Finlande

[ksimodo]

Il y a 6 heures, MIC_A a dit :

C'est un poil contradictoire ton "plaidoyer" !
 

rien de contradictoire, puisque je ne conclus pas grand chose.

Mais des becs aussi usés comme ça par ragage au fond, c'est trés trés trés improbables. Si tu perds autant de matière par "meulage" au fond, c'est toute l'ancre qui sera amincie.

Donc, casse des becs , puis oui, une sorte de "meulage" avant ré utilisation.

OU BIEN,

Ancre "redessinée" avant acte de de raclage. 

 

Je ne suis que modeste utilisateur de forme Britany en 12 kilos, donc bien des divisions en dessous de ce dont on parle ici ( dans les 10 tonnes et autre forme ).

Selon la nature du fond ( rocher, sable, vase, algue, etc.....), le comportement des ancres, des formes, etc....sera différent. Au delà du poids, pour les fonds "mous", l'accroche est liée à la surface "plantée", à la condition d'une longueur de mouillage suffisante et d'un angle de pénétration satisfaisant.

Dans la photo au dessus, si la perte des becs n'impacte la masse globale que de 10 % au max  ( à vue d'oeil ) la capa d'accroche est considérablement amoindrie et pas de 10 % seulement. 

Donc oui c'est plus compatible avec un objet trainant qui évitera de stopper le bateau en arrêt buffet complet ( si sol mou, en baltique ça l'est il me semble ).

Pour illustrer la complexité du truc:

Une Brittany bien plate sur un sol de grosse roche, tu as des chances que ça reste au fond, au bien ça vole au dessus des roches. La solution du soc de charrue y serra plus employé ( autre géométrie ) car ça accrochera mais sans doute avec de la force exercée ( vents fort au mouillage ) tu risques de déraper "un peu" en permanence. 

 

Au sujet de la fissure visible:

Il y avait de toute façon une faiblesse au coulage, ça ne surprendra personne qu'une pièce coulée de 10 tonnes ne soit pas homogène. Et moins que la théorie. 

 

Même si les chicots bien émoussés permettent une force de résistance bien amoindrie, il n'en reste pas moins que tariner des dizaines de kilomètres l'ancre et la chaine à plusieurs fois la profondeurs, et donc vers l'arrière, ça doit sacrément bien marquer la coque, pour ne pas dire littéralement la défoncer. Puisque ce n'est pas fait pour celà, pas du tout. Contrairement à un chalutier ou tout traine vers l'arrière, avec des pièces de contact prévues pour celà.  

[ARMEN56]

il y a 51 minutes, ksimodo a dit :

Il y avait de toute façon une faiblesse au coulage, ça ne surprendra personne qu'une pièce coulée de 10 tonnes ne soit pas homogène. Et moins que la théorie. 

Les ancres de ce calibre  subissent de nombreux contrôles de fabrication sur les pièces moulées et forgées ;

- vérif des caractéristiques mécaniques

-  essai de tension

-  essai de martelage

-  essai de chute

-  contrôles non destructifs ; magnétoscopique et ultrasons pour vérifier tout absence de défauts internes susceptible de nuire à l’usage de l’ancre

[ARMEN56]

Le 14/01/2025 à 21:20, ARMEN56 a dit :

Sur l’ancre bâbord récupérée on observe des extrémités de pattes usées  rendues à un état de moignon . Extrémités limées par un ragage intensif du fond , et pas que sur 100 m ! 

Il y a 21 heures, ARMEN56 a dit :

un poids d’ancre de 10/11 t en 2 ancres ( 1 principale et 1 secours ) 

L’ancre posée sur plateau  , les experts norvégiens ont déroulé un mètre ruban pour  mesurer la longueur de l’ancre ; ici 4m

Or ce 4 m on le retrouve sur la fiche MARIT DT 209 pour une masse d’ancre de 9 à 11 t Code asto 11700 ; Longueur d’ancre L + F

L = 3286 mm

F = 531 mm

Soit 3717 mm , le bloc patte étant incliné on se retrouve avec une sur-longueur d’où l’a peu près 4000 mm;

 

 

La masse d’ancre de 10/11 t évoquée plus haut et déduite d’une approche calculs coin de table se confirmerait donc ;

A moins d’un gros fake satellite/sondeur/sonar  une telle masse laisse trace visible ; 44 position de l'ancre édentée

Je m’interroge toutefois sur l’impact d’une telle traine sur la tenue de cap navire ; peanut ou  parasitage à faire dériver sur bâbord - sachant qu’à faible vitesse les tankers sont peu manoeuvrables

Ici un image du EAGLE S d’avant , avec ses ancres dont celles bâbord ; « incisives » intactes se fourchant dans l’écubier. 

 

 

Modifié dimanche à 11:06 par ARMEN56

[ksimodo]

OK, on est donc bien sur du 10 / 11  tonnes.

Le rabotages des chicots, l'impression de son intensité peut varier selon le prises de vue. 

 

Il y a une coquille malheureuse dans le tableau avec copié collé entre les colonnes H et J, et H serait intéressant. Il reste la valeur A de 177 cm. Ici 1 mètres à l'horizontale mais en prenant un angle de 35 ° 

Cos 35° = adjacent / hypoténuse.

Donc hypoténuse = longueur restante de la patte = adjacent / cosinus 35 ° = 100 / 0.82 = 122 cm au lieu de 177. Il en manque quand même pas mal.

Pour la vérif ultrasons et compagnie, disons que les fab chinoise ....aussi. On ne peut pas exclure une ancre "au rabais" vendue en conscience avec "remise" ou sans conscience. 

 

"Je m’interroge toutefois sur l’impact d’une telle traine sur la tenue de cap navire ; peanut ou  parasitage à faire dériver sur bâbord - sachant qu’à faible vitesse les tankers sont peu manoeuvrables"

Ca reste le point MAJEUR pour moi.

Si on parle d'un bateau qui avance à 12 kn, et qui serait freiné par une ancre en avançant à 6 kn par cette cause ( en gros, hein ), on parle d'un effort absolument considérable provenant du point avant, qui est 200 mètres plus à l'avant que la poussée hélice. Le couple de renversement de cap est absolument formidable, et c'est absolument ingouvernable ( puisque les gouvernes sont elles à une distances trés courtes du contre propulsif versus l'avant du navire ). 

La situation serait évidemment toute autre avec un chalut depuis l'arrière, ou un point de remorquage depuis l'arrière. Il y a toujours le nez à l'avant et la possibilité de garder un cap. 

Sur un navire de petite plaisance, même avec un davier unique de mouillage ( davier centré ) et même avec motorisation HB ( donc centre propulsif ET directif ), ( et donc un ensemble nettement moins "pataud" qu'un cargo ), la navigation ( maintien de cap ) est impossible avec une ancre si elle accroche "un peu". Et même si ça traine sans accrocher, ça part en mode toupie incontrôlée trés vite. 

Mais je développe sur l'accroche.

Si c'est mouillé trop court, ça traine, mais il y a trop d'angle d'angle et les crocs ( limés ou pas ) ne sont pas orientés assez vers le bas. 

Si la longueur est suffisante, l'axe de l'ancre sera proche du "horizontal" et les pattes font le boulot. Effectivement les crocs limés vont fortement diminuer l'accroche. Par ce qui compte plus que le poids à ce stade, c'est la surface "plantée" dans le sol et la résistance du sol selon sa nature. Mais toutefois, la coque doit présenter des sacrées marques visibles de la chaine, vu les tractions de 100 tonnes ( par exemple ) qui seraient exercées. 

[Hibernatus]

Au vu de ma très petite expérience en navigation (plaisance), la quasi impossibilité de garder un cap et les dégâts considérables provoqués le long de la coque par le frottement de la chaîne me semblent patents.

Toutefois, je ne connais rien aux cargos, en dehors de l'impératif de virer de bord dès qu'on soupçonne le moindre risque de trajectoire de collision avec son voilier (priorité au plus gros, on oublie le tribord amure!)...

Est-il envisageable sur un bâtiment de ce type de tracter une ancre par l'arrière ? Ou encore de laisser traîner l'ancre en marcha arrière (peu probable au vu de la perte de puissance, et je me demande si l'écubier ne se prendrait pas un sévère ragage) ?

[ARMEN56]

Il y a 1 heure, Hibernatus a dit :

Est-il envisageable sur un bâtiment de ce type de tracter une ancre par l'arrière ? Ou encore de laisser traîner l'ancre en marcha arrière (peu probable au vu de la perte de puissance, et je me demande si l'écubier ne se prendrait pas un sévère ragage) ?

Certains navires ont des ancres sur l’arrière qu’on appelle dans le jargon mili , ancre de détroit , à ma connaissance l’Eagle S n’en a pas . 

En marche arrière ? Risqué donc peu probable

- d’abord parce que la mèche d’un safran est toujours calculé pour un couple marche avant plein pot. En marche arrière le safran voit bcq plus  de courant d’eau qu’en marche avant ( normal pas de carène  dvt ) , et donc consigne pour limiter la vitesse pour éviter tout surcouple de ruine mèche. 

- Ensuite parce que  butée ligne d’arbre de marche arrière doit être limitée en poussée 

- Enfin dans ces conditions , manœuvrabilité périlleuse . 

Pis discrétion ?

Modifié dimanche à 16:10 par ARMEN56

[ksimodo]

En terme de discrétion, on parle d'une souille sur le fond sur 60 miles. A 6 kn ça fait 10 heures de nav'. Même en pleine nuit ( il est vrai que l'hiver baltique est long ).

Etant donné la densité de navigation dans le coin, en 10 heures on croise du monde. Même sans éclairage je m'interroge aussi..........

Inversement, un sabotage en raclant sur 1 nautique à 1 kn ou 2, avec une impression de plus ou moins manœuvrer pour du mouillage, ça passerait bien mieux quand même. Mais râcler sur 60 miles, il vaut s'équiper avec un chalutier. D'une part ça tire depuis l'arrière et c'est conçu pour ça, et aussi personne ne s'étonnera que des trucs "trainent". 

[gustave]

Volonté d'éviter l'escalade ou constat? Article payant si quelqu'un y a accès...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/

Citation sur @RobLee: “Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage, according to several U.S. and European intelligence officials. The determination reflects an emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services, according to senior officials from three countries involved in ongoing investigations of a string of incidents in which critical seabed energy and communications lines have been severed.”

[Titus K]

il y a 8 minutes, gustave a dit :

Volonté d'éviter l'escalade ou constat? Article payant si quelqu'un y a accès...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/

Citation sur @RobLee: “Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage, according to several U.S. and European intelligence officials. The determination reflects an emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services, according to senior officials from three countries involved in ongoing investigations of a string of incidents in which critical seabed energy and communications lines have been severed.”

Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/

An emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services holds that accidents were the cause of damage to Baltic seabed energy and communications lines.

 

LONDON — Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage, according to several U.S. and European intelligence officials.

The determination reflects an emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services, according to senior officials from three countries involved in ongoing investigations of a string of incidents in which critical seabed energy and communications lines have been severed.

The cases raised suspicion that Russia was targeting undersea infrastructure as part of a broader campaign of hybrid attacks across Europe, and prompted stepped-up security measures including an announcement last week that NATO would launch new patrol and surveillance operations in the Baltic Sea.

But so far, officials said, investigations involving the United States and a half-dozen European security services have turned up no indication that commercial ships suspected of dragging anchors across seabed systems did so intentionally or at the direction of Moscow.

Instead, U.S. and European officials said that the evidence gathered to date — including intercepted communications and other classified intelligence — points to accidents caused by inexperienced crews serving aboard poorly maintained vessels.

U.S. officials cited “clear explanations” that have come to light in each case indicating a likelihood that the damage was accidental, and a lack of evidence suggesting Russian culpability. Officials with two European intelligence services said that they concurred with U.S. assessments.

Despite initial suspicions that Russia was involved, one European official said there is “counter evidence” suggesting otherwise. The U.S. and European officials declined to elaborate and spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of ongoing investigations.

The probes center on three incidents over the past 18 months in which ships traveling to or from Russian ports were suspected of severing key links in a vast underwater network of conduits that carry gas, electricity and internet traffic to millions of people across northern Europe.

The oil tanker Eagle S on Dec. 28 in the Gulf of Finland. The tanker was seized by Finnish authorities on suspicion the crew deliberately dragged an anchor to damage undersea cables. (Jussi Nukari/AFP/Getty Images)

In the most recent case, Finland seized an oil tanker suspected of dragging its anchor across an undersea power line connecting Finland and Estonia. Finnish authorities said the vessel, the Eagle S, is part of a “shadow fleet” of tanker ships helping Moscow sell oil on global markets in violation of international sanctions.

Previous cases involved a Hong Kong-registered container ship, the NewnewPolar Bear, that ruptured a natural gas pipeline in the Gulf of Finland in October 2023, and a Chinese ship, the Yi Peng 3, that cut two data cables in Swedish waters in November last year.
 

Russia’s denials of responsibility have been greeted with deep skepticism by European officials confronting a broader wave of hybrid attacks attributed to Moscow.

U.S. and European security officials last year disrupted an alleged Russian plot to smuggle incendiary devices on cargo planes in an apparent trial run for later attacks targeting the United States and Canada. U.S. intelligence officials also warned German authorities that Russia was planning to assassinate the chief executive of one of Europe’s largest weapons producers, a company that had announced plans to build an ammunition manufacturing facility in Ukraine.

At the same time, European security officials have accused Russia of using proxies to carry out hundreds of arson attacks, rail disruptions and smaller sabotage operations aimed at sowing divisions in Europe and sapping support for Ukraine.

Against that backdrop, the damage to seabed systems added to a European sense of being under siege. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called the anchor-dragging incident in November “sabotage” and said “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed.” Weeks later, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said a Christmas Day incident was “definitely” linked to Russia.

Experts have also said that the seabed cases fit a pattern of Russian aggression.

The severing of cables “may very well be random accidents,” said Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who previously served as the United States’ deputy national intelligence officer for Russia. “But it’s hard to rule out a concerted Russian campaign when [Moscow’s] intelligence services are trying to assassinate German business executives, starting fires at factories across Europe, and putting bombs on cargo planes.”

The emerging view among Western spy agencies that accidents — and not Russia — are likely to blame for the undersea damage was dismissed by some critics of Russia.

Pekka Toveri, who represents Finland in the European Parliament and previously served as the country’s top military intelligence official, said that the seabed cases are part of “a typical hybrid operation” from Moscow.

“The most important thing in any hybrid operation is deniability,” Toveri said. Russia’s security services may have succeeded in not leaving “any proof that would hold up in court,” he said, but to conclude that they were accidents “is total B.S.”

Toveri and others cited anomalies in the behavior of the vessels involved as well as evidence that Russia has for decades devoted extensive resources — including a dedicated military unit known as the General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research — to mapping Western seabed infrastructure and identifying its vulnerabilities.

At least two of the ships suspected of causing damage appear to have dragged their anchors 100 miles or more across seafloor. A ship that dropped an anchor by accident, Toveri said, would immediately be dragged so noticeably off course that crews would scramble to bring the vessel to a stop and assess the damage.

Mike Plunkett, naval expert at Janes, said that “aside from a very loud splash, there will also be a lot of noise from the anchor chain paying out through the hawse hole.” He described the chances of three anchor-dropping incidents in the Baltic region since 2023 as “vanishingly small” although not zero. But he said it was extremely difficult to prove intentional sabotage.

The timing of the incidents has heightened suspicion. The most recent cases, in November and December, damaged undersea energy lines at a time when Baltic nations are accelerating efforts to disconnect their power grids from Russia — a move that gained urgency after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

There are also reasons to question why Russia would risk targeting undersea systems in waterways now lined by NATO-member countries. Doing so could endanger oil smuggling operations Russia has relied on to finance the war in Ukraine, and possibly provoke more aggressive efforts by Western governments to choke off Russia’s route to the North Atlantic.

At a Baltic summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced plans for new patrols by frigates, aircraft, submarine satellites and a “small fleet of naval drones” designed to detect undersea sabotage.

From left, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with back to camera, at the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14. (Kimmo Brandt/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

Despite advances in undersea surveillance capabilities, attributing attacks has proved difficult. The bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in September 2022 was initially widely blamed on Russia but is now believed to have been carried out by a senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services.

Finland took a more aggressive approach to the Dec. 25 case of cable damage, forcing the Eagle S into Finnish waters before police and coast guard authorities boarded the vessel by helicopter. Members of the crew suspected of being on duty during the anchor-dragging damage are barred from leaving Finland while the investigation moves forward.

A Nordic official briefed on the investigation said conditions on the tanker were abysmal. “We’ve always gone out with the assumption that shadow fleet vessels are in bad shape,” the official said. “But this was even worse than we thought.”

Herman Ljunberg, a lawyer who represents the owner of the Eagle S tanker, acknowledged in a telephone interview that the vessel was carrying Russian oil but denied that it was in violation of international law or that the crew had intentionally caused any damage.

European security officials said that Finland’s main intelligence service is in agreement with Western counterparts that the Dec. 25 incident appears to have been an accident, though they cautioned that it may be impossible to rule out a Russian role.

A spokeswoman for Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation, which is leading the investigation of the Eagle S, said that the bureau’s probe is “still open, and it is too early to make final conclusions of the causes or combinations behind the damages.”

Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia, and Stanley-Becker from Washington. Ellen Francis in Brussels contributed to this report.

Modifié dimanche à 21:55 par Titus K

[ARMEN56]

Il y a 13 heures, Titus K a dit :

Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/

An emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services holds that accidents were the cause of damage to Baltic seabed energy and communications lines.

 

LONDON — Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage, according to several U.S. and European intelligence officials.

The determination reflects an emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services, according to senior officials from three countries involved in ongoing investigations of a string of incidents in which critical seabed energy and communications lines have been severed.

The cases raised suspicion that Russia was targeting undersea infrastructure as part of a broader campaign of hybrid attacks across Europe, and prompted stepped-up security measures including an announcement last week that NATO would launch new patrol and surveillance operations in the Baltic Sea.

But so far, officials said, investigations involving the United States and a half-dozen European security services have turned up no indication that commercial ships suspected of dragging anchors across seabed systems did so intentionally or at the direction of Moscow.

Instead, U.S. and European officials said that the evidence gathered to date — including intercepted communications and other classified intelligence — points to accidents caused by inexperienced crews serving aboard poorly maintained vessels.

U.S. officials cited “clear explanations” that have come to light in each case indicating a likelihood that the damage was accidental, and a lack of evidence suggesting Russian culpability. Officials with two European intelligence services said that they concurred with U.S. assessments.

Despite initial suspicions that Russia was involved, one European official said there is “counter evidence” suggesting otherwise. The U.S. and European officials declined to elaborate and spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of ongoing investigations.

The probes center on three incidents over the past 18 months in which ships traveling to or from Russian ports were suspected of severing key links in a vast underwater network of conduits that carry gas, electricity and internet traffic to millions of people across northern Europe.

The oil tanker Eagle S on Dec. 28 in the Gulf of Finland. The tanker was seized by Finnish authorities on suspicion the crew deliberately dragged an anchor to damage undersea cables. (Jussi Nukari/AFP/Getty Images)

In the most recent case, Finland seized an oil tanker suspected of dragging its anchor across an undersea power line connecting Finland and Estonia. Finnish authorities said the vessel, the Eagle S, is part of a “shadow fleet” of tanker ships helping Moscow sell oil on global markets in violation of international sanctions.

Previous cases involved a Hong Kong-registered container ship, the NewnewPolar Bear, that ruptured a natural gas pipeline in the Gulf of Finland in October 2023, and a Chinese ship, the Yi Peng 3, that cut two data cables in Swedish waters in November last year.
 

Russia’s denials of responsibility have been greeted with deep skepticism by European officials confronting a broader wave of hybrid attacks attributed to Moscow.

U.S. and European security officials last year disrupted an alleged Russian plot to smuggle incendiary devices on cargo planes in an apparent trial run for later attacks targeting the United States and Canada. U.S. intelligence officials also warned German authorities that Russia was planning to assassinate the chief executive of one of Europe’s largest weapons producers, a company that had announced plans to build an ammunition manufacturing facility in Ukraine.

At the same time, European security officials have accused Russia of using proxies to carry out hundreds of arson attacks, rail disruptions and smaller sabotage operations aimed at sowing divisions in Europe and sapping support for Ukraine.

Against that backdrop, the damage to seabed systems added to a European sense of being under siege. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called the anchor-dragging incident in November “sabotage” and said “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed.” Weeks later, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said a Christmas Day incident was “definitely” linked to Russia.

Experts have also said that the seabed cases fit a pattern of Russian aggression.

The severing of cables “may very well be random accidents,” said Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who previously served as the United States’ deputy national intelligence officer for Russia. “But it’s hard to rule out a concerted Russian campaign when [Moscow’s] intelligence services are trying to assassinate German business executives, starting fires at factories across Europe, and putting bombs on cargo planes.”

The emerging view among Western spy agencies that accidents — and not Russia — are likely to blame for the undersea damage was dismissed by some critics of Russia.

Pekka Toveri, who represents Finland in the European Parliament and previously served as the country’s top military intelligence official, said that the seabed cases are part of “a typical hybrid operation” from Moscow.

“The most important thing in any hybrid operation is deniability,” Toveri said. Russia’s security services may have succeeded in not leaving “any proof that would hold up in court,” he said, but to conclude that they were accidents “is total B.S.”

Toveri and others cited anomalies in the behavior of the vessels involved as well as evidence that Russia has for decades devoted extensive resources — including a dedicated military unit known as the General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research — to mapping Western seabed infrastructure and identifying its vulnerabilities.

At least two of the ships suspected of causing damage appear to have dragged their anchors 100 miles or more across seafloor. A ship that dropped an anchor by accident, Toveri said, would immediately be dragged so noticeably off course that crews would scramble to bring the vessel to a stop and assess the damage.

Mike Plunkett, naval expert at Janes, said that “aside from a very loud splash, there will also be a lot of noise from the anchor chain paying out through the hawse hole.” He described the chances of three anchor-dropping incidents in the Baltic region since 2023 as “vanishingly small” although not zero. But he said it was extremely difficult to prove intentional sabotage.

The timing of the incidents has heightened suspicion. The most recent cases, in November and December, damaged undersea energy lines at a time when Baltic nations are accelerating efforts to disconnect their power grids from Russia — a move that gained urgency after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

There are also reasons to question why Russia would risk targeting undersea systems in waterways now lined by NATO-member countries. Doing so could endanger oil smuggling operations Russia has relied on to finance the war in Ukraine, and possibly provoke more aggressive efforts by Western governments to choke off Russia’s route to the North Atlantic.

At a Baltic summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced plans for new patrols by frigates, aircraft, submarine satellites and a “small fleet of naval drones” designed to detect undersea sabotage.

From left, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with back to camera, at the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14. (Kimmo Brandt/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

Despite advances in undersea surveillance capabilities, attributing attacks has proved difficult. The bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in September 2022 was initially widely blamed on Russia but is now believed to have been carried out by a senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services.

Finland took a more aggressive approach to the Dec. 25 case of cable damage, forcing the Eagle S into Finnish waters before police and coast guard authorities boarded the vessel by helicopter. Members of the crew suspected of being on duty during the anchor-dragging damage are barred from leaving Finland while the investigation moves forward.

A Nordic official briefed on the investigation said conditions on the tanker were abysmal. “We’ve always gone out with the assumption that shadow fleet vessels are in bad shape,” the official said. “But this was even worse than we thought.”

Herman Ljunberg, a lawyer who represents the owner of the Eagle S tanker, acknowledged in a telephone interview that the vessel was carrying Russian oil but denied that it was in violation of international law or that the crew had intentionally caused any damage.

European security officials said that Finland’s main intelligence service is in agreement with Western counterparts that the Dec. 25 incident appears to have been an accident, though they cautioned that it may be impossible to rule out a Russian role.

A spokeswoman for Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation, which is leading the investigation of the Eagle S, said that the bureau’s probe is “still open, and it is too early to make final conclusions of the causes or combinations behind the damages.”

Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia, and Stanley-Becker from Washington. Ellen Francis in Brussels contributed to this report.

@Titus K  oups , merci pr cette complétude 

En l’état,  certains  arguments consternant à toucher le fond donc à prendre les finlandais pour des c…; je dis ça pour avoir un certain éclairage métier dans ce domaine : calculs et règles de maintenance. 

Cette ancre  qui n’est par une HHP ( hight holding power) , ne s’est pas affalée folle sans intervention avec en creux le sous entretien .

Pour ce faire il aurait fallut que ; 

- la cravate d’ancre soit désaisinée  de l’organeau ( première maille de la verge) 

- Le stoppeur soit libre , linguet enlevé 

- le guindeau barbotin soit defreiné …

Une ancre ne s’affale pas toute seule ! 
 

A noter que le bord semble maîtriser le processus puisque l’EAGLE S tjrs au mouillage obligé sur son ancre Tb. 

Modifié lundi à 11:09 par ARMEN56

[Rivelo]

12 hours ago, Titus K said:

Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/

An emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services holds that accidents were the cause of damage to Baltic seabed energy and communications lines.

 

[...]

Pekka Toveri, who represents Finland in the European Parliament and previously served as the country’s top military intelligence official, said that the seabed cases are part of “a typical hybrid operation” from Moscow.

“The most important thing in any hybrid operation is deniability,” Toveri said. Russia’s security services may have succeeded in not leaving “any proof that would hold up in court,” he said, but to conclude that they were accidents “is total B.S.”

Toveri and others cited anomalies in the behavior of the vessels involved as well as evidence that Russia has for decades devoted extensive resources — including a dedicated military unit known as the General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research — to mapping Western seabed infrastructure and identifying its vulnerabilities.

At least two of the ships suspected of causing damage appear to have dragged their anchors 100 miles or more across seafloor. A ship that dropped an anchor by accident, Toveri said, would immediately be dragged so noticeably off course that crews would scramble to bring the vessel to a stop and assess the damage.

Mike Plunkett, naval expert at Janes, said that “aside from a very loud splash, there will also be a lot of noise from the anchor chain paying out through the hawse hole.” He described the chances of three anchor-dropping incidents in the Baltic region since 2023 as “vanishingly small” although not zero. But he said it was extremely difficult to prove intentional sabotage.

The timing of the incidents has heightened suspicion. The most recent cases, in November and December, damaged undersea energy lines at a time when Baltic nations are accelerating efforts to disconnect their power grids from Russia — a move that gained urgency after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

There are also reasons to question why Russia would risk targeting undersea systems in waterways now lined by NATO-member countries. Doing so could endanger oil smuggling operations Russia has relied on to finance the war in Ukraine, and possibly provoke more aggressive efforts by Western governments to choke off Russia’s route to the North Atlantic.

At a Baltic summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced plans for new patrols by frigates, aircraft, submarine satellites and a “small fleet of naval drones” designed to detect undersea sabotage.

From left, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with back to camera, at the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14. (Kimmo Brandt/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

Despite advances in undersea surveillance capabilities, attributing attacks has proved difficult. The bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in September 2022 was initially widely blamed on Russia but is now believed to have been carried out by a senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services.

Finland took a more aggressive approach to the Dec. 25 case of cable damage, forcing the Eagle S into Finnish waters before police and coast guard authorities boarded the vessel by helicopter. Members of the crew suspected of being on duty during the anchor-dragging damage are barred from leaving Finland while the investigation moves forward.

A Nordic official briefed on the investigation said conditions on the tanker were abysmal. “We’ve always gone out with the assumption that shadow fleet vessels are in bad shape,” the official said. “But this was even worse than we thought.”

Herman Ljunberg, a lawyer who represents the owner of the Eagle S tanker, acknowledged in a telephone interview that the vessel was carrying Russian oil but denied that it was in violation of international law or that the crew had intentionally caused any damage.

European security officials said that Finland’s main intelligence service is in agreement with Western counterparts that the Dec. 25 incident appears to have been an accident, though they cautioned that it may be impossible to rule out a Russian role.

A spokeswoman for Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation, which is leading the investigation of the Eagle S, said that the bureau’s probe is “still open, and it is too early to make final conclusions of the causes or combinations behind the damages.”

Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia, and Stanley-Becker from Washington. Ellen Francis in Brussels contributed to this report.

Merci pour l'article.

C'est bizarre, le titre ("An emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services holds that accidents were the cause of damage to Baltic seabed energy and communications lines.") ne correspond pas vraiment à la suite de ce qui est décrit dans l'article, qui reprend tous les éléments dont on a discuté. A part deux lignes qui parlent dans des termes vagues que les espions de l'Ouest ne pas certain que cela soit les Russes, le reste de l'article dit le contraire 

[gustave]

Il y a 11 heures, Rivelo a dit :

Merci pour l'article.

C'est bizarre, le titre ("An emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services holds that accidents were the cause of damage to Baltic seabed energy and communications lines.") ne correspond pas vraiment à la suite de ce qui est décrit dans l'article, qui reprend tous les éléments dont on a discuté. A part deux lignes qui parlent dans des termes vagues que les espions de l'Ouest ne pas certain que cela soit les Russes, le reste de l'article dit le contraire 

Pas vraiment. Il rappelle les déclarations accusant la Russie, et les indices appuyant ces déclarations, avant de conclure que "European security officials said that Finland’s main intelligence service is in agreement with Western counterparts that the Dec. 25 incident appears to have been an accident, though they cautioned that it may be impossible to rule out a Russian role."  Si ces déclarations sont exactes (on peut aussi imaginer qu'elles s'inscrivent dans une "négociation" avec la Russie) alors cela signifie qu'en dépit des apparences ayant conduit aux déclarations initiales les services occidentaux concluent à l'absence de rupture délibérée et volontaire du câble, tout en rappelant qu'il est très difficile de prouver une telle intention.

Rappelons qu'au départ on est sur un navire espion et saboteur doté d’équipements d'écoute et des officiers de renseignement associés...

Modifié lundi à 22:43 par gustave

[ARMEN56]

Évidemment qu’affaler une chaîne de mouillage ça ft des étincelles et tintamarre à porter casque anti bruit. Perso suis un littoral habitant à 12 km d’une aire de mouillage d’attente gros cargos, jamais rien entendu , alors que pendant des années la fameuse bouée sifflante de la passe ouest d’à côté  marquait acoustiquement lors grosse houle . 

Sauf erreur la largeur du golfe de Finlande à cet endroit ft 60 km , rail au milieu à peu près ?  C’est couvert par SOSUS  ? 

Je pense aussi que ça risque d’être difficile de prouver l’irréfutable sabotage même si éléments plus que probant sur la table . Les avocats peuvent tjrs avancer un soucis technique machine suivi d’un mouillage d’urgence pour dépanner et éviter échouage  ( Cf Amoco) , humm à côté des câbles ? - pas de bol , coïncidence. 

Le précédant  Newnew Polar Bear 

Ici son ancre AC 14 de six tonnes ( patte et verge sectionnées ) trouvée à proximité du site d'endommagement du gazoduc Balticconnector et récupérée  le 24.10.2023. 

Le gazoduc a été endommagé 

Pas de bol coïncidence ? 

Modifié il y a 8 heures par ARMEN56

[ARMEN56]

Soit dit en passant ; une idée qui a fait son chemin . 

« navires chinois soupçonnés d'avoir coupé des câbles de communication sous-marins clés dans le monde entier, un examen de Newsweek des demandes de brevet en langue chinoise montre que les ingénieurs chinois ont inventé des dispositifs pour couper ces câbles rapidement et à moindre coût. »

@Hibernatus  « Est-il envisageable sur un bâtiment de ce type de tracter une ancre par l'arrière ? » Yes !

 

 

 

https://www.newsweek.com/china-conflict-undersea-cables-cutting-internet-data-subsea-marine-baltic-taiwan-2012396

https://splash247.com/chinese-anchor-like-device-to-cut-cables-makes-headlines/

 

[clem200]

Citation

Reached by telephone for comment, the deputy director of Lishui University's Scientific Research Division, Wang Yan, said, "No need, no need," then hung up.

Mais pourquoi breveter publiquement ce genre de dispositif ...