[Irak] passé, présent, avenir

[Gibbs le Cajun]

En gros il plie bagage et abandonne l'Irak à son sort...

 

Je suis vraiment étonné d'un tel désengagement pour un pays aussi important pour la stabilité de la région.

 

J'aurais aimé être une petite souris et assister au débat entre ses conseillés et qui a abouti à ces choix. Enfin, dans quelques années on aura livres et documentaires pour savoir.

 

un truc comme sa :

 

un conseiller :

- monsieur le président la situation est grave en Irak !

 

Obama :

- hé Mec ,j'ai envoyé mes soldats dans le Pacifique et en Asie  ,pour qu'ils s'esquintent moins la santé Mec ,donc là sa ne va pas être possible Mec .

 

un autres conseiller :

-mais cela risque de déstabilisé le moyen-orient d'une manière irréversible monsieur le président .

 

Obama :

Mec ,tu me vois dire à nos soldats que les vacances en Australie s'est fini ,on repart en Irak .

non Mec t'est pas sérieux ,le sable pourri d'Irak à la place du sable accueillant d'une plage australienne !

en plus mec sur les plages australienne ,il y a des mecs qui assurent la sécurité ,question requins Mec !en Irak nos gars pourront même pas profité si en plus faut monté la garde .

 

non mec s'est plié , moi j'ai qu'une parole les boys s'est direct en Australie Mec !

 

de toute façon s'est tous des putains de terroristes mec ,alors sa me coûtera moins cher une attaque de requins en Australie Mec !

[metkow]

un truc comme sa :

 

un conseiller :

- monsieur le président la situation est grave en Irak !

 

Obama :

- hé Mec ,j'ai envoyé mes soldats dans le Pacifique et en Asie  ,pour qu'ils s'esquintent moins la santé Mec ,donc là sa ne va pas être possible Mec .

 

un autres conseiller :

-mais cela risque de déstabilisé le moyen-orient d'une manière irréversible monsieur le président .

 

Obama :

Mec ,tu me vois dire à nos soldats que les vacances en Australie s'est fini ,on repart en Irak .

non Mec t'est pas sérieux ,le sable pourri d'Irak à la place du sable accueillant d'une plage australienne !

en plus mec sur les plages australienne ,il y a des mecs qui assurent la sécurité ,question requins Mec !en Irak nos gars pourront même pas profité si en plus faut monté la garde .

 

non mec s'est plié , moi j'ai qu'une parole les boys s'est direct en Australie Mec !

 

de toute façon s'est tous des putains de terroristes mec ,alors sa me coûtera moins cher une attaque de requins en Australie Mec !

 

tu l'imagine aussi avec la voix du gars qui fait le doublage de Eddie Murphy?

Ca fait chier, mec!! lol

Modifié le 19 juin 2014 par metkow

[Gibbs le Cajun]

tu l'imagine aussi avec la voix du gars qui fait le doublage de Eddie Murphy?

Ca fait chier, mec!! lol

 

j'ai plus de j'aime 

 

donc je le post  =)

 

oui trop fort avec la voix d'Eddie Murphy 

 

 

Irak-Face à l'armée sunnite Il est impossible de faire la paix avec l’Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (Daech) mais il est très difficile de le vaincre par les armes. Daech a conservé la motivation fanatique de l’ancienne Al-Qaïda en Irak et y ajouté le nombre et l’argent. L'organisation disposerait de 10 000 combattants en Irak, soit à peu près trois fois le volume des forces que nous avons affronté au Mali. L’équipement est léger et peu sophistiqué mais Daech est capable de mener, en parallèle de pures actions de terreur, des actions de combat sophistiquées qu’il s’agisse d’infiltrations comme à Ramadi en janvier ou des raids offensifs mobiles. Son offensive de juin de Mossoul jusqu’aux portes de Bagdad a été ainsi plus rapide que celle des Américains en mars-avril 2003. Daech est à ce jour l’organisation armée non-étatique arabe sunnite la plus puissante au monde.

 

la suite ici :

 

http://lavoiedelepee.blogspot.fr/2014/06/irak-face-larmee-sunnite.html?spref=fb

 

 

 

 

 

L'effondrement de l'armée irakienne face à la progression des combattants de l'Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (EILL) est le résultat de nombreux dysfonctionnements. Des lacunes graves en matière de management, de logistique ou encore d'organisation n'ont pas aidé à renforcer une force de soldats peu motivés. Le tout dans un contexte de vassalisation au profit du Premier ministre.

L’offensive des jihadistes en Irak, au début du mois de juin, a marqué les esprits tant par la capacité des combattants de l’Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL) à mener une opération d’envergure, que par l’incapacité de l’armée irakienne à lui tenir tête. Cette dernière a donné l’impression d’une immense débandade, abandonnant uniformes et armements aux mains des conquérants.

 

http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20140619-armee-irak-deroute-echec-lacunes-maliki/

 

 

 

 

 

La France a demandé une réponse «urgente» mais aussi «politique» face à l'offensive jihadiste de l’Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL) et se dit «prête» à contribuer au renforcement de l'opposition démocratique en Syrie, a annoncé l'Elysée ce jeudi 19 juin.

Depuis des semaines, la Direction du Renseignement militaire (DRM) suit la situation en Syrie et dans le nord de l'Irak. Des photos satellites toutes récentes ont été présentées au président François Hollande accompagné du ministre de la Défense et du chef d'Etat major des armées pour ce conseil de défense restreint à l’Elysée sur la situation en Irak.

Au final, le président français condamne l'offensive et exprime sa solidarité avec le peuple irakien face au « terrorisme », peut-on lire dans un communiqué de l'Elysée. La France appelle au dialogue entre toutes les composantes de la société irakienne, autrement dit entre chiites et sunnites. Paris s'inquiète de la constitution d'une zone ou les mouvements terroristes pourraient librement agir et s'organiser entre la Syrie et l'Irak.

la suite ici :

http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20140619-irak-conseil-defense-france-lutter-contre-eiil/

 

sans déconné !

 

 

 

 

L’offensive militaire lancée par l’Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL) depuis neuf jours en Irak, a mis à jour une stratégie de communication élaborée du groupe jihadiste sur le web. Pour enrayer cette propagande digitale de l’EIIL, le gouvernement irakien a décidé, depuis le 13 juin, de fermer l’accès à lnternet et à différents réseaux sociaux dans cinq provinces du pays. 

 

Alors que les combats se poursuivent entre l’armée et l’Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL), dans la raffinerie de Baiji, principale raffinerie de pétrole du pays au nord de Bagdad, les insurgés sunnites mènent un tout autre combat sur Internet. Depuis son offensive contre les villes de Mossoul, Tirkit et Kirkouk, l'EIIL multiplie la publication de messages, photos et vidéos sanglantes sur le web.

la suite ici :

http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20140619-irak-eiil-al-maliki-internet-propagande-reseaux-sociaux/

[Tomcat]

Oui enfin il n'a jamais eu de prétention militaire et laissait plus volontiers ces généraux faire dans les moments les plus critiques car il savait ne pas être un stratège, sinon il n'aurait jamais gagné la guerre. Il dégage même certains de ces plus fidèles généraux les sachant incompétents, comme son fidèle parmi les fidèle, le général Duri.

Il faut voir plus loin que la propagande qui entoure le personnage pour comprendre la complexité de la situation.

 

Je ne reviens pas sur ton résumé historique des événements qui te permettent de faire passer Saddam Hussein pour un "élément de stabilité inter-communautaire". Tu ne semble pas te rendre compte de l'approximation et ça ne fait bien marrer :)

 

Sur cette dernière partie, j'aimerais bien avoir tes sources (et ne me sors pas que c'est dans tes cours d'unif rangé au grenier...). Parce qu'elle est contredite par: 

 

- Le Général Hamdani qui a combattu durant la guerre Iran-Irak, la première et la seconde guerre du golfe : Je cite 

 

 

(...) The problems started when Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979. He believed that the competence level, courage, and loyalty of the people were proportionate to their commitment to the Ba‘ath Party.Since Saddam was not a military person, he did not believe in specializa- tion. He believed as long as someone was a Ba‘athist, he could be a military commander. Thus, he promoted a number of officers several ranks above the rank they deserved. He assigned them as division commanders to the 3rd, 6th, and 10th Armored Divisions; the 9th Division was not formed yet. Tala al-Duri would eventually form the 9th Division. (..)

 

Pour ce qui est de Al-Duri écarté, encore une approximation. Saddam le place à la tête de la 12ème division après que sa 9ème division s'est révélé plus que médiocre à Khoramshahr repris par les Iraniens. Il est remplacé par Kamal Latif 3 jours avant la dissolution de la 9ème division et qui a du assumer toute la responsabilité des conneries de Al- Duri qui reste à la tête de la 12ème division et continuera à avoir de très hautes responsabilités jusqu'à la fin de son régime. 

 

- Le Général Makki Khamas 

 

 

The air strikes were a failure. On the second day, Iranian aircraft bom- barded us. I do not know why the Iraqi Air Force did not practice. Many bad things hap- pened in the army, but it was not always because of Saddam. Who was the air force com- mander? He was a good attack pilot, but he was also Saddam‘s political appointee. This is how the war started and why the war did not finish in a two-week blitzkrieg.

 

- Le général Tarfar

 

 

(...)Saddam relied on our analysis from the war‘s beginning, but he was disappointed with us when Fao fell. However, it was not that we failed in our job. The problem resided with the director of military intelligence, General Mahmoudi Shahin, whom Saddam ap- pointed to head the group. He was not an intelligence officer, but rather was an armor of- ficer, who had commanded a tank division (...)

 

- Le lieutenant général Kabi

 

 

I was introduced to Saddam by the previous navy commander, Aladdin Hammad al- Janabi. He had served most of his career in the army, but was assigned to the navy in 1979

 

Source : Project 1946 qui a mené plusieurs entretients très enrichissants avec les généraux Irakiens de Saddam après la chutte de son régime.  https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/ida-document-d-4121.pdf

Modifié le 19 juin 2014 par Tomcat

[Rob1]

Source : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BqggAkPIYAAbq44.jpg:large

 

 Ca doit pas être le bon lien O0

[Tomcat]

 Ca doit pas être le bon lien O0

 

Ooppps la boulette. J'ai inversé deux liens :s  Je ne comptais pas publier mais tant qu'on y est. Les pro-EIIL tournent cette photo sur les réseaux sociaux montrant le répression des sunnites par les chiites d'Irak. Sauf que l'image montre en vérité l'ex-président Iranien dans le musé de cire de Téhéran sur le site de QG de la SAVAK et montre les activités de la police secrète du Shah. 

 

La propagande que les pro-ISIS alimentent n'a rien avoir avec celle qu'on a connu en Syrie tant par la quantité que la qualité. Ainsi, si on se base sur les réseaux sociaux, l'Irak a perdu plus d'hélico qu'il en a :s 

 

 

https://pbs.twimg.co...Abq44.jpg:large

[jeanbelved]

tous les groupes extrémistes sont financés et bienvenu au qatar

 

source reportage CNN

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-aQuutMOJo

Modifié le 19 juin 2014 par jeanbelved

[Tomcat]

Dans la suite de la vidéo qui précède (plus ou moins), un article du Marc Lynch sur les liens troubles qu'entretiennent les supporters des rebelles Syriens, en conflit ouvert avec l'EIIL, aux événements actuels en Irak vu par eux comme une révolution Sunnite et islamique contre un tyran. La présence de l'EIIL en Iraq est réduit à l'extrême, leurs combattants deviennent des locaux sunnites révoltés.  

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/18/how-arab-backers-of-the-syrian-rebels-see-iraq/ 

 

Je ne suis pas sûr que cela arrange vraiment le cas des rebelles Syriens. Ils ont déjà beaucoup de mal à se détacher de l'image islamiste et radicale qui leur est (parfois injustement) collée. Si le soutient commencent à soutenir également des gars qui sont eux réellement radicaux et islamistes, ça risque de donner quelques maux de tête aux conseillers de communication. Certains espèrent que pour combattre l'EIIL, Obama pourrait fournir plus d'armes aux rebelles afin de l'emporter sur Assad et de se tourner contre l'EIIL. Je ne vois pas ça arriver tant les liens entre l'opposition modérée et AQ sont troubles. Par exemple, l'opposition modérée (Harkat Hazm qui a reçu des TOW) vient d'intégrer une joint operational room à Daraa où il y a JAN afin de mener des opérations ensemble.... 

[Patrick]

Quelqu'un sait quelle est la position de Sergueï Lavrov sur la question des liens entre eiil/al qaida et la FSA ? Je suis assez surpris qu'on entende pas plus les russes en mode "je vous l'avais bien dit" sur la question.

[Tonton Flingueur]

“Nous devons retourner en Irak”

Par Jean-Cosme Delaloye. Mis à jour le 19.06.2014 

•  

Dans un entretien exclusif accordé à la Tribune de Genève, Paul Bremer, l’ambassadeur américain qui a dirigé l’Irak pour le compte de l’administration Bush entre 2003 et 2004, préconise un retour limité des Etats-Unis à Bagdad.

http://www.tdg.ch/monde/ameriques/Nous-devons-retourner-en-Irak/story/24530853

 

C'est vrai qu'il avait été d'une efficacité redoutable, et que la situation actuelle n'est absolument pas en partie, le résultat de son action  :lol: 

 

 

 

Des djihadistes prennent une usine d'armes chimiques

Mis à jour à 07h10

•  

Les islamistes irakiens ont pris le contrôle du complexe d'Al Muthanna, une ancienne fabrique d'armes chimiques datant du régime de Saddam Hussein.

http://www.tdg.ch/monde/asie-oceanie/djihadistes-prennent-exusine-gaz-sarin/story/18055211

 

(titre racoleur) 

[Wallaby]

Un peu d'histoire :

 

http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/fr/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/ITW-IRAK-10_03_2003.pdf

 

Palais de l'Élysée, le lundi 10 mars 2003

QUESTION - Monsieur le Président, merci de nous recevoir alors que nous vivons les heures les plus brûlantes de l'affrontement diplomatique et que nous sommes peut-être à quelques jours d'une intervention militaire annoncée en Iraq. Alors, chacun, et pas seulement en France, veut savoir ce que fera la France, ce que vous ferez, si vous irez personnellement à New-York, aux Nations-Unies, si la France utilisera son droit de veto et si les relations franco-américaines ne tournent pas au divorce.

[French Kiss]

Ben au moins s'ils reprennent des sites datant de l'epoque de Saddam, on aura pas a aller chercher trop loin dans les archives pour savoir ou les frapper, tachons de voir le bon cote des choses. Autre point qui me fait plaisir, le rapprochement de l'oncle Sam avec Teheran au grand dam des genereux donateurs du Golf qui subventionnent les mouvements islamistes, la aussi il y aurait sans doute matiere a un rapprochement entre Poutine et Obama qui permettrait peut-etre de mettre de l'huile dans les rouages diplomatiques du cote de l'Ukraine.

 

Enfin bon, les islamistes semblent super bien entraines et encadres par rapport a l'armee irakienne (dont la plupart des soldats ne semblent pas encore avoir compris pourquoi ils devaient se battre), et l'occident n'aura vite plus 36 choix : soit remettre les pieds dans ce merdier, soit laisser les irakiens se demerder avec... rien de rejouissant dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la seconde option etant la seule qui apprendrait aux irakiens a se prendre par la main, chose qui pourrait se faire quand meme avec un soutient exterieur aussi discret que possible.

[Tomcat]

Ben au moins s'ils reprennent des sites datant de l'epoque de Saddam, on aura pas a aller chercher trop loin dans les archives pour savoir ou les frapper, tachons de voir le bon cote des choses. Autre point qui me fait plaisir, le rapprochement de l'oncle Sam avec Teheran au grand dam des genereux donateurs du Golf qui subventionnent les mouvements islamistes, la aussi il y aurait sans doute matiere a un rapprochement entre Poutine et Obama qui permettrait peut-etre de mettre de l'huile dans les rouages diplomatiques du cote de l'Ukraine.

 

Enfin bon, les islamistes semblent super bien entraines et encadres par rapport a l'armee irakienne (dont la plupart des soldats ne semblent pas encore avoir compris pourquoi ils devaient se battre), et l'occident n'aura vite plus 36 choix : soit remettre les pieds dans ce merdier, soit laisser les irakiens se demerder avec... rien de rejouissant dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la seconde option etant la seule qui apprendrait aux irakiens a se prendre par la main, chose qui pourrait se faire quand meme avec un soutient exterieur aussi discret que possible.

 

- Sur le rapprochement Iran/US il s'agit pour l'instance d'une alliance de circonstance et localisée puisqu'ils divergent sensiblement sur la Syrie. Certes la situation est fondamentalement différente mais les risques que représente ce pays pour les alliés des E-U, Pays Arabes-UE (un argument avancé hier pour passer à l'action aux côtés du gouvernement Irakien) restent les mêmes voir plus puisque la frontière Turque est toujours volontairement ouverte pour les mouvements islamistes/jihadistes. 

- Sur l'Etat de l'armée Irakienne, je suis plus optimiste. L'armée Irakienne est plus ou moins dans l'état de l'armée Syrienne en 2012 (défection et abandon de poste). L'EIIL tout en étant une tête au dessus de tous les autres groupes en Syrie reste limité dans ses actions comparé à une armée qui dispose d'une l'artillerie et aviation capable de frapper derrière ses lignes et de changer la balance de la terreur.  Pour l'instant l'avancée de l'EIIL à Mosul et Fallujah s'est fait sans combat mais là où l'armée Irakienne et les milices irakiennes se sont battus l'EIIL a dû battre retraite comme à Samarra.

 

-L'Iran a réussi à former en 6 mois l'armée Syrienne aux techniques contre insurrectionnelle qui manquent cruellement à l'armée Irakienne. L'Iran connait parfaitement l'EIIL pour l'avoir combattu en Syrie. Je suis sûr qu'en 6 mois ils arriveront à mettre en place une milice assez forte pour reprendre le terrain perdu jusqu'à Al-Anbar.  Le problème de l'EIIL c'est l'absence de base de retrait dans un pays immune de toute attaque. Les Irakiens peuvent librement mener des frappes en Syrie et inversement. Ils ne bénéficient plus d'un soutien étatique comme JAN ou l'IF en Syrie. 

 

- Obama est face à un grand dilemme. Soit il aide l'armée Irakienne à frapper l'EIIL avec l'aide et la coordination de l'Iran ( au risque de s'attirer la foudre des pays du Golfe qui voit dans l'EIIL Irak une "révolution de Sunnites" bien que le groupe est responsable de la mort de 4000 rebelles sunnites en Syrie en 6 mois) soit il abandonne Maliki à son sort et donne donc à l'Iran carte blanche pour former/armer l'armée Irakienne voire même intervenir avec sa propre armée. 

[Wallaby]

L'Iran connait parfaitement l'EIIL pour l'avoir combattu en Syrie.

Serait-il possible d'avoir quelques précisions sur ce point, car cela permettrait de nuancer le propos peut-être quelque peu caricatural du communiqué de l'Élysée du 19 juin « Bachar el-Assad entretient de longue date des relations troubles avec les groupes terroristes, qu’il ne combat pas » ( http://www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/article/conseil-restreint-de-defense-consacre-a-la-situation-en-irak/ ).

[debonneguerre]

Oui, oui, assad ne combat pas l'EIIL en syrie.

Ils ont  pas honte à l'élysée, vraiment pas.

Modifié le 20 juin 2014 par debonneguerre

[thibaut]

l'asl et jabat al nostra on fait plus contre l'eiil que l'armée loyaliste.

[debonneguerre]

Oui eux aussi combattent l'EIIL même si ca n'a pas toujours été le cas.

[Tomcat]

Serait-il possible d'avoir quelques précisions sur ce point, car cela permettrait de nuancer le propos peut-être quelque peu caricatural du communiqué de l'Élysée du 19 juin « Bachar el-Assad entretient de longue date des relations troubles avec les groupes terroristes, qu’il ne combat pas » ( http://www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/article/conseil-restreint-de-defense-consacre-a-la-situation-en-irak/ ).

 

Cette affirmation est encore plus ridicule qu'elle tombe 2 jour après que l'armée Syrienne ait bombardé le QG de l'EIIL à Raqqa, l'EIIL a répondu en tirant des roquettes sur la base Tabqa. Les clashs sont quotidiens dans cette région. Par ailleurs l'armée Syrienne a bombardé des positions de l'EIIL dans le Haskah (dixit détruisant des véhicules Iraqiens que l'EIIL tentait de passer en Syrie). 

 

 

 

l'Iran connait l'EIIL parce qu'avant les combats ouverts entre l'EIIL et l'ASL/JAN, l'ASL était allié à l'EIIL sur de nombreux front notamment à Alep où l'EIIL a repris la base Menagh et surtout à Lattaquié lors de la première offensive. Ce sont les troupes de Riad Al Assad formé par les Iraniens/Hezbollah qui ont repoussé l'EIIL à Idlib. Mais bon je ne compte pas sur la France pour reconnaitre ça.... 

[debonneguerre]

J'imagine lors de la rédaction du communiqué : "bon là l'EIIL c'est le bordel, faut surtout pas qu'on nous accuse de l'avoir favorisé en favorisant la rébellion en syrie, alors on va suggérer que c'est des potes à assad, hein! comme ca c'est tous les mêmes méchants et nous on reste gentil".

Non en effet faut pas compter sur la France pour être objective, que ce soit sur le plan interne ou sur l'international, il faut prendre les gens pour des crétins, c'est la colonne vertébrale de leur communication.

Modifié le 20 juin 2014 par debonneguerre

[amarito]

Sans compter qu'il y a quelques jours des chefs de l'ASL à Deir Ezzor ont prêté allégeance à l'EIIL.

 

Beirut-based Al-Akhbar daily reported on Thursday that the FSA militants, triggering insurgency in Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria near Iraqi border, swore to fight along with ISIL terrorists.

The move is considered the last symbolic presence of FSA militants in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, the newspaper noted.

Monir al-Matar, Qanam al-Kurdi, Abu Harun and Abu Abd al-Rahman are the FSA commanders, who accepted to coordinate with the ISIL in Deir ez-Zor, according to Al-Akhbar.

Several supporters of the FSA and the ISIL have censured both groups in Deir ez-Zor for the alliance.

Al-Akhbar quoted a source affiliated to the ISIL as claiming that the coordination comes after ISIL victories in Syria, and there will happen other oath of allegiance soon.

 

http://al-akhbar.com/node/208878

[thibaut]

 l'EIIL, islamiste sunnite combatant les régimes chiite de bagdad et de damas

leur constestant non seulement leur frontière mais leur pays dans leur entier et le multiconfessionalisme qui les compose. entraine forcement un antagonisme qu'il est inutile de nier.

 

néanmoins:

 

le régime syrien a eu "un role trouble" dans la constitution de la rébellion sunnite irakienne (un peu comme la turquie aujourd'hui en syrie).

"trouble" aussi parce que potentiellement schizophrène  et la un peu comme le pakistan, luttant d'un coté soutenant ou laissant faire de l'autre. (je parle de bien avant les printemps arabes)

 

Ensuite il ya avait les supposé libérations d’islamistes au début du conflit (tout le monde en parle mais j'en sais vraiment rien , tellement il y a d'affirmation de part et d'autre).

 

enfin il y a le fait que le régime syrien laisse au autre rebelles le soin de combattre l'EIIL. A mon avis c'est plus de la stratégie du diviser pour mieux régner qu'une preuve d ecomplicité(c'est pas plus con qu'autre chose)

 

 

 

bon là l'EIIL c'est le bordel, faut surtout pas qu'on nous accuse de l'avoir favorisé en favorisant la rébellion en syrie

 

Il y a ptr un peu de ça, il faut dire que beaucoup de personne font un peu exprès de ne pas voir que depuis le début on explique en vain qu'on ne soutient pas le plus radicaux.  

Qu'ont est échoué a permettre la montée en puissance d'une "rebellion acceptable" ne signifie pas qu'on ai soutenue l'EIIL.

[amarito]

----

Je repense à la conf. de presse d'Obama hier, il était vraiment géné, hésitant, cherchant ses mots, beaucoup parlé des Sunnites, quand un journo lui a posé une question sur la Syrie, le mot clé était "moderates", il a parlé de la nécessité de les entrainer et équiper correctement, tout en expliquant que la solution ne pouvait etre que politique en Irak. Il expliquait aussi que la méthode d'attaquer frontalement les terroristes avait ses limites il fallait former les FdS locales et avoir une plateforme de lutte contre le terrorisme au niveau régional pour ne pas se retrouver à jouer "whack-a-mole".

C'était vraiment troublant, d'un coté on avait l'impression que les USA revenait à une politique mesurée, on avait presque l'impression d'entendre le discours diplomatique de la Chine ou de la Russie avant 2014, il prenait ses distances avec tous les acteurs regionaux pour se garder des marges avec tout le monde (sauf avec la Syrie-former des "modérés" à décapiter les soldats syriens c'est OK). Ca doit etre les necessites de la geopolitique internationale (affontements avec Russie et Chine) qui dictent cette prudence aux Etats-Unis.

 

Par contre la France -on le comprend- a plus à gagner en prenant clairement le parti du camp sunnite (extremiste), elle risque de s'aliener les chiites mais bon on s'en fout ils sont loin. 

[Tomcat]

@Thibaut je suis partiellement d'accord. Étant sur mobile je vais essayer d'être court.

- Le soutien Syrien au jihadistes en Irak (bien avéré) s'inscrit dans un contexte particulier où il y avait de grande chance que les néo-cons poussent jusqu'à Damas tellement ils acaient l'impression d'avoir le vent en poupe.

- l'argument de la libération des islamistes est à double tranchant. Ces mêmes islamistes se révèlent être les opposants les plus efficaces cobtre Assad (Aboud, Alloush). Reprenant le même argument peut on dire que les américains ont libéré Al Baghdadi et qu'ils sont derriere la montée de l'EIIL?

- il ne faut pas confondre une situation où le régime tire un bénéfice un direct (lutte inter rebelles) en s'assurant que ca dure le plus lovgtemps possible et la situation où c'est le régime qui téléguide le tout avec des agents infiltrés.

-l'occident ne soutient pas directement les radicaux mais sa politique en Syrie est responsable de la montée des radicaux en laissant carte blanche aux Qatari et saoudiens et permettant à membre de lOtan de faciliter le passage des combattants étrangers dont environs 5 à 10 k sont passés chez l EIIL

[Gravity]

Serait-il possible d'avoir quelques précisions sur ce point, car cela permettrait de nuancer le propos peut-être quelque peu caricatural du communiqué de l'Élysée du 19 juin « Bachar el-Assad entretient de longue date des relations troubles avec les groupes terroristes, qu’il ne combat pas » ( http://www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/article/conseil-restreint-de-defense-consacre-a-la-situation-en-irak/ ).

 

 

Syria's Assad accused of boosting al-Qaeda with secret oil deals

 

Western intelligence suggests Bashar al-Assad collaborating with jihadists to persuade West the uprising is terrorist-led

 

By Ruth Sherlock, in Istanbul and Richard Spencer

7:53PM GMT 20 Jan 2014

 

The Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad has funded and co-operated with al-Qaeda in a complex double game even as the terrorists fight Damascus, according to new allegations by Western intelligence agencies, rebels and al-Qaeda defectors.

 

Jabhat al-Nusra, and the even more extreme Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS), the two al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Syria, have both been financed by selling oil and gas from wells under their control to and through the regime, intelligence sources have told The Daily Telegraph.

 

Rebels and defectors say the regime also deliberately released militant prisoners to strengthen jihadist ranks at the expense of moderate rebel forces. The aim was to persuade the West that the uprising was sponsored by Islamist militants including al-Qaeda as a way of stopping Western support for it.

 

The allegations by Western intelligence sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, are in part a public response to demands by Assad that the focus of peace talks due to begin in Switzerland tomorrow be switched from replacing his government to co-operating against al-Qaeda in the “war on terrorism”.

 

“Assad’s vow to strike terrorism with an iron fist is nothing more than bare-faced hypocrisy,” an intelligence source said. “At the same time as peddling a triumphant narrative about the fight against terrorism, his regime has made deals to serve its own interests and ensure its survival.”

 

Intelligence gathered by Western secret services suggested the regime began collaborating actively with these groups again in the spring of 2013. When Jabhat al-Nusra seized control of Syria’s most lucrative oil fields in the eastern province of Deir al-Zour, it began funding its operations in Syria by selling crude oil, with sums raised in the millions of dollars.

 

“The regime is paying al-Nusra to protect oil and gas pipelines under al-Nusra’s control in the north and east of the country, and is also allowing the transport of oil to regime-held areas,” the source said. “We are also now starting to see evidence of oil and gas facilities under ISIS control.”

 

The source accepted that the regime and the al-Qaeda affiliates were still hostile to each other and the relationship was opportunistic, but added that the deals confirmed that “despite Assad’s finger-pointing” his regime was to blame for the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria.

 

Western diplomats were furious at recent claims that delegations of officials led by a retired MI6 officer had visited Damascus to re-open contact with the Assad regime. There is no doubt that the West is alarmed at the rise of al-Qaeda within the rebel ranks, which played a major role in decisions by Washington and London to back off from sending arms to the opposition.

 

But the fury is also an indication that they suspect they have been outmanoeuvred by Assad, who has during his rule alternated between waging war on Islamist militants and working with them.

 

After September 11, he co-operated with the United States’ rendition programme for militant suspects; after the invasion of Iraq, he helped al-Qaeda to establish itself in Western Iraq as part of an axis of resistance to the West; then when the group turned violently against the Iraqi Shias who were backed by Assad’s key ally, Iran, he began to arrest them again.

 

As the uprising against his rule began, Assad switched again, releasing al-Qaeda prisoners. It happened as part of an amnesty, said one Syrian activist who was released from Sednaya prison near Damascus at the same time.

 

“There was no explanation for the release of the jihadis,” the activist, called Mazen, said. “I saw some of them being paraded on Syrian state television, accused of being Jabhat al-Nusra and planting car bombs. This was impossible, as they had been in prison with me at the time the regime said the bombs were planted. He was using them to promote his argument that the revolution was made of extremists.”

 

Other activists and former Sednaya inmates corroborated his account, and analysts have identified a number of former prisoners now at the head of militant groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS and a third group, Ahrar al-Sham, which fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra but has now turned against ISIS.

 

One former inmate said he had been in prison with “Abu Ali” who is now the head of the ISIS Sharia court in the north-eastern al-Qaeda-run city of Raqqa. Another said he knew leaders in Raqqa and Aleppo who were prisoners in Sednaya until early 2012.

 

These men then spearheaded the gradual takeover of the revolution from secular activists, defected army officers and more moderate Islamist rebels.

 

Syrian intelligence has historically had close connections with extremist groups. In an interview with The Daily Telegraph after he defected, Nawaf al-Fares, a Syrian security chief, told how he was part of an operation to smuggle jihadist volunteers into Iraq from Syria after the 2003 invasion.

 

Aron Lund, editor of a website, Syria in Crisis, used by the Carnegie Endowment to monitor the war, said: “The regime has done a good job in trying to turn the revolution Islamist. The releases from Sednaya prison are a good example of this. The regime claims that it released the prisoners because Assad had shortened their sentences as part of a general amnesty. But it seems to have gone beyond that. There are no random acts of kindness from this regime.”

 

Rebels both inside and outside ISIS also say they believe the regime targeted its attacks on non-militant groups, leaving ISIS alone. “We were confident that the regime would not bomb us,” an ISIS defector, who called himself Murad, said. “We always slept soundly in our bases.”

 

The Telegraph

 

Al Qaeda in Iran

Why Tehran is Accommodating the Terrorist Group?

 

By Seth G. Jones

January 29, 2012

 

Virtually unnoticed, since late 2001, Iran has held some of al Qaeda's most senior leaders. Several of these operatives, such as Yasin al-Suri, an al Qaeda facilitator, have moved recruits and money from the Middle East to central al Qaeda in Pakistan. Others, such as Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian that served as head of al Qaeda's security committee, and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, one of the masterminds of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, have provided strategic and operational assistance to central al Qaeda. The Iranian government has held most of them under house arrest, limited their freedom of movement, and closely monitored their activities. Yet the organization's presence in Iran means that, contrary to optimistic assessments that have become the norm in Washington, al Qaeda's demise is not imminent.

 

Perhaps more disturbing, Iran appears willing to expand its limited relationship with al Qaeda. Just as with its other surrogate, Hezbollah, the country could turn to al Qaeda to mount a retaliation to any U.S. or Israeli attack. To be sure, the organization is no Iranian puppet. And the two have sometimes been antagonistic, as illustrated by al Qaeda in Iraq's recent attacks against Shias. But both share a hatred of the United States. U.S. policymakers should think twice about provoking a closer relationship between them and should draw greater public attention to Iran's limited, but still unacceptable, cooperation with al Qaeda.

 

Evidence of the Iranian-al Qaeda partnership abounds -- and much of it is public. This past year, I culled through hundreds of documents from the Harmony database at West Point; perused hundreds more open-source and declassified documents, such as the U.S. Department of Treasury's sanctions against al Qaeda leaders in Iran; and interviewed government officials from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.

 

Through that research, the history of al Qaeda in Iran emerges as follows: over the past several years, al Qaeda has taken a beating in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. In particular, an ongoing campaign of drone strikes has weakened -- although not eliminated -- al Qaeda's leadership cadre in Pakistan. But the group's outpost in Iran has remained almost untouched for the past decade. In late 2001, as the Taliban regime collapsed, most al Qaeda operatives fled Afghanistan. Many of the leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy and future successor, headed for Pakistan. But some did not, choosing instead to go west. And Iran was apparently more than willing to accept them. Around October 2001, the government dispatched a delegation to Afghanistan to guarantee the safe travel of operatives and their families to Iran.

 

Iran is in many ways a safer territory from which al Qaeda can operate. The United States has targeted al Qaeda in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, but it has limited operational reach in Iran.

 

Initially, Iran's Quds Force -- the division of the Revolutionary Guard Corps whose mission is to organize, train, equip, and finance foreign Islamic revolutionary movements -- took the lead. Between 2001 and 2002, it helped transport several hundred al Qaeda-linked individuals. By 2002, al Qaeda had established in Iran its "management council," a body that bin Laden reportedly tasked with providing strategic support to the organization's leaders in Pakistan. Key members of the council included Adel, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani. All five remained influential over the next several years and retained close ties to bin Laden. Among the most active of the council, Adel even helped organize groups of fighters to overthrow Hamid Karzai's regime in Afghanistan and provided support for the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh.

 

According to U.S. government officials involved in discussions with Iran, over time, the growing cadre of al Qaeda leaders on Iranian soil apparently triggered a debate among senior officials in Tehran. Some worried that the United States would eventually use the terrorist group's presence as a casus belli. Indeed, in late 2002 and early 2003, U.S. government officials held face-to-face discussions with Iranian officials demanding the regime deport al Qaeda leaders to their countries of origin. Iran refused, but around the same time, the country's Ministry of Intelligence took control of relations with the group. It set to work rounding up al Qaeda members and their families.

 

By early 2003, Tehran had detained all the members of the management council and their subordinates who remained in the country. It is not entirely clear what conditions were like for al Qaeda detainees. Some apparently suffered through harsh prison confinement, while others enjoyed informal house arrest with freedom to communicate, travel, and fundraise. Over the next several years, bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other leaders apparently sent messages to Tehran threatening to retaliate if al Qaeda personnel and members of bin Laden's family were not released. Iran did not comply. Bin Laden did not follow through.

 

After that, the details of al Qaeda's relationship with the Iranian government are hazy. It seems that many of the operatives under house arrest petitioned for release. In 2009 and 2010, Iran did begin to free some detainees and their family members, including members of bin Laden's family. And the management council remained in Iran, still under limited house arrest. Tehran appears to have drawn several red lines for the council: Refrain from plotting terrorist attacks from Iranian soil, abstain from targeting the Iranian government, and keep a low profile. As long as it did so, the Iranian government would permit al Qaeda operatives some freedom to fundraise, communicate with al Qaeda central in Pakistan and other affiliates, and funnel foreign fighters through Iran.

 

Today, Iran is still an important al Qaeda hub. Suri, who was born in 1982 in al-Qamishli, Syria, is a key operative. According to U.S. Treasury Department accounts, Tehran has permitted Suri to operate discretely within Iran since at least 2005. He has collected money from donors and transferred it to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan and other locations; facilitated the travel of extremist recruits from the Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan; and according to U.S. State Department accounts, "arranges the release of al-Qaeda personnel from Iranian prisons."

 

On the surface, the relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni al Qaeda is puzzling. Their religious views do differ, but they share a more important common interest: countering the United States and its allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Iran's rationale might be compared to that of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who declared, "If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons."

 

Iran is likely holding al Qaeda leaders on its territory first as an act of defense. So long as Tehran has several leaders under its control, the group will likely refrain from attacking Iran. But the strategy also has an offensive component. If the United States or Israel undertook a bombing campaign against Iran, Tehran could employ al Qaeda in a response. Tehran has long used proxies to pursue its foreign policy interests, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it has a history of reaching out to Sunni groups. In Afghanistan, for example, Iran has provided limited support to the Taliban to keep the United States tied down. Al Qaeda's proven willingness and ability to strike the United States make it an attractive partner.

 

Al Qaeda is probably making similar calculations. To be sure, some revile the Ayatollahs. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased head of al Qaeda in Iraq, actively targeted Shias there. In a 2004 letter, Zarqawi explained that they are "the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion." Yet, in a sign of Churchill-esque pragmatism, Zawahiri chastised Zarqawi in 2005, writing that the Shias were not the primary enemy -- at least not for the moment. It was crucial, Zawahiri explained, to understand that success hinged on support from the Muslim masses. One of Zarqawi's most significant mistakes, Zawahiri chided him, was targeting Shia communities, because such a strategy would cripple al Qaeda's support among the broader Muslim community. And most al Qaeda operatives since the debacle in Iraq have cautiously followed Zawahiri's lead. 

 

Moreover, Iran is in many ways a safer territory from which al Qaeda can operate. The United States has targeted al Qaeda in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, but it has limited operational reach in Iran. In addition, Iran borders the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, making it centrally located for most al Qaeda affiliates. No wonder that Suri has been able to move money and recruits through Iran to various theaters, including al Qaeda central in Pakistan. Although most governments in the region have clamped down on al Qaeda, Iran's willingness to allow some activity sets it apart.

 

With the management council still under limited house arrest, Iran and al Qaeda remain at arm's length. But that could change if Washington's relationship with Tehran does. So far, the conflict between Iran and the West has been limited to diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. It has also occasionally deteriorated into cyber attacks, sabotage, assassinations, kidnappings, and support to proxy organizations. But much like the struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, it has not spilled into overt conflict. Should an increase of those activities cause a broad deterioration in relations, however, or should the United States or Israel decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran and al Qaeda could come closer together.

 

The United States should think twice about actions that would push Iran and al Qaeda closer together -- especially a preemptive attack on the country's nuclear program.

 

For one, Iran would likely respond to an attack by targeting the United States and its allies through proxies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. The regime might increase its logistical support to al Qaeda by providing money, weapons, housing, travel documents, and transit to operatives -- some of which it is already doing. In a worse scenario, Tehran might even allow al Qaeda officials in Iran to go to Pakistan to replenish the group's depleted leadership there, or else open its borders to additional al Qaeda higher-ups. Several of the operatives already in Iran, including Adel and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, would be especially valuable in this regard, because of their prestige, experience in paramilitary and external operations, and religious credentials. In an even more extreme scenario, Iran could support an al Qaeda attack against the United States or one of its allies, although the regime would surely attempt to hide its role in any plotting. Based on Iran's cautious approach over the past decade, Tehran's most likely strategy would be to gradually increase its support to al Qaeda in response to U.S. actions. That way it could go slowly, and back away at any time, rather than choosing an all-or-nothing approach from the start.

 

It would be unwise to overestimate the leverage Tehran has over al Qaeda's leadership. The terrorist organization would almost certainly refuse Iranian direction. But given the group's current challenges, any support or tentative permission to plot on Iran's soil would be helpful. It could set about restoring its depleted senior ranks in Pakistan and other countries, or else rebuild within Iran itself. The organization might thus be amenable to working within Iranian constraints, such as seeking permission before planning attacks in the West from Iranian soil, as long as the taps were flowing.

 

It is true that the United States has limited leverage with Iran, but it still has several options. The first, and perhaps easiest, is to better expose the existence and activities of al Qaeda leaders in Iran. Al Qaeda has killed tens of thousands of Sunnis, Shias, and non-Muslims over the past two decades and has unified virtually all governments in the world against it. Iran, too, has become an international pariah. Its limited aid to al Qaeda is worthy of further public condemnation. But Iran has largely escaped such scrutiny.

 

The United States could encourage more countries to prohibit citizens and companies from engaging in commercial and financial transactions with al Qaeda leaders and their networks in Iran. The U.S. Treasury and State Departments have taken steps against some al Qaeda operatives and their supporters in Iran, including against Suri and his circle. But those efforts have not been coupled with robust diplomatic efforts to encourage other countries to do the same. Nor have they been successful in eliminating al Qaeda's sanctuary in Iran.

 

Finally, the United States should think twice about actions that would push Iran and al Qaeda closer together -- especially a preemptive attack on the country's nuclear program. Thus far, Iran and al Qaeda have mutually limited their relationship. It would be a travesty to push the two closer together at the very moment that central al Qaeda in Pakistan has been severely weakened.

 

Thankfully, there is still time to deal with the problem. But the stakes are too high for the United States to remain quiet any longer.

 

Foreign Affairs

 

Strange bedfellows -- Iran and al Qaeda

 

By Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst

March 11, 2013 -- Updated 0021 GMT (0821 HKT)

 

Editor's note: Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden -- From 9/11 to Abbottabad" and a director at the New America Foundation.

 

(CNN) -- The appearance Friday in a lower Manhattan courtroom of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Osama bin Laden's son-in-law and one-time al Qaeda spokesman, to face charges of conspiracy to kill Americans underlines the perhaps surprising fact that members of bin Laden's inner circle have been living in Iran for the past decade or so.

 

It was Abu Ghaith's decision to leave the comparative safety of his longtime refuge in Iran for Turkey a few weeks ago that led to the chain of events that landed him in Manhattan for trial.

 

The leading Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet, reported that Abu Ghaith was detained in the Turkish capital, Ankara, in early February. Turkey then decided to deport him to his native Kuwait via Jordan, where he was intercepted by FBI agents, who escorted him to New York.

 

As is well known, many of bin Laden's family and members of his inner circle fled Afghanistan for Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban in the winter of 2001, but what is less well known is that some also fled to neighboring Iran.

 

According to U.S. documents and officials, in addition to Abu Ghaith, other of bin Laden's inner circle who ended up in Iran include the formidable military commander of al Qaeda, Saif al-Adel, a former Egyptian Special Forces officer who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, as well as Saad bin Laden, one of the al Qaeda's leader older sons who has played some kind of leadership role in the group.

 

Saad bin Laden spent the first six months of 2002 living in Karachi in southern Pakistan. From there he helped one of his father's wives, Khairiah bin Laden, and several of his father's children to move from Pakistan to Iran.

 

For years these bin Laden family members all lived in the Iranian capital, Tehran, under some form of house arrest. Their conditions were not unpleasant, with time for visits to swimming pools and shopping trips.

 

Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence learned that some al Qaeda operatives were living in the northern Iranian town of Chalus, on the Caspian Sea.

 

In 2002 a U.S. Navy SEAL operation into Chalus was planned and then rehearsed somewhere along the U.S. Gulf Coast.

 

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Richard Myers, called off the assault because the information about where precisely the al Qaeda members were living in Chalus was not clear.

 

A year after that operation was called off, according to US and Saudi officials, from his Iranian refuge Saif al-Adel authorized al-Qaeda's branch in Saudi Arabia to launch a series of terrorist attacks in the Saudi kingdom that began in the capital Riyadh in May 2003, a campaign that killed scores of Saudis and expatriates.

 

Bergen: Trying bin Laden's son-in-law in New York makes sense

 

On the face of it, the fact that a number of al Qaeda leaders and operatives and bin Laden family members found shelter in Iran is puzzling, as the Shia theocrats in the Iranian regime are hostile to the Sunni ultra zealots in al Qaeda, and vice versa.

 

For al Qaeda's operatives, life in Iran was more secure than for many of their colleagues in Pakistan who risked capture by Pakistani forces working with the CIA or death by CIA drones.

 

The Iranian regime likely saw the al Qaeda operatives as useful bargaining chips with the United States in the event of some kind of peace negotiations with the Americans. That peace deal, of course, never happened.

 

Of course, for Iran the adage, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" may have also come into play, although there doesn't seem to be evidence that Iran and al Qaeda have ever cooperated on a specific operation.

 

That said, the 9/11 Commission found that of the 19 hijackers, "8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle" operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001." Whether this was with any degree of Iranian complicity is still an open question.

 

The fact that leading members of al Qaeda were based in Iran from 2002 on was known to the U.S. government at the time. (In fact, in early 2003 counterterrorism officials briefed me about this development).

 

There is something of an irony here. This was during the same time period in which senior administration officials under President George W. Bush were citing the alleged presence of al Qaeda members in Baghdad and a supposedly burgeoning alliance between al Qaeda and Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein as a key reason to go to war against Saddam, Iran's bitter enemy.

 

Five years after the invasion of Iraq, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded, as had every other official investigation of the matter, that in fact there was no "cooperative relationship" between Saddam and al Qaeda.

 

In late 2008 al Qaeda operatives kidnapped Heshmatollah Attarzadeh-Niyaki, an Iranian diplomat, in the western Pakistan city of Peshawar.

 

After holding the diplomat for over a year the militants quietly released him back to Iran in the spring of 2010.

 

This was part of a deal that allowed some of bin Laden's family and al Qaeda members living under house arrest in Iran to depart, according to a Pakistani official familiar with the deal.

 

This deal did not, however, mean that relations between the Iranians and al Qaeda suddenly became all hunky dory.

 

Documents recovered at bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, following the SEAL raid there on May 1, 2011, and since publicly released portray a rather tense relationship between al Qaeda and the Iranian authorities.

 

In a letter that bin Laden wrote just five days before he died he described a document from his son Saad who had lived in Iran for years "which exposes the truth of the Iranian regime." What bin Laden meant precisely by this is not clear, but taken together with some of the other letters that were found in his Abbottabad compound it is obvious that bin Laden and his men were quite distrustful of the Iranian regime.

 

A letter to bin Laden from his chief of staff dated 11 June 2009 has a detailed account about a group of "mid level" al Qaeda members who the Iranians had recently released, including three Egyptians, a Yemeni, a Iraqi and a Libyan.

 

Bin Laden's chief of staff attributed these releases to al Qaeda's kidnapping of the Iranian diplomat in Peshawar, but added that the Iranians "don't want to show that they are negotiating with us or reacting to our pressure. ... We ask God to repel their evil."

 

In another undated letter from bin Laden to his chief off staff al Qaeda's leader gave a set of detailed instructions about how best to handle his family members living in Iran once they were released.

 

Bin Laden urged extreme caution "since the Iranians are not to be trusted." Among another precautions, he wrote that his family members "should be warned about the importance of getting rid of everything they received from Iran like baggage or anything even as small as a needle, as there are eavesdropping chips that have been developed to be so small they can be put inside a medical syringe."

 

In this letter bin Laden mentioned by name a number of his children living in Iran including his sons Ladin, Uthman and Muhammad and his daughter Fatima, who is married to Sulaiman Abu Ghaith who now sits in a Manhattan jail.

 

In October the U.S. Treasury named as terrorists six al Qaeda members living in Iran who it said are funding terrorist activities in Pakistan and sending fighters and money to Syria to fight the Assad regime there.

 

Abu Ghaith didn't play an operational role in al Qaeda -- a fact that was underlined in the charges filed against him last week in Manhattan that revolve around his role as a propagandist for the group. So it is the precise nature of al Qaeda's arrangements in Iran and the kind of activities outlined in the recent Treasury designation of the half-dozen al Qaeda members living in Iran that are likely to be of most interest to American investigators.

 

Given the fact that since 9/11, New York courts have convicted at a rate of 100% in cases that involve members of al Qaeda and associated groups, Abu Ghaith could doubtless cut an attractive plea deal for himself if he gives a full accounting of al Qaeda's murky decade in Iran.

 

CNN

Modifié le 20 juin 2014 par Gravity

[thibaut]

Irak, syrie, nucléaire, il est ptr temps que la diplomatie mèlent les sujets et trouve un terrain d'entente.

 

Les iraniens veulent: le nucléaire, damas et bagdad

Les saoudiens veulent: pas de nucléaire iranien, bagdad et damas.

 

les occidentaux veulent pas de nucléaire et bachar out (pas forcement damas en revanche et clairement pas bagdad, ce qui ne signifie pas forcement garder maliki) .

 

il y  quand mème la place pour quelque chose.

Modifié le 20 juin 2014 par thibaut