[OPV ] Programme de renouvellement de la Marine Nationale

[ARMEN56]

Il y a 3 heures, BPCs a dit :

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2016/06/thoughts-batch-2-river-class/

  Masquer le contenu

 

Posé d'un  merlin  sur ce format  c'est pas un peu ambitieux ?

[BPCs]

il y a 8 minutes, ARMEN56 a dit :

Posé d'un  merlin  sur ce format  c'est pas un peu ambitieux ?

Sais pas mais in real life  :

[clem200]

Et en vidéo :

Qu'est ce que bateau est laid de profil avec son immense cheminé et sa passerelle très basse

[Fusilier]

il y a une heure, BPCs a dit :

donc un VSR-700 armé n'est pas du pignolage.

Franchement tu crois sérieusement que la MN va armer les VSR?  On verra quand on aura le détail de la barque.  Mais, s'ils choisi le 40 mm , je crains que l'entrée conceptuelle ne favorise pas ce genre de gadget. Si tu as des MMP embarqués avec les équipes Fusco (comme évoqué par le EMMN)  ça sera déjà bien... 

[ARMEN56]

il y a 50 minutes, BPCs a dit :

real life

Voici ce que j'ai en standard posé et distance obstacle avant 

pour un diamètre rotor ppal de 18.6 m, X devrait faire plus de 6 m

ici OK c'est une vue d'artiste qui fait qd mme chausse pied .......

image au réel et vidéo ; posés de jour et par SST idéal alors qu'on doit pouvoir assurer sous SST5 ,

Modifié le 1 novembre 2020 par ARMEN56

[BPCs]

il y a 19 minutes, Fusilier a dit :

Franchement tu crois sérieusement que la MN va armer les VSR?

Alors là pour le coup, oui.

A cause des Retex des Reaper.

Mais par contre, je crois pas vraiment qu'il y en aura sur les PO vu la rareté probable du bouzin... sur une FLF plus probablement.

[BPCs]

il y a 41 minutes, ARMEN56 a dit :

pour un diamètre rotor ppal de 18.6 m, X devrait faire plus de 6 m

On doit être plus dans les cordes pour le Wildcat.

Or dans l'article de Thinkdefence, il était évoqué un emploi des Wildcat plus cohérent avec la brcasse.

Tandis que l'intérêt ops du Merlin sur river-class est pas très évident... l'aerocordage et le Vertrep étant toujours possible.

Modifié le 1 novembre 2020 par BPCs

[Bruno]

Il y a 6 heures, BPCs a dit :

Par rapport à cela, un PO toulonais, avec son 40CTA, son Tétral, son Sonar, son VSR-700 avec MMP ou Rocket guidées Thales voire son H160 + ANL (et peut-être MU90 un jour) ne sera pas ridicule, sans compter les possibilités d'armement containerisés (M31, munitions rodeuses)...

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2016/06/thoughts-batch-2-river-class/

  Révéler le texte masqué

A 76 mm gun system with an unprotected magazine could turn an OPV into a death trap if it got caught up in a real shoot out, even if the opponent had lighter calibre weapons. A 76 mm gun is useful for intimidating modern large, ocean-going fishing vessels that may be bent on poaching, and so is a valid option for, example, the Irish Naval Service (which has no corvettes, let alone frigates) but it carries the risk that politicians will see the OPV as more powerful than it really is and order deployments in areas where it should not go.

Generally, many online commentators have dismissed the modifications to the BAES OPV design to convert it into the R2 design as being secondary or not important enough to justify the greatly increased price tag.

I believe they are wrong.

First, let us consider the watertight integrity improvements. How do you improve watertight integrity? I would argue that this would require additional watertight bulkheads and/or the fitting of shock-proof water inlet and outlet valves, pumps and pipes. With watertight bulkheads, one wants them to have as few points of penetration (for cables, pipes, etc.) as possible, and these to be as high up on the bulkhead as possible. So fitting even one new such bulkhead would require a noticeable redesign of internal hull systems. Improving existing watertight bulkheads (by, for example, reducing, or changing the location, of the points of penetration) would also involve internal redesign. Shock-proof pumps, valves, etc., will be significantly more expensive than their non-shock counterparts. They may also take up more volume, again requiring internal redesign. And improving watertight integrity also probably has consequences for the air conditioning system.

Ballast water modifications would also, I suggest, involve a degree of internal redesign. It may be possible to fit the new sewage treatment system in straight swap for the existing system, provided it has the same dimensions and weight. If not — then some redesign would be needed. Fire safety modifications may also involve some internal redesign or the fitting of better, but more expensive, fire resistant materials, or both. Regarding magazine protection, Kevlar is not cheap and we do not know how much is needed.

I won’t go through everything: some new systems will indeed involve simple swaps for existing systems. However, the new, strengthened, flight deck will be heavier than the existing flight deck. You just can’t drop a heavier flight deck on the existing structure, I would argue. It would increase the stress on the hull. So I believe that the fitting of the new flight deck must involve a strengthening of the hull, either by having stronger hull frames or more hull frames, or a mixture of the two. That, too, would involve redesign. Also, while the fitting of the machinery space walkway may have been a simple affair, it might not have been: it might have involved some redesign of the machinery space. After all, if a machinery space walkway was not part of the original BAES OPV design requirement, would any provision have been made for it in the original design?

The Flight Deck Officer position had to be designed and integrated into the Ship’s superstructure in such a way as not to interfere with the crane, or other fittings and equipment, and integrated into the various ship systems, including power, communications and air conditioning. This might have been straightforward, but then again it might have involved some delicate redesign. Increased stowage space also suggests some internal redesign.

In addition, don’t forget, all these internal changes cannot be made in isolation. They have to be coordinated and made compatible with each other and with the rest of the ship and its systems. That involves design work. And, of course, the time of designers (naval architects) is expensive.

But why these changes? To me, improved watertight integrity, fire safety modifications, enhanced firefighting facilities, automatic emergency lights, magazine protection and the installation of a machinery space walkway (which will clearly give easier access to machinery at sea, allowing emergency repairs) suggest that the R2s, unlike the BAES OPVs, are designed to engage in battle and sustain damage. Or, in other words, they are real, if lightly armed, warships.

Also very suggestive in this regard is the unprecedented top speed of the R2s, in comparison to the RN’s previous OPVs — 24 knots. The RN’s original OPVs, the Island-class, could manage 16.5 kts. The larger Castle-class could reach 19.5 kts. The current R1s have a maximum speed of 20 kts and HMS Clyde, 21 kts. The R2 maximum speed is more than needed by a standard OPV and just, I would argue, inside the warship range.

And if the R2s are real warships, in terms of the hull structure and systems, then it makes enormous sense to use them to replace the current River-class Batch 1 (R1) vessels, which are standard OPVs, and of no use in conflict scenarios at all, and thus provide no flexibility in deployment. (And, if the R1s have no magazine protection, then it is hardly surprising that the RN restricts their main armament to a single 20 mm gun.) The R1s can be sold or transferred to small navies or coast guards for which a seagoing OPV would represent a major increase in patrol capability, such as a number of Caribbean or African countries. They might also make useful secondary-level patrol ships for navies like Uruguay’s or Bangladesh’s. They could even conceivably end up with the UK Border Force. While it might make sense to keep the one “R1.5” ship, the helicopter-deck fitted HMS Clyde, in service (in home waters) after the five R2s are all commissioned, it must not be forgotten that she is not fitted with the new “Shared Infrastructure” system and I doubt it would make sense to refit her with it, so she would probably have to be retired in a decade or so, anyway.

Now, of course, if the R2s are real warships, why are they so lightly armed? I would argue that their armament is perfectly adequate for their intended peacetime roles. The main armament is reported to be a single DS30M 30 mm cannon, a remotely-operated gyro-stabilised electricity-powered system. This has a reported maximum range (in a naval role such as this) of 5 100 m. This is greater that the range to the visual horizon at sea level, which is about 4.7 km. It has a rate of fire 100/200 rounds per minute and uses armour-piercing incendiary (API) and high explosive incendiary (HEI) ammunition. It can also use armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot tracer ammunition, although whether such rounds would be used in a naval context is unclear. I would argue that this weapon is capable of doing a lot of damage even to larger targets, and certainly to the kind of target an R2 would be most likely to meet in the real world.

The most severe likely threat an R2 would face in normal operation would be a swarming attack by terrorists in small boats. Now, to succeed, such attacks must be launched at short range, otherwise the attackers will be cut to pieces by the 30 mm gun: the boats employed in such attacks would be small and fragile and a single 30 mm hit, or even proximity detonation, would disable one. Such early losses would eviscerate an attack. Given the necessity of a short-range attack, the shorter range of the Mk 44 Gatling guns (in comparison to the 25 mm cannons carried in the BAES OPVs now operated by the Brazilian Navy) is, in this scenario, quite irrelevant but their higher rate of fire is very relevant. Also, given the fragility of the attacking boats, the calibre of 7.62 mm would be perfectly adequate. (The have been pictures of pirate and rebel skiffs operating in the Niger River Delta armed with 12.7 mm or even 14.5 mm heavy machine guns, but these are not to be taken seriously; the moment they hit the sea, even on a calm day, their gunnery would be wildly inaccurate and utterly useless, except to intimidate unarmed and defenceless merchantmen.)

Moreover, it is a pretty safe bet that the RN has not only exercised swarm attacks, but that Ministry of Defence scientists, in what used to be (and maybe still is) called Operational Research (OR), have simulated and modeled them. Such research could be carried out by the MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, or DSTL (which, according to its 2014-2015 Annual Report, has 3 839 staff, 90% of them permanent, so it is a substantial, heavyweight, research and development organisation) or be contracted out by DSTL to Qinetiq.

OR has a fantastic record of success, because it is applied science, and many of its findings in the past (eg, Second World War) have been in complete contradiction to what was then regarded as common sense, but proven to be true when put into practice. OR was and is also highly secret, so the only results we see are in, for example, apparently strange weapons choices. I would suggest that many of the RN’s seemingly odd weapons and equipment choices for its ships are based on OR. If the OR boffins (to use a good, old-fashioned, term) gave their approval to the Mk 44 Gatling, then it is the right choice. These comments also apply, of course, to the R2s main armament.

The other probable reason for the light R2 armament in peacetime is what political scientists call bureaucratic politics — interdepartmental disputes (over policy, budget and so on). In this case, a more heavily armed R2 could lead the Treasury to argue that it was a corvette (which, at 24 kts, it is not) and could serve as a cheaper substitute for more frigates (specifically, for the planned General Purpose Frigate).

But what about the R2s during a sustained, State-on-State, conflict? What could they do in such a scenario? The key here is the flexibility of the design. The first key point is the fitting of the Shared Infrastructure common control system. This, of course, makes great sense in terms of training and operating experience for the crews. Although the fit is likely to be relatively basic, I would suggest it would still make it easy to upgrade the weapons and sensor systems on an R2, if and when required, because the information technology backbone would already be in place.

The ships will be equipped with the Terma Scanter 4100 radar for surveillance. According to Terma, the Scanter 4100 can provide 2D air surveillance to a range of 90 nm and 35 000 ft in altitude. It can track up to 100 air targets (subsonic and supersonic). In the surface role, its range is out to the radar horizon (ie, depends on high up the antenna is mounted) and can track up to 500 targets. The company affirms in a brochure that the “accurate tracker allows for transmission of target data to the Command Management System or Fire Control System for target designation”. This suggest that the R2s can be up-armed without needing any new radar fit.

Furthermore, the BAES OPV can be fitted with up to six 20 ft ISO containers. There is no indication that this capability has been removed from the R2s. This means that the ships will be able to be fitted with just about any system or equipment that can be containerised or palletised. One can easily imagine the ships being fitted with containerised/palletised mine hunting systems, or mine laying systems (for defensive mine laying, probably in support of allies), or containerised workshops and spares stores to act as command and support ships for minehunters or patrol boats, or a containerised/palletised system carrying unmanned surface vessels and extra rigid hull inflatable boats allowing the ships to serve as forward force protection base ships. One could even image them being fitted with palletised Sea Ceptor missiles (would should be relatively easy to do) — assuming each pallet carried six Sea Ceptors (as would be carried by each vehicle in the land-based version of the missile), an R2 could carry anything from six (one pallet) to 36 (six pallets) missiles, making it a very useful local area air defence escort for amphibious ships and auxiliaries. Likewise, one can easily envisage the ships embarking containerised unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems. Not very long ago, it was officially stated that it was not envisaged that these ships would carry UAVs, but a lot has happened since then and that position will likely have changed by the time they enter service. (The most likely reason why the R2s might not deploy containerised UAV systems is the apparent success of current experiments with 3D printed tactical UAVs being undertaken by the RN; I would not be surprised if the R2s entered service with 3D printers installed as standard fit.) The fact that none of these proposed containerised/palletised systems currently exists is irrelevant; it is highly likely that, in an emergency, many of them could be developed, tested and deployed in a matter of weeks. Of course, if most or all the container spaces are occupied, the flight deck is likely to be covered and unusable; but the ships will still be able to refuel helicopters using their helicopter in-flight refuelling systems.

Then there is the flexibility made possible by the absence of a helicopter hangar. Yes, you read that right. Flexibility has many dimensions. Not having a helicopter hangar cuts flexibility along one axis but increases it along another. For a start, the R2s would not be able to carry up to six containers if they had a hangar!

Before going any further, it is necessary to highlight that the fact that one of the modifications to the BAES OPV design to create the R2s is the addition of a flight deck officer position. In addition, a press release by Kelvin Hughes states that the R2s will each be fitted with two types of SharpEye radar — the E/F band navigation and collision avoidance radar and the I-band Doppler helicopter control and navigation radar. These two facts clearly show that the RN fully intends to carry out extensive helicopter operations with the R2s.

Do not forget that the RN has decades of experience in operating ships with flight decks but no hangars. During the Second World War, the RN operated a number of Merchant Aircraft Carriers (merchant ships fitted with flight decks but which continued to carry cargo — grain or oil, which were loaded and unloaded using hoses) that had no hangars: their air groups of three to five Swordfish were lashed down and maintained on the flight deck when not flying. These were used for convoy escort in the North Atlantic. Then, in the mid-1960s, the converted tank landing ship HMS Lofoten, serving as the RN’s first helicopter support ship, successfully operated Wessex anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters on a sustained basis over several days during RN and NATO exercises in the North Sea and (I think) Norwegian waters, despite having no hangar. (My father was one of the Fleet Air Arm maintainers embarked during these exercises, which served to test the Wessex in the ASW role.) Another example is provided by HMS Fearless, which, during the Falklands War in 1982 embarked and operated three Sea King assault and three Scout helicopters despite having no hangar. (Sister ship HMS Intrepid likewise embarked and operated Sea Kings.)

So, contrary to opinions often found on the web, ships with flight decks but no hangars can operate helicopters, not just refuel them. Of course, the length of time they can do this depends on the size of the ship and the weather. And the fact that the R2s are also to be fitted with flight deck landing grids shows that the RN is determined to push the weather/sea condition limits on helicopters operations with the R2s.
Of course, the period that smaller ships without hangars can operate helicopters is likely to be measured in days, whereas a ship with a hangar can operate a helicopter for months. But it does mean that the helicopter operating capabilities of the R2s are much greater than they are usually given credit for.

The other source of flexibility for the R2s resulting from their lack of a hangar is that fact that this allows them to have a larger flight deck, capable of taking the Merlin. As the RN is standardizing on the Lynx/Wildcat and the Merlin, and these will carry out all helicopter roles and missions within the Fleet Air Arm, this means that the R2s will be able to support all these roles and missions: anti-surface vessel warfare, ASW, airborne early warning, assault, and so on. I was going to suggest a number of possible scenarios, but that would only make this piece even longer than it already is! Suffice to say that the R2s will be able to act as floating, moving, forward operating bases for helicopters detached from larger units (frigates, destroyers, aircraft carriers) or from shore bases, for one, two or a few days, depending on the mission, type of helicopter and weather conditions. I will give one scenario: a Type 45 could detach a Wildcat to an R2 operating in coastal and/or inshore waters, for anti-ship reconnaissance and attack missions. The much smaller R2 would have greater freedom of manoeuvre in such waters & if, the worst came to the worst, would be expendable. Also, in many parts of the world, such waters are sheltered and an R2 might very well be able to operate a Wildcat for a week or more (it would be perfectly capable of embarking the necessary maintainers, spares and tools for routine support of the aircraft). In other situations, an R2 might be able to embark and operate an ASW or AEW Merlin for a couple of days.

To sum up, first, I believe that the modifications to the BAES OPV design to create the R2 are — or at least some of them are — extensive and important and justify the significantly increased price. (Of course, I might be wrong, but I do not think I am.) Second, these changes convert the ships from standard OPVs to real, if lightly armed, warships, with significant flexibility designed into them. Indeed, I cannot help wonder if — although the RN will never so describe them, for reasons of bureaucratic politics — they are really sloops. But not, I hasten to add, the much talked about “Black Swan” concept. The Second World War “Black Swans” were, for their size, heavily armed (main armament: 6×4″ dual purpose guns) and specialised (anti-aircraft) escorts. Clearly, the R2s bear no resemblance to such ships. No, the sloops I am thinking about are the First World War Flower-class (not to be confused with the Second World War Flower-class corvettes). These were highly successful, very seaworthy, multipurpose vessels, but were never heavily armed. The first 24 examples had a main armament of just two 12 pounder guns (and a secondary, anti-aircraft armament of two quick-firing 3 pounders). Later examples had a main armament of two 4″ or even two 4.7″ guns (plus the 3 pounders) — still on the light side, by the standards of the day.

Of course, we won’t know for certain until the ships are built, commissioned and in service.

But, while the RN may not have originally desired the R2s, they do seem to have made a virtue out of a necessity.

 

A vrai dire, et sauf erreur de ma part, jusqu'ici on ne sait pas si les P.O auront autre chose comme armement qu'un canon 40 CTA et 2 mitrailleuses manuelles de 12.7mm (je parle du navire lui-même, pas de ses  "vecteurs déportés" : H-160M, VSR-700, semi-rigides...). 

La présence d'au moins un affût TETRAL (ou 3-4 affûts SIMBAD-RC) est vivement souhaitable, pour leur donner une vraie capacité AA d'une allonge d'au moins 6000m. Mais j'ai comme l'impression que comme souvent l'arbitrage va être le fruit d'une longue cogitation avec plein de paramètres, et qu 'on n'aura pas l'annonce officielle de ce qu'ils auront avant l'automne 2021, bien que leur design est censé être arrêté dès le printemps... 

[g4lly]

Aux USA ils ont adapté l'Hellfire a un usage naval ... quelqu'un sait si c'est envisagé pour le MLP?

[Scarabé]

il y a 6 minutes, g4lly a dit :

Aux USA ils ont adapté l'Hellfire a un usage naval ... quelqu'un sait si c'est envisagé pour le MLP?

Oui c'est prévu sur les Drone de la marine, sur les Tigre, sur  les drones Patroller, et sur les Repear de l'armée de l'air en remplacement du missile US Hellfire

le programme s'appel (MAST-F) missile air-sol terrestre futur destiné à armer l'hélicoptère de combat Tigre (Standard 3) et qui sera développé par MBDA. Au sein du missilier, le projet s'appelle European Modular Missile (EMM).

Ce future engin en devloppement sur une base MMP ou on rajoute un booster un peu comme Aster 15/ 30 aura une porté de plus de 10 KM .  

[BPCs]

il y a 18 minutes, g4lly a dit :

Aux USA ils ont adapté l'Hellfire a un usage naval ... quelqu'un sait si c'est envisagé pour le MLP?

Avec le Sea Brimstone et la logique "One MBDA", les tests du "petit" MMP fait sur plateforme navale par le constructeur, ce serait surprenant que l'on ne voit pas apparaître la proposition ...après que cela arrive en dotation en version surface-surface...

PS : ta question n'était pas focalisée en fait sur ce type de version et donc Scarabé a déjà répondu.

Modifié le 1 novembre 2020 par BPCs

[hadriel]

il y a 11 minutes, g4lly a dit :

Aux USA ils ont adapté l'Hellfire a un usage naval ... quelqu'un sait si c'est envisagé pour le MLP?

En mer-mer c'est plus un gadget pour le LCS qu'autre chose non? Ou tu veux dire en air-mer?

 

[g4lly]

1 minute ago, hadriel said:

En mer-mer c'est plus un gadget pour le LCS qu'autre chose non? Ou tu veux dire en air-mer?

Non bien en mer-mer ou mer-sol ... ça peu servir contre pour l'appui contre terre ... ou pour péter un vedette rapide par exemple ... ça peut déboîter la timonerie d'un navire de commerce ...

C'est une solution NLOS "man in the middle" ... qui permet de taper très précisément une cible jusqu'à 10km ...

[hadriel]

Ben figure toi que je me pose la même question en sol-sol pour l'AdT pour faire du tir au-delà de la vue directe. Il me semble avoir lu que le MLP aurait une liaison de données RF, donc ça risque d'être compliqué de le tirer au-delà de l'horizon, quoique on peut toujours le tirer un peu lobé, accrocher la cible manuellement tant qu'on le voit encore, et ensuite l'autodirecteur fait la poursuite auto.

Au-delà de ça y'a rien qui interdit de l'employer en mer-mer, vu que MBDA vend le MMP pour une utilisation mer-sol depuis un zod pour des commandos, ou même en mer-mer.

[g4lly]

26 minutes ago, hadriel said:

Ben figure toi que je me pose la même question en sol-sol pour l'AdT pour faire du tir au-delà de la vue directe. Il me semble avoir lu que le MLP aurait une liaison de données RF, donc ça risque d'être compliqué de le tirer au-delà de l'horizon, quoique on peut toujours le tirer un peu lobé, accrocher la cible manuellement tant qu'on le voit encore, et ensuite l'autodirecteur fait la poursuite auto.

Au-delà de ça y'a rien qui interdit de l'employer en mer-mer, vu que MBDA vend le MMP pour une utilisation mer-sol depuis un zod pour des commandos, ou même en mer-mer.

S'il n'y a pas de MLP prévu sur Jaguar c'est juste pour éviter la guéguerre de chapelle avec l'artillerie déjà toute déplumée ...

[ARMEN56]

Il y a 8 heures, Scarabé a dit :

La fosse pour les sonars des FLF 

le bassin 1 était trop petit pour les FLF BRAVO dont finition armement dans le 2 ou 3 cf cliché

[Eau tarie]

Il y a 15 heures, g4lly a dit :

Aux USA ils ont adapté l'Hellfire a un usage naval ... quelqu'un sait si c'est envisagé pour le MLP?

Qqun sait qui vend le système ? Car j'ai vu ça sur les CB90-H en test mais on en sait pas bcp plus.

Citation

CB 90 H can also carry 2.8 ton of mines or the modified Hellfire-type RBS 17 SSM system

 

[g4lly]

3 minutes ago, Eau tarie said:

Qqun sait qui vend le système ? Car j'ai vu ça sur les CB90-H en test mais on en sait pas bcp plus.

On l'a vu sur les bateau de soutien de SEAL aussi ... en plus visiblement il tir des version Longbow avec le radar millimétrique.

Il y a aussi des essai sur LCS ... en lancement vertical.

 

[BPCs]

Il y a 4 heures, Eau tarie a dit :

Qqun sait qui vend le système ? Car j'ai vu ça sur les CB90-H en te

A noter, comme "missile" Mer-Mer sur petite embarcations, CMN a doté sa version Mk3 de son Hsi32 de roquettes guidées LOGIR qui sont une Hydra-70 avec autodirecteur infra-rouge et une portée de 8 km, développées par les Coréens.

Citation

Le HSI32 MkIII peut aussi emporter des missiles antisurface ou roquettes, comme des systèmes LMM (Thales) ou LOGIR (LIG Nex1).

© Mer et Marine https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/cmn-developpe-une-version-plus-musclee-du-hsi32#

[Fusilier]

Selon M&M  il va falloir mettre  100 millions pour le développement du RapidFire (qui n'existe pas...)  

"Rien n’est encore acté et cela dépendra notamment des discussions, qui se poursuivent, autour du coût du programme, qu’il faut faire entrer dans un cadre budgétaire contraint et sans sacrifier d’autres systèmes, au risque d’obérer les capacités globales des futurs bâtiments (...)  Car développer un nouveau canon est évidemment bien plus onéreux"

 

[clem200]

Il y a 2 heures, Fusilier a dit :

Selon M&M  il va falloir mettre  100 millions pour le développement du RapidFire (qui n'existe pas...)  

"Rien n’est encore acté et cela dépendra notamment des discussions, qui se poursuivent, autour du coût du programme, qu’il faut faire entrer dans un cadre budgétaire contraint et sans sacrifier d’autres systèmes, au risque d’obérer les capacités globales des futurs bâtiments (...)  Car développer un nouveau canon est évidemment bien plus onéreux"

 

Juste pour préciser parce que je trouve que ta citation peut être trompeuse : 

le système sera bien financé, avec 2 RapidFire par BRF. 

Mais effectivement reste à voir sur quelles autres plateformes ils arriveront

Je note d'intéressant : 

Citation

Ce canon offre une cadence pouvant atteindre 200 coups par minute, mais n’est pas conçu pour des tirs prolongés comme d’autres systèmes de type CIWS

 

[Bruno]

100 million d'Euros, soit plus cher que le prix d'acquisition d'un Rafale F-3R, pour extrapoler une version navale d'un canon qui existe déjà depuis des années ? C'est un "poisson d'avril" à retardement (ah, le fameux "effet Covid-19"...), ou les 2 industriels essaient d'escroquer le client étatique ; sérieusement ?

Si ça coûte vraiment aussi cher, et que l'EMM finit par se tourner vers un achat sur étagère d'un matos étranger existant, autant équiper les BRF et P.O du 76mm Super Rapido que la MN connaît bien maintenant : au total ça ne coûterait sans doute pas plus cher à la MN, qui conserverait seulement 2 modèles de canons à entretenir (enfin 3, tant qu'il reste des unités avec le bon vieux 100mm).

Vu que sur les BRF le deuxième canon sera en hauteur à l'arrière, et que le 76mm est bien + lourd qu'un 40mm, on reprendrait alors pour eux la config des FREMM > 1 X 76mm à l'avant, et 2 Narwhal-20B (ou deux affûts SIMBAD-RC) aux coins de leur hangar Avia, ce qui éviterait d'avoir à modifier leur conception en urgence alors que la construction du premier vient de commencer (je suppose que pour les quelques tonnes de plus et l'espace pour la soute à munition sous le pont à l'avant ça passe sans modif significatives). Quant au P.O, dont le design n'est pas encore arrêté, un 76mm à l'avant, là ou le CTA-40mm est pour l'instant envisagé.

Et si c'est trop compliqué (ou finalement + cher) comme ça ; alors faire un "deal" avec les italiens :  "On vous achète 16 unités de votre nouveau 40mm Sovraponte (6 pou les 3 BRF + 10 pour les P.O) d'ici 2029, et vous nous renverrez l'ascenseur lorsqu'on arrêtera le choix des équipements soit de la rénovation des 2 + 2 frégates Horizons, soit des futures corvettes du programme EPC"  (à supposer qu'ils respecteraient leur parole ensuite)

[clem200]

il y a 14 minutes, Bruno a dit :

100 million d'Euros, soit plus cher que le prix d'acquisition d'un Rafale F-3R, pour extrapoler une version navale d'un canon qui existe déjà depuis des années ? C'est un "poisson d'avril" à retardement (ah, le fameux "effet Covid-19"...), ou les 2 industriels essaient d'escroquer le client étatique ; sérieusement ?

Vous vous attendiez tous a combien ? J'ai un peu de mal à comprendre votre étonnement ...

100 millions pour 2-3 ans de développement d'une tourelle navale c'est pas incohérent du tout. Ça va faire bosser plusieurs dizaines de personnes, il y aura surement des protos. C'est une tourelle automatique légère bourrée d'électronique, c'est pas un tube de 18 plié et soudé.

On aurait pu imaginer 60-70 millions a la limite mais ai bout d'un moment il faut bien sortir l'argent. 

En 1980 personne n'a dit à Dassault que 40 milliards le programme Rafale c'était n'importe quoi et qu'on allait simplement acheter du F18. 

[Fusilier]

il y a une heure, clem200 a dit :

Vous vous attendiez tous a combien ? J

A rien 

il y a une heure, clem200 a dit :

En 1980 personne n'a dit à Dassault que 40 milliards le programme Rafale c'était n'importe quoi

Mais, pour un canon à priori moins performant que l'existant, ça fait cher... 

[BPCs]

il y a une heure, clem200 a dit :

100 millions pour 2-3 ans de développement d'une tourelle navale c'est pas incohérent du tout.

Oui mais avant d'arriver à une valeur résiduelle où on aura amorti le coût de développement, il faudrait en coller partout.

Sur les 15 1ers rangs, les 9 POM et PAG, les 10 PO, les 6 pour les BRF, les BHO, 6 sur les PHA

Soit presque 50 tourelles qui ont encore un surcout de 2 m€.

Et tout ça pour arriver sur un marché où il y a déjà 3 à 4 propositions

De mémoire une tourelle de 76mm c'est 5 m€...