Conflits territoriaux dans la Mer de Chine méridionale

[nemo]

Ce qui distingue simplement les occidentaux entre eux. Ce projet est issus d'une façon de voir les relations internationales typiquement européennes ce qui n'a pas que des inconvénients.

[Akhilleus]

Et bien, les Taïwanais non plus ne reconnaissent pas l'autorité de La Haye sur l'histoire de la mer de Chine méridionale. Il est temps que nous punissions cette bande de singe jaune qui ne veulent rien savoir sur notre suprématie occidentale...

Quand est-ce qu'on peut faire un sac de Taipei ? J'aime bien la bouffe et les filles là bas...

ROC does not ‘recognize’ UN tribunal

 

Henri K.

<Henri, le second degré, c'est quelque chose qui se manie avec précaution. Là c'est complétement raté. Sous entendre que les occidentaux sont tous des petits racistes qui voient les orientaux comme des petits singes jaune, c'est gros, faux et stupide. Ne serait ce que par le poids politico-économique de la Chine et du Japon vis à vis de l'Europe et des USA. La prochaine fois, essaye une autre approche........>

[collectionneur]

Et vu que Taïwan à était blackboulé de l'immense majorité des organismes internationaux - même de l'organisation postale universelle !!!-, la question ne se pose même pas...

[Lezard-vert]

Et bien, les Taïwanais non plus ne reconnaissent pas l'autorité de La Haye sur l'histoire de la mer de Chine méridionale. Il est temps que nous punissions cette bande de singe jaune qui ne veulent rien savoir sur notre suprématie occidentale...

Quand est-ce qu'on peut faire un sac de Taipei ? J'aime bien la bouffe et les filles là bas...

ROC does not ‘recognize’ UN tribunal

 

Henri K.

Pourquoi  jaune ?

[canteloup]

Henry est une personne paradoxale: d'une part, comme nous le montre ses postes et ses analyses très poussés sur la Chine, il est passionné, rigoureux et méthodique; d'autre part il semble être totalement parano sur tout ce qui se rapporte à la Chine, un peu comme un Ultra en foot.

J'espère pour ma part continuer à voir le premier aspect et éviter au maximum le second.

[Henri K.]

Henry est une personne paradoxale: d'une part, comme nous le montre ses postes et ses analyses très poussés sur la Chine, il est passionné, rigoureux et méthodique; d'autre part il semble être totalement parano sur tout ce qui se rapporte à la Chine, un peu comme un Ultra en foot.

J'espère pour ma part continuer à voir le premier aspect et éviter au maximum le second.

< 1g = 1er

> 1g = 2nd

< 10 cons croisés dans la journée = 1er

> 10 cons croisés dans la journée = 2nd

< 10 conneries des journalistes vues = 1er

> 10 conneries des journalistes vues = 2nd

En fin de compte, je crois que je suis plus souvent dans l'état n°2 que le premier, à méditer...

Henri K.

[canteloup]

< 1g = 1er

> 1g = 2nd

< 10 cons croisés dans la journée = 1er

> 10 cons croisés dans la journée = 2nd

< 10 conneries des journalistes vues = 1er

> 10 conneries des journalistes vues = 2nd

En fin de compte, je crois que je suis plus souvent dans l'état n°2 que le premier, à méditer...

Henri K.

ah ah ok. Les trois variables sont donc le whisky, les "cons" et les écrits des journalistes! 

J'en prends note...

 

[Henri K.]

Finalement il n'y a pas de déclaration commune au sommet de la défense des pays ASEAN, à cause qu'une divergence profonde entre des pays d'ASEAN et qui se sont divisés en 2 camps, ceux qui sont rangés aux côtés de la Chine, et l'autre côté avec le Vietnam et les Philippines qui se sont mis avec l'Australie, les Etats Unis et le Japon.

Dans le même temps, le Ministre chinois de la défense a fait de multiples rencontres :

Avec le vice premier ministre du Cambodge

Avec le Ministre malais de la défense

Avec le Ministre de la défense australien

Avec le Ministre de la défense sud coréen

Avec le Ministre de la défense japonais

Henri K.

[rogue0]

C'est au tour de Taiwan d'aménager son avant-poste sur Taiping (mer de chine méridionale)

Construction d'installation portuaires en cours:

http://www.janes.com/article/55978/taiwan-s-new-harbour-on-taiping-taking-shape

[Lezard-vert]

"La Chine a fait preuve d'une "grande retenue" dans l'affaire des litiges territoriaux en mer de Chine méridionale, a déclaré aujourd'hui le vice-ministre chinois des Affaires étrangères, Liu Zhenmin.

"Le gouvernement chinois a le droit et la capacité de recouvrer toutes les îles et tous les récifs illégalement occupés par des pays voisins", a-t-il dit. "Mais nous ne l'avons pas fait. Nous avons fait preuve d'une grande retenue afin de préserver la paix et la stabilité en mer de Chine méridionale".

Pékin revendique la souveraineté de la quasi-totalité de la mer de Chine méridionale, rejetant les revendications du Vietnam, des Philippines, de Taiwan, de Malaisie et du sultanat de Bruneï sur certaines parties."

 

Ben tien rien  que ça ... il prennent  leurs désirs pour des réalités les chinois.

[Henri K.]

La Chine et l'Indonésie ont mené un exercice conjoint de simulation de sauvetage pour la mer de Chine méridionale.

Selon le média "The National Interest", la Malaisie a autorisé l'utilisation de son port Kota Kinabalu par la marine chinoise. L'accord est signé lors de la visite du Commandant en chef de la marine chinoise à la Malaisie.

A noter que lors de l'opération FONOP (Freedom of Navigation Operation) menée récemment par le destroyer USS Lassen de l'US Navy dans la mer de Chine méridionale, ce dernier a été suivi par les navires chinois dès sa sortie du port de Kota Kinabalu, rapporte l'US Navy.

The Chinese Navy and the Quest for Access

Geoff Wade

November 18, 2015

In a quiet but undoubtedly significant event, Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利), commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and a member of the PRC’s Central Military Commission recently visited Malaysia with an entourage of 10 senior officials. During his visit, Admiral Wu secured agreement from the Malaysian Navy for the ships of the PLA Navy to use the port of Kota Kinabalu in Malaysian Borneo as a "stopover location" to "strengthen defence ties between the two countries."

What’s remarkable is the environment in which this agreement has been reached. China’s military vessels have been active in Malaysia’s territorial waters off Borneo from 2011. Since 2013, the number of Chinese naval and coast guard vessels patrolling and anchoring around Malaysia’s Luconia Shoals and James Shoal, both of which are within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, has increased greatly, and PRC territory markers have been erected on the latter.

In June, National Security Minister Shahidan Kassim said that Malaysia would protest to China about the PRC Coast Guard ship long anchored in Malaysian waters at Luconia Shoals, while legislators voiced their unhappiness with the situation. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry has more recently been lodging weekly protests with Beijing over the presence of the Chinese ship in the area. While the anchored PRC ship is being monitored, there have been reports that Malaysian fishermen are still being driven away from the shoals by Chinese threats to facilitate Chinese fishing boats’ exploitation of the area.

Further, only a day after Admiral Wu left Malaysia, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, visited Sabah and started berating ‘a regional superpower’ which has built facilities on three atolls just 155km from Sabah and "3,218km from its mainland.' "To claim this part of the South China Sea as theirs due to historical narrative is invalid," the Deputy Prime Minister Zahid noted.

Why then do we have this agreement now by the Malaysian Navy for Chinese navy port access to Sabah? And which part of the Malaysian administration was responsible for approving it?

Access to a northern Borneo port has long been an ambition of the PLA Navy in its efforts to expand control in the South China Sea. Two years ago, in a Strategist posting entitled Xi Jinping and the Sabah enigma, I noted how Xi Jinping’s planned visit to Sabah (subsequently aborted) reflected PRC efforts to increase links with that key region of northern Borneo. Chinese naval personnel first visited Kota Kinabalu in August 2013.

Later that year, direct contact between Malaysia’s Naval Region Command 2 (Mawilla 2) and China’s Southern Sea Fleet Command was initiated and Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein invited China’s Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan (常万全), to visit the Royal Malaysian Navy base in Teluk Sepanggar, Sabah, to jointly launch the tie-up. At the same time, Malaysia and China announced joint military exercises for 2014, eventually held in 2015 in the Strait of Malacca. A PRC consulate was established in Kota Kinabalu in April 2015 and the new consul-general began by urging that Chinese-language signs be erected across Sabah.

But back to Admiral Wu’s journey. During his current peregrination, Admiral Wu is visiting Malaysia, Indonesia and the Maldives, undoubtedly reflecting Chinese naval access aspirations in those three regions. This is one of three trips to neighbouring countries by senior PRC military officials this month. Admiral Sun Jianguo (孙建国), Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Department, accompanied Xi Jinping on his visit to Vietnam in early November. General Fan Changlong (范长龙), Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, is also currently leading a military delegation to Pakistan and India. A Global Times commentary suggests that all three trips are related to expanding China’s maritime interests.

In the light of these visits and increasing PRC maritime assertiveness, only the most innocent would, on observing the location of Darwin between the South China Sea and the Indian and South Pacific Oceans, conclude that the PLA Navy would not likewise be interested in securing access to and facilities in the port of Darwin. Particularly if it was under the control of a Chinese enterprise for the coming century.

This piece first appeared in ASPI’s The Strategist here.

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Le 18 Novembre, la marine chinoise et le marine vietnamienne ont mené leur 19ème patrouille conjointe dans le golfe du Tonkin.

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Le plus grand navire de l'armée de terre, un navire de soutien logistique Type 701 qui déplace à 2 700 t, est affecté aux Paracels dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

Une photo de cette classe de navire, pour le moment 2 sont construits :

Henri K.

Modifié le 23 novembre 2015 par Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Le 13 Novembre, un navire de transport vietnamien Hải Đăng 05 qui tentait de pénétrer dans les eux du récif Subi a été expulsé par le garde-côtes et la marine chinoise.

Le LST 995 Wan Yangshan, les patrouilleurs immatriculés 2305 et 35115, ont participé aux manœuvres.

Sources en vietnamien :

http://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/video-tau-hai-canh-trung-quoc-ruot-duoi-chia-sung-de-doa-tau-dan-su-viet-nam-638924.html

http://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/video-tau-hai-canh-trung-quoc-hung-han-doa-tau-hai-dang-05-639115.html

http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/thoi-su/tau-chien-trung-quoc-chia-sung-de-doa-tau-tiep-te-viet-nam-3318989.html

Henri K.

[rogue0]

Signature d'une loi US pour encadrer une "South China Sea Initiative".

http://www.janes.com/article/56273/united-states-enacts-south-china-sea-initiative

Si j'ai bien compris, le Pentagone et le Département d'état sont autorisés à coordonner des alliances / activités / exercices/ entraînements / coopérations avec les pays bordant la Mer de Chine.
S'ils veulent que ça soit vraiment efficace (et pas seulement du Valium face à la PLAN), va falloir mettre le paquet sur le budget ...

 

[Henri K.]

La CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) investit 200 millions de Yuan et construit une base de soutien logistique dans le Nord de l'île de Haïnan, pour supporter ses forages et les puits dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

La CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) annonce le 2 Décembre que sa plateforme de forage mobile 981 a réalisé avec succès un forage au fond profond pour la première fois dans la mer de Chine méridionale. 

Le puits Lingshui-18-1-1 est un puits de pré-sondage, la profondeur de l'eau est de 1 688 m, et celle du puits est de 2 927 m. C'est la première fois que les Chinois atteignent une telle profondeur avec leurs propres technologies.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2015-12/02/c_1117333172.htm

http://www.cosl.com.cn/art/2015/11/9/art_14991_2187981.html

On peut localiser précisément ce puits Lingshui-18-1-1 à l'aide de l'alerte de navigation HN-059 :

http://www.hnmsa.gov.cn/hxnews_114.aspx

琼航警0059 南海 2015年10月22日至11月20日，“海洋石油981”钻井平台在17-34.64N 110-55.52E处进行钻井作业，禁止驶入其2000米范围内。

HN0059 SOUTH CHINA SEA DRILLING WORK BY M/V “HAI YANG SHI YOU 981” IN 17-34.64N 110-55.52E FROM 22 OCT TO 20 NOV 15. ENTERING PROHIBITED WITHIN 2000 METRES RADIUS OF IT . HAINAN MSA CHINA.

D'autres forages sont en cours, avec le puits Lingshui-18-2-1, et dans 2 autres zones que j'ai marqué en jaune.

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Intéressant...

Why Beijing’s South China Sea Moves Make Sense Now

Greg Austin

December 16, 2015

China’s military activities on its ocean frontier have given rise to a fear that it’s seeking to expand its power at the expense of others now that it has a more powerful navy. The essence of this idea is that China’s activities are expansionist and more aggressive compared with twenty or thirty years ago because it has a new urge for more territory or because it wants to throw its new-found weight around in maritime areas to rewrite regional order.

Another interpretation is possible, more in conformity with the facts, and less sinister.

China’s ocean frontier has, for the most part, never been settled in the five centuries since the idea of maritime borders under international law was first articulated in 1609.

China’s primary motivation in recent South China Sea military activities, then, is to defend what it sees as its island territories which neighboring countries have attempted to usurp.

Regional order (the balance of economic and military power between Japan and China and between the mainland and Taiwan) has already been rewritten by China’s peaceful rise and any additional gains accruing from the control of its claimed small island territories in the South China Sea would be marginal. For China, the main game on its maritime frontier is successful unification with Taiwan, which sits at the northern end of the South China Sea. Though China has come to describe the dispute in the Spratly Islands as a “core interest” because it involves sovereign territory, that is hardly new and is only a statement of the obvious. The more important characterization driving Chinese policy for decades has remained, as one Chinese government adviser observed in 1996, that the Spratly dispute is “small in scale and local in nature.”

Beginning in the mid-1800s, colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal, Russia and Japan successively became involved in carving out spheres of influence or de facto sovereignty (“concessions” of some kind) over enclaves of Chinese land territory in such a way that the country, weak in naval power, didn’t place any priority on asserting or protecting a maritime frontier.

It wasn’t until an 1887 treaty with France delimiting a sea border with the French protectorate of Tonkin that China began to take any action to demarcate and defend an ocean frontier. That came just two years after China had been forced by Japan to cede the island of Taiwan and associated small islands to Japanese sovereignty. And it was only with the defeat of Japan in 1945 that China again was in a position to demarcate and defend its maritime frontier, including around Taiwan, free from foreign military threat, invasion or occupation.

The opportunity was short-lived because the country again fell into civil war, which resulted in an enduring stalemate about the country’s ocean frontier. In 1949, the Communist victory was incomplete. The rival government, the Republic of China (ROC) was able to establish itself on Taiwan and the mainland government was forced into a protracted and still unfinished series of island wars and political contests to mark out a maritime frontier.

Beginning with Canada in 1970, major Western powers still recognizing the ROC began to shift their diplomatic recognition from it to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This has the inevitable effect under international law of preserving to a unitary China (led by the only recognized government) all territorial rights of the ROC prior to 1949. Of special significance, these include the ROC claim to the Spratly Islands, manifested in 1946 through physical occupation of the island of Taiping (Itu Aba). The ROC and the PRC maintain nearly identical territorial claims in the South China Sea.

China’s current claims on its ocean frontier comprise three main elements: claim to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and other ROC-controlled islands, claim to territorial sovereignty over a large number of other small islands in the South China Sea (Paracel and Spratly islands) or East China Sea (Senkaku Islands), and claims to maritime resource jurisdictions (not sovereignty) that might flow to China if its claims to the land territories were recognized by adjacent states.

With the exception of the claim to the Senkaku Islands, the territorial claims of China haven’t changed since before 1949. It was the ROC that in 1970 first claimed the Senkaku Islands and the PRC was forced to follow suit since both governments were at that time competing to be seen as defending the sovereignty of “one China."

The extent and character of China’s sovereignty claims aren’t unusual and in broad terms conform to the practice of other states with only one clear set of exceptions: China appears to claim sovereignty over submerged reefs that wouldn’t normally qualify as land territory.

It’s regularly asserted by some scholars, media commentators and other analysts that China claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea. But that is based on a misunderstanding of the so-called nine-dashed line that China has repeatedly included in maps of the South China since 1947. In December 2014, in a study of China’s potential ocean frontier in the South China Sea, the U.S. Department of State observed correctly that China has never clarified the jurisdictional intent of the U-shaped line.

Thus, the current maritime territorial disputes predate the rise of China’s power and increase in its naval capability. Any assumption that China has somehow expanded its maritime claims because it now feels more powerful is not borne out by the facts. One of many things that have changed about the disputes is China’s willingness to act robustly, as most states would, to defend pre-existing sovereignty claims that have been in place for at least 66 years.

Greg Austin is a Professorial Fellow with the EastWest Institute in New York and a Visiting Professor at the University of New South Wales Canberra. This article first appeared in the Strategist.

How China's Worldviews Are Manifested in the South China Sea

Merriden Varrall

December 16, 2015

With the ongoing controversy over China's activities in the South China Sea, it is timely to explore how Chinese worldviews play out in practice. In particular, it is worth considering how they underpin Chinese foreign-policy behavior now, and may do so in the future; and how our own behavior may ultimately be counter-productive if we continue to ignore how the Chinese see the world.

The key worldviews in Chinese foreign policy are: the century of humiliation; the view of cultural characteristics as being inherent and unchanging; the idea of history as destiny; and notions of filial piety and familial obligation as they apply both inside China and to China’s neighbors.

Overall, these four worldviews add up to a China that believes it is on course to resume the central role it previously played in regional and global affairs, and that the outside world should recognize this. It feels it has been held back from this central role by the United States and some U.S. allies, and that these powers will continue to restrict China’s development where they can. 

China’s recent actions in the South China Sea reflect several of these narratives, especially the narrative of history as destiny. According to this view, Chinese actions in the South China Sea reflect its gradual resumption of its rightful and respected place in the region. 

China’s attitude towards the other claimants in the South China Sea reflects the narrative of filial piety and familial obligation. In this view, China’s role is that of a father figure and benevolent overseer of a peaceful region, in which its neighbors willingly and without coercion pay tribute and homage. By the same token, if China’s neighbors do not willingly pay tribute and homage then this is seen to justify taking stronger measures to ensure that this familial order is respected.

The narratives of the century of humiliation and the unchanging nature of cultural characteristics also inform how China sees the role that the United States is playing in the South China Sea. China interprets U.S. actions like its recent freedom of navigation patrol not as some limited exercise to uphold international maritime norms but as part of a long-standing effort to maintain its hegemony and keep China from resuming its rightful place in the world.

China’s recent actions in the East China Sea also reflect the four narratives noted above. China and Japan have had a long-term dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands which flared up again in 2012. In November 2013, China announced the creation of a new air defense identification zone (ADIZ) around the islands. 

In this situation, the narratives of cultural characteristics as unchanging and the century of humiliation are particularly resonant. The focus is very much on Japan and the danger that it is seen to represent to China. This draws on the strong historical memory in China of Japanese expansionism in World War II, a memory that the Chinese authorities have done much recently to revive. Japan is portrayed as naturally imperialistic, expansionist, and untrustworthy.

The four worldviews are not just relevant to understanding Chinese behavior when it comes to security issues. Both the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and One Belt One Road initiatives (OBOR has a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and ocean-going Maritime Silk Road, and aims to increase connectivity and cooperation among countries, principally in Eurasia) reflect the century of humiliation narrative and the idea of history as destiny. Both are portrayed within China as evidence that China is finally overcoming its period of weakness and vulnerability. As one Chinese academic said to me, these initiatives represent "a great shift from the idea of just taking care of ourselves." Rather, they are seen as a way for China to resume its rightful position as a wealthy, strong, and responsible power, at the center of a web of regional economic interdependence.

A call to understand these worldviews is not an argument for appeasement. In some cases policymakers will need to respond firmly to Chinese actions, even if this may have longer-term costs. In the East China Sea, the strong reaction of the United States and some of its allies to China’s ADIZ may well have reinforced narratives of persecution and humiliation.

However, understanding Chinese worldviews can help policymakers to develop responses that do not reinforce the negative aspects of these narratives in ways that are ultimately counterproductive. For example, in China, Washington’s tough response to the AIIB and its ambivalent attitude to OBOR will have reinforced the idea that despite its calls for China to be a responsible stakeholder, no matter what China does on the world stage, the United States will always try to curb China’s emergence as a more central actor in the international system.

Ultimately, choices about how the United States and its allies respond to China need to be taken on a case-by-case basis. In some cases U.S. and other Western policymakers may see no option but to take action that reinforces the more negative aspects of the Chinese narratives outlined above. In other cases, however, an understanding of these Chinese worldviews can help policymakers to avoid actions that are needlessly counterproductive.

Merriden Varrall's recent Lowy Institute Analysis: China's WorldViews and China's Foreign Policy can be downloaded here. This article first appeared in the Interpreter.

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Un B-52 de l'armée américaine a survolé le récif de Cuarteron en mer de Chine méridionale le 10 Décembre. Ce récif fait parti des îlots sous le contrôle de la Chine que cette dernière y mène des travaux d'agrandissement.

Le Pentagone va "investiguer" sur cet incident "non intentionnelle" et l'un des officiers parle de la cause "météorologique".

Personnellement, c'est comme baisser son pantalon pour péter. Quand tu veux y aller pour montrer qui est le patron, tu y vas franco. Déjà parce que tu y vas toi-même et non envoyer des petits du coin pour faire le boulot à ta place, alors de là à trouver une excuse bidon météorologique, c'est exactement comme le passage de l'USS Lassen dans le coin en Novembre où l'US Navy "précise" que les radars de conduite de tir sont éteints...

Et en plus concrètement ça ne va strictement rien changer, ceux qui veulent passer à côté pour cramer du fiole peuvent passer, la Chine va gueuler un peu symboliquement comme toujours mais va surtout continuer à fortifier et terminer les travaux déjà entamés, ça va devenir un fait acquis et les pays autour seront amenés à collaborer. On voit déjà le vent tourné avec la Malaisie et l'Indonésie. Carotte et bâton, ça a toujours marché.

U.S. Bomber Flies Over Waters Claimed by China

 

Citation

eijing files diplomatic protest over the B-52 flight; Pentagon claims route was unintentional

By JEREMY PAGE in Beijing and  GORDON LUBOLD in Manama, Bahrain
Updated Dec. 18, 2015 7:11 p.m. ET

An American B-52 bomber on a routine mission over the South China Sea unintentionally flew within two nautical miles of an artificial island built by China, senior defense officials said, exacerbating a hotly divisive issue for Washington and Beijing.

Pentagon officials told The Wall Street Journal they are investigating why one of two B-52s on the mission last week flew closer than planned to Cuarteron Reef in the Spratly Islands, an area where China and its neighbors have competing territorial claims. A senior U.S. defense official said that bad weather had contributed to the pilot flying off course and into the area claimed by China.

Beijing filed a formal diplomatic complaint with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which prompted the Pentagon to look into the matter.

The flight comes amid rising tensions over China’s island-building program and U.S. operations to challenge Beijing’s broad but vaguely defined claims in the area.

In late October, a U.S. Navy destroyer sailed within 12 nautical miles of another Chinese-built island in the Spratlys. Two American B-52s also flew close to the islands last month but didn’t go within 12 nautical miles, a boundary marking a country’s territorial waters.

Unlike those patrols, the route taken by the B-52 this week wasn’t planned, according to the Pentagon. “For this mission, there was no intention of flying to within 12 nautical miles,” said Cmdr. Bill Urban, a Pentagon spokesman.

“The Chinese have raised concerns with us about the flight path of a recent mission,” he said. “We are looking into the matter.”

China’s Defense Ministry said that both of the American B-52 bombers on Dec. 10 “entered without authorization the airspace around the relevant islands and reefs” of the Spratlys, but didn’t specify the precise area.

The ministry said this and other U.S. operations in the area were “serious military provocations” that endangered Chinese personnel and could cause the militarization of the South China Sea. It added that the Chinese military would take “all necessary measures” to protect China’s sovereignty.

The incident is diplomatically awkward for the White House, which is trying to maintain stable ties with the world’s No. 2 economy while responding to pressure from U.S. allies in Asia, as well as the Pentagon and Congress, to push back against Beijing’s recent military assertiveness.

Aside from the South China Sea, other security issues roiling relations included alleged cyberattacks by China on the U.S.

On Wednesday, Beijing lodged another formal protest after the U.S. approved a $1.83 billion arms sale to Taiwan, an island that China claims but doesn’t control.

Cuarteron lies about 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) south of China’s Hainan island. Since mid-2014, reclamation has expanded the reef by more than 230,000 square meters (57 acres); it now includes two helipads, possible gun or missile emplacements and two possible radar towers, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Washington has grown alarmed at the speed at which China’s artificial islands have expanded—from a total of 2,000 acres earlier this year to more than 3,000 acres by September, according to Defense Department documents.

Cuarteron is one of seven rocks and reefs in the Spratlys where China has built artificial islands in the past year, as part of what neighbors fear is a program to better enforce its claims and establish control over one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

China says it guarantees freedom of navigation, but has “indisputable” sovereignty over all South China Sea islands and adjacent waters. It says the new facilities are for civilian purposes such as weather monitoring, as well as national defense.

Many maritime law experts categorize Cuarteron as a rock rather than a reef, a difference that some maritime experts say figures into Washington’s strategy in the South China Sea.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, natural islands and rocks are entitled to territorial seas stretching out 12 nautical miles, whereas most reefs that are submerged at high tide aren’t.

Thus, some maritime experts say Washington had planned to focus its overflights and ship passages on Chinese installations built on such reefs.

Cmdr. Urban said the Pentagon didn’t consider this week’s B-52 flight to be a freedom of navigation operation. The term is used by the Pentagon to describe missions meant to challenge what the U.S. sees as excessive claims to territorial waters.

Cmdr. Urban said Chinese personnel on the ground warned the aircraft during the flight but there was no indication that the Chinese military had scrambled jet fighters. He declined to say whether any disciplinary action had been taken or if other flights had been grounded.

While the U.S. says it doesn’t take sides in the territorial dispute, U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Ash Carter, have said the U.S. will fly or sail wherever it believes international law permits.

The U.S. conducts routine B-52 flights from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam throughout the Asia-Pacific region under a program known as “continuous bomber presence” started in 2004 to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to security in the region.

 

Le récif de Cuarteron en fin Août 2015

Sur l'ensemble des îlots, les travaux ne s'arrêtent pas et avancent très bien. Ici sur le récif de Fiery Cross le 19 Novembre 2015 :

Henri K.

Modifié le 19 décembre 2015 par Henri K.

[French Kiss]

C'est les annexes clubmed de la PLA navy? ils ont interet a pousser fort sur le traite de limitation de la hausse de temperature defini lors de la COP21 s'ils veulent que leurs investissements portent dans le long terme...

Il parait evident que les gesticulations US ne peuvent avoir un impact sur l'expansionnisme chinois, il faudrait vraiment qu'une de ces rencontres parte gravement en sucette pour que le regime de communication diplomatique regional change vraiment de ton.

[Bat]

Citation

 

La Chine dénonce une provocation après le survol des îles Spratleys par un avion américain

La Chine a accusé les Etats-Unis de provocation après qu’un bombardier B-52 américain a survolé la semaine dernière les îles Spratleys, une zone de la mer de Chine méridionale quasi intégralement revendiquée par Pékin.

Dans un communiqué, publié samedi 19 décembre, le ministère chinois de la défense estime que les Etats-Unis font délibérément monter la pression dans cette zone située sur une des principales routes commerciales du monde, riche en ressources naturelles et revendiquées par plusieurs pays du sud-est asiatique. Le ministère, qui reproche à l’appareil américain de s’être approché à deux miles nautiques de l’un des îlots artificiels chinois de la région, a demandé aux autorités américaines de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour respecter la souveraineté chinoise.

Le Pentagone, saisi d’une réclamation déposée par Pékin auprès de l’ambassade américaine, a indiqué se pencher sur le dossier. (...)

 

Suite: http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2015/12/19/la-chine-denonce-une-provocation-apres-le-survol-des-iles-spratleys-par-un-bombardier-americain_4834980_3216.html#0LKhvWSsSLJix1CD.99

[Henri K.]

Face à la protestation du Ministère vietnamien des affaires étrangères sur les essais à venir dans le nouvel aérodrome du récif de Fiery Cross, le porte-parole chinois des affaires étrangères répond dans la conférence de presse hebdomadaire que les travaux de la piste sont terminés, le gouvernement chinois va utiliser des avions civils pour vérifier la conformité des installations par rapport aux normes. La Chine ne tient pas compte de ces accusations étrangères sur ce qu'il se passe sur le sol chinois.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1329221.shtml

Henri K.

[Bat]

il y a 29 minutes, Henri K. said:

Face à la protestation du Ministère vietnamien des affaires étrangères sur les essais à venir dans le nouvel aérodrome du récif de Fiery Cross, le porte-parole chinois des affaires étrangères répond dans la conférence de presse hebdomadaire que les travaux de la piste sont terminés, le gouvernement chinois va utiliser des avions civils pour vérifier la conformité des installations par rapport aux normes. La Chine ne tient pas compte de ces accusations étrangères sur ce qu'il se passe sur le sol chinois.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1329221.shtml

Henri K.

Donc si je décode: Fiery Cross = le sol chinois?

[Henri K.]

il y a 11 minutes, Bat said:

Donc si je décode: Fiery Cross = le sol chinois?

Je ne sais pas, tu peux leur demander si tu veux.

Henri K.

[Urgan]

il y a 42 minutes, Henri K. said:

Je ne sais pas, tu peux leur demander si tu veux.

Henri K.

Ou aux vietnamiens. Ou aux phillipins. 

Tout le problème est là.