère ? 

On peut poser la question :

-aux équipages des gazelles incapables de voler à l'altitude souhaitée par l'EM en afghanistan...

-aux troupes au sol pour savoir s'ils ne souhaitent pas avoir en cas de problème un tucano de soutien en 10 minutes ou un hélico en 30 minutes !

Je ne critique pas les hélicoptères : il faut les deux sur le terrain... et c'est dommage mais on n'a pas les moyens financiers, d'où le choix de l'hélicoptère seul. Le Tigre va apporter un vrai soutien.

Durant la guerre en Algérie, on était mieux équipés avec des appareils variés adaptés à différentes missions :  http://avions-de-la-guerre-d-algerie.over-blog.com/

A rajouter dans la discussion le cout de l'heure de vol (prohibitive pour un Hélico comparée au turboprop).

Mais il est clair qu'en ces périodes de vaches maigres, il ne peut y avoir que 2 programmes :

un hélico de combat

et

Un Jet

A moins d'imaginer un 3ème larron comme pourrait l'être un parc de super tucano mixte trainer et light attack

(ou l'utilisation d'alpha jet trainer reconfiguré en light attack : très improbable ...)

Ensuite la question du plafond pour l'hélico de combat est justement de pouvoir éviter de se faire descendre par des armes légères, ce qui est un pêcher capital vu le prix d'une machine et qui est du principalement à leur incapacité à reprendre de l'altitude rapidement, ce que n'a pas un turboprop

Il faudrait alors que les Tigres évoluent vers un mode VTDP

Sinon si l'on envisage une utilisation du Tigre en remplacement des Jaguar, ce que j'ai vu écrit , on retourne sur la problématique décrite par Pascal du risque de perte de pilotes...

[pascal]

Au Sud Vietnam en 67/69 les avions FAC  O1, OA 2, 0A 10 furent remplacés par les F 100F dans les zones à risques

[Invité BPCs]

Au Sud Vietnam en 67/69 les avions FAC  O1, OA 2, 0A 10 furent remplacés par les F 100F dans les zones à risques

oui mais remplacement hélico par OV 10 : quelles données ?

[pascal]

pas d'exemple

[Invité BPCs]

pas d'exemple

C'est là le noeud de la question : soit augmenter la vitesse notamment ascensionnelle des hélo soit switcher sur des turboprop mais qui inversement ne peuvent pas se cacher aussi facilement derrière les replis du terrains.

Les jets semblent intouchables : ou alors on rentre dans la question appareils spécialisé de CAS versus Multirole : on en a bcp discuté par ailleurs déjà...

[Chris.]

OV-10, pas OA-10, si jamais ;)

l'A-10 (et donc l'OA-10) est entré en service après la guerre du vietnam ;)

[pascal]

youre righte  =D

[Invité BPCs]

C'est là le noeud de la question : soit augmenter la vitesse notamment ascensionnelle des hélo soit switcher sur des turboprop mais qui inversement ne peuvent pas se cacher aussi facilement derrière les replis du terrains.

En plus on doit avoir des données historiques datant de la guerre du Vietnam où tant l'OV-10 (merci Chris pour avoir repéré la faute de frappe) que les Cobra étaient déjà en lice

[SPARTAN]

Un super tucano (full option) et bronco ça coute combien?

[Invité BPCs]

oui mais remplacement hélico par OV 10 : quelles données ?

Quelques éléments de réponses tirés de  :

http://www.volanteaircraft.com/ov-10-8.htm

Toward the end of '68 Admiral Zumwalt obtained some of the Marine's Broncos to support his Riverine and SEAL forces in the Delta. Assigned to Light Attack Squadron 4 (VAL-4), these Navy "Black Ponies" operated from Vung Tau and Binh Thuy. They operated on a waiver from the JCS under which the USAF would not dispute the trespass on their assignment. The waiver limited the OV-10As to 2.75 white phosphorus and once in a while high explosive 2.75 inch rockets along with their 7.62mm machine guns, 7.62mm mini gun pods and occasionally 20mm gun pods on the centerline. After a costly accident on the carrier "Constellation," the entire Navy inventory of 5 inch Zuni rockets were transferred to the VAL-4 OV-10 squadron and these were used to good effect. The waiver, however, denied all free fall ordnance such that bombs and adapted weapons of all types were forbidden. However, also by default, the Black Ponies were assigned CBU-55 fuel-air cluster bombs. Since the CBU-55 was worthless for close air support when dropped from any usual jet aircraft speed and altitude, only the OV-10As could deliver them low and slow enough to have any value.

These operations quickly confirmed that the Bronco was an excellent weapons platform. The Marines also demonstrated the aircraft's unique effectiveness in reconnaissance, artillery and naval gunfire spotting, FAC airborne, light attack and helicopter escort. In addition they demonstrated the capability to lay a tactical smoke screen so successfully that it took much longer than planned to get the demo aircraft back to the States. The users didn't want to let it go. This is a capability that has had great value historically, yet in Vietnam we had no other capability that this OV-10. Jets couldn't get low enough an helicopters were unstable. Today, we have no such capability at all.

The Air Force avoided weapon delivery as much as possible and confined its Broncos to mainly FAC work, initially not even allowing the use of its machine guns. This restriction was later lifted, but the Air Force Broncos were never allowed to explore any missions except FAC. It turned out that the 1000lb electronic suite that the Air Force had added in development to add weight and discredit the plane backfired. In combat, the FAC pilots expanded their role and became essentially very successful airborne command posts. Their pilots made the Air Force Bronco a success in spite of the machinations of HQ. They published a report, "Combat Dragon," that praised the aircraft lavishly, and asked for more and broader mission assignments. It was suppressed, however a book, written by an Air Force FAC, "A Lonely Kind of War," tells the real story very well. He used every capability the aircraft had, even the fuselage cavity to rescue a patrol surrounded by VC in Laos.

The Navy "Black Ponies," operating side by side with their own armed helicopters, demonstrated that the OV-1) could get to the target much faster than helicopters, and they often accomplished emergency missions hours before the centrally controlled jets arrived - much to the consternation of the Air Force. The Black Ponies weren't as restricted as the other services and probably got the most out of the aircraft. Even they were very limited in the ordnance they had available, mostly five inch rockets and machine guns, sometimes a 20mm pod (which KP had built at China Lake on his second tour there). Bombs, napalm, ground ordnance in a bomb bay or the recoilless rifle, could have added much to their already exemplary effectiveness.

In spite of these successful operations in three services, the light attack component was overshadowed more and more by the Air Force's opposition to anything that would give the "Grunts" on the ground anything airborne except what was left over after Air Force priorities were met. This eventually forced the Army into the development of the armed helicopter as the only way it could get the timely and dependable support needed.

Ii is interesting to note here that Army doctrine in the late '60s viewed the helicopter as a means of transport. As such, it was not a fighting vehicle and, for a time, the Army forbade any armament on helicopters. This policy was overtaken by events in Vietnam when tactical necessity forced field expedient armed helicopters. The Marines soon followed suit (for a while Marine helicopters only flew, if Army "gun ships" were available for escort.) Since the Army, although barred by the Air Force from fixed-wing support, did have helicopters, the armed helicopter was the inevitable solution. Thus the development of the armed helicopter, not only for the Army and Marines who followed their lead, but for practically every Army of consequence in the world. In spite of the fact that practically everything an attack helicopter could do, could be done cheaper and better with a fixed wing aircraft of proper design, Air Force politics overruled it.

Back at North American I continued to push the unique close support capabilities of the airplane, now to foreign air forces in addition to our own. I soon realized that the biggest obstacle to sales was politics and that, ridiculous as it sounds, the OV-10 was perceived as a threat to the jets. Before I could even discuss OV-10 capabilities in CAS, etc, I had to make a better case for jets. This was true for every air force I approached, and I approached a lot of them.

The problem can best be illustrated by the experience of Marine Aviation, the initial backer of the OV-10. As soon as the OV-10 achieved a degree of success in Vietnam, the Marines were asked to trade some of their F-4s for OV-10s. The F-4s would go to the Navy which needed more fighters, and the Marines would get more OV-10s for close support, which the Marines advertised they wanted. The Marine Commandant, Gen. Shoup actually went along with this proposal, but it was later turned down by the Navy CNO, Adm. Burke. Vadm. Pirie, DCNO Air actually wrote the letter (as I discovered in a private conversation with him much later). He recognized that if the Navy could provide the fighters needed by the Marines, there was no need for organic Marine Air at all. If the Marines than had no air of their own, what was the difference between them and the Army? Why not do away with the Marines altogether? This was no joke and there is no doubt that the Air Force and Army would have used this argument in DOD. In the end, Marines owe their very existence to Adm. Pirie, but few realize it.

The interesting thing is that this line of reasoning was essentially universal. Everywhere I went, to get the OV-10 even considered, I first had to protect the "F-4." Eventually, we sold the OV-10 to some countries where "COIN" operations were especially applicable such as Venezuela, Indonesia and Thailand. In addition, Germany bought some for target towing and even came up with a modification in which they added a jet engine for added speed on selected missions.

[g4lly]

Embraer Communique on the Colombian Super Tucano aircraft

15:09 GMT, February 1, 2009 São José dos Campos | In an article entitled "Cobrança Suspeita" ("Suspicious Payment"), published in issue number 2098, Brazil’s Veja magazine reports the improper request by Ms. Maria Juliana Buendía de La Vega for a commission on the sale of Super Tucano aircraft to the Colombian Government.

Embraer considers that this article originates from a libelous attack on the part of Ms. Buendía de La Vega, based on incomplete and untrue information released to the press.

Therefore, the Company clarifies that, in February 2000, it hired the services of Eximco, a company at which Mr. Guillermo Garcia Gil - Ms. Buendía de La Vega husband - worked, for the purpose of promoting the sale of Super Tucano aircraft to the Colombian Government. During the term of the contract, which was formally terminated by the parties in August 2002, no sales were finalized to the Colombian Government.

In fact, in June 2002, the Colombian Government chose not to move forward with the bidding process. The contract for the sale of Super Tucano aircraft to the Colombian Government was signed on December 7, 2005, within the scope of a new bidding process, about three years after the termination of the contract with Eximco and two years after the death of Mr. Guillermo Garcia Gil, which occurred in 2003, and not in 2005, as stated in the article.

Embraer further clarifies that in duly documented correspondence with Ms. Buendía de la Vega and her legal representative in Brazil, in March 2007 and April 2008, respectively, the Company expressly denied the undue request for payment. Embraer has built a worldwide reputation based on ethical and respectful conduct, and on rigorous integrity with all of the people, companies and Governments with which it has relations, and wholly refutes the attacks to which it has been subjected.

The Company is analyzing appropriate legal measures to be taken in this case.

[Tomcat]

Dans ce genre d'engin, on case où le radar? son pif est quand même trop petit

[pascal]

no radar mais de l'imagerie passive

[g4lly]

Dans ce genre d'engin, on case où le radar? son pif est quand même trop petit

S'il faut on peut mettre un radar meteo sur le bord d'attaque de l'aile au niveau d'un pylone. Mais les radar meteo c'est tout petit.

[Chris.]

on peut aussi envisager un radar en pod. Les F-15E ont je crois un deuxième radar, de suivi de terrain, embarqué dans un des deux pods fixables sous le fuselage. C'est aussi fixable sur les F-16 je crois.

[pascal]

@Chris

Ce système de double pod était le système Lantirn de suivi de terrain passif par TV et IR avec en sus pod de désignation laser; un Damoclès (si on prend l'option du flir dans le pylone) bien avant l'heure

[alexandreVBCI]

Sur le air&cosmos de cette semaine il y a un article sur l'utilisation des turboprop U-28a de l'Airforce Special Operations Command (AFSOC) en afghanistan pour la reconnaissance, l'espionnage et la dépose de commandos.

Le U-28A est la variante militaire du Pilatus PC-12

http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=226

L'AFSOC indique dès 2007 : "Acquisition of various smaller, highly specialized fixed-wing aircraft is also planned, with many of them earmarked for ISR and support roles connected to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A number of Pilatus PC-12/U-28A turboprop business aircraft, for example, was recently (and quietly) procured for the low-profile conveyance of SOF operators around world hot zones."

On a bien une utilisation de turboprop en afghanistan. 

[pascal]

Appareil d'infiltration, de manoeuvre surtout pas de contact.

On parle du U 28 et pas du A 28 ...

[g4lly]

Nous on a les Socata TBM dans le meme genre.

---

Pour le radar ...

... en bout d'aile un petit radar meteo

[Invité BPCs]

Un article de flight global de début février :

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/02/01/321730/boeing-considers-restarting-ov-10-production-after-23-year.html

"Boeing considers restarting OV-10 production after 23-year hiatus

By Stephen Trimble

Boeing is considering the possibility of restarting production of the OV-10 Bronco turboprop, a Vietnam-era light attack and observation aircraft last produced in 1976.

http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/getAsset.aspx?ItemID=27313

The company confirms that the OV-10 could be offered as either a light attack or intra-theatre light cargo aircraft for the US Air Force. The international market is also driving interest in the slow-flying aircraft, which blends some of the observational capabilities of a helicopter with the range of a fixed-wing aircraft.

Boeing has cited recent USAF interest in acquiring a light attack aircraft as a possible reason to revive OV-10 production.

Although known for its surveillance prowess, the OV-10 remains in combat service in four countries: Colombia (pictured below), Indonesia, the Philippines and Venezuela, with a weapons load at least equivalent to the Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter. Some of those countries, and perhaps new customers, could seek remanufactured or new production OV-10s as their current fleets wear out.

© US Air Force

So far, the USAF has not decided whether to buy a light attack fleet, known as the OA-X. But the Air National Guard will experiment later this year with the Beechcraft AT-6 Texan II. The USAF is also buying dozens of AT-6s on behalf of the Iraqi air force. The Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano and US Aircraft A-67 Dragon are also candidates for an OA-X order.

If the OA-X opportunity stalls, Boeing believes there could be interest in reviving the OV-10 as an intra-theatre transport for moving small groups of troops or medical services around the battlefield.

Boeing notes that the OV-10 revival idea is very preliminary. However, the company has created a marketing brochure, which has been circulated at defence industry events.

Unmanned air systems are being increasingly augmented by piloted aircraft for the persistent intelligence surveillance reconnaissance mission. The US Army and US Marine Corps have adapted the Shorts C-23B Sherpa with a wide-area surveillance sensor, and the USAF will deploy 37 MC-12W Project Liberty aircraft - modified Beechcraft King Air 350/350ERs, to augment unmanned operations.

The OV-10 has been considered for a similar role for several years. The Department of Defense contacted John Hodgson, president of the OV-10 Bronco Association, a few years ago to inquire about fleet availability.

Hodgson is not surprised by the rising interest in the observation platform. "It doesn't make any difference how good your UAV is," he says. "Nothing replaces a couple of eyeballs on a head that moves around."