Marine Australienne: modernisations, acquisitions et exercices navals.

alexandreVBCI · le 21 novembre 2012

Navantia débute la construction des chalands de débarquement australiens.

Le chantier Navantia de San Fernando-Puerto Real, en Espagne, a débuté en octobre la réalisation du premier des 12 chalands de débarquement commandés l’an dernier par la marine australienne. Ces engins, identiques aux chalands du type LCM-1E construits en 2007 et 2008 pour l’Armanda espagnole, sont destinés aux porte-hélicoptères d’assaut HMAS Canberra et HMAS Adelaide.

http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/navantia-debute-la-construction-des-chalands-de-debarquement-australiens

alexandreVBCI · le 1 décembre 2012

Vol d'armes audacieux sur un navire de l'armée australienne

Un voleur cagoulé a dérobé des armes à bord d'un bateau de la Marine militaire australienne dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, après avoir maîtrisé le marin de garde. Les autorités ont qualifié l'acte d'"inquiétant".

Deux fusils à pompe et douze pistolets ont été volés par le malfaiteur, dont la tête était recouverte d'une balaclava (passe-montagne). Il portait des vêtements de style militaire et paraissait" bien connaître le bateau", le HMAS Bathurst, a indiqué la police.

Le navire était à l'ancre dans la base navale de Larrakeyah, située à proximité de Darwin (nord). Le garde a été bâillonné mais est parvenu à se défaire des câbles qui l'attachaient, avant de donner l'alerte.

"A moins d'une assistance quelconque, nous pensons que ces armes ne peuvent pas être utilisées pour le moment", les chargeurs correspondants n'ayant pas été pris, a déclaré Richard Bryson, commandant de police des Territoires du Nord (la région de Darwin).

Le chef de la Marine australienne, le vice-amiral Ray Griggs, a ordonné une inspection sur la sécurité de tous les bateaux et bases navales.

"C'est une vraie violation de la sécurité, et très inquiétante qui plus est, selon moi", a indiqué M. Griggs à la radio Fairfax. Il a précisé qu'il s'agissait du premier incident de ce type sur un bateau de la Marine militaire australienne.

Darwin est un port primordial pour la Marine australienne, d'où les autorités conduisent des opérations de contrôle à la frontière maritime.

Le bateau cambriolé est un des 14 patrouilleurs qui participent à la surveillance de la pêche, aux opérations de douanes et à la lutte contre l'immigration clandestine et le trafic de drogue.

http://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/nouvelles_agence/international/Vol_darmes_audacieux_sur_un_navire_de_larmee_australienne.html?cid=34079882

alexandreVBCI · le 3 décembre 2012

Du nouveau sur les armes volées à bord d’un patrouilleur australien :

http://www.opex360.com/2012/12/03/des-armes-ont-ete-volees-a-bord-dun-patrouilleur-australien/

Skw · le 5 décembre 2012

Article synthétisant les différentes alternatives qui s'offre aux Australiens pour leur sous-marinade future.

Defence faces build or buy choice for submarines
John Kerin

Both the government and the opposition have promised that the submarine fleet will be built in Australia by ASC.

But importing an off-the-shelf French, Spanish or German design could slash the cost of a new fleet by tens of billions of dollars.

The idea of buying a nuclear powered submarine fleet from the US looks dead in the water, but could resurface if the Coalition wins office.

Defence Minister Stephen Smith is still intent on buying 12 submarines to replace the ailing Collins class, although the amount the government is willing to spend has undoubtedly shrunk since the dumping of the 2009 Defence White Paper in June.

In a seminal paper released following the announcement of Kevin Rudd’s ambitious $275 billion weapons wish list in 2009, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) estimated it could cost as much as $36 billion to design and build a new fleet of submarines in Australia. Alternatively, investing in a fleet of European off-the-shelf submarines could cost as little as $9 billion.

Few defence sources believe this government or the next – if Opposition Leader Tony Abbott wins office in an election due in 2013 – would outlay $36 billion in the current fiscal environment.

“You can be sure the price tag will be nowhere near the upper limit given the current budget climate,’’ says Andrew Davies, co-author of the report and ASPI capability analyst.

“It may be still officially in the mix, but the idea of an Australian design and build is off the table for a whole range of reasons to do with the approach taking too long and being too costly,’’ Davies says.

Defence sources suggest such a bespoke submarine would not be in the water before 2030, while an off-the-shelf option with few modifications could be launched by 2022 – before the first of the Collins class boats reaches the end of its service life in 2025.

Despite the biggest budget cuts to Defence in May since 1953 in percentage terms, Smith has at least suggested the Gillard government would press ahead with plans to build the new submarines as part of its 2013 Defence White Paper.

The continuing problems with the 3000 tonne Collins class submarines and their longevity continue to ensure the process of embarking on a new fleet is never far from controversy.

Smith has set June 2013 as the time frame for narrowing the acquisition options.

The government has committed $214 million to consider four options for the purchase of 12 new submarines – an off-the-shelf boat modified only to meet Australian legislative requirements, an evolved Collins class boat, an Australianised off-the-shelf design, or an entirely new developmental submarine.

Among off-the-shelf designs being considered are the French DCNS Scorpene, the German HDW Type 214 or the Spanish Navantia S-80 (which has not yet been to sea).

However, all three submarine builders have also been asked to submit a design for a larger submarine to fit Australia’s requirements.

The ambitious white paper envisaged conventionally powered submarines of about 4000 tonnes with longer range and endurance on patrol and land strike missiles.

And both the government and the Coalition have promised the submarines will be built in Adelaide by government owned builder ASC.

La suite sur : Financial Review

French Kiss · le 7 décembre 2012

Avoir 12 subs c'est bien joli, mais ils ont deja des difficultes a trouver du monde pour armer leurs 3 Collins en service... va falloir qu'ils investissent dans le clonage :lol:

maminos · le 10 décembre 2012

Qu'il achètent les trois Oscars 2 qui trainent en Russie, pour faire nique aux futurs PA chinois c'est assez le top

alexandreVBCI · le 12 décembre 2012

Un nouveau rapport décapant révèle que les sous-marins australiens de la classe Collins se comportent loin en dessous des standards internationaux et avertit le gouvernement australien qu’il doit entreprendre une vérification préliminaire complète de la nouvelle génération de sous-marins.

Suite : http://www.corlobe.tk/article31186.html

alexandreVBCI · le 17 janvier 2013

Austal lance le premier d’une nouvelle série de patrouilleurs

Construit par le chantier Austal d’Henderson, à l’ouest de l’Australie, le premier d’une série de 8 patrouilleurs destiné au CBPS (Customs and Border Protection Service) a été mis à flot. Mis sur cale en juin 2012, ce bâtiment du type Cape soit être baptisé au mois de mars et livré dans la foulée. Long de 58 mètres, ce patrouilleur est conçu pour les missions de surveillance et de contrôle des espaces maritimes. Pouvant demeurer en mission durant 28 jours, son autonomie sera de 4000 milles à vitesse économique. Il sera armé par un équipage d’une vingtaine d’hommes et disposera de mitrailleuses, ainsi que de deux embarcations d’intervention.

Commandés en août 2011 par le service australien des douanes et de la protection frontalière, les 8 patrouilleurs du type Cape doivent être livrés d’ici août 2015. La valeur de ce contrat dépasse 260 millions d'euros.

Photos :

http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/austal-lance-le-premier-dune-nouvelle-serie-de-patrouilleurs

alexandreVBCI · le 21 janvier 2013

La Grande-Bretagne et l’Australie ont signé le 18 janvier de nouveaux accords de Défense au travers desquels les deux pays envisagent, notamment, de fusionner leurs futurs programmes de frégates.

Il s’agit de tenter de faire converger le design du Type 26, actuellement à l’étude afin de concevoir un successeur aux 13 frégates du Type 23 de la Royal Navy, et les besoins de la Royal Australian Navy dans le cadre d’un programme de remplacement de ses 4 frégates du type O.H. Perry (FFG 7), mises en service entre 1983 et 1993.

Suite :

http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/vers-une-nouvelle-fregate-anglo-australienne

alexandreVBCI · le 11 mars 2013

La marine australienne envisage de doter ses sous-marins de la classe Collins de nouvelles technologies japonaises, ce qui permettrait de prolonger de 10 ans leur durée de vie opérationnelle.

Cela aurait aussi pour conséquence de retarder d’autant le besoin de construire de nouveaux sous-marins pour remplacer ceux de la classe Collins.

Suite : http://www.corlobe.tk/article31989.html

Les australiens deviendraient-ils raisonnables ? :lol:

collectionneur · le 11 mars 2013

Le Japon qui a réduit ses limitations a l'exportation verrait ainsi ses premiers contrats ?

Michael Guay · le 20 mai 2013

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/05/20/australia-needs-strategic-rethink-on-submarines/

Is Australia’s new submarine program being driven by careful assessments of the country’s future defense strategy or more by short-term electoral considerations? This is a key question leading up to Australia’s national elections on September 14.

The Labor Party government revealed back in May 2012 that it had ruled out the option of a nuclear-powered submarine and commissioned detailed assessments of four conventionally-powered options:

- An existing off-the-shelf foreign design.

- A modified off-the-shelf foreign design

- An evolved Collins-class design

- Development of a completely new submarine design in Australia.

Then, when Prime Minister Gillard released the 2013 Australian Defense White Paper on May 3, she announced she’d narrowed the options to the last two. The prime minister also confirmed her commitment to purchase 12 new submarines, which she said would be assembled in South Australia. In addition, she revealed that the government had commissioned the development of a land-based facility to enable the full-scale testing of submarine propulsion, system integration and support services.

In order to provide sufficient time for this process of design, testing, construction and commissioning, the Minister for Defense, Stephen Smith revealed that the six existing Collins-Class submarines would be extended until at least 2038. No plans were released for the maintenance and upgrading of the Collins Class boats, nor estimates of the costs of operating these boats for 45 and possibly even 50 years.

In light of these developments, what are the main issues now confronting Australia’s new submarine program?

First, it should be noted that there is a strong prospect that the Australian government will change following the national elections in September and that the decisions announced in this month’s White Paper may not be sustained. The opposition parties have announced that if they return to government they will review all defense policies and publish a new White Paper within 18 months.

Second, whoever is in government during the next three years will be choosing the nature of the new submarine program at a time when the regional strategic environment is changing markedly. The most important shift is the substantial growth in China’s military capability and its assertiveness in a number of regional disputes. The Chinese defense budget has risen an average 14 percent annually during the last fifteen years, the PLA-Navy has launched some 50 new submarines since 1995 and Chinese cyber, intelligence and maritime operations have been widespread and deeply intrusive. Most of Australia’s allies and friends in Asia are worried and working to strengthen their defenses. United States and allied dominance of the Western Pacific can no longer be assured in the medium term. Moreover, in contrast to the Cold War, the focus of superpower competition is not on the other side of the world, but in Australia’s backyard.

These developments have fundamental implications for Australian defense strategy and for what prudence dictates the Australian Defense Forces should operate in the 2030-2060 timeframe. All Australian governments will prefer to focus on encouraging positive political and security partnerships with China, North Korea, India, Indonesia and other regional powers. However, given the continuing shift in the strategic balance, defense planners cannot overlook the possibility that in some future contingencies Australia might be subjected to serious coercion and even attack.

In these circumstances, Australian defense planners need to think deeply about the strategy they would employ if the country were directly challenged. Some commentators argue that Australia should focus on small, relatively inexpensive submarines that in a crisis could attempt to mount a barrier defense in Australia’s immediate approaches. The main problems with this strategy are that such a barrier defense would always be porous and it would not force a coercive major power to halt its attacks.

If the Australian Government wishes to have a strong capacity to deter and dissuade a major power, it needs to invest in more than barrier defenses. It needs the capacity to reach out at great distance and threaten targets that the opposing side’s decision-makers value most. Australia, as a non-nuclear weapon state, has only a few options for applying strong strategic leverage (and deterrence) over a long range. Powerful submarines, strong cyber capabilities, advanced air and special force strike capabilities and combined operations with the United States are the primary options.

This logic confers a special strategic importance to Australia’s submarine choice. The new submarines are not just another military capability. While transport aircraft, armored vehicles and supply ships all have important roles to play in the Australian Defense Force, they cannot generate the strategic leverage and the deterrence power of advanced long-range submarines. The types of submarines and associated underwater systems the next Australian cabinet selects will give the country a strong deterrent and leverage in future serious crises, or they will preclude it from having the necessary capacity to use underwater forces to defend Australia with anything but a porous barrier defense.

In the context of this strategic logic there are, unfortunately, no simple, easy or low cost options for a new class of submarines. The off-the-shelf European boats may appear to be relatively cheap but they fall far short of Australia’s operational needs. They are too small, their payload is too limited and their range and time on station is too short. They cannot easily be refitted with the advanced US-supplied combat data and other systems that are already fitted to the Collins boats. Hence they would not be easy to integrate into Australian or allied operations.

The evolved Collins option would provide a much larger submarine, with greater range, endurance and weapon loads. The evolved Collins would also provide a substantial boost to Australian industry. This option would come at a much higher cost and carry availability risk as the first of these boats would probably not be available until 2035.

The option of a completely new design submarine would permit the development and production of an even larger submarine – almost certainly the largest conventionally-powered submarine in the world. This option would place the greatest pressure on Australian industry. These boats would be optimized for long-range, long endurance operations but they would entail acceptance of even higher costs and higher levels of risk. New design boats would also take longer to design, develop and build with the first vessel probably not being commissioned until about 2038.

As with the evolved Collins option, these boats would also be “orphan” submarines in the sense that they would not be operated by any other navy and Australia would need to carry the very substantial design authority and other overhead costs for the full life of the class.

Some commentators have assumed that there is no penalty for Australia in proceeding slowly and cautiously with this program. The problem with this relaxed approach is that the Collins boats are wasting assets that are losing their technological advantage and growing much more costly to maintain. The Collins Class already imposes prohibitive costs on the budget to maintain and these are likely to continue growing. This raises the serious possibility that Australia may not be able to operate a credible submarine force through most of the 2020s and 2030s. Attempting to extend the life of the Collins boats is like trying to maintain a 1993 vintage racing car and expecting it to routinely win races until it is phased out of service in 2038 or 2045. This stretches credulity.

What Australia really needs is a class of large submarines that have been fully proven in another navy, are currently in series production and can perform all of the tasks that the Australian Government requires with low risk and high reliability. This submarine force needs to be available at a comparable cost to the evolved Collins and new design options and capable of operating seamlessly with United States forces. The first of Australia’s new submarines should also be available for commissioning within a decade.

Remarkably, there is a class of submarines that meets all of these requirements well; the United States Virginia Class. The only problem is that like the United States, Britain, Russia, France, China, India and Brazil, Australia would need to accommodate itself to operating submarines with nuclear propulsion.

Ross Babbage is Founder of the Kokoda Foundation and Managing Director of Strategy International (ACT) Pty Ltd.

French Kiss · le 22 mai 2013

AMHA, l'auteur reve tout haut, avant que les US ne vendent des Virginia aux australiens, ou que l'Australie soit financierement ou operationnellement capable de se les offrir et de les operer... c'est carrement pas realiste.

Par contre les autraliens pourraient renforcer leurs moyens ASM aeroportes et commander des poseidons et des drones HALE, ce qui collerait plus avec la vision defensive de la posture australienne. Ils pourraient racheter le contrat des Hawk allemands ?

pascal · le 22 mai 2013

à part acheter les équipages avec les SOUM je ne vois pas comment ils feront, déjà qu'ils ont du mal à armer les Collins alors s'il faut en plus recruter des ingénieurs atomiciens ...

French Kiss · le 22 mai 2013

à part acheter les équipages avec les SOUM je ne vois pas comment ils feront, déjà qu'ils ont du mal à armer les Collins alors s'il faut en plus recruter des ingénieurs atomiciens ...

Oui a la limite une location, comme se que fait l'Inde avec le Nerpa, serait realiste, a condition de payer aussi la formation des equipages aux US et la construction des installations pour effectuer le minimum de maintenance/reparation du soum, y compris sur le reacteur. Hors si en Inde il y a deja une branche nucleaire civile active, il n'en est rien en Australie, la il faudrait vraiment partir de zero...

alexandreVBCI · le 24 juin 2013

La marine australienne vient d’adopter un nouveau calendrier de maintenance pour ses 6 sous-marins de la classe Collins. Conséquence : 2 d’entre eux vont rester en entretien pendant plus de 6 ans.

Le HMAS Rankin et HMAS Collins subissent actuellement une période d’entretien à Adelaïde. Mais ils reprendront du service au sein de la Royal Australian Navy bien après l’échéance de 3 ans actuellement prévue. Le Rankin est le plus récent sous-marin de la flotte. Pourtant, il n’a pas navigué depuis 2008. Le chantier naval ASC ne le livrera pas à la RAN avant le milieu de l’an prochain au plus tôt. Le Collins est le plus ancien sous-marin, et il se trouve dans les installations d’ASC à Adelaïde depuis aout dernier. Il ne reprendra pas du service avant 2018.

Un porte-parole du ministère australien de la défense a précisé qu’aucun autre bâtiment de la flotte n’était hors service.

Suite : http://www.corlobe.tk/article33044.html#sthash.FccjQzsG.dpuf

Philippe Top-Force · le 6 juillet 2013

Hobart class destroyer AW

BPCs · le 6 juillet 2013

If the Australian Government wishes to have a strong capacity to deter and dissuade a major power, it needs to invest in more than barrier defenses. It needs the capacity to reach out at great distance and threaten targets that the opposing side’s decision-makers value most. Australia, as a non-nuclear weapon state, has only a few options for applying strong strategic leverage (and deterrence) over a long range. Powerful submarines, strong cyber capabilities, advanced air and special force strike capabilities and combined operations with the United States are the primary options.

This logic confers a special strategic importance to Australia’s submarine choice. The new submarines are not just another military capability. While transport aircraft, armored vehicles and supply ships all have important roles to play in the Australian Defense Force, they cannot generate the strategic leverage and the deterrence power of advanced long-range submarines. The types of submarines and associated underwater systems the next Australian cabinet selects will give the country a strong deterrent and leverage in future serious crises, or they will preclude it from having the necessary capacity to use underwater forces to defend Australia with anything but a porous barrier defense.

In the context of this strategic logic there are, unfortunately, no simple, easy or low cost options for a new class of submarines. The off-the-shelf European boats may appear to be relatively cheap but they fall far short of Australia’s operational needs. They are too small, their payload is too limited and their range and time on station is too short. They cannot easily be refitted with the advanced US-supplied combat data and other systems that are already fitted to the Collins boats. Hence they would not be easy to integrate into Australian or allied operations.

The evolved Collins option would provide a much larger submarine, with greater range, endurance and weapon loads. The evolved Collins would also provide a substantial boost to Australian industry. This option would come at a much higher cost and carry availability risk as the first of these boats would probably not be available until 2035.

The option of a completely new design submarine would permit the development and production of an even larger submarine – almost certainly the largest conventionally-powered submarine in the world. This option would place the greatest pressure on Australian industry. These boats would be optimized for long-range, long endurance operations but they would entail acceptance of even higher costs and higher levels of risk. New design boats would also take longer to design, develop and build with the first vessel probably not being commissioned until about 2038.

On peut poser l'équation de la même façon que ce Think Tank Australien et arriver à la conclusion que ce n'est pas des Virginia qu'il faut aux Aussies

A partir du moment où nécessité :

Longue endurance

Performance SNA like

puissance non nuke

La solution s'appelle SMX-25

Et accessoirement comme submersible pouvant aussi opérer en surface, peut être qu'il sera moins difficile de trouver les équipages...

Par ailleurs, l’équipage du SMX-25 comptera seulement 27 marins mais il aura la capacité d’embarquer une dizaine de nageurs de combat. Ces derniers pourront être déployés quand le sous-marin est en semi-plongée.

Maintenant, il reste à voir l’usage qu’il pourrait être fait du SMX-25... Sa rapidité à se rendre sur une zone d’opération...

Chez DCNS, l’on estime qu’il constitue un substitut intéressant aux sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque. Ce qui est susceptible d’intéresser les pays émergents, d’autant plus que, comme il est conçu avec des technologies existantes, son prix ne devrait pas être exhorbitant.

http://www.opex360.com/2010/10/08/le-smx-25-le-dernier-concept-de-sous-marin-de-dcns/

French Kiss · le 8 juillet 2013

Wouais, il leur faudrait quand meme une version XL, parceque le SMX n'est pas concu pour emporter beaucoup d'armes, etant avant tout un vecteur d'interdiction a vocation defensive plus qu'offensive. Pour ce genre de besoin, il leur faudrait plutot un engin concu sur une base qui a fait ses preuves au niveau longue endurance, ou qui soit facilement adaptable. Du cote des propositions, si on regarde de notre cote la question est : qui peut proposer un gros SSK capable de rester en patrouille 60 jours et d'embarquer une trentaine d'armes (torpilles lourdes/missile AN/MdC/SHORAD) avec une architecture systeme US...?

pascal · le 15 juillet 2013

La Marine australienne poursuit son petit bonhomme de chemin (de croix)

http://www.news.com.au/national-news/nsw-act/navy-techical-sailors-lured-by-mine-cash/story-fndo4bst-1226504893587

le HMAS Choules ex Largs Bay est toujours en rideau pour des pbs de propulsion

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_Choules_%28L100%29

Une Marine ce sont avant toute chose des hommes sans eux rien n'est possible

Chris. · le 18 juillet 2013

Sont forts ces australiens. Ils prennent un navire en parfait état de marche, ils le modifient un peu pour qu'il réponde à leur standard et paf, il marche plus…

(un peu comme avec certains hélicos d'ailleurs, qui marchent parfaitement de l'autre coté de la mer de Tasmanie…)

alexandreVBCI · le 26 septembre 2013

Les sous-marins australiens pourraient devoir être désarmés plus tôt que prévu.

La liste des problèmes des sous-marins australiens est invraisemblable : http://www.corlobe.tk/article33779.html

alexandreVBCI · le 16 octobre 2013

Ils sont maudits...

Le ministère australien de la défense espère que l’assurance couvrira les réparations d’un sous-marin de la classe Collins, endommagé en juin dernier durant une forte tempête.

Le sous-marin HMAS Sheean a subi des dégâts sérieux lorsqu’il a été heurté par un navire de commerce à la dérive, qui avait rompu ses amarres. Le navire de commerce a été poussé vers le sous-marin par des vents soufflant en tempête.

http://www.corlobe.tk/article33962.html#sthash.BgJ5JQnM.dpuf