Armée de l'air Finlandaise - Ilmavoimat

[prof.566]

https://pastebin.com/eJkkms0r

 

Un article du chef de projet. Traduit en anglqis.

Modifié le 15 mai 2018 par prof.566

[mgtstrategy]

  Le 15/05/2018 à 11:21, clem200 a dit :

Comme partout dans le monde. On fait des gros jouets technologiques chères et fragiles. 

Heureusement que les décideurs sont plus malin que ça. La preuve, Ils nous prennent des centrales nucléaires ..

Expand  

haha j'adore le coté pince sans rire de cet humour et blague

[zx]

New team seeks local firms for Finland’s fighter replacement contract

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/05/11/new-team-seeks-local-firms-for-finlands-fighter-replacement-contract/

[herciv]

  Le 15/05/2018 à 13:14, prof.566 a dit :

https://pastebin.com/eJkkms0r

 

Un article du chef de projet. Traduit en anglqis.

Expand  

 C'est celui que j'ai copié au-dessus. 

[prof.566]

  Le 16/05/2018 à 08:54, herciv a dit :

 C'est celui que j'ai copié au-dessus. 

Expand  

Dsl. PAs vu.

[Ponto Combo]

C'est parti pour le RFP préliminaire... Décision en 2021.

• The first requirement is maintenance and security of supply (The unique and highly centralised maintenance model of the F-35 Lightning II has raised questions whether the aircraft can meet the requirements for security of supply for militarily non-aligned Finland)
• Moving on from here comes the life-cycle costs
• Industrial cooperation will then be the third step
• Following these go/no-go criterias comes wartime performance.(The Wide Area Display is one of many features which makes the JAS 39E Gripen a quantum leap over the older C/D-generation. But how will the wartime performance of the relatively light fighter measure up against the larger competitors?)

L'article est plutôt centré sur le F35, le Gripen et le Rafale sous l’angle des relations avec la France. L'Eurofighter n'est presque pas cité. Quelques points très intéressants.

 

The preliminary request for quotations for the HX-program is now out, and the process is kicking into the next gear. The manufacturers will have about three-quarters of a year from when it was sent out before they will have to return their answers early next year. However, what happens after that is the really interesting part.

  Révéler le contenu masqué

The offers will be evaluated according to a stepped ladder of requirements, where all stages except the last one are of the go/no-go nature. If the preliminary bid doesn’t meet the requirements of a step it is back to go and the negotiation table (note, this is where the ‘preliminary’ comes into the process), and the Defence Forces will discuss with the manufacturer how their bid can be tuned to meet the requirements so that an updated bid can pass the step and move on to the top of the ladder. The goal is not to shake down the field, but to get the best possible offer from all five companies when it is time for the final and legally binding offers.

The first requirement is maintenance and security of supply. The supplier will have to present a plan for how the aircrafts are able to keep operating both during peacetime and in war. This will require plans for in-country spares and training for maintainers.

Moving on from here comes the life-cycle costs. The project is receiving a start-up sum of up to 10 Bn Euros, but after this is used up the operating costs of the system will have to be covered under the defence budget as it stands today. In other words, the cost of training pilots and ground crew, renewing weapon stocks, maintaining the aircrafts, refuelling – everything will have to be covered by a sum similar to that used for keeping the F/A-18C Hornets in the air. Naturally this ties in to the first requirement, as an aircraft requiring vast amounts of spares and maintenance will have a hard time meeting both the security of supply and the LCC requirements at the same time.

Industrial cooperation will then be the third step. 30% of the total acquisition value will have to be traded back into the country, as a way of making sure that the necessary know-how to maintain the aircrafts in wartime is found domestically (and as such this requirement ties into the two earlier requirements). Notably, current sets of rules require that the industrial cooperation is indeed cooperation directly related to the HX-program. Sponsoring tours of symphonic orchestras might buy you brownie points, but not industrial cooperation.

Following these go/no-go criterias comes wartime performance. This is the only requirement which will be graded. The Defence Forces will run a number of simulations of how the aircraft would perform in different missions and scenarios, gather information from the field, and possibly do flight trials. All of this will then come together to give a picture of how a given aircraft would perform as part of the greater Finnish Defence Forces in wartime.

Yes, wartime performance as part of the whole FDF is the sole factor that will rank the aircrafts in the acquisition proposal put forward to the MoD by the Finnish Defence Forces.

“But wait!” I hear you say. “Doesn’t economic considerations count for anything?”

Yes, indeed they do. Wartime performance require more than just 64 aircraft. If you can squeeze the price on the aircraft and its maintenance costs, the pilots will be able to receive more flight hours, and the Defence Forces will be able to stock more advanced weaponry (the low stocks of which is identified as a key issue in the latest Puolustusselonteko). Thus a cheaper aircraft allows the Defence Forces will provide more room for other things, which in the end make it more dangerous to the enemy.

Having received the acquisition proposal from the Defence Forces, the MoD takes over, and their job is to bring in the national security policy aspect into the equation. The national security evaluation coupled with the evaluation of wartime performance is then used to create the final acquisition proposal made by the MoD and put forward to the then government (i.e. the one which will take over following the next parliamentary elections). The final decision will then take place in 2021.

That the MoD will make a national security evaluation is interesting as it leaves room for politics overruling the wartime performance (though likely only to a certain extent). At first glance this would seem to favour the US contenders, however the situation might be more complex than that, thanks to the law of diminishing marginal utility. To what extent would a fighter deal actually deepen the already strong Finnish-US bilateral relations? There are already eleven confirmed export customers for the F-35, and a double-digit number of countries have bought into other US fighter programs as well, so would Finland’s inclusion (or absence) from that group be noticed in Washington? The US is also already Finland’s premier arms exporter (2015 numbers, unfortunately I didn’t find newer ones), and while this in parts comes from weapons for the Hornet-program, a number of other potential deals are on the horizon.

The Swedish offering has understandably not gathered quite the same number of export customers, but here as well even without a fighter deal the bilateral Finnish-Swedish cooperation is reaching levels that make one wonder whether significant improvements are possible? Geography and shared history also seems to dictate that the relation would survive Gripen failing to secure the HX order (though Charly might disagree). The benefits of operating the same aircraft is obvious when it comes to interoperability, but for political benefits it is doubtful how much 10 Bn (in the short term) actually would buy.

Enter France, a European powerhouse with an army still measured in divisions, a permanent seat at the UN security council, a nuclear strike force, a rather low threshold for military interventions, and a marked disinterest in what takes place on the northern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Finnish fighter order would be a big deal for Dassault, accounting for 40% of the total number of Rafale’s exported (96 firm orders to date plus 64 aircrafts for HX). It is also eye catching that a large percentage of the whole sum would go to France, compared to the larger amounts of foreign content in the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JAS 39E Gripen.

10 Bn Euros would not buy Finland a French expeditionary corps brimming with Leclercs in case of a Russian invasion. However, they just might ensure that Paris starts paying more attention to what happens in the European far north, courtesy of increased exchanges of people, experiences, and arms deals. If Finland would face an attack, having France as a political ally in Brussels and in the UNSC would be significant, even if the support would stop short of a military intervention. Another element is that as Washington is proving to be a more unreliable ally, the importance of the EU security cooperation is bound to increase (though granted from a low level to a somewhat less-low one), and with “the other European power” (Germany) showing limited appetite for anything resembling a confrontation with Russia over eastern Europe, the role of France in the greater Finnish security picture seems set to increase.

While Finnish security policy is famed for being slow in altering course and likely to favour trying to cash in further political points with Sweden or the USA, the question deserves to be asked:

Might it just be that we would gain more by having this investment go into our relationship with France?

https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/06/13/the-path-forward-for-hx/

[Boule75]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 17:47, Ponto Combo a dit :

C'est parti pour le RFP préliminaire... Décision en 2021.

https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/06/13/the-path-forward-for-hx/

Expand  

Je ne m'attendais pas à une conclusion aussi aimable pour la France, plus encore que pour l'avion. Là, le Caporal Fisk en est à se lamenter que Paris ne fasse pas plus attention au Nord de l'Europe !

 

Mazette, comme les temps changent...

D'ici à ce que les suédois re-regardent les devis pour le SAMPT.

[TarpTent]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 17:47, Ponto Combo a dit :

C'est parti pour le RFP préliminaire... Décision en 2021.

• The first requirement is maintenance and security of supply (The unique and highly centralised maintenance model of the F-35 Lightning II has raised questions whether the aircraft can meet the requirements for security of supply for militarily non-aligned Finland)
• Moving on from here comes the life-cycle costs
• Industrial cooperation will then be the third step
• Following these go/no-go criterias comes wartime performance.(The Wide Area Display is one of many features which makes the JAS 39E Gripen a quantum leap over the older C/D-generation. But how will the wartime performance of the relatively light fighter measure up against the larger competitors?)

L'article est plutôt centré sur le F35, le Gripen et le Rafale sous l’angle des relations avec la France. L'Eurofighter n'est presque pas cité. Quelques points très intéressants.

 

The preliminary request for quotations for the HX-program is now out, and the process is kicking into the next gear. The manufacturers will have about three-quarters of a year from when it was sent out before they will have to return their answers early next year. However, what happens after that is the really interesting part.

  Révéler le contenu masqué

The offers will be evaluated according to a stepped ladder of requirements, where all stages except the last one are of the go/no-go nature. If the preliminary bid doesn’t meet the requirements of a step it is back to go and the negotiation table (note, this is where the ‘preliminary’ comes into the process), and the Defence Forces will discuss with the manufacturer how their bid can be tuned to meet the requirements so that an updated bid can pass the step and move on to the top of the ladder. The goal is not to shake down the field, but to get the best possible offer from all five companies when it is time for the final and legally binding offers.

The first requirement is maintenance and security of supply. The supplier will have to present a plan for how the aircrafts are able to keep operating both during peacetime and in war. This will require plans for in-country spares and training for maintainers.

Moving on from here comes the life-cycle costs. The project is receiving a start-up sum of up to 10 Bn Euros, but after this is used up the operating costs of the system will have to be covered under the defence budget as it stands today. In other words, the cost of training pilots and ground crew, renewing weapon stocks, maintaining the aircrafts, refuelling – everything will have to be covered by a sum similar to that used for keeping the F/A-18C Hornets in the air. Naturally this ties in to the first requirement, as an aircraft requiring vast amounts of spares and maintenance will have a hard time meeting both the security of supply and the LCC requirements at the same time.

Industrial cooperation will then be the third step. 30% of the total acquisition value will have to be traded back into the country, as a way of making sure that the necessary know-how to maintain the aircrafts in wartime is found domestically (and as such this requirement ties into the two earlier requirements). Notably, current sets of rules require that the industrial cooperation is indeed cooperation directly related to the HX-program. Sponsoring tours of symphonic orchestras might buy you brownie points, but not industrial cooperation.

Following these go/no-go criterias comes wartime performance. This is the only requirement which will be graded. The Defence Forces will run a number of simulations of how the aircraft would perform in different missions and scenarios, gather information from the field, and possibly do flight trials. All of this will then come together to give a picture of how a given aircraft would perform as part of the greater Finnish Defence Forces in wartime.

Yes, wartime performance as part of the whole FDF is the sole factor that will rank the aircrafts in the acquisition proposal put forward to the MoD by the Finnish Defence Forces.

“But wait!” I hear you say. “Doesn’t economic considerations count for anything?”

Yes, indeed they do. Wartime performance require more than just 64 aircraft. If you can squeeze the price on the aircraft and its maintenance costs, the pilots will be able to receive more flight hours, and the Defence Forces will be able to stock more advanced weaponry (the low stocks of which is identified as a key issue in the latest Puolustusselonteko). Thus a cheaper aircraft allows the Defence Forces will provide more room for other things, which in the end make it more dangerous to the enemy.

Having received the acquisition proposal from the Defence Forces, the MoD takes over, and their job is to bring in the national security policy aspect into the equation. The national security evaluation coupled with the evaluation of wartime performance is then used to create the final acquisition proposal made by the MoD and put forward to the then government (i.e. the one which will take over following the next parliamentary elections). The final decision will then take place in 2021.

That the MoD will make a national security evaluation is interesting as it leaves room for politics overruling the wartime performance (though likely only to a certain extent). At first glance this would seem to favour the US contenders, however the situation might be more complex than that, thanks to the law of diminishing marginal utility. To what extent would a fighter deal actually deepen the already strong Finnish-US bilateral relations? There are already eleven confirmed export customers for the F-35, and a double-digit number of countries have bought into other US fighter programs as well, so would Finland’s inclusion (or absence) from that group be noticed in Washington? The US is also already Finland’s premier arms exporter (2015 numbers, unfortunately I didn’t find newer ones), and while this in parts comes from weapons for the Hornet-program, a number of other potential deals are on the horizon.

The Swedish offering has understandably not gathered quite the same number of export customers, but here as well even without a fighter deal the bilateral Finnish-Swedish cooperation is reaching levels that make one wonder whether significant improvements are possible? Geography and shared history also seems to dictate that the relation would survive Gripen failing to secure the HX order (though Charly might disagree). The benefits of operating the same aircraft is obvious when it comes to interoperability, but for political benefits it is doubtful how much 10 Bn (in the short term) actually would buy.

Enter France, a European powerhouse with an army still measured in divisions, a permanent seat at the UN security council, a nuclear strike force, a rather low threshold for military interventions, and a marked disinterest in what takes place on the northern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Finnish fighter order would be a big deal for Dassault, accounting for 40% of the total number of Rafale’s exported (96 firm orders to date plus 64 aircrafts for HX). It is also eye catching that a large percentage of the whole sum would go to France, compared to the larger amounts of foreign content in the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JAS 39E Gripen.

10 Bn Euros would not buy Finland a French expeditionary corps brimming with Leclercs in case of a Russian invasion. However, they just might ensure that Paris starts paying more attention to what happens in the European far north, courtesy of increased exchanges of people, experiences, and arms deals. If Finland would face an attack, having France as a political ally in Brussels and in the UNSC would be significant, even if the support would stop short of a military intervention. Another element is that as Washington is proving to be a more unreliable ally, the importance of the EU security cooperation is bound to increase (though granted from a low level to a somewhat less-low one), and with “the other European power” (Germany) showing limited appetite for anything resembling a confrontation with Russia over eastern Europe, the role of France in the greater Finnish security picture seems set to increase.

While Finnish security policy is famed for being slow in altering course and likely to favour trying to cash in further political points with Sweden or the USA, the question deserves to be asked:

Might it just be that we would gain more by having this investment go into our relationship with France?

https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/06/13/the-path-forward-for-hx/

Expand  

Vous la comprenez comment, cette remarque : « a rather low threshold for military interventions » ?

[Ponto Combo]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:27, TarpTent a dit :

Vous la comprenez comment, cette remarque : « a rather low threshold for military interventions » ?

Expand  

"Un seuil plutôt bas pour les interventions militaires"

[Boule75]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:27, TarpTent a dit :

Vous la comprenez comment, cette remarque : « a rather low threshold for military interventions » ?

Expand  

"Il leur arrive de se bouger le fion"
Variante 1 : "sont susceptibles de ne pas nous abandonner au premier prétexte"
Variante 2 : "le Mali, d'accord, la Lybie, hum !!"

[TarpTent]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:43, Boule75 a dit :

"Il leur arrive de se bouger le fion"
Variante 1 : "sont susceptibles de ne pas nous abandonner au premier prétexte"
Variante 2 : "le Mali, d'accord, la Lybie, hum !!"

Expand  

C’est bien la difficulté que j’ai, de comprendre de quelle variante il s’agit.

Pour eux, on a l’intervention facile donc on est des va-t-en-guerre et c’est négatif, ou bien on est réactif (en ayant confiance en nos capacités et en les employant facilement) et c’est positif ?

[Boule75]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:46, TarpTent a dit :

C’est bien la difficulté que j’ai, de comprendre de quelle variante il s’agit.

Pour eux, on a l’intervention facile donc on est des va-t-en-guerre et c’est négatif, ou bien on est réactif (en ayant confiance en nos capacités et en les employant facilement) et c’est positif ?

Expand  

Je l'interprète comme "positif dans le contexte" : certains n'y vont presque jamais, a contrario la France se sert de son armée.

[Ponto Combo]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:48, Boule75 a dit :

Je l'interprète comme "positif dans le contexte" : certains n'y vont presque jamais, a contrario la France se sert de son armée.

Expand  

Absolument. Voir aussi ce passage:

  Citation

Another element is that as Washington is proving to be a more unreliable ally, the importance of the EU security cooperation is bound to increase (though granted from a low level to a somewhat less-low one), and with “the other European power” (Germany) showing limited appetite for anything resembling a confrontation with Russia over eastern Europe, the role of France in the greater Finnish security picture seems set to increase.

Expand  

 

[Conan le Barbare]

Pas dupe sur le fait que l'Allemagne ne bougera pas le petit doigts si confrontation avec les Russes.

[herciv]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 17:47, Ponto Combo a dit :

C'est parti pour le RFP préliminaire... Décision en 2021.

• The first requirement is maintenance and security of supply (The unique and highly centralised maintenance model of the F-35 Lightning II has raised questions whether the aircraft can meet the requirements for security of supply for militarily non-aligned Finland)
• Moving on from here comes the life-cycle costs
• Industrial cooperation will then be the third step
• Following these go/no-go criterias comes wartime performance.(The Wide Area Display is one of many features which makes the JAS 39E Gripen a quantum leap over the older C/D-generation. But how will the wartime performance of the relatively light fighter measure up against the larger competitors?)

L'article est plutôt centré sur le F35, le Gripen et le Rafale sous l’angle des relations avec la France. L'Eurofighter n'est presque pas cité. Quelques points très intéressants.

 

The preliminary request for quotations for the HX-program is now out, and the process is kicking into the next gear. The manufacturers will have about three-quarters of a year from when it was sent out before they will have to return their answers early next year. However, what happens after that is the really interesting part.

  Révéler le contenu masqué

The offers will be evaluated according to a stepped ladder of requirements, where all stages except the last one are of the go/no-go nature. If the preliminary bid doesn’t meet the requirements of a step it is back to go and the negotiation table (note, this is where the ‘preliminary’ comes into the process), and the Defence Forces will discuss with the manufacturer how their bid can be tuned to meet the requirements so that an updated bid can pass the step and move on to the top of the ladder. The goal is not to shake down the field, but to get the best possible offer from all five companies when it is time for the final and legally binding offers.

The first requirement is maintenance and security of supply. The supplier will have to present a plan for how the aircrafts are able to keep operating both during peacetime and in war. This will require plans for in-country spares and training for maintainers.

Moving on from here comes the life-cycle costs. The project is receiving a start-up sum of up to 10 Bn Euros, but after this is used up the operating costs of the system will have to be covered under the defence budget as it stands today. In other words, the cost of training pilots and ground crew, renewing weapon stocks, maintaining the aircrafts, refuelling – everything will have to be covered by a sum similar to that used for keeping the F/A-18C Hornets in the air. Naturally this ties in to the first requirement, as an aircraft requiring vast amounts of spares and maintenance will have a hard time meeting both the security of supply and the LCC requirements at the same time.

Industrial cooperation will then be the third step. 30% of the total acquisition value will have to be traded back into the country, as a way of making sure that the necessary know-how to maintain the aircrafts in wartime is found domestically (and as such this requirement ties into the two earlier requirements). Notably, current sets of rules require that the industrial cooperation is indeed cooperation directly related to the HX-program. Sponsoring tours of symphonic orchestras might buy you brownie points, but not industrial cooperation.

Following these go/no-go criterias comes wartime performance. This is the only requirement which will be graded. The Defence Forces will run a number of simulations of how the aircraft would perform in different missions and scenarios, gather information from the field, and possibly do flight trials. All of this will then come together to give a picture of how a given aircraft would perform as part of the greater Finnish Defence Forces in wartime.

Yes, wartime performance as part of the whole FDF is the sole factor that will rank the aircrafts in the acquisition proposal put forward to the MoD by the Finnish Defence Forces.

“But wait!” I hear you say. “Doesn’t economic considerations count for anything?”

Yes, indeed they do. Wartime performance require more than just 64 aircraft. If you can squeeze the price on the aircraft and its maintenance costs, the pilots will be able to receive more flight hours, and the Defence Forces will be able to stock more advanced weaponry (the low stocks of which is identified as a key issue in the latest Puolustusselonteko). Thus a cheaper aircraft allows the Defence Forces will provide more room for other things, which in the end make it more dangerous to the enemy.

Having received the acquisition proposal from the Defence Forces, the MoD takes over, and their job is to bring in the national security policy aspect into the equation. The national security evaluation coupled with the evaluation of wartime performance is then used to create the final acquisition proposal made by the MoD and put forward to the then government (i.e. the one which will take over following the next parliamentary elections). The final decision will then take place in 2021.

That the MoD will make a national security evaluation is interesting as it leaves room for politics overruling the wartime performance (though likely only to a certain extent). At first glance this would seem to favour the US contenders, however the situation might be more complex than that, thanks to the law of diminishing marginal utility. To what extent would a fighter deal actually deepen the already strong Finnish-US bilateral relations? There are already eleven confirmed export customers for the F-35, and a double-digit number of countries have bought into other US fighter programs as well, so would Finland’s inclusion (or absence) from that group be noticed in Washington? The US is also already Finland’s premier arms exporter (2015 numbers, unfortunately I didn’t find newer ones), and while this in parts comes from weapons for the Hornet-program, a number of other potential deals are on the horizon.

The Swedish offering has understandably not gathered quite the same number of export customers, but here as well even without a fighter deal the bilateral Finnish-Swedish cooperation is reaching levels that make one wonder whether significant improvements are possible? Geography and shared history also seems to dictate that the relation would survive Gripen failing to secure the HX order (though Charly might disagree). The benefits of operating the same aircraft is obvious when it comes to interoperability, but for political benefits it is doubtful how much 10 Bn (in the short term) actually would buy.

Enter France, a European powerhouse with an army still measured in divisions, a permanent seat at the UN security council, a nuclear strike force, a rather low threshold for military interventions, and a marked disinterest in what takes place on the northern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Finnish fighter order would be a big deal for Dassault, accounting for 40% of the total number of Rafale’s exported (96 firm orders to date plus 64 aircrafts for HX). It is also eye catching that a large percentage of the whole sum would go to France, compared to the larger amounts of foreign content in the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JAS 39E Gripen.

10 Bn Euros would not buy Finland a French expeditionary corps brimming with Leclercs in case of a Russian invasion. However, they just might ensure that Paris starts paying more attention to what happens in the European far north, courtesy of increased exchanges of people, experiences, and arms deals. If Finland would face an attack, having France as a political ally in Brussels and in the UNSC would be significant, even if the support would stop short of a military intervention. Another element is that as Washington is proving to be a more unreliable ally, the importance of the EU security cooperation is bound to increase (though granted from a low level to a somewhat less-low one), and with “the other European power” (Germany) showing limited appetite for anything resembling a confrontation with Russia over eastern Europe, the role of France in the greater Finnish security picture seems set to increase.

While Finnish security policy is famed for being slow in altering course and likely to favour trying to cash in further political points with Sweden or the USA, the question deserves to be asked:

Might it just be that we would gain more by having this investment go into our relationship with France?

https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/06/13/the-path-forward-for-hx/

Expand  

J'ai du mal a interprété cet article comme autre chose qu'un appel du pied à la France. "Putain vous allez vous reveiller oui ?"

[Skw]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 20:10, Conan le Barbare a dit :

Pas dupe sur le fait que l'Allemagne ne bougera pas le petit doigts si confrontation avec les Russes.

Expand  

Cela étant dit, quand tu n'as pas de dissuasion... la posture n'est pas si aisée que cela. Déjà que quand tu bénéficies d'une dissuasion...

[TarpTent]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 20:15, herciv a dit :

J'ai du mal a interprété cet article comme autre chose qu'un appel du pied à la France. "Putain vous allez vous reveiller oui ?"

Expand  

C’est en tout cas une manière assez appuyée de dire que le jeu est sans doute plus ouvert qu’il ne semblait jusqu’à récemment.

[Picdelamirand-oil]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:03, Boule75 a dit :

Je ne m'attendais pas à une conclusion aussi aimable pour la France, plus encore que pour l'avion. Là, le Caporal Fisk en est à se lamenter que Paris ne fasse pas plus attention au Nord de l'Europe !

Expand  

 

  Le 14/06/2018 à 20:15, herciv a dit :

J'ai du mal a interprété cet article comme autre chose qu'un appel du pied à la France. "Putain vous allez vous reveiller oui ?"

Expand  

 

  Le 14/06/2018 à 20:57, TarpTent a dit :

C’est en tout cas une manière assez appuyée de dire que le jeu est sans doute plus ouvert qu’il ne semblait jusqu’à récemment.

Expand  

 

 

Bon il est possible qu'on le sache depuis longtemps en fait:

http://www.air-defense.net/forum/topic/19231-qui-sera-le-quatrième-client-export-du-rafale/?do=findComment&comment=1057448

  Citation

Dassault et Thales font un effort particulier pour la Finlande

Expand  

Posté(e) May 22, 2017, il y a plus d'un an

[DEFA550]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 19:46, TarpTent a dit :

C’est bien la difficulté que j’ai, de comprendre de quelle variante il s’agit.

Pour eux, on a l’intervention facile donc on est des va-t-en-guerre et c’est négatif, ou bien on est réactif (en ayant confiance en nos capacités et en les employant facilement) et c’est positif ?

Expand  

Traduction : on n'a pas peur d'aller au charbon.

[Boule75]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 21:18, Picdelamirand-oil a dit :

Bon il est possible qu'on le sache depuis longtemps en fait:

http://www.air-defense.net/forum/topic/19231-qui-sera-le-quatrième-client-export-du-rafale/?do=findComment&comment=1057448

Posté(e) May 22, 2017, il y a plus d'un an

Expand  

Je ne suis pas surpris que Dassault et Thalès fassent un effort. Je suis heureusement surpris, en revanche, par le ton employé par le Caporal, s'il est bien ce qu'il prétend être et surtout s'il est quelque peu représentatif.

[Picdelamirand-oil]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 21:23, Boule75 a dit :

Je ne suis pas surpris que Dassault et Thalès fassent un effort. Je suis heureusement surpris, en revanche, par le ton employé par le Caporal, s'il est bien ce qu'il prétend être et surtout s'il est quelque peu représentatif.

Expand  

Ils ne font pas un effort, ils ont fait depuis un an un effort particulier, je peux même dire aujourd'hui que c'est le seul appel d'offre où ils ont fait ce "particulier" là. 

[P4]

"discretion, permanence de l'action"

tout sauf la Belgique.

[Conan le Barbare]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 21:27, Picdelamirand-oil a dit :

Ils ne font pas un effort, ils ont fait depuis un an un effort particulier, je peux même dire aujourd'hui que c'est le seul appel d'offre où ils ont fait ce "particulier" là. 

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En même temps j'ai le sentiment que gagner cet appel d'offres pourrait être LE contrat qui changerait tout...

[Asgard]

  Le 14/06/2018 à 21:27, Picdelamirand-oil a dit :

Ils ne font pas un effort, ils ont fait depuis un an un effort particulier, je peux même dire aujourd'hui que c'est le seul appel d'offre où ils ont fait ce "particulier" là. 

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tu pourrais nous faire deviner sans trahir ?

[Teenytoon]

C’est quoi un effort particulier ? 

Tu mets toutes tes ressources de lobbying et de communication sur le coup au détriment d’autres (genre Belgique et Canada) ? 

  Le 14/06/2018 à 21:34, Conan le Barbare a dit :

En même temps j'ai le sentiment que gagner cet appel d'offres pourrait être LE contrat qui changerait tout...

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Gagner un contrat en Europe pourrait à mon sens effectivement changer bien plus de choses que de vendre 200 avions à l’Inde. 

Meme si je suis preneur des 200 Rafale indiens, hein