Marine Britannique

[tipi]

Il y a 2 heures, Patrick a dit :

Et bien que dire des autres dans ce cas... Le CdG est l'un des PA les plus armés en missiles anti-missiles qui soient avec 32 ASTER 15 dans des Sylver A43.

Les menaces mentionnées dans l’article australien sont les missiles balistiques. 32 Aster 15 ne protègent pas beaucoup contre ces menaces…

[Ciders]

Quel porte-avions est équipé contre les missiles balistiques ? En armement propre, pas celui de l'escorte ?

Et tiens, puisqu'on parle des Chinois, les deux premiers en service n'ont que du HQ-10 et des CIWS. 

[tipi]

il y a 27 minutes, Ciders a dit :

Quel porte-avions est équipé contre les missiles balistiques ? En armement propre, pas celui de l'escorte ?

Et tiens, puisqu'on parle des Chinois, les deux premiers en service n'ont que du HQ-10 et des CIWS. 

C’est le GAN qu’il faut considérer. Les GAN américains sont protégés par des SM6, donc antiballistiques si je ne me trompe. Je ne crois pas que les Aster 30 de notre GAN aient cette capacité. 
C’est Patrick qui évoquait les Aster 15 du CDG, pas moi.

[mudrets]

Euh, si on revenait à la prétention glaouch et la réaction aussie 

Modifié le 26 juillet par mudrets

[Patrick]

Il y a 13 heures, tipi a dit :

Les menaces mentionnées dans l’article australien sont les missiles balistiques. 32 Aster 15 ne protègent pas beaucoup contre ces menaces…

Les ESSM et RIM-116 d'un CVN-78 non plus.

Il y a 12 heures, tipi a dit :

C’est le GAN qu’il faut considérer. Les GAN américains sont protégés par des SM6, donc antiballistiques si je ne me trompe. Je ne crois pas que les Aster 30 de notre GAN aient cette capacité. 
C’est Patrick qui évoquait les Aster 15 du CDG, pas moi.

Ce n'est pas ce que tu as mentionné.

Je te cite:

Il y a 23 heures, tipi a dit :

Interessant, mais il me semble que la même critique pourrait s’appliquer au CDG: navire faiblement armé face aux missiles anti navires chinois…

Tu n'as pas dit "escorte du navire", "groupe aéronaval", "frégates d'accompagnement", etc.

Pour comparer, le CVN-78 Ford est équipé de deux lanceurs octuples pour des ESSM et de deux RIM-116 avec 21 missiles chacun.

Les 32 Aster 15 et 12 Mistral 3 du CdG ne peuvent-ils pas être comparés aux 16 ESSM et 42 RIM-116 du Ford? Moi je pense que si, et surtout face aux missiles à trajectoire plongeante.

Bon par contre les US ont trois Phalanx en 20x102 (surface air) et 4 Mk38 en 25x137 (surface surface) là où le CdG se "contente" de 8 Giat 20F2 en 20x139 et de 3 Narwhal en 20mm également. Donc les Ford seront mieux protégés en défense terminale au cas où les missiles échoueraient. Il faudrait des RapidFire ou tout autre système approchant sur le CdG pour être protégé à ce niveau.

Après si tu veux remettre en cause les capacités et le nombre des missiles anti-missiles en France, le nombre de VLS à bord de nos frégates FREMM et FDI et de nos "frégates" Horizon, l'absence de quad-pack pour le VL MICA ou tout autre système, et la taille du GAN Français en général, je suis avec toi à 100%.

Mais c'est bien à cause de ces faiblesses qu'on a été obligés de mettre 32 ASTER 15 sur le CdG à l'époque.

Et d'ailleurs si ça ne tenait qu'à moi on mettrait minimum 64 ASTER 30 block 1 NT dans des A50 sur le PANG...

Il est certain que quand on voit des destroyers à 192, voire 256 VLS Mk41 ailleurs... ça laisse songeur.

Modifié le 27 juillet par Patrick

[tipi]

Je me suis mal exprimé. Je voulais dire que la critique que font les australiens au Queen Elizabeth (inutile car non protégé contre les derniers missiles anti PA chinois) valait tout autant pour le CDG. Seuls les américains avec les SM-6 de leur escorte peuvent prétendre disposer d’un certain niveau de protection. Encore que quand on voit leur prudence face aux Houtis…

Peut-être cette situation changera t elle avec le B1 NT, mais pour l’instant c’est comme ça.

Modifié le 27 juillet par tipi

[Patrick]

Il y a 6 heures, tipi a dit :

Je me suis mal exprimé. Je voulais dire que la critique que font les australiens au Queen Elizabeth (inutile car non protégé contre les derniers missiles anti PA chinois) valait tout autant pour le CDG. Seuls les américains avec les SM-6 de leur escorte peuvent prétendre disposer d’un certain niveau de protection. Encore que quand on voit leur prudence face aux Houtis…

Peut-être cette situation changera t elle avec le B1 NT, mais pour l’instant c’est comme ça.

Oui de ce point de vue pas de soucis.

Dans un monde idéal moi aussi je voudrais une douzaine de croiseurs avec 512 VLS chacun.

[OysterCultist]

https://www.navylookout.com/rfa-argus-stuck-in-portsmouth-deemed-unsafe-to-sail/

Le RFA Argus est bloqué a Portsmouth. La RN/RFA n'a plus de navires amphibie en service.

RFA Argus arrived in Portsmouth on 8th June, but is now unable to sail to Falmouth for repair as her safety certification has been withdrawn. This means the Royal Navy / RFA currently does not have a single active amphibious vessel.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and Lloyds Register (LR) inspect vessels to ensure minimum safety standards are met and have deemed Argus unsafe, even for the short trip to Falmouth. The RFA is working to resolve the issue, but this is just another example of the struggling Naval Service.

RFA Argus completed a 5-month overhaul at APCL Falmouth at the end of March 2025, which included significant refurbishment, upgrades or replacement of several onboard systems. While the refit addressed some longstanding defects, a lack of funding has prevented the full repair list from being completed. As a result, Argus remains in service with several unresolved issues, including problems with fire doors, a persistent leak from the ballast tank and a worn seal on the main aircraft lift that is in need of replacement.

[...]

Argus was supposed to be participating in the latter stages of the carrier strike group deployment, although this seems unlikely now. With the LPDs axed, RFA Lyme Bay and RFA Mounts Bay in maintenance and RFA Cardigan Bay without a crew, there is not a single vessel available to support amphibious operations.

Si j'avais le temps je ferais bien la liste des navires britanniques avec leur statut actuel mais je crois que le résultat serait trop déprimant. 

[pascal]

On tombe de Charybde en Scylla... Nom que d'ailleurs la RN donna à plusieurs de ses bâtiments 

[penaratahiti]

il y a une heure, pascal a dit :

On tombe de Charybde en Scylla... Nom que d'ailleurs la RN donna à plusieurs de ses bâtiments 

Ulysse revient ! 

En version anglaise : out of the frying pan into the fire

Ou comme disait ce cher Winston : les Anglais ne tracent jamais une ligne sans la brouiller.

Modifié mercredi à 05:49 par penaratahiti

[Ronfly]

Décidément, c'est un peu la descente aux enfers pour la RN. C'est impressionnant le nombre de coques non disponible.

Du coup, plus que jamais, la Marine nationale va être aux avant postes des forces navales dans la zone Euro-atlantique notamment. Et d'ailleurs malgré 2 décennies de vaches maigres budgétaire compensées par sa résilience sans failles (ou presque).

[Patrick]

Il y a 6 heures, OysterCultist a dit :

https://www.navylookout.com/rfa-argus-stuck-in-portsmouth-deemed-unsafe-to-sail/

Le RFA Argus est bloqué a Portsmouth. La RN/RFA n'a plus de navires amphibie en service.

RFA Argus arrived in Portsmouth on 8th June, but is now unable to sail to Falmouth for repair as her safety certification has been withdrawn. This means the Royal Navy / RFA currently does not have a single active amphibious vessel.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and Lloyds Register (LR) inspect vessels to ensure minimum safety standards are met and have deemed Argus unsafe, even for the short trip to Falmouth. The RFA is working to resolve the issue, but this is just another example of the struggling Naval Service.

RFA Argus completed a 5-month overhaul at APCL Falmouth at the end of March 2025, which included significant refurbishment, upgrades or replacement of several onboard systems. While the refit addressed some longstanding defects, a lack of funding has prevented the full repair list from being completed. As a result, Argus remains in service with several unresolved issues, including problems with fire doors, a persistent leak from the ballast tank and a worn seal on the main aircraft lift that is in need of replacement.

[...]

Argus was supposed to be participating in the latter stages of the carrier strike group deployment, although this seems unlikely now. With the LPDs axed, RFA Lyme Bay and RFA Mounts Bay in maintenance and RFA Cardigan Bay without a crew, there is not a single vessel available to support amphibious operations.

Si j'avais le temps je ferais bien la liste des navires britanniques avec leur statut actuel mais je crois que le résultat serait trop déprimant. 

Une pensée émue pour les trolls anglais qui, il y a bien des années ,dans certains lieux sombres des internets, se gaussaient de la Marine Française, en mettant en avant la prodigieuse flotte amphibie et logistique de la RN que le monde (et surtout les Français bien sûr) leur enviait secrètement. Du moins ils en étaient persuadés.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

[penaratahiti]

j'ai essayé de résumer le statut des grosses unités de la RN (avec un peu d'aide) : 

[Titus K]

il y a 25 minutes, penaratahiti a dit :

j'ai essayé de résumer le statut des grosses unités de la RN (avec un peu d'aide) : 

Pour les SSN, le Anson revient tout juste de plusieurs semaines de mer, le Astute aussi était a la mer vers fin-juin il me semble. 

 

Il y a Britsky sur twitter qui rend compte de l'état de la RN, et il remet ses tableaux a jour très régulièrement   --> https://x.com/TBrit90

Au 29 juillet 2025

[Brian]

Ils ont mis un gros coup de collier sur leurs Type 23. Faut dire qu'ils en avaient plus qu'une pour patrouiller au large de leurs côtes ...

[HK]

49 minutes ago, Titus K said:

Il y a Britsky sur twitter qui rend compte de l'état de la RN, et il remet ses tableaux a jour très régulièrement   --> https://x.com/TBrit90

Au 29 juillet 2025

Donc concrètement la Royal Navy aujourd’hui c’est:

- 1 PA

- 1 ou 2 SNA

- 10 frégates (3 AA, 5 ASM, 2 de 2e rang)

- 2 pétroliers (mais sans capacité de ravitaillement en solides)

- 0 ou 1 navire amphibie

L’autre moitié de la flotte étant indisponible en entretien prolongé, sans équipage etc.

Reste aussi les SNLE dont on ne connaît pas la disponibilité.

Modifié mercredi à 11:38 par HK

[Patrick]

il y a 6 minutes, HK a dit :

Reste aussi les SNLE dont on ne connaît pas la disponibilité.

Le Victorious est disponible? Sinon c'est qu'ils sont toujours à 3.

[pascal]

Il est assez rare qu'un non Américain s'exprime dans Proceedings

Citation

The End of the Illusion of Choice: Providing and Maintaining the UK’s Maritime Power in the Age of Polycrisis

Alex Harris

July 2025 Proceedings

Introduction

Whilst the decline of the Royal Navy (RN) as a fighting force is exaggerated, the deteriorating global geopolitical outlook—as confirmed by the events in Ukraine, the Red Sea, Guyana and the Indo-Pacific—demand a renewed focus on Britain’s seafaring prowess and the nation’s ability to support it. Even before the emergence of these threats, the defence committee’s 2021 report ‘We’re going to need a bigger Navy’ acknowledged that the RN does not have sufficient ships to meet the full ambition of the 2021 Integrated Review. Maritime trade remains the essential lifeblood of the UK, accounting for 95% of all UK trade by volume, and as such a Navy, sufficient “to pursue and secure British interests,” and aligned to a Maritime-led national defence strategy, will be crucial to ensure a successful Britain in the 2030’s and beyond.

Whilst the US Navy remains a powerful force and a key ally in preserving the pax mare that has allowed global sea trade to flourish since the Second World War, Dr Hendrix confirms that it faces its own challenges around fleet size, conditions, and combat 
readiness even before we analyse the impact of Trump’s foreign policy. The recent increase in Defence spending to 2.5% of GDP is very welcome, but this uplift will not come until April 2027, and even the ongoing ambition to reach 3% in the next parliament is not sufficient to meet the current threat level and material state of the RN. Geoffrey Till’s perspective acknowledges that sea 
power is not solely about sea control or military force but also about maintaining security, economic stability, and influence across the maritime domain. His approach combines both traditional and modern aspects of naval operations to define its role in the 21st century. This article highlights the need for a multifaceted approach to not only strengthen the Royal Navy but the whole UK 
maritime enterprise to ensure a credible warfighting capability to deter adversaries across the warfare spectrum.

Considering the currents status of the RN, and the challenges it faces, the author recommends the following actions: Firstly, in the short term we must rapidly increase the available mass of both the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) by the 
development of Q-ships or multifunction support vessels and a temporary relaxation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) to allow foreign purchase (both design and construction) when that would accelerate delivery. Secondly, to support sea power, the UK government should develop a National Maritime Strategy that reconnects the nation to its maritime lifeblood. The 
backbone of this strategy should be investment in sovereign commercial shipbuilding, repair, and operation to secure warship construction expertise and help reverse the alarming decrease British-registered merchant shipping. Given this mirrors a need of the US, and matches a strength of South Korea, this could also become part of the AUKUS pillar 2. This strategy should also focus on the development of maritime automation and sustainability as well as bringing prosperity to coastal communities by promoting skilled, maritime focussed, jobs. To support the development of a strong sovereign shipbuilding enterprise and to avoid the 
current cycle of costly refits the UK government should commit to a fixed funding model for continuous shipbuilding in a use and sell model. A continuous shipbuilding pipeline allows technology adoption at the pace of relevance to ensure emerging technology is incorporated through continuous spiral development of capability. The UK should focus on building its Anti-Access/Area denial (A2AD) and Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) capabilities to ensure the UK can project sea power whilst maintaining homeland security. Lastly the UK government must invest in the development of the necessary national resilience, stockpiles and stores to deliver a credible RN capable of projecting sea power based on a strong national foundation.

The Geopolitical Context

To understand the challenges the RN needs to be prepared to face, as well as the opportunities it must exploit, it is crucial to 
review recent naval conflict and possible geopolitical unrest. One of the most striking elements of the recent conflict in Ukraine and the Red Sea is the asymmetrical nature of warfare - as cheap uncrewed aerial and naval drones damage targets of a value 
exponentially higher than their own cost. A further impact of the conflict in the Black and Red Seas is the challenge of prevailing assumptions concerning the continuance of free trade and free movement.

In the Red Sea, Houthi rebels have been able to disrupt international trade via a combination of missiles and uncrewed aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). Whilst the air defence performance of the Type-45 destroyer, HMS Diamond, should be celebrated, it has sadly lived up to previous accusation of being a porcupine, due to its inability to deliver a land-based attack capability. The conflict in the Red Sea is additionally challenging navies to consider increasing warship numbers, anti-air missile production capacity, 
magazine sizes and the ability to replenish missiles at sea. The Red Sea conflict has further highlighted the spread of 
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threat capabilities beyond traditional actors, and the threat this poses to support vessels, and third party ISR provision. For the RN, availability of the right warship for the job was also highlighted as, with no Type-45 destroyer available, a Type-23 frigate was deployed instead.

In Ukraine, a power with no traditional Navy has been able to pursue a strategy of sea denial using uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) and UAVs in the Black Sea. Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy Captain and a senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute, notes that “The vulnerability of surface ships that many of us have spoken about in the past seems all too real.” Whilst this is not a tactic that will be applicable to oceanic warfare, in confined or narrow seas such as the Persian Gulf and Taiwan Strait, there are applicable lessons. The conflict in the Black Sea has highlighted the vulnerability of fixed infrastructure and the attritional nature of naval conflict due to the difficulty of replacing losses.

Outside of the Black Sea, Russia has taken a more aggressive naval stance with both conventional forces, and the shadow fleet it operates in the ‘grey zone’, with its CNI attacks in the Baltic. This ‘grey zone’ sabotage of CNI has driven the RN to procure RFA Proteus to counter such activity and secure UK CNI. The recent activity of RNS Yantar around the British and Irish coasts, should leave the government in no doubt that this capability is essential and should be developed. Whilst the Russian conventional 
surface fleet is obsolete and lacks an aircraft carrier capability, and the Admiral Kuznetsov lingers in a refit, the submarine force is significantly more effective, as evidenced by the 2018 hunt for RFS Severodvinsk. The arrival of the RN’s new Type 26 frigate 
cannot come soon enough. Outside of the naval sphere, Russia has been accused of a significant sabotage campaign throughout Europe with a particular focus on defence firms.

Increased tension in the Indo-Pacific is a further demand on RN resource. Whilst the PLAN has traditionally limited its activities to the first and second island chains, it is increasingly capable of blue water operations, and power projection beyond its traditional area of operations. This is further evidenced by the expansion of PLAN bases globally.  Furthermore, the value to the UK of 
access to the Indo-Pacific region, evidenced by the substantial RN force commitments being made, signifies the region cannot 
be ignored.

Graham Allison observes this in the Thucydides Trap. Concerning the US and China, he cites historical precedents for conflicts between dominant powers. Whilst the limits of any UK (or NATO) involvement in conflicts in the Indo-Pacific theatre have been queried, it is increasingly clear we will either be required to take on significant global force mitigating responsibilities whilst US Navy assets are redeployed to the Indo-Pacific, or be deployed to support an ally with whom we have significant economic and defence dependency, and to whom we could not refuse a request for help. The RN must prepare for taking on significant 
additional maritime responsibility and be ready to ensure by deploying forces, if necessary, that a Chinese hegemony 
cannot prevail.

Whilst we review the threats, we must also understand our obligations and the expectations of our closest allies, namely, to 
deliver expeditionary, littoral and carrier group capabilities to NATO. When we consider expeditionary warfare, we must also 
consider the lessons from the Falklands campaign. Whilst technological advances may have outpaced some of the doctrinal learning from the conflict, the logistical effort required to support expeditionary warfare is relevant today. The RN’s reliance on Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) and dockyards that had been scheduled for closure highlights the importance of sovereign capability. The declining numbers of British-registered merchant shipping, that might be militarily useful is concerning in the 
context of the de facto CRINK sponsorship of non-state actor strikes on merchant shipping and the warning from Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Small that: “Given the magnitude of the effort required by the United Kingdoms’ 
merchant fleet before Falklands operations could proceed underlines the fact that it would be impossible for NATO to be assured success in a conflict that repeats the rates of ship attrition exacted by German U-boats in World War II.”

The decrease in merchant shipping construction and operation is not a challenge unique to the UK with significant concerns raised recently in a report to the US Congress. Against this backdrop the PLAN is increasing its own militarily valuable commercial fleet. The challenge of projecting and sustaining forces over large distances is immense and former Chief of the General Staff Sir Patrick Sanders has expressed that a conflict at the level of the Falklands would be difficult to prosecute now, given the logistical effort required.

As global warming melts the polar ice caps and creates additional sea-lanes, such as the North Sea Route, the RN will have to 
increasingly look further North. Whilst Russia’s ground forces have been depleted by the Ukraine invasion, they still have 
significant defence infrastructure and assets in the Northern fleet, which must be monitored, increasing their mass and lethality. The UK is not alone in needing to respond to this challenge, and international cooperation should be explored. This again requires the RN to have sufficient capability, material quality and availability to cover the increasing sea space, something the current 
solitary Ice Patrol Ship HMS Protector cannot do.

The re-election of Donald Trump and his transactional stance on international relationships creates significant challenges for UK strategy. Trump’s stance on the Ukraine conflict, threats that the US will leave NATO and linked demand that Alliance members spend 5% of their GDP on defence has gained some response from European nations. The GDP argument made by Trump is not without some merit, US defence spending accounted for 68.66% of NATO’s total in 2023. Whether the US really does leave NATO or abandon Europe, the increased tensions in the Indo-Pacific will see US assets pivot increasingly to that theatre and Europe will need to take more responsibility for its own security. The UK’s defence architecture is intrinsically linked with that of the US and so an uncoupling would significantly compromise our defence capabilities. The UK must remain a willing and supportive partner to the US whilst at the same time hedging its bets by making significant investments, developing sovereign capabilities and further developing its European and global alliances.

In summary, whilst the new government faces a huge number of budgetary pressures it cannot afford to let this detract from the defence spending, we need to face the current and future existential threats. The RN remains a highly capable force with some exquisite capabilities but lacks the mass and support (societal, infrastructure and industrial) functions required to be a truly 
credible deterrent, considering the range of dangers in the current geopolitical climate. The commitments to shipbuilding 
programmes that have been made in the past couple of years (T26, T31, FSS and MRSS) are welcome, however tomorrows ships won’t deter today’s threats, and further action is required now. Past conflicts also teach us the value of STUFT as a sovereign 
capability that can be mobilised, highlighting the importance of a vibrant merchant navy.

Mass

In the context of naval sea power, ‘mass’ refers to the quantity of naval assets that a nation can deploy and sustain to achieve its strategic objectives at sea. To deliver the high-end capabilities required for worldwide force projection, dictated by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Navy has grown in terms of displacement but been reduced in terms of the number of escorts that can deliver lower-end capabilities and mass. The Defence committee has acknowledged this issue with availability and highlighted the need to double the size of the escort fleet as well as to increase the attack submarine fleet. The need to increase mass is 
exacerbated by the fact that, although construction of the Type 26 and Type 31 is well established, the numbers of RN frigates is likely to decrease before it increases. This section of the article highlights options for increasing mass (and the lethality of that mass) in the next five years and then on to 2040 to meet the breadth of challenge we face as a nation.

William Freer and Dr Emma Salisbury in A more lethal Royal Navy: Sharpening Britain’s Naval power, recommend that the RN 
increase planned numbers of T26, T83, Poseidon aircraft, F35’s, FSS, oilers, Dreadnought and SSN’s. The author is supportive 
of these measures, and of the desire for a larger RN fleet. Rather than repeating their recommendations, this article produces 
recommendations that can be viewed as compatible and complimentary. To support efficiently increasing mass the RN should also examine the findings of the US Government Accountability Office and the report on US Navy shipbuilding, which makes 
recommendations to improve the timeliness of ship deliveries, including the use of existing designs. These recommendations 
tie in well with the lessons that we can learn from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force’s (JMSDF) recapitalisation 
programmes that have focussed on consistency, diversity, and evolution as a component of qualitative superiority rather than quantitative parity.

A large part of increasing mass in the RN will be achieved through the integration of uncrewed and minimally crewed platforms. 
A recently published memorandum from the US Department of the Navy outlines their strategic recommendations for the 
integration of uncrewed systems. It emphasises the impending shift towards a hybrid fleet (vice fully autonomous), with a 
substantial portion of operations relying on unmanned technologies to enhance capability and survivability. This article also 
acknowledges that the traditional, longer, development and procurement cycles employed by the USN are unsuitable, given 
advancement in the uncrewed technologies being demonstrated in Ukraine. Key steps include prioritising experimentation, 
prototyping, and acquisition processes in parallel, rather than sequentially. The memorandum identifies five critical operational 
areas for unmanned systems: maritime domain awareness, fires, logistics, resilient communications, and deception. It also calls for budget allocations to support operational deployments and recommends establishing a dedicated command for unmanned systems. The overall goal is to rapidly adopt unmanned technologies to ensure effective deterrence and operational readiness in potential conflict zones. These strategic recommendations should guide the RN’s approach towards adoption of uncrewed 
systems and highlight the opportunities for cooperation with allies in the development of mass enhancing uncrewed assets.

Short term options (2025 – 2029) – Rebuilding Mass

The fastest route to increasing mass and lethality in the Royal Navy is to explore containerised modular payloads. In the Q-ship model, a commercial ship could be purchased, utilising the procurement model employed for RFA Proteus and RFA Stirling Castle, and outfitted with either containerised USVs, UUVs, UAVs, missiles or Dragonfire laser/RF directed energy weapons to deliver 
capability in a much shorter timescale than any new build project. Whilst a Q-ship would deliver benefits in terms of cost of 
purchase and potentially crewing, it does have drawbacks in terms of speed and stealth. An alternative to utilising a converted commercial ship, that will take longer to deliver, but with advantages in terms of speed and stealth is to follow the Dutch model and construct multifunction support vessels capable of carrying containerised payloads. Either option would be a quick and 
relatively cheap choice to deliver much needed increased missile capacity in the fleet, responding to a capability gap evidenced 
in the Red Sea. 

The fastest route to increasing mass and lethality in the Royal Navy is to explore containerised modular payloads. In the Q-ship model, a commercial ship could be purchased, utilising the procurement model employed for RFA Proteus and RFA Stirling Castle, and outfitted with either containerised USVs, UUVs, UAVs, missiles or Dragonfire laser/RF directed energy weapons to deliver 
capability in a much shorter timescale than any new build project. Whilst a Q-ship would deliver benefits in terms of cost of 
purchase and potentially crewing, it does have drawbacks in terms of speed and stealth. An alternative to utilising a converted commercial ship, that will take longer to deliver, but with advantages in terms of speed and stealth is to follow the Dutch model and construct multifunction support vessels capable of carrying containerised payloads. Either option would be a quick and 
relatively cheap choice to deliver much needed increased missile capacity in the fleet, responding to a capability gap evidenced 
in the Red Sea.

A further option to reduce the short-term pressure on hull numbers is to extend the out of service dates for the Batch One OPVs beyond 2028. Whilst this wouldn’t bring about additional warfighting capability for the RN, it would reduce the pressure on the RN’s frigates and destroyers to replace the activity undertaken by these three vessels.

Due to the decline in British shipbuilding capacity, increasing the mass of the RN in the medium term will require pragmatic 
short-term adjustments be made to the National Shipbuilding Strategy. The first target for this should be to accelerate the 
construction of the three Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships that are vital for logistical support of the RN fleet. Construction could be accelerated by selecting an existing FSS design with as limited change as possible, learning the lessons from the US GAO office report. By allowing the construction of these ships in a foreign shipyard, in contravention of the existing NSS, capacity would be created, at the newly acquired Navantia, Belfast shipyards. This capacity could be used for the construction of a fleet of corvettes based on an existing Navantia design, the Tasman-class, that is capable of delivering cross domain effect and delivers 30 
days endurance.

In the short term a batch of Tasman-class corvettes could be used to bolster the Royal Navy’s mass, as Type 23’s and Type 45’s linger in extended refits or become unviable to maintain, whilst in the long term they should replace the role of the OPVs (and the Sandown and Hunt-class Minehunters which operate a secondary role as OPVs), which have offered great benefit to the RN but are no longer fit for purpose, as the RN needs to shift from defence engagement to a capable warfighting poise. The choice of 
additional Tasman-class corvettes rather than additional T31s is one of pragmatism. The Tasman-class corvette is a proven 
design with reference vessels in service that is smaller than a T31 and designed by Navantia, the owners of Belfast dock. Choosing this design would de-risk the programme and ensure the speed of delivery required by the current threat levels. It also allows the opportunity to create efficiencies in forward deployment due to the same vessels being used by Saudi Arabia and 
potentially Australia. Whilst this design has less VLS cells than planned for the T31, in areas where additional VLS are required, 
the corvettes could be used in conjunction with the multifunction support vessels carrying containerised missiles.

Meeting the challenge of the expanding sea lanes in the Arctic will require the RN to procure additional Icebreaker capable vessels to challenge the increasing strength of the Russian Northen fleet. This is another area where adjustments could be made to the National Shipbuilding Strategy to allow the procurement of an existing foreign design, such as the Canadian DeWolf class, and foreign construction to accelerate the delivery of a platform.

Whilst the next five years should aim to deliver an increasing mass through traditional shipbuilding, the RN should aim to deliver the first stages of a pivot to autonomy by delivering a series of uncrewed autonomous platforms to deliver mass by uncrewed and crewed platform teaming. A cornerstone of this will be to develop the necessary digital infrastructure, architecture and 
communications network to support the effective use of uncrewed and autonomous assets. The RN can learn the lessons from the work of Task Force 59 and the Ukrainian Navy in the Black Sea to understand the use of uncrewed systems in MESH networks and over the horizon. In the first stage of the pivot to autonomy the RN should aim to deliver smaller uncrewed vessels (sub 24m) as short-medium distance effectors whilst, advancing larger uncrewed vessels to deliver ISR operations of increasing magnitude and endurance, as suggested by Project Cabot, before spirally developing larger USV’s to deliver lethality as the understanding of operating USVs increases.

Medium term options (2030-2040) – Pivot to Global Autonomy

The second stage of the RN’s pivot to autonomy should focus on further developing the capability of the uncrewed fleet, 
delivering both mass and lethality through a spiral development process to integrate the lessons from the Black Sea. This pivot should also include the procurement of carrier-capable autonomous combat aircraft as part of the RN’s maritime aviation 
transformation strategy to deliver uncrewed aviation capabilities. This second stage should also seek to use autonomy to reduce crew requirements with respect to the future crewed ship replacements.

The re-establishment of the Coastal Forces Squadron and the impending OSD of the P2000 vessels gives the RN the opportunity to develop a warfighting doctrine of crewed and uncrewed teaming along the lines of what was proposed by the Black Swan Sloop of War concept. A new generation of coastal forces craft that can deliver a significantly greater effect across air, surface, and underwater domains via a series of uncrewed vessels will be key to protecting the Critical National Infrastructure and allow other ships to be freed up for other tasks. Whilst the introduction of a Black Swan style of coastal forces vessel should reduce some of the burden on RFA Proteus, the volume and repeated nature of the CNI attacks we have seen in the Baltic sea, combined with the activities of the RNS Yantar closer to home, should drive the RN to accelerate the construction of the second Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance ship, as planned as well as expand the offensive and defensive capabilities of USVs and UUVs to counter this threat to CNI.

The RN should also seek to procure a series of progressively larger uncrewed surface vessels. This could be done as part of AUKUS pillar 2, noting the technological developments we are seeing from both DARPA and the USN. These would either 
complement or take over the role of the multifunction support vessels (or Q-ships) with regard to acting as a force multiplier for RN platforms by providing increased magazine depth through either containerised weaponry or integrated Vertical Launch System (VLS) missiles. By creating a consistent production line of either modular or container compatible flexible platforms the RN will be better able to rapidly integrate new technological advances into the fleet whilst spirally developing traditional platforms.

The recently announced deletion of Landing Platform Docks HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion should drive further pace into the Multi Role Support Ships (MRSS) earmarked for delivery in the early 2030s. Due to the changing nature of delivering amphibious/littoral strike capability, evidenced by the Chinese construction of a drone carrier that is speculated to be an 
amphibious assault ship, as well as the wide range of tasking that the MRSS design will have to incorporate (replacing the LPDs, LSD (A)s and RFA Argus), I believe the Navy should reconsider the assumption that a single ship design can deliver all and should look at procuring two classes of vessel. One should be an amphibious assault ship design similar to the USS Wasp or the LHD Trieste of the Italian Navy and the other should be a larger logistics and support focussed platform capable of delivering the 
follow on forces identified as required in RUSI papers by both Dr Watling and Kaushal, and Andrew Young.

The Amphibious assault ship design can project greater air power (crewed or uncrewed), deliver amphibious capability and act as a drone mothership for uncrewed surface and underwater vessels through its floodable well deck. The proliferation of anti-ship missiles and UAVs (both anti-ship and anti-personnel), and particularly the use of this technology by non-state actors, presents a new threat in what would be traditionally uncontested areas. This evolving threat in the littoral space will require any amphibious operations in the future to have increasing amounts of ISR and air support capability, to ensure the survival of the ship and marines themselves and this is an advantage an amphibious assault ship’s design provides. This design should be able to 
accommodate F35s and Merlins in the interim but be designed to accelerate the deployment of the new UAVs developed in 
response to the RN’s maritime aviation transformation strategy.

Supporting Seapower

Geoffrey Till states that the inputs to sea power are far greater than merely the actions of the Navy. In his book Seapower: A Guide For the 21st Century, he notes the importance of national policies in the areas of foreign, defence, economic, and maritime policy and the strategies that underscore them in the military and civil maritime space. These combine to produce the civil and military maritime capabilities and their outputs that generate sea power. In this context providing and maintaining maritime power is not just a question of ordering more warships, it requires having the necessary support ships, military-industrial complex, maritime merchant industry, infrastructure, supplies, stockpiles, and workforce to support a transition to war or the national resilience 
required to defend them. Underpinning this is the necessary policy and strategy to support these industries. Sadly, the UK is no longer a world leader in any of the key pillars that supports the RN to operate and ultimately fight. The RFA is in a poor state with the material availability of its ships, and the crews to operate them, severely limiting our sovereign capability. For our Merchant Navy, the declining numbers of British-registered merchant shipping, that might be militarily useful, is a worrying tread, that is mirrored in the US and we now lack the sovereign expertise to militarise them via STUFT as we did in the Falklands war. Our Maritime defence infrastructure is desperately in need of investment, and, in the case of war, dangerously concentrated. Lastly, there is a both a shrinking number of seafarers, and a growing skills gap in the UK maritime sector, with concerning trends in the average age of maritime professionals and declining interest in maritime careers that must be addressed.

The RN alone cannot solve the issues highlighted above and this article proposes a UK National Maritime Strategy, developed jointly with the Department of trade, industry, regulatory bodies and academia, that recognises Britain’s place as a maritime 
nation. This strategy should incorporate measures to develop the domestic maritime workforce, grow the maritime defence and commercial sectors, grow UK flagged shipping, create industry partnerships to promote technology advancements (AI, future 
fuels) and create international partnerships to develop fiscal and strategic advantages. In the short term the UK should also 
modify the National Shipbuilding strategy to support delivery whilst sovereign capability is boosted. Whilst the investments 
required to support the actions proposed in a new UK National Maritime Strategy will be significant, this sector already makes a substantial contribution to the UK economy, as highlighted in a report by The Centre for Economics and Business Research.

“In 2019, maritime contributed £116bn in total turnover to the UK economy, 35% higher than 2010. For every £1 of turnover 
generated directly by the sector, a further £1.09 was generated indirectly across the supply chain, underscoring the far-reaching impact of an industry that carries 95% of Britain’s global trade.”

Resilience

The increased aggression of Russia, both in terms of the physical invasion of Ukraine, hybrid warfare and sabotage attempts across Europe demand an uplift in our efforts to deliver a resilient UK, that can in turn support the RN to deliver maritime power and protect our nation’s maritime supply lines. This should include developing defensive and offensive missile systems, cyber 
security and civic preparedness.

The largest investment should come in closing a key capability gap and delivering a multi layered Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) for the UK. Developments in laser and missile technology should offer the opportunity for this IAMD systems to produce a range of countermeasure types to avoid the cost asymmetry that has occurred in the Red Sea, where cheap drones are being shot down by expensive missiles. This IAMD should be accompanied by long range anti-ship missiles to create a credible anti-access/area denial in both the air and maritime space

The UK should also engage in an increased campaign of civic and industrial preparedness to increase the countries resilience. This should include efforts to increase the number of reservists, following the example of Poland, campaigns to counter Russian and Chinese information warfare, and work to increase the cyber security of government, key industry, and CNI.

Workforce

The average age of a maritime professional in the UK has reached 45 and just 14% are aged under 30. This is creating an 
impending crisis point as a large proportion of the workforce is set to retire, whilst there is a lack of interest in a career in maritime fields from the younger generation. This also creates an additional challenge as the busier experienced staff and the increasing skills shortage has made succession planning and the knowledge transfer to junior staff through apprenticeships and on the job training more difficult. Lastly in the shipbuilding field Stott notes that;

“A hiatus in fabrication can be seen in the seven years between 2000 and 2007 where virtually no submarine fabrication was undertaken in the UK. During this period, a significant part of the experience of how to build submarines was lost along with a proportion of the skills needed. This in all probability contributed to cost and time overruns in that programme. This cost, which is an inevitable feature of volatility, must be factored into the economic consideration of the industry.”

This evidences that the degradation of skills created by the failure of a continuous submarine (and shipbuilding) pipeline has 
created additional costs and delays towards capability delivery that must not be repeated.

The UK National Maritime Strategy should seek to invest in a national marketing campaign to encourage maritime careers, invest in school, colleges, and academia to subsidise maritime programmes (and associated SMET skills), modify hours of work 
regulations to allow over 16s to work offshore in maritime fields, follow the US model of purchasing training platforms, to support skills development and engage with allies to secure co-operative training opportunities.

RFA

To use General Bradleys oft quoted phrase “amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics,” the UK has a diminishing maritime logistical capability that will render us as amateurs in a major conflict. Whilst the RFA sailors pay dispute has ended, and the RFA 2035 Optimisation Programme is underway to improve recruitment, competition for mariners is fierce and pay remains a significant challenge. Whilst workforce remains the most pressing challenge to operations for most RFA vessels, there are also significant issues relating to the material state of ships, such as RFA Fort Victoria, some of which have been placed in long term reserve and would not be ready for conflict in the short term. Interoperability and support co-operation with Germany and Norway has closed some of the capability gap created and is rightfully lauded as positive engagement with close allies, but the UK is not alone in having challenges in supporting its warships, and it exposes the fragility of the RFAs ability to support replenishment at sea, especially in conflict.

One suggestion to resolve the issue of pay and conditions impacting on the RFA workforce, that could be introduced as part of the wider UK National Maritime strategy, would be to detach the RFA from the civil service in a similar manner to the border force. This would allow the RFA to have greater flexibility on its own pay and conditions to allow it to be competitive in a challenging 
sector. The RFA should also utilise the modification of the National Shipbuilding Strategy noted above to accelerate the design and construction of the Tanker, OSV and MROS 2 delivery with a focus on automation and lean crewing to reduce workforce 
burden. Finally, the RFA is taking on additional responsibilities in its manning of the MROS and MHC OSV (with more of both 
vessels in the pipeline), a review should be undertaken to rationalise the roles filled by RN and RFA sailors to support an RFA focus on sustaining logistic capability.

Sealift

Whilst the recent extension of the strategic sealift charter arrangement with Foreland shipping, until 2031, maintains a crucial 
capability to move personnel, supplies, and equipment globally, the decline of British-registered merchant shipping creates a key weakness in our military logistics. In the Falklands war the Royal Navy’s reliance on Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT), and the efforts of the dockworkers required to militarise them for service, highlights the importance of sovereign capability. In Portsmouth dockyard alone a total of 25 ships of various classes were militarised between the 8th of April and 21st May 1982 to enable the 
logistics of Op CORPORATE covering 8,000 miles.

RNSSC fellow Charlotte Kleberg has recently published a paper containing suggested solutions for improving the UK’s sealift 
capability. These suggestions are long-term partnerships with commercial shipping, improved coordination and planning, 
increased efforts to understand commercial capacity and assessment of sea lift requirements and lastly to incentivise national shipping capacity and bolster British flagged vessels. The final recommendation is echoed in the cross party US Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy report that similarly recognised the importance of domestically built and flagged 
vessels to a maritime nation and suggests funding and incentives to support this.

Shipbuilding

The rise of more technologically advanced shipyards across the globe (US, Japan, South Korea and China) and a fall in sovereign demand have contributed to virtually extinguish commercial shipbuilding in the UK. This, combined with a decline in warship building, or uncertainty and delays in the programmes that have existed, has created a British shipbuilding industry suffering a skills shortage, lacking modern technology, and using outdated infrastructure. Given the extensive recapitalisation required for the RN and the gravity of the threats faced, the UK does not have the shipbuilding capability to rebuild the RN fleet at the 
prerequisite pace.

The lack of commercial shipbuilding, and limits to military shipbuilding, in the UK does not however, diminish the strategic 
importance of domestic shipbuilding (noted above in Sealift), nevertheless in the face of global competition the UK will struggle 
to have a competitive industry. Since 2006 China has rapidly progressed its shipbuilding, overtaking Japan and South Korea to 
possess 65% of the global shipbuilding orderbook. The US contends that to achieve this it has aided domestic shipbuilders through extensive subsides and by depressing labor costs in the maritime and shipbuilding markets. Stott (citing Bruno and Tenold) notes that due to the high risks, low returns and the level of capital required that government support is required to 
establish and maintain significant shipbuilding.

Against this backdrop the UK should not seek to independently mass produce commercial shipping to compete with China, 
alongside the production of warships, but instead develop a modern, low output, sustainable commercial shipping industry 
designed to support an uplift in militarily useful British registered shipping (based on the requirements identified in the Sealift 
reviews), in partnership with warship building. The new National Maritime Strategy should create a national enterprise that invests in sovereign shipbuilding, with a focus on creating modern infrastructure, that allows efficient construction. To support the 
development of a strong sovereign shipbuilding enterprise, and to avoid the current cycle of costly refits, the UK government should commit to a fixed funding model for continuous shipbuilding in a use and sell model. This approach will provide industry with certainty, de-risk the necessary modernisation investment and support maritime industry to develop (and maintain) the skilled workforce required. A continuous shipbuilding pipeline allows technology adoption at the pace of relevance to ensure emerging technology to be incorporated through continuous spiral development of capability. The National Maritime Strategy should also prioritise R & D investment to promote innovation, particularly in the areas of uncrewed shipping, autonomy and future fuel transition.

Additionally, the UK should also seek international partners (primarily US, Japan and South Korea as part of AUKUS pillar 2) to collaboratively re-invigorate international commercial shipbuilding through agreements to reduce the Chinese hegemony. This is an additional pathway towards securing the required uplift in British flagged shipping in the short term whilst maintaining UK 
shipbuilding capacity for warships and ensuring value for money. Any investment should also aim to increase security as recent warship sabotage events in Germany  highlight the hybrid warfare that is taking place.

Stockpiles, Supply Chains & Stores

In the Red Sea the spread of advanced missiles and increased use of drones in coordinated mass attacks has highlighted the 
absence of sufficient missile stockpiles. Whilst no naval ships have been damaged by the actions of the Houthi rebels, the varied and substantial arsenals of a peer competitor, would test and therefore deplete the air defences of RN ships quickly. In this 
context the missile stockpiles across Europe and the US must be replenished and the production lines required must be 
supported and strengthened. This is not a process that can be done quickly with long lead times and significant time required to deliver any increases in production. It is essential that the UK invest in its sovereign defence industry to secure sufficient 
stockpiles, surge production and to secure critical materials required for manufacture.

In addition to securing greater missile stockpiles, the RN must greatly increase the availability of stores and spares to maintain the availability of the fleet. The 2017 National Audit office Investigation into equipment cannibalisation in the Royal Navy was damming, highlighting a 49% increase in cannibalisation from April 2012 to March 2017. The use of stores robbery on a 
continuous basis undermines the availability and effectiveness of the RN fleet.

Infrastructure

The infrastructure of the RN is in a poor state and all three of the service’s naval bases Devonport, Portsmouth and Faslane 
require significant investment. Erin Bisset identifies the roots of the current malaise as a repeated failure to understand the 
importance of infrastructure in Defence Reviews, Defence Estate Rationalisation, outsourcing of Defence services and poor 
programme management.  The Defence estate is also both blessed and cursed by its history, with so many protected historic buildings and docks designed for the smaller vessels of yester year that limit the RN’s ability to modernise. Portsmouth and Devonport’s place in the centre of cities limits expansion opportunities at these sites as well. Foreign basing has been used to 
deliver maintenance abroad in the case of the OPV’s but doesn’t present an affordable or realistic option to offset the current 
infrastructure issues in the UK.

The conflict in the Black Sea reminds us that naval infrastructure is vulnerable to enemy action and Cdr Westley highlights that significant disruption could be inflicted through hybrid actions. The concentration of UK based assets in just three naval bases with vulnerable single points of failure (for example ammunition jetties) as well as significant commercial and pleasure shipping presents a significant national security risk.

The UK must make a significant investment in the modernisation of the existing RN infrastructure to ensure it is ready for the 
incoming crewed and uncrewed ships, submarines, and aircraft. It should not however focus development on only existing bases and should investigate opportunities to distribute defence assets in a less concentrated manner to provide greater resilience and use defence investment to support regional development. The development of smaller naval bases in Hull and/or Newcastle would support investment and levelling up in the Northeast of the country, deliver an access point for RN assets to quickly access the North Sea, and allow the RN to build modern state of the art facilities, unhindered by history, whilst reducing the demands on 
existing infrastructure.

Operators & Maintainers

As the Royal Navy seeks to increase mass through a pivot to increasing levels of uncrewed vessels in the underwater, above water and air spaces, challenges and opportunities emerge. Whilst there are currently insufficient numbers of suitably qualified and 
experienced personnel in the RN workforce, the changing requirement profile for operators and maintainers creates opportunities for civilian (with the option for Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) staff to support enlisted personnel. The RN could also look at a Fast track recruitment schemes such as the one recently launched for Cyber Security with moderated requirements (and no sea pay!) for personnel that wouldn’t be deployed overseas. This approach would have to be carefully considered and does create the risk of creating a two tiered RN, however given the challenges in recruitment (and skills shortages) that exist, all options should be considered. Lastly the MoD should encourage/incentivise drone pilots in all domains (air, underwater and above water) to join the reserves and create a cadre of uncrewed operation experts that can support the pivot to autonomy and deliver an uptick in naval mass in wartime.

Legal & Regulation

As noted in the shipbuilding section above, the new National Maritime Strategy should seek to promote innovation and invest in uncrewed shipping and autonomy to support mass in the RN. The UK has a growing underwater and surface uncrewed vessels sector primarily focussed on the offshore energy and infrastructure market and as such the MCA publication of the Workboat Code Edition 3 in December 2023, with a standalone annex on operating remotely operated unmanned vessels (‘ROUVs’), was a critical development for the sector. Unfortunately, a significant number of companies continue to flag vessels abroad due to 
complexities in meeting these requirements and it will struggle to keep relevance given the rapid pace of development in the 
sector. The National Maritime strategy should prioritise regulation support for civilian uncrewed vessel construction and operation in the UK, to encourage uncrewed vessels to be flagged in the UK. Failure to support this regulatory challenge risks stifling a growing industry and blocking the UK from generating the necessary civilian skills to allow a transition to mass drone use in a war scenario.

The increase in the use of AI, autonomy and uncrewed assets in the Royal Navy is also set to challenge traditional rules of 
engagement. Increasingly AI and automation is going to be required to assess and combat the threats of hypersonic missiles and swarm attacks where human decision making is not going to be fast enough. Rules of engagement with regards to uncrewed 
vessels will also have to explored and understood. Traditional decisions on when to open fire have been weighed on a threat to life basis, in the space of crewed and uncrewed vessels working together on operations an uncrewed vessel may deliver an important aspect of a crewed ships defensive measures (the absence of which causes and indirect threat to life) and therefore justify 
forceful protection despite there being no direct risk to life. The Government response to the House of Lords AI in Weapon Systems Committee Report and the Defence AI strategy reflect welcome efforts to consider the legal and ethical considerations of AI and autonomy but the rapid advancement in this technology needs continuous efforts so that government policy can 
keep pace.

Recommendations:

Rapidly accelerate the increase of percentage of GDP spending on defence to ensure the RN is ready for war. Funding for the RN should be focussed on increasing the mass and lethality of the navy (through both traditional and uncrewed shipping), 
increasing the availability of existing assets, increasing stockpiles, and improving infrastructure through investment that 
supports levelling up by decentralisation.

Temporarily relax the NSS to allow foreign build and design of warships to deliver the required mass into the RN in a timely manner and to exploit the lessons from other nations whilst exploring partnership opportunities as part of AUKUS and other alliances.

Develop a new National Maritime strategy to reassert the UK as a maritime nation. The national strategy should incentivise maritime careers, commit to British shipbuilding with steady investment pipeline enabling warship and relevant militarily useful commercial shipping to be built. The strategy should include creation of a Maritime autonomy taskforce to support the 
development, regulation, and legislation of commercial uncrewed vessels in the UK.

Invest in military industrial complex to ensure stockpiles of weaponry, stores and critical materials are sufficient to survive trade disruption.

Increase the Resilience of the UK by developing defensive and offensive missile systems, cyber security, and civic preparedness.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War and a shift towards counter insurgency operations have seen a progressive degradation of the UK’s 
military capability in peer to peer warfare. In the RN this has seen the Navy shrink to historic lows in terms of significant ships, stockpiles, and personnel, whilst a lack of investment in defence has seen a decline in our military–industrial complex. The 
geopolitical upheaval we have witnessed in the last decade confirms that we have reached the end of our peace dividend and need to prepare for, at best, disaggregated challenges in the grey zone and from non-state actors and, at worst, a peer to peer conflict. The measures (and associated costs) suggested in this paper may not be welcomed by a government with fiscal rules and difficult decisions to make, yet we must not give ourselves the illusion of choice. The UK must deliver a Navy that is not only strong on paper but has the necessary support and resilience to deliver in a challenging global environment. Whilst a major 
recapitalisation and rearmament programme will be costly (and require an increase percentage of GDP spent on defence), the costs of not discouraging a major war, or worse being in a major war when we haven’t adequately prepared, will be far greater 
and the lasting impacts far more severe.

 

 

 

[Ardachès]

Le 30/07/2025 à 13:36, HK a dit :

Donc concrètement la Royal Navy aujourd’hui c’est:

- 1 PA

- 1 ou 2 SNA

- 10 frégates (3 AA, 5 ASM, 2 de 2e rang)

- 2 pétroliers (mais sans capacité de ravitaillement en solides)

- 0 ou 1 navire amphibie

L’autre moitié de la flotte étant indisponible en entretien prolongé, sans équipage etc.

Reste aussi les SNLE dont on ne connaît pas la disponibilité.

… Qu'est-ce à dire ? Que c'est la fenêtre parfaite pour que les Argentins débarquent et reprennent - enfin - les Malouines ? 

[Ciders]

il y a 4 minutes, Ardachès a dit :

… Qu'est-ce à dire ? Que c'est la fenêtre parfaite pour que les Argentins débarquent et reprennent - enfin - les Malouines ? 

En 1982, c'était la même antienne mais l'Argentine avait davantage de gras et de troupes.

[Cunégonde]

En effet. Le ministre de Thatcher en charge de la marine (Nott) je n'ai entendu que des horreurs sur lui. Pas autant que McNamara, Hellyer ou Diefenbaker, mais pas loin. Les britanniques ont eu chaud, leur chance c'est que le ministre de la marine argentine, et co-dictateur - l'Amiral Jorge Anaya - était lui aussi un total abruti. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorge_Isaac_Anaya 

Le plan d'origine était d'attendre plus tard en 1982 non seulement pour l'hiver austral mais aussi pour que Nott continue d'éviscerer la RN, particulièrement ses navires amphibie et porte-aéronefs (transfer aux Australiens). A partir de Janvier 1982 Anaya s'est complètement pris les pieds dans ses plans - entre Chili, Géorgie du Sud, Malouines, ONU... Et une fois le Belgrano coulé, il a laissé l'armée de terre et l'aviation avec le merdier qu'il avait provoqué. 

[pascal]

il y a 1 minute, Cunégonde a dit :

En effet. Le ministre de Thatcher en charge de la marine (Nott) je n'ai entendu que des horreurs sur lui. Pas autant que McNamara, Hellyer ou Diefenbaker, mais pas loin. Les britanniques ont eu chaud, leur chance c'est que le ministre de la marine argentine, et co-dictateur - l'Amiral Jorge Anaya - était lui aussi un total abruti. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorge_Isaac_Anaya 

Le plan d'origine était d'attendre plus tard en 1982 non seulement pour l'hiver austral mais aussi pour que Nott continue d'éviscerer la RN, particulièrement ses navires amphibie et porte-aéronefs (transfer aux Australiens). A partir de Janvier 1982 Anaya s'est complètement pris les pieds dans ses plans - entre Chili, Géorgie du Sud, Malouines, ONU... Et une fois le Belgrano coulé, il a laissé l'armée de terre et l'aviation avec le merdier qu'il avait provoqué. 

La situation intérieure en Argentine (mécontentement populaire) exigeait aussi un dérivatif ... rapidement. Quelques mois plus tard la RN aurait été fort dépourvue.

[herciv]

Ca va pas plaire aux norvégiens :

https://www.opex360.com/2025/08/01/dedie-aux-operations-amphibies-le-navire-britannique-rfa-argus-a-ete-juge-trop-dangereux-pour-naviguer/

[Ardachès]

Il y a 9 heures, Ciders a dit :

En 1982, c'était la même antienne mais l'Argentine avait davantage de gras et de troupes.

… et manifestement pas assez de Super-Étendart et d'Exocet ! 

[Beachcomber]

Le 01/08/2025 à 08:55, pascal a dit :

 

Il est assez rare qu'un non Américain s'exprime dans Proceedings

 

Excellent article sans concession sur l'état des lieus des écosystèmes maritimes britanniques. Un peu de yaka yfo sur les solutions et pas mal de vœux pieux sur la suite du programme mais ça vaut le coup de creuser, alors je me lance, en essayant d'être concis :

Royal Navy pas à la hauteur des enjeux du moment, avec des problèmes de masse, de stocks, de disponibilités et de personnels.

Écosystème des chantiers au Royaume Uni dans un état lamentable : peu de chantiers, manque de main d'œuvre qualifiée, infrastructures en nombre limité et obsolètes la plupart du temps. La plupart des antiques docks ont été reconvertis en quartiers "hype" pour "yuppies" donc la remontée en puissance passera par la création de chantiers ex nihilo mêlant bateaux gris et coques civiles (bon courage).

Réserves (Marine Marchande sous pavillon national) quasi inexistantes, avec les quelques marins qui restent qui sont âgés (65% à plus de 45 ans) et une crise manifeste des vocations.

Volonté manifeste de rester accroché à l'allié US.

Finances dans un état "tendu" avec moult autres priorités...

Ça c'est pour le côté sombre. Je dirais qu'il leur reste quelques atouts comme les entreprises BAE ou Rolls Royce branche marine, à partir desquelles ils vont pouvoir reconstruire. Ils ont aussi clairement gardé une approche innovante dans l'art de la guerre sur l'eau puisqu'il me semble qu'ils sont largement impliqués dans les succès ukrainiens en mer Noire.

En termes de solutions ils comptent reconstruire une flotte logistique avec l'appui de chantiers étrangers. Ils escomptent également prendre de la masse grâce aux drones.

C'est selon moi plus une obligation au regard du temps nécessaire à former humainement des techniciens (opérateurs machines outils, chaudronniers, marins) plutôt qu'un choix réfléchi et un avis tranché. D'ailleurs l'auteur n'explique pas comment il compte déployer ses drones en mer de Chine, mer Rouge ou mer de Barents depuis Portsmouth...

Ils comptent aussi sur les alliés proches (dont norvégiens) pour augmenter les cadences et les tonnages. De mon point de vue ils essaieraient bien de convertir quelques supplies au rôle de porte-drones, à l'instar de ce que fait la MN avec ses Bsam et Bsaom, et aussi avec le Bgdm qui selon moi s'inspire techniquement largement d'un supply de part son dessin de coque (avec bien sûr un pont couvert dédié à la  mise en œuvre de drones de guerre des mines).

Bref, après la mondialisation heureuse et les années Thatcher / Reagan, les grands penseurs anglo-saxons du libre échange découvrent que les pays à qui ils ont confié les basses œuvres polluantes et mal payées peuvent se rebeller et qu'ils ont abandonné toute une partie de ce qui a fait leur succès (moins pour les US mais leurs chantiers ne sont pas en forme olympique non plus).

À titre personnel je ne crois pas un instant à la création de nouveaux chantiers mixtes au RU : les règles de "concurrence libre et non faussée" enlèvent tout espoir de rentabilité sur ce type de marché. De plus l'écosystème à mettre en place est d'autant plus compliqué à développer qu'on a "cassé la gueule" à 2 générations de gens motivés à reprendre le flambeau des anciens, sur les bateaux et sur les docks.

En tous cas le constat est clair et assumé, c'est déjà un point de départ... à suivre.