Guerre Russie-Ukraine 2022+ : Opérations militaires

[Banzinou]

il y a 52 minutes, bubzy a dit :

Si les drones sont pilotés à distance, ils doivent l'être via des contrôles au sol, car comment utiliser les satellites russes et les adapter en si peu de temps ? Si c'est le cas, les renseignements américains peuvent certainement trianguler la position des émissions. Ce qui fonctionne à priori facilement dans une guerre "low cost" contre un ennemi qui ne dispose pas de moyens ISR ne l'est plus contre un ennemi qui dispose de moyens d'écoute électronique efficaces. 

Ce ne sont que des conjectures, mais certainement que sans l'aide américaine, les ukrainiens seraient loin d'être là où ils en sont aujourd'hui 

Oui je pense aussi, et dans ce cas la portée du drone via l'antenne du centre de contrôle, aussi petit soit-il, ne doit pas excéder 150 km.

La zone touchée au sud de Kherson se trouve à environ 130 km d'Odessa, ça peut correspondre.

Modifié le 27 septembre 2022 par Banzinou

[Thyd]

Le dernier billet de Goya: L'art opératif, 3.

[Hirondelle]

Il y a 9 heures, Métal_Hurlant a dit :

1 jour d'entrainement c'est bien assez pour servir de chair à canon !

Et bienheureux qu’en tant que «lance-grenade » il ne soit pas employé pour la partie grenade.

[Benoitleg]

il y a 51 minutes, Boule75 a dit :

Une petite dissertation de War on the Rocks sur les explosions nucléaires de haute altitude.

https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/getting-serious-about-the-threat-of-high-altitude-nuclear-detonations/

Ça fout une grouille infâme dans les satellites en orbite basse.

Ça met une grouille innommable absolument partout :

Interférences électromagnétiques et stimulateurs cardiaques

https://www.cardiologie-pratique.com/journal/article/interferences-electromagnetiques-et-stimulateurs-cardiaques

Compatibilité électromagnétique (CEM) (pompe mylife ™ YpsoPump ® )

https://www.mylife-diabetescare.com/files/media/03_Documents/01_YpsoPump/IFU/1.1/amendment_emc/YPU_eIFU_amendment_EMC_REF_8500050_CH-fr_V01.pdf

Les cardiaques et diabétiques pourraient tomber comme des mouches.

Modifié le 27 septembre 2022 par Benoitleg

[Julien]

il y a 42 minutes, Benoitleg a dit :

Ça met une grouille innommable absolument partout :

Interférences électromagnétiques et stimulateurs cardiaques

https://www.cardiologie-pratique.com/journal/article/interferences-electromagnetiques-et-stimulateurs-cardiaques

Compatibilité électromagnétique (CEM) (pompe mylife ™ YpsoPump ® )

https://www.mylife-diabetescare.com/files/media/03_Documents/01_YpsoPump/IFU/1.1/amendment_emc/YPU_eIFU_amendment_EMC_REF_8500050_CH-fr_V01.pdf

Les cardiaques et diabétiques pourraient tomber comme des mouches.

Les pacemakers implantables sont tous compatibles MRI maintenant, ils peuvent encaisser des champs magnétiques très puissant. Reste ceux qui ont des vieux modèles mais la durée de vie de ces systèmes étant de l'ordre de 5-10 ans, et la compatibilité MRI étant plus ancienne que ca, il doit plus en rester beaucoup

Pour les défibrillateurs c'est un peu récent (techniquement plus compliqué) donc oui il reste pas mal de défibrillateurs qui seraient perturbés par un champ électromagnétique.

Mais de toute façon les porteurs ne tomberaient pas comme des mouches dans la grande majorité des cas. Tous les porteurs ne sont pas stimulo-dépendants et pour la tachycardie le défibrillateur est vital uniquement en cas de fibrillation ventriculaire.

Ca provoquerait probablement un encombrement chez les cardio dans les hôpitaux pour contrôler que les devices fonctionnent toujours correctement.

[Connorfra]

Il y a 10 heures, Métal_Hurlant a dit :

1 jour d'entrainement c'est bien assez pour servir de chair à canon !

On peut oublier la partie grenadier de grenadier-voltigeur.... reste juste un voltigeur ... surtout pendant les impacts de missiles et autres obus...

[BP2]

Bientôt on leur demandera, comme leur grand pères avant eux, de récupérer le fusil d'un soldat tué devant eux pour continuer à se battre...

Ca promet des bataillons motivés ça.

 

[Connorfra]

il y a 31 minutes, BP2 a dit :

Bientôt on leur demandera, comme leur grand pères avant eux, de récupérer le fusil d'un soldat tué devant eux pour continuer à se battre...

Ca promet des bataillons motivés ça.

 

 

 

On en est pas loin... Pas besoin de kalash pour les tankistes... bien voyons. Même un Somalien il en voudrait pas de ces AKM ( elles sont totalement réparable mais faut du matériel et du temps qu'on ne leur laissera pas si ils doivent être dans 15 jours sur le front.)

Modifié le 27 septembre 2022 par Connorfra

[Valy]

Il y a 3 heures, ChristoK4 a dit :

Bonjour et merci pour le lien
Serait-il possible de faire un petit résumé des points importants ?

Pas trop le temps de faire des compte rendus (j'ai un travail en +). J'ait fait tourner un transcipteur automatique (texte en anglais en dessous. Dites moi si c'est praticable. Je n'ai pas de traducteur qui accepte des textes de cette longueur

Révélation

You are listening to the War on the Rocks podcast on strategy, defense and foreign affairs. My name is Ryan Evans and I'm sitting here again with Mike Kaufman to update all of us on what's been happening in and around Ukraine. Thanks again for being on the show. Mike, thanks for having me back. Last time we spoke was in the aftermath of Ukraine's amazing success in the Carcass counter offensive. The news now, of course, is that Putin has announced a partial mobilization. But before we get to that, which everyone is focusing on for good reason, let's talk about what's been happening on the various fronts in the war in the last couple of weeks. So I think that after the immediate break of the hark of offensive, russian forces withdrew from much of the Haircut region. They initially attempted to defend Alliance Oscar River, but have been somewhat fallen back from it. Ukrainian forces have established a small beach at a crossover in the rail hub town of Kupiansk. There's been quite a bit of fighting at a southern pocket of maybe more of a northern southern pocket where highcarbon dines Global around the town of Yaman. Ukrainian forces over the last few weeks have been trying to solve involvement and take it there's been pretty fierce Russian resistance there. When you sort of look at the battlefield post hardcore, I think the two things you see is Ukrainian effort to consolidate a lot of territory they gained and an effort to continue pushing at more the southern edges to try to establish a better position, maybe if not for a follow on offensive, then to essentially have better positions going into the winter. Russian forces have tried to reconsolidate their lines on Lansk after this dramatic retreat. They have surprisingly been pushing still in Danesk against Bhmut with the Bahamute Seversk line, and they've actually been making incremental gains, very minor ones, throughout these past several weeks. And that's mostly been Wagner PMCs backed by L and our forces. But it's almost been a bit strange to watch this play out. It's clearly been a political objective for them because of Putin's desire to hold these referendums. 2s I think it's much clear now that part of why the Russian military was so thinly manned in Archev and especially to zoom pocket was that not only did they redeploy substantial forces south to Kirsten. Upper Asia in anticipation of Ukrainian offensive there. But also they were forced to take remaining forces and redeploy them in support of advances in Danielsk and this push to try to break through the buck mood. That's part of the sort of ongoing attempt to put themselves in a position to take savvy and Chromatours. When the gray military counterattack west of a zoom, they found very few people. There was essentially two companies of Rose guardian and some LNR troops. They circumvented, they easily bypassed them. And not only were the Russian lines incredibly thin, but the units there were terribly undermanned in terms of staffing levels and a poor morale. Many of them had been serving pastor contract dates or wanted to quit. And this was basically the consequence of Russia not being able to rotate forces and not being able to replenish them either. And essentially having a military, they'll slowly become exhausted and demoralized. And in that attack, accurate was clear that some Russian units, I think specifically the 11th court from Coleman Grad broke and turned what was an ordered retreat by the Russian general staff into a panic retreat and in some cases clear out. 1s And that situation led them to abandon live equipment. Ukraine captured several recovery repair yards too where Russian tanks and armored vehicles were sort of just parked awaiting repair. They were either broken down or damaged but as I think Guy said in the previous podcast that it essentially led to destruction of the western grouping of forces that a lot of the equipment they had was abandoned there and this was a badly mauled formation to begin with. But my son what drove the situation was that not only could the Russian military not defend north and south but certainly couldn't do that while being ordered to continue attacking in Daniels. Which almost made no sense after the summer given the state of the forest what's happening around Kirsten it seems like Ukrainian forces continue to try to surround the city and give Russian forces in the center of to leave it in your son from the very beginning. The Ukraine military made some progress on established eclipse but then the offensive I think fairly quickly ground down. And the reason for that is it was always Ukrainian plan to press Russian forces out rather than try to do a large ambitious sort of commercial arms offensive because a lot of the Russian military was there dug in and trenched. 1s So the prohibras there, I think, has been fairly anemic, although it's clear that maybe in the last week or two, they've taken a coastal town that got them a bit closer to the city of Trisson. The state of Russian forces is somewhat unclear. My impression, and this has also been based on some reporting, that, to be honest, I read this week myself in the press, is that the Russian military had wanted to retreat from Tursan. From that foothold, logically, it makes the most sense. 1s This has also been my view. But they're not being allowed to, also, for a very clear reason, because Putin refuses to. Putin refuses to because his plans to annex your son. So he can't allow them because it simply doesn't comport with the political objectives. Right. And that's always the challenge. That what maybe sound from an operational perspective 1s doesn't meet with his political objectives for this war. And he clearly wants to conduct four referendums and annex as much of the territory as possible. And I think it's doubly problematic because after the defeated hardcore, you can't allow withdrawal from Curson because it will look like another major defeat. Right. So it will sort of compound the political implications and the impact on morale of the Russian military if they were also then withdrawing from Croissant. 1s Although my sense of their choices a couple of weeks ago when we last spoke, was that it was essentially between three categories of options retrenchment, over, treat to more defensible territory, mobilization or escalation. In an escalation I didn't see as a very real option, but one that they were going to pursue anyway and then would be stuck between retrenchment or mobilization. Let's talk about these referenda which were supposed to take place in advance or when the Carcassive offensive took place that sort of got pushed off the agenda by the Ukrainian counter offensive. What's going on with these referendum and what is their significance in terms of war strategy and war termination? I thought that one of the early success of the Ukraine military may have had was essentially displacing indefinitely the referendum. This is one of their objectives, why they launched the offensive in September. They were very concerned about the referendums, and it looked like they were quite successful at that, and also in showing to the west that they could retake territory and were worthy of more support. However, it's clear that after first announcing that they were postponed referendum indefinitely, russian leadership then changed their mind and decided to quickly go through the main way, except for in hideko, which they lost control of. Well, the implications are, from my point of view, is that this is one of those points of no return in a conflict. If they conduct these referendums, they annex the territories. There's nothing left for them to talk about with the Ukrainian government. There may not be much to begin with, but now there's actually 1s nothing to discuss because essentially Putin has committed himself to this. He's sort of burning his boats on the beach, in a way, yes, for as long as he's in power, he's committed himself to it, and after that it's unclear. He may, to some extent, commit a successor as well. The referendums do have some significance, and I think we should get into that in a bit as we talk about the mobilization aspect of this. But for me, one of the stranger things, and I think one of the less strategic things he has done, essentially tried to claim that once, having annexed them, that direct Russian nuclear deterrence now extends to them. And then he said, and this is not a bluff, which is how you know, it's probably a bluff where the person has credibility issues, because people have credibility issues, don't have to say that this isn't the bluff when they're making a curse of threat. Well, nuclear threats sort of have to be couched in like, no, I actually really mean it because no one actually thinks you do mean it, because he's made way too many nuclear threats in the past. And the challenge, I think, for him is not only is not corrupt because he doesn't control the territory, there's ongoing fighting, and the Ukrainian military has been striking not just this territory, but the Russian homeland. It doesn't look very credible. What it is from my point is actually very foolish because it's retroactively intended angles russian credibility over crimea with these four new territories that they're annexing because then people will say, well, crimea was sort of being treated as a distinct threshold. 1s When it comes to Russian deterrence and claiming of it as being Russian territory. But now he's annexed for additional territories, and he also annexed Crimea in similar fashion at gunpoint. And so maybe those are all five in one group know it's clear that probably Russian political leadership, she's craving it differently from these other four territories that they're picking up or trying to annex before we turn to mobilization. Do you think Putin would actually use nuclear weapons on the battlefield? Nonsense. I don't know. I think it's very unlikely. My view was always that there's going to be nuclear use. It would likely be first nuclear use as a demonstration employment somewhere, maybe in the Black Sea, snake island or Snake Island or something in space, possibly. Sure. And then if there's going to be nuclear use in Ukraine or following nuclear use, it could be against some active military target, like, I don't know, in the air base or what have you, rather than battlefield employment of nuclear weapons. I think most folks think of nuclear weapons as tactical nuclear weapons. But most Russian nuclear weapons are kind of non strategic nuclear weapons. Or think of them as theater nuclear weapons. And likely much more to be employed against fixed targets such as critical infrastructure. Military basing. And what have you. Rather than the notion of tactical nuclear weapons being launched and used in a battlefield against advancing military formations. Which I think is sort of a 1960s 2s versus needle perception of it. Do you think Russia's declaratory policy on nuclear weapons applies to its entire arsenal to include some of these smaller non strategic weapons? So first, 2s No. Second, I think the territory policy is usually written so ambiguously vague that you could drive a bus through it in terms of employment options. Third, it's often inconsistent with other documents and a lot of writing and some statements by Russian officials. And lastly, 1s declaratory policy. In many ways, the shape is used to shape your opponent's perceptions. Most people don't believe each other's declaratory policy, to be perfectly honest either way, but it's not a defense planning or war fighting document. In the event that comes down to something like this, if there's one thing I'm certain of, is that Putin is not going to ask for someone to get the latest copy of the military doctrine to make sure that his use of nuclear weapons is consistent with a vague wordmith clause. That's sure, but these documents were written with his preferences and views in mind in the first place. They absolutely are, but they often conceal just as much as they reveal. And if you look at these documents, they're not necessarily consistent across the board with each other, and they typically include vague language intended to deter the opponent with ambiguity. Right. And so you can read a tremendous amount into them. They're also not the kind of end all, be all of what amounts to knowledge on Russian nuclear strategies. It's a huge amount of writing. Outside of that. Anya and I have worked on it extensively over the years, and it does show very clearly that while Russia may not have, I'd say maybe cookie cutter escalated escalator escalated wind type strategy, it clearly has a place for the use of nuclear weapons in escalation management and war termination approaches under a certain criteria. 1s And to suggest otherwise, I just think, to me, the preponderance of evidence, obviously, we don't know use of nuclear weapons is a political decision. The personal views matter most on this in a personal authoritarian system of Lamar Putin's check. But the preponderance of evidence. I think. Points to a very clear direction and shows a lot of the ambiguity in Russian declaratory policy. From my point of view. Disguises more than it reveals. And it usually speaks specific to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal and Russian force. Boscher. And how Russia might retaliate in the event of fairly uncontroversial contingencies such as strategic nuclear attack or mass conventional attack on the Russian homeland. Don't say very much at all about limited theater, nuclear employment, or border towns getting shelled by the Ukrainians. Sure. Or Crimea is a potential corner case. Right? I mean, I think that. 2s For Russia to use nuclear weapons, even as a demonstration, but especially on the battlefield in this conflict, would be utter madness. But that doesn't mean that they're not going to do it, I think, which fits with Russian behavior in this war. What I really worry about worry about is that Putin and the Russian elite around him do not understand the truly or appreciate the truly global consequences that nuclear use would bring upon Russia. Much bigger than what we've seen, in my opinion, at least in terms of its ability to maintain relations with states that have so far stayed on the sidelines, are not interfered too much, most significantly India. But I worry that Moscow does not appreciate that sure. And that's likely quite true at the very least, because no one has used nuclear weapons and war since the United States has used them at the end of World War II. But just to say that none of us know for sure what will happen or how the international community will react, we can say for sure. It's going to be quite bad. But I think it's an incredibly unlikely event. And I juxtapose that with the fact that as unlikely as it is, and in the conversations on nuclear escalation, even though probably is considered very high, it is still probably the highest likelihood that we potentially have had of nuclear use 1s of nuclear as being likely in a conflict since 1983. Certainly it's the highest amount of decades. I think, paradoxically, that because nuclear use was only going to be really likely in the event of a complete collapse of cohesion of Russian forces, and you are going to have a deterioration of the Russian military in Ukraine that perhaps would be sudden and unrecoverable. The mobilization. 2s Which I think we're going to get to in a minute, actually makes nuclear use less likely. Well, let's talk about that. But first I want to talk about the important context, both for mobilization and the nuclear use debates. Putin was very clear, as were his most senior officials in the aftermath. They explicitly view this as a war with the United States and NATO, where Ukraine is being used as a proxy, which I think is important rhetoric from Moscow that frames all of these issues, but especially mobilization and the possibility of nuclear use. Yeah, they very much see us, I think, really as a regional war. They don't see us as a local war just between them and Ukraine, and they see Ukraine as being backed by United States and UK first and foremost, but much of Europe and NATO. I completely agree. They've always spoken about this way and have increasingly come to acknowledge it this way also. I think it's actually really they almost have to, because, I'll be honest, since the war had gone poorly for Russia, russian political leads, I think, would be much more willing to acknowledge defeat at the hands of the United States and NATO than they would ever be willing to acknowledge it at the hands of Ukrainians. Yeah, I think that's an important aspect of this. So let's dig into what exactly what was announced, and then we'll get into what it means. What did Putin announce and show you after in terms of specifics as to what mobilization would take place and is now unfolding? So two things have taken place what was announced and what was actually written in the executive orders, and that's typically in Russia, they don't quite align with each other. But what was announced was a partial mobilization and an enactment of a host of policies that are essentially, from my point of view, policies that enact wartime measures in Russia. And I'm sure you said that mobilization will essentially be phased, that's going to focus on men with prior service experience and military experience, and that they're looking to call up maybe something like 300,000 over a period of time, obviously not all at once. And that does only 1% of the total available mobilization based on Russia, which they typically pegged to being somewhere between a number of 25 to 30 million, almost. This is what was announced. What was written in the executive order, to me, is actually quite more interesting, which is that there's no framing or wording of this as a partial mobilization. What it looks like, de facto, uses a phase general mobilization and what they're mobilizing. So you understand, it's not that these people are really reservists. The Russian reserve, which is in the bar system, had been called off and sent to the war from the very beginning. 1s So what is essentially is a large pool of manpower. A lot of these men had been previously conscripted on service at some point, but some haven't and includes basically everyone's a general mobile utilization of individuals across the board and it looks like it's going to proceed in phases. That's where they get this very large number from that they think they're pulling from. These aren't necessarily men in any specific kind of active reserve system, they just counted as reserves because of prior service or just because you actually don't have to have military experience and you don't have to have had prior service to be listed here too. Are all the people being called up so far prior service though? No. So here's what I see is happening in practice, by the way, just to be clear, I don't believe the numbers that should we give out at all. I actually think that what's happening initially is that 1s they are likely calling up a wave 1s of men that they're mobilizing now and that this is going to be rolling through the course of the coming year. And what's happening is that the various agencies in the regions that are calling up these men are just trying to fill quotes. So they're getting everybody, people who qualify and people who don't doesn't matter to them. And then they're going to the vancommat and there 2s at the commissariat they're trying to filter a bit and some of the ones that are unqualified, clearly unqualified, basically just called up but don't meet the criteria they're sending back. 2s Some of some they're keeping. It looks like actually a pretty ad hoc approach because right now they're clearly looking for bodies and the initial training period is pretty short. So here's what I think. Here's what I think of the mobilization side was going to happen. I think the most likely their strategy right now is to very quickly get manpower in the battlefield to stabilize the lines before the winter because they're very afraid probably of a collapse or major Ukrainian breakthrough again before the winter comes. And so they're likely going to take this initial group maybe 60,000, maybe all the way up to 120,000. It's not clear to me how many men they mobilized, but actually in the first week it's looking like a lot more men than I personally initially imagined. That they would try to pull in their bandwidth and capacity to process these personnel. I don't know. I'm not sure of no, there aren't people really available to train them. I think they're going to, at best, get two weeks of refresh or some kind of familiarization training before being sent off. And what most likely they're going to do with them is first raise manning levels and currently deployed units that are short on staff and then deploy these mobilized personnel as probably infantry regiments just to hold the line, assuming that, look, you don't need much training for defense and that they can learn the rest on the battlefield, so to speak, stabilize the lines in advance of winter. That's it. And then the second thing they're likely going to do is form lighter. From my point of view, this is kind of my first impression. They might try to form like sort of motorized infantry regiments, essentially the units that they were previously forming with mobilized LDNR personnel. Sort of 2000 man infantry regiments. Didn't have a lot of maneuver capacity, not much armor mechanization, but nonetheless could potentially hold the line and start deploying these forces, then maybe start pulling BTG out of the battlefield and try to reconstitute them additional personnel and then maybe three, four months from now use the mobile to start creating new units. But they have a big problem. 2s First mobilization made the most sense for Russia to do back in April when they had the officers they had allowed the active force still available to create new units to train them. Russian soldiers typically get their basic training at the unit they deploy, employed to. They don't go to an actual training center like they do in the United States that processes everybody. And because all these officers, unless the professionals were already used up center war, used to command reserve battalions or volunteer battalions, there isn't really much I don't think there's going to be much of anyone really available to train them right now or lead them. So the mobilization probably will mobilize a lot of prior officers first and then use them to try to command units or then use them to try to set up a training pipeline that they're essentially going to mobilize in order to further mobilize. 1s But as always, we can kind of wait and procrastinate it for six months. And 1s the net effect of mobilization solution would have been much worse if they done it back in April than now. A lot of people are scoffing at this, saying, this doesn't solve Russia's problems. They're just going to throw a bunch of poorly trained manpower at the problem, which isn't going to help them. 1s Do you view it as? I think it's important to look at this temporarily is to separate what is going to happen in the coming months from what setting up this new machinery on the Russian side this new pipeline allows as them to do over the longer term over the next year do you think that's fair? Yeah. Absolutely I think it's fair to think of it that way 2s I just also want to be really upfront that 1s I've seen folks being pretty dismissive of this and I'm far less deterministic and much more concerned looking at its implications 1s first we really haven't seen Russia conduct this kind of mobilization since World War II we're very much unfamiliar with it it's a distinct knowledge gap in my subfield it's a knowledge gap outside of my subfield and I think we have to be very honest about the uncertainty that we're very much in uncharted waters regarding the implications of and how it will go I think on the one hand there's a fair amount of dismissiveness of Russian ability to execute it and at first it obviously looks like a hot mess that's very much true but they are also pulling in quite large numbers of men and I think you have to wait some weeks to see what it actually looks like when they try to deploy them. Where they're going to go and how they're going to first use them I think that the mobilization effort main ability is to solve the problem of quantity when it comes to Russian manpower but not solve the issue of quality or Russian challenges and force employment so the two main big limitations they're going to have in conducting this process or first. Their actual capacity to process these personnel since they haven't really done anything on the scale before 1s as always. I think they're going to run into a huge amount of challenges in the first weeks but people will probably read that as being deterministic of what the future phase of mobilization looks like and I would be very careful with straight line analysis in the space the second main governing factor is going to be actual Russian capacity to sustain a larger force in Ukraine because no matter how many men they mobilize they have limitations in terms of what they can sustain logistically in terms of command and control the kind of army that they can actually build and manage across this very large front that's another uncertainty but I think. 1s They're probably going to try to create a rotation and solve a lot of the rotation problems that they've had in the force and a lot of the manic problems in their force. Yes, it's going to be a lower quality force, for sure. And definitely initially what it looks like several months from now, though, though, coming out of the winter is the big issue. I have no clear view as to whether this can at all change the trajectory of the war for Russia or change the potential outcome. But what they can certainly do is dramatically extend Russia's ability to sustain this war. And that does matter. It actually matters towards the outcome, how long this war runs. Right. I know people are tired of me saying that things are contingent, but the longer a conflict goes on, the more contingent things kind of get as you look out to potential futures. And this mobilization. General Radiation tells us that unless something dramatic happens between now and the winter, that the war is likely to drag on. And Russia may very well stabilize their lines and their situation coming out of the one turn to 2023. The downstream implications are, of course, not clear, because a lot depends on how Russians react. Sure. Some Martians have chosen to flee. Some Russians you see protesting. 1s Right. But so far the protests don't look that large. And in terms of Russian reactions, it depends how the Russian public actually responds to the successive waves of mobilization with this clear, especially once they start dying. The conscripts, well, these are mobilized personnel, but yes, sure, once they start dying. And the more importantly, this is also an inflection point, just as the kind of the much anticipated Ukrainian set of offensives has been and is essentially forced Putin now to acknowledge that they're not winning the war and they're not going to be able to grind the Ukraine military down. And it's forced him to do something he hasn't wanted to do this entire war. 2s This idea, this comparison, isn't really mine. I'm going to borrow from a good colleague and friend, Steve Cocktail, who has viewed Putin's regime as a demobilization regime relative to Stalin's, which was Immobilization regime. And I know few people that knows much about Stalin Stalin's regime than Steve cocktail. And from my point of view. It's quite right in that Putin's regime has very much dependent on the public not being mobilized. On the public not turning out. And being afraid of the proposition that the public will turn out. And that the regime dependent primarily on public apathy and the belief within the public that the war wouldn't really affect them. They wouldn't have to go and fight. Their kids wouldn't necessarily be set to. Yes. They will suffer from sanctions and export controls and what have you. But the war actually wasn't going to come home to them. 1s And in this respect, the regime always had outs, essentially, on the way out, and it wasn't declaring war. 1s I like to say that special operations can be begun and ended, but wars are won or lost, and the public generally knows which one of those two is happening. Right? So once you mobilize the public, once you fully commit your regime to the war, which he has done, he's essentially raised all the stakes. Now, these are two points of no return. The first one is annexation of Ukrainian territory, and the second one is mobilization. And what's happening now is really the introduction of wartime measures. And there's another aspect to it that we should cover, which is alongside mobilization. What's also very significant is the introduction of stop loss policies. So it's not just the Russian that the Russian military is mobilizing personnel. It's that alongside an executive order, all the things that have been playing the Russian military in terms of retention, people not willing to fight, tiring up their contracts. They're now essentially ended, effective this week, all contract servicemen of their contracts extended indefinitely. Even those who signed up for several months of fighting in Ukraine. They cannot refuse deployment. They cannot tear up their contract. A lot of these people that thought they were in and out, getting maybe a good deal financially, are now stuck. Yeah, let's put it this way. Putin altered the terms of the deal, and they are now stuck. 2s You make a deal with the devil. Those who thought that they were going to fight for four months and make hundreds of thousands of rubles, well, they will still make potentially hundreds of thousands of rubles, but they have no ticket back until mobilization of the war is over. It's. Those also in many ways affects Conscripts. So they made said very clearly that they're not going to use Conscripts in the war, except once they annex these four territories, they will then claim that they're part of Russia and constructs can be deployed there again. And at the very release, they've made clear that once Conscripts complete their one year of service, guess what? They're immediately available to be mobilized as contract servicemen. All personnel who are mobilized or treated as contract servicemen, they are paid, but they no longer have the right to refuse to deploy or to withdraw from the military. So, basically, this is the end of how the Russian military was managing personnel for the last seven months. And it is, in practice, the near full introduction of wartime measures. It's not just the mobilization side of it that's the big change. It's the actual change, the policies and the full enactment of stop loss procedures across the Russia military. So I think it's fair to say, taking all this we've been discussing, putin has very clearly shown and attempted to very clearly show that his appetite, his will for staying in this war and carving some sort of victory out of it for himself, for Russia, is not diminished, as I mentioned before, burning his boats on the beach, doubling down. Choose your analogy. Let's talk about the other side of the table. How is Ukraine responding to all these announcements coming out of Moscow? So I think that their general reaction has been not to show particular alarm or concern. I think the natural response is to ask for more Western assistance and more advanced Western assistance. Yeah. And 1s the biggest concern now is the longevity and sustainability of Western assistance. Right. What mobilization essentially tells you is that the conversation now has to be a lot more than just what's the immediate support for the next coming months, but what should the Ukrainian military look like in the coming year or two years? Is there going to be a sustainable pipeline to supply them with ammunition and further support? This is a conversation much more now looking out into 1s at least the next year. I think one of the big challenges that. 3s I don't know for a fact, but I suspect that Europeans can get through this winter in terms of the energy crisis and the policies they have to enact to manage a dramatically restricted supply of energy from Russia. I think Putin's, but all along has been economic sustainability and the longevity of European support for Ukraine. And this is much easier to manage when it looked like the Russian military was really faltering in the late summer and going into this fall. If it begins to be clear that the Russian military can actually sustain this war not just into next year, but through all of next year, into the next winter, I think we'll need to drive a lot of conversations in Europe about the big adjustments they have to make right? To make sure that everything they've done isn't just about getting through this first winter, but what the next year actually looks like for them. Because Putin's bet is, at this point, from my point very clearly, a bet on time. It is a bet on time and will time and will wars or contests of wills. Ukraine has always had the will his regime consistently. Not really. I mean, if you look at how desperately they avoided all the riskiest and cautious measures, it didn't look that way. And now easily signaling that to some extent, he does have the will to continue prosecuting this conflict rather than suffer an embarrassing defeat. This is where I think the. 1s I think this one of the biggest questions moving forward is sustainability. Understanding the implications of this war, dragging out being as unpopular may sound, being a protracted war, 2s but also have to be honest is now we're probably looking at much greater uncertainty that's the future. And I myself am trying to be honest about that because I'm not fully seizing the implications of this and have never seen mobilization or anything like this from Russia before. So we're going to end the episode there, although I have one request from you, dear listener. So Mike and I have been talking about launching a new show. We're going to keep these conversations going on the War on the Rocks podcast, but we're talking about launching a new show that dives even deeper into this, hosted by Mike and someone else on the membership side. You've heard me talk about the War on the Rocks membership is about to change. It is. We're rolling out an app and some new features in the coming month or two and Mike's show might be one of them. So if you are interested in seeing something like that, drop us a line. Either tweeted us or shoot us an email at editor war on the rocks.com to tell us if that's something that might interest you.

 

[gargouille]

il y a 27 minutes, Connorfra a dit :

 

 

On en est pas loin... Pas besoin de kalash pour les tankistes... bien voyons. Même un Somalien il en voudrait pas de ces AKM ( elles sont totalement réparable mais faut du matériel et du temps qu'on ne leur laissera pas si ils doivent être dans 15 jours sur le front.)

Il est très bien ce fusil d'assaut il est juste en version camouflage.

[vince24]

26 minutes ago, Connorfra said:

 

 

On en est pas loin... Pas besoin de kalash pour les tankistes... bien voyons. Même un Somalien il en voudrait pas de ces AKM ( elles sont totalement réparable mais faut du matériel et du temps qu'on ne leur laissera pas si ils doivent être dans 15 jours sur le front.)

Bon ok, on a vu 3 vidéo de Kalash qui auraient besoin de petits soins amoureux par un collectionneur de reliques.

On va attendre un peu plus avant de juger pour les 300,000 autres Kalash, non? 

A part ça, quelle est la météo du côté de Kherson? Gadoue? 

[Connorfra]

il y a 2 minutes, vince24 a dit :

Bon ok, on a vu 3 vidéo de Kalash qui auraient besoin de petits soins amoureux par un collectionneur de reliques.

On va attendre un peu plus avant de juger pour les 300,000 autres Kalash, non? 

A part ça, quelle est la météo du côté de Kherson? Gadoue? 

Je pense clairement qu'ils ont un ordre de priorité la on parle de tankistes donc effectivement je pense que le troupier recevera sa 74 son vieux 47 ou son mosin en état de tir. Mais l'exemple reste saisissant.

[gargouille]

il y a 3 minutes, vince24 a dit :

Bon ok, on a vu 3 vidéo de Kalash qui auraient besoin de petits soins amoureux par un collectionneur de reliques.

On va attendre un peu plus avant de juger pour les 300,000 autres Kalash, non? 

A part ça, quelle est la météo du côté de Kherson? Gadoue? 

Bien plus sec qu'en Bretagne* :

https://meteofrance.com/meteo-monde/kherson/706448

 

*Et que chez moi.

[Niafron]

il y a 4 minutes, Connorfra a dit :

Je pense clairement qu'ils ont un ordre de priorité la on parle de tankistes donc effectivement je pense que le troupier recevera sa 74 son vieux 47 ou son mosin en état de tir. Mais l'exemple reste saisissant.

Hum...

S'ils peuvent se procurer des drones auprès de l'Iran, au pire, ils ne peuvent pas commander quelques dizaines de millier de Kalash en état de marche de par le monde?

Ca ne doit ni manquer ni coûter une fortune, non?

[Amnésia]

il y a 39 minutes, BP2 a dit :

Bientôt on leur demandera, comme leur grand pères avant eux, de récupérer le fusil d'un soldat tué devant eux pour continuer à se battre...

Ca promet des bataillons motivés ça.

 

C'est tout le problème d'un pouvoir politique et d'une propagande qui donne le sentiment que le peuple partage l'ambition de Poutine, qu'il est obstiné à se battre , que le pays est dans un élan général du style de la grande guerre patriotique.

Dans les faits les russes n'ont pas la volonté de faire la guerre, car elle est sans intérêts pour eux , elle ne menace en rien leur sécurité, ne met pas en danger leur pays. C'est une guerre politique ou les russes n'ont pas le bon rôle.

Il n'y a que le politique russe et sa propagande pour imaginer qu'en déclarant les 4 régions ukraiennes comme étant territoire russe, que le peuple russe se sentira agressé et dans une logique de défense de la Russie. Non ça ne passera pas ainsi, le forcé russe qu'on va envoyer au front ne se dira pas qu'il défend la Russie, seul le système voudra leur faire croire.

Quand vous avez des types non volontaires, voir totalement contre l'acceptation d'être mobilisé, ben en les forçant vous n'en ferez rien. Ils deviendront au contraire un vrai problème amenant à une non combativité, la désertion, la mutinerie et ces types ont toujours un pouvoir contagieux, ce ne sont pas eux qui vont changer.

Si la Russie serait envahie, une mobilisation serait bien différente. Déjà le simple usage de conscrits (hors mobilisation) est problématique pour une guerre extérieure, alors venir chercher des types dans le civil, presque au hasard pour faire ça, c'est se tirer une balle dans le pied. Le russe n'a pas assez été endoctriné, le contexte n'est pas assez détérioré, le 21e siècle et ses spécificités ne sont plus celles du 20e siècle non plus.

Et si la guerre dès le début prend une mauvaise tournure, bonne chance. 

Encore une fois tout cela n'est qu'une idéologie politique d'un pouvoir russe qui rêve de grandeur et pense que le peuple est une ressource docile qui fera ce qu'on veut qu'il fasse. Mais il ne suffit pas d'habiller un civil en militaire et de lui donner une arme pour en faire un bon soldat.

Pour l'instant faut pas croire, ça va bien se passer , ces petits couacs ne sont pas bien grave. L'impact de la mobilisation c'est de monter dans un bus, un train et un avion avec un "risque" et une "peur" de ce qui suivra. Le problème viendra avec la découverte de la guerre et de ses conditions difficiles(hiver...),celle de la mort, des blessés. La résilience va diminuer, le moral diminuera, la société s'opposera de plus en plus à la guerre, elle finira par préférer laisser toute l'Ukraine aux ukrainiens pourvu que ça arrête les pertes, en opposition au pouvoir qui veut donner le sentiment qu'il est prêt à d'énormes sacrifices pour garder ces bouts d'Ukraine.

[George Abitbol]

Quand on voit l'etat des Ak j'imagine pas celle des munitions..

[2020]

il y a 13 minutes, Connorfra a dit :

Je pense clairement qu'ils ont un ordre de priorité la on parle de tankistes donc effectivement je pense que le troupier recevera sa 74 son vieux 47 ou son mosin en état de tir. Mais l'exemple reste saisissant.

Faut pas exagéré avec cette histoire d Ak47 rouillée, une arme si elle est non huilée un peu usée etc si elle séjourne dans un milieu humide elle rouille très très rapidement. En plus on ne connaît pas les conditions de découvertes (tank détruit ou abandonné puis laissé aux aléas météo) 

[Ciders]

il y a 11 minutes, Niafron a dit :

Hum...

S'ils peuvent se procurer des drones auprès de l'Iran, au pire, ils ne peuvent pas commander quelques dizaines de millier de Kalash en état de marche de par le monde?

Ca ne doit ni manquer ni coûter une fortune, non?

A supposer que les stocks ne soient pas déjà préemptés par les Ukrainiens ou les fournisseurs des Ukrainiens.

Et puis bon, ce serait la honte : obligée d'acheter des AK à l'export ? La Russie ?

[Niafron]

il y a 6 minutes, Ciders a dit :

A supposer que les stocks ne soient pas déjà préemptés par les Ukrainiens ou les fournisseurs des Ukrainiens.

Et puis bon, ce serait la honte : obligée d'acheter des AK à l'export ? La Russie ?

Si c'est ça le problème, au point où ils en sont, je pense qu'ils peuvent pas tellement aller plus bas...

[Connorfra]

il y a 8 minutes, Ciders a dit :

A supposer que les stocks ne soient pas déjà préemptés par les Ukrainiens ou les fournisseurs des Ukrainiens.

Et puis bon, ce serait la honte : obligée d'acheter des AK à l'export ? La Russie ?

Bientôt les russes au type 56 et zastava.

[herciv]

il y a 13 minutes, Amnésia a dit :

Il n'y a que le politique russe et sa propagande pour imaginer qu'en déclarant les 4 régions ukraiennes comme étant territoire russe, que le peuple russe se sentira agressé et dans une logique de défense de la Russie.

Ces référendums ne sont pas des sujets en occidents en tant que tel. Ils ne sont là que pour justifier un éventuel recours à la mobilisation générale. Ca par contre c'est un problème en occident parce qu'il y aurait escalade le cas échéant.

Poutine passe en mode Bersek et la Chine semble se détourner mais prête à profiter de la situation au moins sur le plan de l'accès aux ressources.

[Ciders]

il y a 7 minutes, Niafron a dit :

Si c'est ça le problème, au point où ils en sont, je pense qu'ils peuvent pas tellement aller plus bas...

Certes. Mais quand même. L'AK-47 c'est un symbole national.

il y a 6 minutes, Connorfra a dit :

Bientôt les russes au type 56 et zastava.

Là tu as l'extrême-droite nationaliste qui rapplique. Se battre avec des armes chinoises, tu veux une révolution ?

il y a 4 minutes, herciv a dit :

Ces référendums ne sont pas des sujets en occidents en tant que tel. Ils ne sont là que pour justifier un éventuel recours à la mobilisation générale. Ca par contre c'est un problème en occident parce qu'il y aurait escalade le cas échéant.

Poutine passe en mode Bersek et la Chine semble se détourner mais prête à profiter de la situation au moins sur le plan de l'accès aux ressources.

La Chine continue à regarder, tout en gérant ses propres problèmes. Le mode "berserk" à force d'être agité devient de plus en plus visible : c'est une outre vide avec la seule idée potentielle du "attention, on a des nukes", idée irréaliste et irréalisable.

Dans les conditions actuelles, les Russes ont intérêt à trouver autre chose que le froncement de sourcils.

[vince24]

24 minutes ago, Ciders said:

A supposer que les stocks ne soient pas déjà préemptés par les Ukrainiens ou les fournisseurs des Ukrainiens.

Et puis bon, ce serait la honte : obligée d'acheter des AK à l'export ? La Russie ?

Rien qu’au US je suis sur qu’on trouve facile 300,000 Kalash en 7.62x39, parfait état!

[Niafron]

à l’instant, vince24 a dit :

Rien qu’au US je suis sur qu’on trouve facile 300,000 Kalash en 7.62x39, parfait état!

Le pire, c'est que c'est sans doute vrai...

[zozio32]

1 minute ago, Niafron said:

Le pire, c'est que c'est sans doute vrai...

ce qui me sidere, c'est qu'on ne depense pas une partie de notre budget en Europe a les acheter et les detruire...   bon, faut faire gaffe a pas faire un appel d'air pour en produire plus.   Mais de vielle arme plus en production, ca doit pouvoir le faire