Sur l’état de l’armée américaine

[Chronos]

En effet la tête gonfle.

 

Mais les EM ne sont-ils pas gardés pour gérer les alliés en prime ? Vu que les forces ses réduisent tout en conservant le moyen de projection. Est-ce tout bêtement une bureaucratisation ou une manière implicite d'acter que les alliés deviennent plus essentiels, en Asie en fait (parce que l'Europe...).

[Tancrède]

Ils doivent réduire ce qui est le plus facilement (ou moins difficilement) "refabricable", soit, pour faire simple, l'effectif: on fait des unités de manoeuvre comme on les veut (les BCT à 3 sous-éléments de manoeuvre) et on en taille le nombre. Pour le reste, les structures d'entraînement et de formation ne sont pas trop touchées, donc conservent la capacité de remonter en puissance, surtout quan on connaît l'état des stocks de matériels surnuméraires aux USA (voire le cas extrême des Abrahms, produits bien au-delà de tout besoin par arrangement politique/industriel -essentiellement un effort de lobbying des producteurs et représentants de l'Etat qui héberge l'usine, soutenus par la convention nationale républicaine et divers lobbies et think tanks, bien arrosés au passage). Pour l'instant, les coupes n'ont rien tranché qui ne puisse être rapidement remis en place (voir la montée en puissance des années 2002 à 2007: très conséquente et très rapide, le tout sur fond d'engagement important des troupes et moyens).

Pour le reste, il suffit de voir où vont les moyens: outre évidemment les grands programmes de matériels, ça se concentre sur la formation initiale et continue des officiers et des équipes de commandement et coordination des éléments et unités à tous niveaux, sur les capacités de renseignement et d'analyse (humains et techniques), les systèmes (humains et techniques) de prise de décision en général (du plus petit niveau tactique au plus haut niveau opératique et stratégique), les capacités de coordination des armes et systèmes (niveaux interarmes et interarmées).... Bref, booster le système nerveux, réflexif et décisionnel des forces. Et là, les moyens sont en augmentation. Ajoutés aux capacités de transport stratégique, à ce que donnera l'évolution matérielle en terme de mobilité et d'efficacité tactique/opératique et au repositionnement de forces dans les grands commandements géographiques (vers l'Afrique et Pacifique surtout), ça donne un portrait plutôt cohérent de ce que les Américains veulent faire. Les coupes actuelles, s'ils s'y tiennent et n'engagent pas fondamentalement plus de resserrement budgétaire (qui imposeraient un changement de posture stratégique nettement plus radical: plus d'isolationnisme, réorientation de l'effort budgétaire sur le pays, au détriment de "l'empire"), ne reflètent pas un changement fondamental de posture ou de modèle de force, ou de capacité à peser (laquelle de toute façon baisse avant tout en relatif).

Il s'agit de rendre les unités plus efficaces et adaptables (reste à savoir si c'est par anticipation du bon type de conflits), plus capables d'appuyer une force amie qui semble il est vrai être plus inclue dans le calcul initial, moins parce qu'il y en a militairement besoin dans l'hypothèse d'un conflit classique que parce qu'elle est le motif et le partenaire obligé: dans une hypothèse de conflit en zone Asie Pacifique, on voit effectivement plus un cas de figure d'appui à une armée alliée (Taiwan, Corée du Sud, Japon, Australie, Asie du Sud Est) que celle de corps expéditionnaires communs pour pacifier un failed state.

[actyon]

 

US Army Embarks on the Testing of a Hybrid Ultra Light Vehicle (ULV)

The U.S. Army’s latest “research prototype vehicle” has entered advanced testing phase with the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC). The new vehicle known as the Ultra Light Vehicle (ULV) was built as a Concept Vehicle for TARDEC’s Detroit Arsenal. The new hybrid tactical vehicle targets safety, fuel-efficiency and versatility. It was developed in the past 16 months using commercial technologies. Final testing is beginning on the ULV vehicle platform with evaluating its capability to support Soldiers on missions across a full spectrum of mobility challenges while keeping occupants safe and using fuel efficiently.

• Payload – 4,500 lbs
• Performance – at 14,000 lbs curb weight
• Protection – comparable to the currently fielded Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles
• Price – $250,000 each in a hypothetical 5,000-unit production run

http://defense-update.com/20130909_ulv.html?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=96272&utm_campaign=0

 

[actyon]

 

Oshkosh Defense Unveils the Light All-Terrain Vehicle (L-ATV)

Oshkosh Defense has unveiled today the Light Combat Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (L-ATV), a new class of vehicle designed to meet the military’s new trend toward lighter, deployable yet highly protected tactical vehicles. Based on its extensive experience with and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and the medium weight variant, (M-ATV), comprising a major part of teh U.S. Army vehicle fleets in Iraq and Afghanistan, Oshkosh anticipates the next generation of light combat military vehicles require new levels of mobility and protection to operate effectively in remote, rugged and hostile landscapes.

 

http://defense-update.com/20110914_latv.html

[actyon]

60-kilowatt laser to kill UAVs, rockets, and mortars

Laser weapons experts at Lockheed Martin Aculight on Bothell, Wash., will help the U.S. Army develop a 60-kilowatt fiber laser module for a truck-mounted laser weapon system intended to shoot down enemy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rockets,artillery rounds, and mortars.

 

http://i-hls.com/2013/09/60-kilowatt-laser-to-kill-uavs-rockets-and-mortars/?utm_source=activetrail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=English%20Newsletter%2011/9/2013

 

[actyon]

[actyon]

 

In service with US forces in Afghanistan since 2009, the M-ATV the highly mobile all-protected vehicle is currently fielded in several variants. Oshkosh has received awards to date for nearly 8,700 M-ATVs, including more than 460 SFV variants. The SFV features a modified cargo deck, intended to accept specialized equipment based on each mission’s requirements, and larger front windscreens for increased visibility. Oshkosh is displaying the M-ATV the Special Forces Vehicle (SFV) at its booth #J619 in Hall 6.

http://defense-update.com/20120611_oshkosh-matv-medevac.html

 

[actyon]

Nouveau rapport américain sur leurs forces spéciales

http://bit.ly/15wyUkB

Les forces spéciales, l’instrument de prédilection de l’administration Obama (opérant hors les cadres établis, sinon dans le secret le plus total, elles froissent moins les susceptibilités, permettent d’affirmer une chose et faire son contraire, se moquer des règles aussi aisément que des frontières), veulent s’autonomiser encore plus. Triplées en budgets /effectifs/ déploiements depuis le 11 septembre 2001, l’USSOCOM (commandement des opérations spéciales) est devenu, selon son ex-patron, un « microcosme » (comprenons : un univers complet en soi) du Département de la défense des USA.

Aujourd’hui, l’USSOCOM souhaite voir ses responsabilités élargies au déploiement et à l’emploi effectif des forces spéciales, avec le feu vert des seuls commandants régionaux. Sans attendre donc celui du centre à Washington. Meilleure recette pour accroître toujours davantage l’irresponsabilité et le chaos.

Une des raisons invoquées : l’USSOCOM pourrait ainsi faciliter ses relations avec des armées étrangères. En réalité, il s’agit de la construction, déjà en marche, d’un réseau global de forces spéciales, avec l’USSOCOM au gouvernail et l’Etat-major des opérations spéciales de l’OTAN (NSHQ) comme laboratoire. Pour le secrétaire général Rasmussen, il s’agit de la clé de l’avenir : les forces spéciales sont, avec la cyberdéfense et le système antimissile, l’une des composantes de la nouvelle triade stratégique. Inutile de préciser que le personnel du NSHQ de l’Alliance est majoritairement américain, et que le patron est directement nommé par le président des Etats-Unis.

 

[Rob1]

Les forces spéciales, l’instrument de prédilection de l’administration Obama (opérant hors les cadres établis, sinon dans le secret le plus total, elles froissent moins les susceptibilités, permettent d’affirmer une chose et faire son contraire, se moquer des règles aussi aisément que des frontières), veulent s’autonomiser encore plus. Triplées en budgets /effectifs/ déploiements depuis le 11 septembre 2001, l’USSOCOM (commandement des opérations spéciales) est devenu, selon son ex-patron, un « microcosme » (comprenons : un univers complet en soi) du Département de la défense des USA.

Aujourd’hui, l’USSOCOM souhaite voir ses responsabilités élargies au déploiement et à l’emploi effectif des forces spéciales, avec le feu vert des seuls commandants régionaux. Sans attendre donc celui du centre à Washington. Meilleure recette pour accroître toujours davantage l’irresponsabilité et le chaos.

 

 

Tout en mesure et bien argumenté (ironie inside)

[actyon]

 

Israeli Offers an Advanced Aircraft to the U.S. Army

An American company owned by Israeli Abraham Karem offers an advanced tiltrotor the U.S. army.

Karem Aircraft is owned by, an aviation expert who designed some of Israel’s very first unmanned air systems. After moving to the U.S., the company owned by Karem designed the first version of the U.S. Predator UAS.

http://i-hls.com/2013/10/israeli-offers-an-advanced-aircraft-to-the-u-s-army/?utm_source=activetrail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=English%20Newsletter%2009/10/2013

 

[alexandreVBCI]

Video: SOCOM Wants an Iron Man Suit with Liquid Body Armor
 

http://defensetech.org/2013/10/09/video-socom-wants-to-build-an-iron-man-suit/

[actyon]

[Borisdedante]

Pentagon unit held 'phony' ceremonies for MIAs, using planes that can't fly

http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/10/20889368-pentagon-unit-held-phony-ceremonies-for-mias-using-planes-that-cant-fly?lite

Modifié le 15 octobre 2013 par Borisdedante

[Stalker]

L'armée américaine subit les coupes budgétaires qui affectent la plupart des programmes d'armement

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/usa-army-budget-idUSL1N0IB15C20131021

 

Plus de cents programmes sont touché par des réduction voir des annulations

Modifié le 22 octobre 2013 par Stalker

[Clemor]

J'aimerai bien voir le détail de ces coupes budgétaires :|

[actyon]

Apache & Black-Hawk bientôt remotorisés

L’Armée américaine malgré les contraintes budgétaires, maintien ses objectifs pour permettre à terme une remotorisation de ses hélicoptères AH-64 «Apache» et UH-60 «Black-Hawk» à partir des années 2020.

Un programme ambitieux :

Le programme qui porte le nom de AATE (abordable advanced turbine) est un projet de la Direction des Technologies Appliquées de l'armée américaine qui est destiné à valider les technologies nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs ambitieux de performance du programme d’amélioration des turbine de l'armée (ITEP). Le futur moteur d’une puissance de  3000 shp, soit une augmentation de 50% de puissance par rapport à l’actuelle turbine General-Electric T700, devra également offrir une réduction de carburant de 25% et permettre une diminution de 35% des frais de maintenance avec une durée de vie plus longue de 20%.

Deux motoristes en compétition :

Deux motoristes sont déjà en phase de tests au sol, Honeywell / Pratt & Whitney travaillent sur le prototype du démonstrateur du HPW3000, tandis que General Electric travaille sur le GE3000.  Dès 2014, les deux motoristes devront être en mesure de proposer chacun une version suffisamment développée de leur prototype, afin de permettre un choix entre les deux modèles. Un seul moteur serait choisi pour procéder au développement, puis aux essais au sol et en vol. Une production initiale à faible taux est prévue pour débuter en 2022-23.

http://psk.blog.24heures.ch/

[actyon]

 

 

GMLRS Completes Engineering Development Flight Tests with Alternative Warhead Configuration

Lockheed Martin successfully conducted the third  engineering development test flight of the new Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. Preliminary data indicate all test objectives were achieved. During the short-range test, three GMLRS rockets were launched from an MLRS M270A1 launcher and each destroyed its respective ground-based target approximately 17 kilometers away. This was the final engineering development flight test in the series before the program continues to production qualification testing.

http://defense-update.com/20131027_gmlrs_awp.html?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=96272&utm_campaign=0

 

[actyon]

Regardez bien ce bidule (le LEMV)

The huge hybrid airship known as the long-endurance multi-intelligence vehicle made a 90-minute first flight at Lakehurst, N.J., on August 7. (Photo: U.S. Army)

http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-08-10/last-huge-hybrid-airship-isr-makes-first-flight

 

Ils ont mis pres de $300M pour qu'une compagnie anglaise Hybrid Air Vehicles et Northrop le construisent en 26 mois, avec 8 mois de retard. Une fois que la strategie americaine en Afghanistan a change la US Army a decide, apres des tests, de ne pas l'utiliser. Pire, le dirigeable a ete revendu au constructeur pour ...$300K
Sa payload est extraordinaire et son autonomie en air etait supposée durer plus d'une semaine. Trois de ce genre plus un ou deux spares, équipes de senseurs, comms, cams, etc. pourraient suffir pour surveiller la frontiere Est.

 

[Serge]

Interview du CEMAT américain sur l'effet du séquestre :

Interview: US Army Chief Says Budget Cuts Are Hurting Force

Oct. 31, 2013 - 05:49PM | By VAGO MURADIAN

At last week’s Association of the United States Army annual meeting and exposition in Washington, thousands gathered to hear senior leaders explain where the service is headed in this era of austerity.

And the message from Gen. Ray Odierno, the US Army’s chief of staff, was one of frustration with uncertain budgets and automatic and inflexible defense cuts that are gutting readiness, with only two of his brigades ready for combat. The Army has been cutting personnel at a breakneck pace to save as much money as possible, given additional budget cuts are likely.

The Army is headed from a force of 570,000 soldiers, just a few years ago, down to 490,000. That number could get smaller, given sequestration is likely to continue and deeper reductions are expected over the coming months as part of a broader federal debt and spending deal between Congress and the White House.

Odierno spoke at length about the budget situation in an interview with Defense News:

Q. What is the real impact of past and future budget cuts on the force? Why are you so alarmed? And what is the way out of it?

A. Well, it is a bunch of cumulative things that have occurred: continuing resolutions [CRs], which we submit budgets, the House Armed Service Committee passed these budgets, but since we have not gotten a total governmental budget, we do not execute them, so we go to a CR. So it is not in line with how we think we should spend money in order to keep our force up. Then you have a shutdown. Then on top of that, you have sequestration, where we have a bunch of very heavy cuts that we have to take.

So let’s forget about the number on sequestration. It is about the up-front cuts in sequestration that does not allow you to properly manage sequestration where you can sustain readiness, you can sustain modernization, as you reduce end strength. So what we are being forced to do is cut readiness, cut modernization, because we cannot cut end strength fast enough. Because it becomes too expensive to cut it, and you do not get any savings if you cut it very fast because you have to pay benefits.

Q. So what is the net impact from a readiness standpoint?

A. So let me put it in very simple terms. A brigade [of soldiers is] not going to the National Training Center. They do not have dollars to train at their home station. So we still have brigades, but if we ask them to go, they are not going to be trained properly. So what does that mean? That means when they go, it is going to take them longer to do it. They might have more casualties. So to me, that is unacceptable. And so the problem with us is, we are realistic about the future. What I am telling you is we have to deploy people in the future. They are not going to be ready right now. That is a problem for me.

Q. What is it going to take to drive this point home? Is this a credibility issue for the service chiefs and the defense leadership?

A. The bottom line is everybody has got to realize between now and 2019, we have significant risk because we will not get rebalanced until then. And so that is a six-year period where we are going to be unbalanced. And what I worry about is this world we live in is incredibly uncertain. I do not know what is going to happen. There are lots of possibilities out there.

I certainly hope we do not have to deploy soldiers, but my job is to make sure we are ready to deploy them. And if we have to do it in the next six years, we have significant problems, because I think they will not be trained or equipped the way we think they should be as American soldiers to do their job.

Q. There has been a sense that the Pentagon has been waiting for Congress to come and ride to the rescue with more money, sort of forestalling the hard decisions. Was it a mistake to wait as long as you did?

A. So, you know, if we get a budget, we can plan towards that budget and we have planned towards these budgets. So we have a sequestration budget. We have planned for that. We know what it means. We know what a ’15 to ’19 budget would look like. So we are prepared to execute that. Again, the bottom line is sequestration was a tool that was supposed to force compromise in Congress. It was not a tool developed to properly manage the downsizing of the Department of Defense or the Army. And that is the problem. The tool was not right.

Q.One of the challenges is almost everything you have now is more expensive than it was in the last downturn.

A. They like to compare it, “Well, you know, in 2001, your budget was here, and now it’s going to be here. It is about the same. Why do you not have the same capabilities?” Well, the cost of soldiers has gone up. The other pieces we thought were for 12 years. And then we have wounded warriors. We have to take care of our families. We have to take care of our soldiers. That all costs a lot of dollars and we have to invest in that. There are other things, like the ability to sustain equipment is more expensive today than it was then because costs go up over time. So for us, if it is the same budget, it is a reduction in the budget.

Q. Do the military service chiefs need to map the drawdown themselves, rather than leave it to the political process?

A. I think the quadrennial defense review gives us an opportunity to do this. I think [Defense] Secretary [Chuck] Hagel and the chairman are having discussions about how we want to move forward. And this might be one of the solutions. We will probably include the combatant commanders in that as well, as we think our way through this process. I think that is one thing that is on the table, and I think that is a good way to go after this. We will see if that is where we head or not.

Q. There is a fierce debate among Army intellectuals, which you are fueling with your long-range study panels that you are putting together. What is it you want to achieve?

A. Strategic landpower is a kind of comment that we are using. There are a lot of people that dismiss the fact we really do not need ground forces any more. There is not going to be a necessity to use ground forces. And my view is that that is a bit naïve. Because I believe it is about the human domain, human dimension. It is about humans, and you have to be able to compel humans to do things. And the way you compel humans is by having soldiers and Marines and others on the ground. And it can be an engagement. It could be, if necessary, deploying and conducting operations across a broad array of missions that we might have to do. And I think that is key, especially in this complex world we live in, that we have to have that capability. The president and the national security team want to have a variety of capabilities available, and you certainly do not want to dismiss this. And I am afraid there are too many people that are dismissing that as an alternative for the future.

Q. In the future’s team, there is a sense that some have that it is going to support the status quo. Is that going to be the case this time or do you expect totally different fresh views?

A. Well, I think we are getting different kinds of views. We are looking at new alternatives of what we think we are going to have to do in the future. We have to learn from the last 10 or 12 years because our adversaries look at what has happened over the last 10 or 12 years, and so we have to be prepared to operate in that environment. I think it is going to make the environment more complex. And so we have to prepare our leaders. We have to prepare our units. We have to prepare our training and our development in order to meet these complex challenges that we have. And that is what we are focused on.

Q. Are there any particular challenges that you think are going to be a more important focus area?

A. Well, what I would say is, it is a combination of things. So we still are going to have to probably deal with some sort of an insurgency wherever we are. We still might have to deal with stability operations, all simultaneously while we might have to deal with a military action of either state or non-state actors. So it’s a combination of all of those things that we are going to have to do, which is incredibly complex. We know it is going to be a civil-military solution. We know it is going to have to be maybe a multinational solution. But all of that requires lots of preparation, training and capability in order to accomplish that.

Q. What is the right balance between massive, combined-arms evolutions and counterinsurgency? And how do you retain highly perishable skills?

A. If you went out to our training centers today, you would not recognize what we are doing because what we are building out there is a very complex environment that when a brigade goes out, they have to do counterinsurgency. They have to do some level of combined-arms maneuver. They have to do some stability operations. All at one time. And the scenarios are very complex. It also weaves in conventional special operations force integration. So these are the lessons we have learned. But now we are moving them forward into an even more complex environment — what we think we are going to have to fight in the future. And we will constantly update that environment out there as we learn more and think more about where we have to go.

Q. But you guys were doing brigade-level operations as part of a counterinsurgency.

A. Right, but it is a different kind of operations. I mean, it takes different synchronization and different capabilities.

Vago Muradian is the Editor of Defense News.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131031/DEFREG02/310310024/Interview-US-Army-Chief-Says-Budget-Cuts-Hurting-Force

[collectionneur]

Sur ''Lignes de Défense'', un article présente le tableau suivant tiré il me semble d'un ''groupe de réflexion'' montrant une baisse de l'US Army à 6 divisions et seulement 7 porte-avions en 2021. C'est crédible ?

 

Modifié le 20 novembre 2013 par collectionneur

[actyon]

Blackhawks land under Honduran sun

 

11/21/2013 - A formation of three UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters assigned to Joint Task Force-Bravo's 1-228th Aviation Regiment makes a landing approach at Puerto Castilla, Honduras, Nov. 19, 2013. The helicopters were flying a mission that was part of a week-long Collective Training Exercise conducted by the 1-228th. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Zach Anderson)

http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123371613

 

[alexandreVBCI]

Conçus pour se fondre dans l'environnement, les camouflages d'uniforme sont devenus un moyen pour chaque service de l'armée américaine de se distinguer des autres, une coquetterie jugée bien coûteuse par le Congrès qui veut mettre fin à la gabegie.

 

Avant 2001, la situation était simple : tout le monde avait le même camouflage, à dominante verte pour les pays tempérés, couleur sable pour les zones désertiques. Mais à la faveur d'un budget en constante augmentation, marins, soldats, aviateurs et marines en ont profité pour afficher leurs particularisme au moment où le pays s'engageait dans deux conflits, en Afghanistan et en Irak. Aujourd'hui, l'armée américaine compte 10 types différents de camouflage, à motifs pixellisés ou à "rayures de tigre", à dominante verte, brune, voire bleue.

 

Pour le Pentagone, cette source de multiplication des dépenses est inopportune en période de disette budgétaire. "Cela n'a rien à voir avec les dépassements de coûts du F-35 – qui se chiffrent en dizaines de milliards de dollars –, mais c'est quelque chose que toute personne normale considérerait comme de l'argent gaspillé", concède Larry Korb. Sénateurs comme élus de la Chambre des représentants veulent donc y mettre un terme.

 

Le projet de loi de financement présenté à la Chambre prévoit le retour à un uniforme commun le 1er octobre 2018. "Nous ne pouvons nous permettre d'avoir différents motifs de camouflage simplement pour marquer l'esprit de corps" de chaque service, dénonce l'élu démocrate William Enyart à l'origine de cet amendement. Le patron des marines, le général James Amos, a de son côté d'ores et déjà tonné devant les troupes qu'il n'avait "aucune intention de changer d'uniforme" et qu'il s'y accrocherait "comme un clochard à son sandwich".

 

Suite : http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2013/11/21/quand-l-armee-americaine-parle-chiffons_3517551_3222.html

Modifié le 24 novembre 2013 par alexandreVBCI

[actyon]

The U.S. Army’s new laser truck has taken a major step toward becoming a reality. Boeing integrated a beam control system to find and track targets and point and focus a laser beam on the targets. Photo: Boeing Company

US Army Tests High Power Laser Weapon
The Army High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) underwent multiple test events between Nov. 18 and Dec. 10, at White Sands Missile Range, engaging more than 90 mortar rounds and several unmanned aerial vehicles in flight. What ‘engaged’ means? Has HEL-MD actually destroyed all those targets? - subscribe to find an answer
http://defense-update.com/20131214_us-army-tests-high-power-laser-weapon.html

 

 

[actyon]

 

 

 

 

[actyon]

 

 

Hickam Airmen partner with 25th Infantry Division for VALEX

12/19/2013 - JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii -- A team of Airmen from the 535th Airlift Squadron recently paired up with Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division for a validation exercise to confirm the unit's ability to rapidly deploy a contingency response force from Wheeler Army Airfield Dec. 16.

http://goupeelbombardi.highbb.com/t4736p20-us-navy-us-marine-corps#131369

 

Modifié le 20 décembre 2013 par actyon