Le JSF menacé au Canada !!!!

[syntaxerror9]

C'est même encore plus simple que ça : tu tires la poignée et tu es dehors.

Ensuite, avec un peu de temps devant soit, il devient possible de gérer certaines choses pour améliorer l'ordinaire (attendre d'être dans le domaine d'éjection, soigner sa posture, gérer la trajectoire finale de l'avion, couper certains systèmes, etc).

Ah bon, faut tirer une poignée?!

;)

[alpacks]

Ah bon, faut tirer une poignée?!

;)

  Au moins aussi pratique que tirer une poubelle ^^

[zx]

J'ai l'impression qui veulent balancer la patate chaude après les élections de 2015, quand la conjoncture économique sera meilleure, pour que la pilule passe mieux.

 

http://o.canada.com/2013/08/15/0816-col-dentandt/

 

The Harper government is in the throes of a mid-mandate housecleaning — and so, not coincidentally, is its tortured military procurement policy. The highest-profile casualty looks to be the Royal Canadian Air Force’s long-standing, never-say-die yen for a fleet of 65 F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, a purchase that was “rebooted” by cabinet last winter and now looks a fair bet to be punted beyond the next federal election in 2015.

Avid readers of the procurement file will recall that, last December, after years of bombardment from aviation industry insiders, procurement experts and opposition critics, the Harper government effected a 180-degree reversal and scrapped the sole-source program it had up to that point staunchly defended, guns blazing, against all comers.

Control of the process to replace Canada’s aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets was snatched away from “the boys with their toys,” that is to say then-defence minister Peter MacKay and the military brass, and handed to a National Fighter Procurement Secretariat, under the aegis of then-public works minister Rona Ambrose. The RCAF was set to work reviewing from scratch all available options for a new Canadian fighter — a list that includes the F-35 as well as Boeing’s Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab’s Gripen. A four-member panel of independent reviewers was struck to oversee that work and ensure its impartiality.

Despite this, word in defence circles last spring was that the fix was still in for U.S.-based Lockheed-Martin’s F-35, and that all talk of an impartial options review, let alone opening up of the $9-billion acquisition (upwards of $45-billion when all life-cycle cost estimates are included), was mere spin. Reinforcing that view, in early June, Swedish-based Saab withdrew from the review process. Saab was sending a not-so-subtle message: Show us a competition and we’ll come to the table. Otherwise, don’t waste our time.

Beyond that, there has been quiet speculation in Ottawa for months about a little-noted technical aspect that could make the F-35 vital to U.S. allied strategic planning, and would virtually compel Canadian participation. According to this theory, the F-35 is not so much a jet fighter, as it is a mobile, real-time, global data-gathering network, which relies on each of its component parts.

The strategic need to participate in such a network would explain, according to the theory, why the Conservatives stuck with the platform for so long, despite the attendant headaches. Lockheed-Martin says on its website that “the F-35’s communication, sensors and information systems enable it to draw on information from around the world.” Details of how that is to work are not public.

Be that as it may, whatever the government’s past rationale, the tide appears to have turned. There is now an expectation within defence industry circles that the government intends to either announce a competition for the fighter contract sometime early next year, or defer the matter until after the 2015 election, or a combination of both. If the fix was in, it no longer is.

It is also posited that Canada could eventually choose to stay within the international F-35 consortium to buy a much smaller number of planes than the original 65 — say 20 — and open up the remainder of the contract to international bids, which could mean a mixed fleet. Such a course would allow the Harper government to cover its bases politically, but would also be costly and controversial. Mixed fleets are notoriously expensive to operate, due to the doubling up on maintenance, training, parts and the like.

If a competition is to be announced before the 2015 election, an opportune moment would be early in 2014 — in time for the government to take credit for doing “the right thing” by taxpayers, but not so proximal to the vote as to make it appear opportunistic, or risk its once again becoming an election issue. The idea, in other words, is to take the fighter contract off the table politically, while reasserting the Conservatives’ reputation as responsible managers of the public purse.

That has been made possible, industry insiders believe, by commander of the RCAF Lt. Gen. Yvan Blondin’s assertion before the Senate defence committee last March 25, that the Air Force’s CF-18s are flyable through 2025. Previously the planes’ best-before date was deemed to be 2020.

Why the change of heart? The theory making the rounds in Ottawa is two-fold. First, members of the caucus and cabinet are acutely aware that they need good-news stories, or at least the absence of more bad news stories, as they head into the pre-election period. Second, in the context of U.S. President Barack Obama’s continuing chilliness towards the Keystone XL Pipeline, there is a new determination at senior levels of the government to put Canadian industrial regional benefits first, and cut the best deal possible, for the best plane, at the best price, with the greatest economic benefit to Canada.

All of which, if true, would appear to be good news. Better late — even very, very late — than never

 

Modifié le 15 août 2013 par zx

[mgtstrategy]

en gros, les USA font faire pression, et finalement le canada en restera au jsf. Bref, rien de nouveau... 

[zx]

Visiblement dans la communication des dernières news, ils tentent de dire que le F35 fait des choses que ne font pas les autres, notamment pour la guerre electronique et la collecte de données. Il y a aussi l'hypothèse de n'acheter que 20 F35 au lieu des 65 prévus, et de gerer une flotte mixte, pour limiter les dégats coté politique 

vis à vis des USA.

 

http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/opinion/story.html?id=7c721bee-5504-4d86-842f-ddc79a81f0e0

 

It is also posited that Canada could eventually choose to stay within the international F-35 consortium to buy a much smaller number of planes than the original 65 - say 20 - and open up the remainder of the contract to international bids, which could mean a mixed fleet. Such a course would allow the Harper government to cover its bases politically, but would also be costly and controversial. Mixed fleets are notoriously expensive to operate, due to the doubling up on maintenance, training, parts and the like.

 

 

According to this theory, the F-35 is not so much a jet fighter, as it is a mobile, real-time, global datagathering network, which relies on each of its component parts.

The strategic need to participate in such a network would explain, according to the theory, why the Conservatives stuck with the platform, despite the attendant headaches. Lockheed-Martin says on its website that "the F-35's communication, sensors and information systems enable it to draw on information from around the world." Details of how that is to work are not public.

 

 

Je crois qu'il fut un temps question d'étendre les capacités de spectra avec une nacelle pour la guerre electronique et la collecte des données comme le fait entre autre, astac (Analyseur de Signaux TACtiques).  mais il a été abandonné, il semble que le f35 marque un point sur ca (on dirait qu'il ferait office de mini awacs).  avec seulement spectra, le raffy semble un peu court la dessus.  ce qui est curieux qu'on essaye de l'adapter sur M2000D. mais pas sur le raffy. sous entendus, les autres sont des nanars.

Modifié le 16 août 2013 par zx

[seb24]

Je qu'il fut un temps question d'étendre les capacités de spectra avec une nacelle pour la guerre electronique et la collecte des données comme le fait entre autre, astac (Analyseur de Signaux TACtiques).  mais il a été abandonné, il semble que le f35 marque un point sur ca (on dirait qu'il ferait office de mini awacs).  avec seulement spectra, le raffy semble un peu court la dessus.  ce qui est curieux qu'on essaye de l'adapter sur M2000D. mais pas sur le raffy. sous entendus, les autres sont des nanars.

 

Le SPECTRA fait le même boulot que l'ASTAC et collecte également des données pour sa base de donnée.

[zx]

Qu'est ce qu'il entend d'avoir en plus le f35 en la matière, une idée ?

Modifié le 16 août 2013 par zx

[prof.566]

Non ils disent qu'il fait de la collecte et du partage de données avec les autres F35 (via sa nouvelle datalink?) uniquement.

Modifié le 16 août 2013 par prof.566

[DEFA550]

Le SPECTRA fait le même boulot que l'ASTAC et collecte également des données pour sa base de donnée.

Doucement quand même... SPECTRA a quelques facultés (limitées) dans ce domaine mais reste très loin des capacités du pod ASTAC.

[g4lly]

Je crois qu'il fut un temps question d'étendre les capacités de spectra avec une nacelle pour la guerre electronique et la collecte des données comme le fait entre autre, astac (Analyseur de Signaux TACtiques).  mais il a été abandonné, il semble que le f35 marque un point sur ca (on dirait qu'il ferait office de mini awacs).  avec seulement spectra, le raffy semble un peu court la dessus.  ce qui est curieux qu'on essaye de l'adapter sur M2000D. mais pas sur le raffy. sous entendus, les autres sont des nanars.

Sous Rafale le projet c'était une nacelle de brouillage offensif de puissance CARBONE. Aucun projet d'intégration de nacelle ELINT a ma connaissance.

La nacelle ELINT chez nous c'est l'ASTAC sous Mirage F1 ... qui devrait migrer sur autre chose avec la disparition des F1, probablement sous Mirage 2000. Elle permet la reconnaissance électromagnétique temps réel de tout type de radar et brouilleur, le positionnement, la qualification, classification, identification, et permet de transférer ces infos en temps réel vers des station au sol et de conserver les engregistrement brut pour un traitement plus fin au retour. Le systeme permet de cartographier plusieurs centaine de sources electromagnétiques par mission.

[zx]

ils n'ont pas projet de faire évoluer spectra pour intégrer ce que fait l'astac ? ca l'objetif reste de remplacer par le tout rafale. les M2000D reste une solution d'attente.

[g4lly]

ils n'ont pas projet de faire évoluer spectra pour intégrer ce que fait l'astac ? ca l'objetif reste de remplacer par le tout rafale. les M2000D reste une solution d'attente.

On pourrait tres bien coller la nacelle Astac sous Rafale. Le probleme c'est que ca mobiliserait des Rafale pour des missions pour lesquels il est loin d'etre indispensable il me semble. Le Mirage F1 faisait ca tres bien ...  c'est dire qu'il n'y a pas besoin d'un matos d'enfer pour faire une mission Astac, tout est dans la nacelle. D'autant qu'il y a nulle besoin de froler la défense aérienne ennemi, le systeme capte les radar de tres loin, d'ailleurs une partie des missions doit pouvoir etre faite avec le meme systeme depuis un Falcon ou un Transall.

[pascal]

Gabriel dispose de l'Astac en bout d'aile non ?

[hadriel]

Il me semble qu'on doit monter les Astac sous un avion de combat pour pouvoir enregistrer les mode conduite de tir des systèmes radars et pas seulement les modes veille: le chasseur s'approche avec un profil menaçant pour la batterie en mode veille, qui du coup prépare une solution de tir et donc change ses émissions, et le chasseur s'écarte au dernier moment grâce à sa manœuvrabilité supérieure à un falcon ou un transall. Du coup, quand une autre mission se fait accrocher par une batterie air-sol, ses ECM sont programmées pour contrer aussi la conduite de tir et pas seulement le mode veille.

Il y avait une interview du DRM qui expliquait ça à l'assemblée je crois, ou alors c'est dans une LOLF.

[clem200]

Pas besoin d'un chasseur pour réveiller la défense ennemi. 

 

Par contre ça limite une éventuel monte sur drone. 

[zx]

comparatif entre rafale et F35 pour l'offre canadienne.

 

Rafale and F-35

Analyzing the pros and cons of two contenders vying for the title of Canada’s next generation fighter.

 

http://skiesmag.com/news/articles/19534-rafale-and-f-35.html

 

Editor’s Note: No one disputes the fact that Canada needs to procure new fighter jets, but that’s where universal agreement ends. Several aircraft types are competing to be Canada’s next fighter jet. In this ongoing series, defence analyst Richard Shimooka examines the pros and cons of each contender. He wraps up the final installment with a look at the Dassault Rafale and the Lockheed Martin F-35.

 

 

DASSAULT RAFALE

The Dassault Rafale is a French multi-role fighter currently under production. It emerged during the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) program – a multinational effort between France, West Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, to produce Europe’s next fighter aircraft. 

 

Paris required a single aircraft type to replace seven that were in service during the 1970s: the Mirage F.1, III, IV and 3000, the F-8 Crusader and the Étendard IV and Super Étendard. The last three presented a significant challenge, as they formed the core of the Aéronavale’s (French naval aviation’s) carrier-borne capability. The other partners resisted adding such a condition to the FEFA requirements, as none of them utilized the catapult launch and arrested landing system. Consequently, France would part ways with the other partners, and Dassault started development. The Rafale’s concept demonstrator flew in 1986, and it entered service in May 2001. The aircraft has seen incremental improvement since then, with the current production standard known as F.3. The Rafale has seen significant operational service over Afghanistan, Libya and Mali. 

 

Dassault currently has only one major customer, France, which operates three versions: conventional takeoff single and dual seat configurations, and a carrier version. One hundred and ten have been produced, with 70 more under contract. Yet, the Rafale’s export record has been marred by several disappointing outcomes. A number of expected deals have fallen through during contract negotiations, most notably with the United Arab Emirates and Morocco. Dassault’s fortunes turned in 2011, when Rafale won the Indian medium multi-role combat aircraft competition. This was a highly sought after contract, with six different manufacturers offering their aircraft. Initial indications suggest the contract may add up to 189 aircraft to Dassault’s order book, significantly improving its production scale and the opportunity for manufacturing learning. At the time of writing, final contract negotiations were still ongoing between the two parties.

 

Capabilities

From its inception, the Rafale was designed to be an advanced multi-role fighter, much in the same vein as the F/A-18E. It took advantage of new technologies and aerodynamic approaches to produce a highly maneuverable and capable aircraft. This included the use of an unconventional canard-delta design and new composite structures. Consequently, the Rafale is in a similar class to the Eurofighter, but with small differences. Its twin Snecma M88 engines produce approximately five to 10 per cent less thrust than the EJ-200 that powers its European cousin, depending on the flight profile and power setting. 

 

The aircraft also made trade-offs in aerodynamic performance to improve its low observable features and multi-role capabilities. This included blended body features, and the internal carriage of several key systems. The aircraft also possesses excellent low-level and low speed performance, in part due to the carrier landing and related requirements. The aircraft has a very large air-to-air combat radius, which is said to exceed 850 nautical miles (NM) according to the manufacturer. 

 

Overall, the Rafale is considered a highly maneuverable, high performance aircraft with aerodynamic performance on par with most contemporary western fighters of its generation. One of the Rafale’s key advantages lies with its avionics systems, which have benefited from strong and consistent investment by the French government. The most apparent upgrade was the installation of the Thales RBE2 airborne electronically scanning array, or AESA, radar. The aircraft’s other systems are also significant. The forward sensor optronics (FSO) system is a combined infrared, TV and laser rangefinder system mounted on the Rafale’s nose and primarily optimized for the air-to-air field. FSO is complemented by the Thales Damocles external sensor pod with FLIR and TV capabilities, which is primarily designed for the air-to-ground field. Combined, these systems provide a pilot with the ability to passively scan and track his surrounding environment without betraying his position through active electronic emissions. The Rafale also integrally mounts an electronic warfare (EW) defensive warfare suite called SPECTRA. It allows for the identification of incoming threats and deploys countermeasures when required. SPECTRA also provides a limited electronic signals detection and jamming capability. The data from these systems are brought together by the aircraft’s core architecture, the Thales Modular Data Processing Unit. As with other sensor fusion systems, it integrates data and displays them for a pilot in an ergonomic fashion. The Rafale’s avionics systems were highly praised by French pilots during the Libyan campaign, for their ability to manage the combat environment. That operation also displayed another strength of the aircraft: high mission availability rates. Dassault designed the aircraft with easy to replace systems and modules that decrease maintenance time spent on the fighter. 

 

Despite these advantages, the Rafale is not without shortcomings. As with other aircraft of its generation, it must carry all of its weapon stores externally, which increases drag and electromagnetic visibility. Yet its most significant issue relates to interoperability. The French military has indigenously developed a complete ecosystem of capabilities and systems, in part due to the Gaullist efforts to create a strong independent state. The Rafale’s capabilities reflect these policy choices. The aircraft almost completely relies on French systems, either indigenously produced or as part of a multinational group. This has been a major selling point to some of Rafale’s potential customers, who were worried about American influence. Yet it is problematic for the RCAF and its strong operational relationship with the United States. Purchasing the Rafale would lock Canada into Dassault’s supply chain and decisions, or else assume the total cost for upgrading the aircraft to enhance its interoperability and operational relevance. This is particularly evident with the ordnance the fighter is cleared to carry, the vast majority of which is French made. The Rafale is only cleared for a limited selection of American weapons, primarily the Raytheon Paveway II laser-guided bomb. It has not integrated any weapons from the GPS-guided joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) family or the new small diameter bomb. While the French have developed a similar, more capable weapon (Safran AASM), at $300,000 per unit it is 12 times the cost of the JDAM, which is $25,000 per unit. While the AASM’s costs will decline as more units are produced, it will only slightly narrow the wide disparity between the two systems. 

 

Although choosing Rafale would diversify Canada’s military and industrial relationships, it would come at the detriment of interoperability with its closest ally. This can have operational consequences in a wide array of areas. During the Kosovo conflict, for example, the Canadian Air Force at Aviano purchased ordnance directly from deployed United States Air Force units. Such advantages would be largely negated if the RCAF went with the Rafale.  

 

It should be noted that Dassault and the French government have facilitated operational interoperability with allies in other areas. For example, the Rafale employs the NATO standard Link 16 datalink, which allows the aircraft to communicate seamlessly and share data with allied fighters. 

 

Cost and Industrial Benefits

As with other European fighters, the Rafale suffers from a small order book and an inefficient production rate. With only 180 fighters slated for French service, to be introduced over the space of 15 years, the yearly rate of production is about 10 to 15 aircraft per year, or roughly one a month. Consequently, Dassault is unable to develop economies of scale or efficiencies developed through a manufacturing learning, leading to higher than normal costs. In 2010, the French Ministry of Defence suggested the unit cost as 101.1 million Euros, with a Court of Inquiry pegging it at 125.3 million Euros. The actual figure probably is closer to the former for export, particularly given the Rafale’s recent success in the Indian MRCA competition. Operational costs are approximately US $18,000 per hour, according to the French government. However, that figure only provides a rough comparison, due to different accounting practices between governments. At $18,000, the Rafale’s operational cost should be around that of other aircraft like the F-35 or the F/A-18E. 

 

The industrial benefits package is likely to be significant, meeting the Government of Canada’s requirements for 100 per cent of the contract’s value being reinvested into the domestic economy. The question remains (as with all programs) as to the proportion: will the offsets be direct or indirect, and what level of quality will the latter category entail? 

 

Dassault has sourced components from several major Canadian subcontractors in the past, including Heroux-Devtek and Pratt and Whitney Canada. It has also promised that subcontractors will retain any intellectual property for the parts they produce. However, it is questionable whether Canada will be able to obtain major contracts on foreign-operated Rafales, given France’s preference for national producers. It is also doubtful whether those contracts would be particularly valuable, given the relatively small size of Dassault’s order sheet. Finally, Canada’s probable purchase timeframe (2016 to 2019) is likely nearer to the end of the aircraft’s production life. Thus, Dassault will have to provide more indirect offsets to meet the Government of Canada’s purchasing requirements.

 

Future Prospects

The Rafale’s future prospects largely reflect that of its current state, with the same benefits and problems. Development would continue to refine the aircraft’s already strong multi-role capabilities. Dassault has actively upgraded the fighter’s capabilities in an iterative manner, and plans to do so in the future. This includes a directional infrared counter measures system, and a new model of the Damocles targeting pod. The ability to upgrade the aircraft is aided by its modularity. For example, components in the Thales MDPU avionics suite can easily be replaced with new versions when required. 

 

However, the underlying problem with a possible Canadian purchase is whether the aircraft will be upgraded in a fashion that meets the air force’s requirements. If the French and/or Indian governments do not fund improvements deemed necessary by the RCAF, it will likely bear these costs alone. This is a significant risk for future cost escalation and military capability. 

 

Conclusion

The Rafale offers a very strong out-of-the-box capability compared to other aircraft, albeit at a higher cost and with serious implications. Its long range and effective multi-role capability are major assets for the RCAF, but the questions surrounding interoperability and its future upgrade path are considerable. 

 

LOCKHEED MARTIN F-35A LIGHTNING II

The Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II (also known as the Joint Strike Fighter, or JSF) is a single-engine, multi-role fighter currently under development and limited production by the Lockheed Martin Corporation in the United States. The program emerged from a consolidation of several aircraft replacement programs during the 1990s. They represented an entire generation of lightweight tactical aircraft then in service with the United States military, including the F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon, F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet, A-10 Warthog and the AV-8 Harrier. These four aircraft were procured in large numbers during the 1980s and 1990s, and represented the bulk of the U.S. military’s strike capability. Lockheed and Boeing submitted designs for the JSF in a winner-takes-all competition, which the F-35 won in 2001. The contract was initially for 2,800 aircraft, but this was reduced in 2002 to 2,443, where it has remained since.   

 

International participation was a strong component of the JSF program from the outset. Many U.S. allies had purchased their current tactical fighter aircraft in the 1980s, which required replacement in the 2010 to 2020 timeframe. A unique multinational participation scheme was established, where foreign countries could become risk-sharing partners in the JSF’s development and obtain the opportunity to bid on subcontracts.  A total of eight countries joined as partners in the program, including Canada. Approximately 660 F-35s will go to partner countries, with at least 200 more to be sold through foreign military sales.

 

Capabilities

The F-35 was designed with a novel operational concept in mind. Previously, aircraft development had largely focused on improving aerodynamic performance, such as speed or maneuverability, as a path to superiority. The F-35 largely eschewed this approach. Its maneuvering performance objectives roughly sought to maintain the standards set by previous generations of fighters like the F-16 and earlier legacy F/A-18. These aircraft exhibited outstanding maneuverability, which the F-35 would only attempt to emulate in certain regimes. This included high acceleration, instantaneous turn rate and slow speed nose authority, among others, which are generally critical for modern air-to-air combat. This design philosophy also provides excellent performance in areas that are useful for other mission profiles, such as air-to-ground strikes. 

 

The F-35’s streamlined design and fuel-efficient Pratt and Whitney F135 engine provides the aircraft with excellent range. Its combat radius with two 2,000-pound bombs is just over 600 NM. Unburdened with such weight, the F-35 will likely be able to go significantly beyond 700 NM, and reach all major forward operating locations in Canada without refueling. 

 

Yet, the aircraft does not devote effort to performance areas that were of lesser value to a pilot, or those that would increase the jet’s cost with minimal operational benefit. For example, the F-35’s maximum speed is only Mach 1.6. While many aircraft (like the F/A-18 and F-16) could theoretically reach higher speeds, they could not do so while carrying any appreciable combat load. The Lightning II can reach supersonic speeds carrying a full internal ordnance load. 

 

Instead of focusing on aerodynamic improvements to provide pilots with an edge, designers looked to incorporate technological advances in two different areas: low observable systems and advanced avionics. First, the F-35 was designed to be a very low observable aircraft, along the lines of other “stealth” aircraft like the F-22, B-2 and F-117. Yet its systems were designed to be much more durable and affordable than those of legacy stealth aircraft, which had prevented them from being introduced on a wide scale. Moreover, these systems were not just aimed at avoiding detection by radar, but also included most common sensor systems across the electromagnetic spectrum. It would allow pilots much greater opportunity to operate without being detected in contested airspace, which by itself is a significant advantage.

 

The second, and arguably the more important, developmental focus was on the F-35’s avionics, specifically in regards to its sensors, commutations and computing capabilities. The primary goal of these additions would be to provide pilots a superior ability to detect, identify and track adversaries and targets. Several key systems were developed. The most advanced sensor is likely the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-81 AESA radar, with low probability intercept modes, as well as limited jamming and hacking capabilities. It is backed up by a new generation of electro-optical and infrared sensors. Another was the Harris Corporation Multifunction Advanced Data link (MADL), which allowed large volume data transmission with a low probability of detection or intercept. This in effect creates a flying battlefield network, where aircraft share information. 

 

Linking these systems together is the F-35’s onboard computer system, which processes data from all onboard and offboard sources, then presents prioritized data to pilots through a display projected onto a helmet-mounted visor and large touch screen display. Combined with the advanced sensors, these systems should provide a pilot with a superior situational awareness over any adversary. 

 

Significant attention was also paid towards developing aspects of the F-35’s capability indirectly related to combat capability. The aircraft is intended to have a very high operational availability rate, largely achieved through several technological advances. The Lightning II utilizes a highly modular design, which makes major subcomponents and assemblies easy to replace on the flight line. In addition, the aircraft uses a large amount of internal sensors that provide real time prognostics on component health during flight. Replacement parts can be quickly ordered, based upon a forecast of need, through a global logistics network and delivered where and when required. These capabilities are not precisely novel; however, they leverage significant developments in the civil aviation industry over the past two decades. In particular, prognostic systems are becoming widespread among airlines to increase the efficiency of their maintenance, repair and overhaul systems. 

 

The F-35 also benefits from significant investments in engine and component reliability driven by the civil aviation industry. Its F135 turbofan will likely have extremely low loss rates. The company’s last engine in a single-engine application, the F100-229, has yet to cause a major crash on any F-16C it is installed on. The F135 incorporates a significant number of design improvements, which will improve the reliability and safety of the engine.

 

Yet, the leading edge nature of these systems came with significant risks. The program is significantly delayed, almost seven years behind the original intended schedule, and has experienced significant cost overruns. In response, the Joint Program Office implemented several major reforms in 2010, including increasing program funding and pushing back major milestones to provide more time for development. This has forced Canada, and several other partners, to extend the life of their current fighter fleets and, in some cases, reduce the number of aircraft they intend to purchase. The delays and overruns have caused considerable consternation among partner nations, which has become a major public embarrassment for Lockheed Martin. In light of the delays, the U.S. military services have decided to move up their initial operating capacity date for the USAF to 2016 while pushing back the introduction of some capabilities. These are largely related to some higher-level programming tasks surrounding sensor fusion, which will be added to current aircraft as part of the JSF follow-on development process within a year or two.

 

Cost and Industrial Benefits

Likely the biggest advantage of the F-35 over other aircraft is its very large production scale. Lockheed Martin can currently count on more than 3,000 aircraft orders from the United States and its allies, between 2009 and 2040. The manufacturer will ramp up production after 2014, reaching 10 per month by 2020. This creates the opportunity for large economies of scale and learning curves to decrease the per-unit costs to a point where aircraft can be efficiently produced. Canada’s projected cost is approximately CDN$85 million (2018 dollars) per aircraft for most of the aircraft it plans to purchase, based on current estimates. This is around 15 per cent higher than originally envisaged by the Government of Canada in 2010. However, a recent cost analysis undertaken by the United States government suggested a slight decrease in the unit cost. While such decreases rarely translate into actual savings, they indicate the program is becoming increasingly stable, making further major cost increases unlikely. Also, Canada’s involvement in the partnership program would exempt it from the 3.5 per cent administrative fee usually applied to foreign military sales, as well as the non-recurring research charge (currently US$1.5 million per F-35.) 

 

The F-35’s operational cost was originally envisaged to be around that of legacy aircraft; however, this area has also witnessed significant cost overruns. Some internal U.S. government analysis suggested an operational cost that was 30 per cent higher than previously estimated, which was considered unaffordable. However, the 2010 reform efforts were able to bring this down significantly. In April 2013, program executive officer Christopher Bogdan suggested the F-35’s hourly cost would only be 10 per cent above that of the F-16; or approximately US$23,000 per hour. While this is a significant increase, the F-35 will likely fly fewer training missions than legacy aircraft, due to increased simulator use to replace some aspects of flight training. 

 

The Joint Strike Fighter program utilizes a very different scheme for providing industrial benefits than other programs. Partners that signed the memorandum of understanding have gained the opportunity to bid on production subcontracts, which were usually limited to American suppliers. Given the large size of the F-35 order sheet, these are extremely lucrative for any participant. Unlike traditional offset programs, contracts were not guaranteed, however; they were awarded through a best value competition. With its strong aviation industry, the Government of Canada predicts that it will eventually produce CDN$9.8 billion worth of F-35 contracts; 20 per cent more than what it would gain through a traditional offset arrangement.

 

This is not without limitations, however. Unlike traditional contracts, Canadian companies will be less involved in the actual design and engineering of subcomponents. Lockheed Martin provides the engineering plans to manufacturers, but retains the intellectual property. Thus, Canadian companies cannot easily apply the experience gained from the F-35 on other programs. While this reflects the nature of the civil aviation industry and could benefit Canadian industry for additional advanced technology work, it does somewhat limit the profitability of participating in the JSF program. 

 

Future Prospects 

Considering the F-35’s critical role in Western defence planning, the aircraft’s potential is very bright. The Lightning II will likely dominate the fighter procurement market for the next two decades, which will assist in further driving down costs and delivering additional economic benefits to participating Canadian industries. 

 

Like with the F/A-18E/F, the F-35 will utilize a spiral or iterative design process, where additional capabilities will be added incrementally. Already, several major upgrades have been identified, such as additional missile carriage and engine improvements. It will remain at the leading edge of fighter capability for at least the next thirty years. Yet the F-35’s upgrade plans are, in some ways, a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the United States is Canada’s closest ally, and choosing the Lightning II all but ensures nearly complete interoperability for the foreseeable future. Canada will also have access to upgrades at a much lower cost, as research and development funding can be spread across the entire JSF partnership. However, the proprietary nature of the F-35 will make it very difficult to unilaterally upgrade the fighter.  Canada has previously enjoyed the ability to modify its CF-18s as it saw fit, which allowed for significant tailoring to occur. While some of those costly upgrades were required because Canada did not have access to similar U.S. Navy upgrades, others added meaningful advances to the aircraft’s capability and flight safety. While the need will be somewhat different, the government will have less ability to undertake such modifications under the F-35’s strong proprietary safeguards. 

 

Conclusion

The F-35 likely offers the best long-term capability at the best cost, but with some restrictions. While the program suffered serious problems between 2006 and 2010, many of the major issues have either been addressed or are on their way to being resolved. The aircraft is delivered as a complete capability. However, these advantages must be weighed against the restrictions on unilateral development of the capability and delivery delays. If Canada can get past these initial development hurdles and accept Lockheed Martin’s proprietary control, it will likely obtain an aircraft that will keep the RCAF at the forefront of aerial warfare for the next 30 years.

 

Richard Shimooka is a defence analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Between 2007 and 2012 he was a fellow at the Defence Management Studies Program at Queen’s University, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Richard recently released a report on the F-35 with the CDAI, entitled “Towards an international model for Canadian defence procurement? An F-35 Case Study.” He lives in White Rock, B.C.

Modifié le 27 août 2013 par zx

[Skw]

Analyzing the pros and cons of two contenders vying for the title of Canada’s next generation fighter.

 

http://skiesmag.com/news/articles/19534-rafale-and-f-35.html

 

 

Ahahaha... On a retrouvé Carlo Kopp ! Voir le commentaire signé "Another Guest (from Australia) ><

[alpacks]

 

comparatif entre rafale et F35 pour l'offre canadienne.

 

Rafale and F-35

Analyzing the pros and cons of two contenders vying for the title of Canada’s next generation fighter.

 

http://skiesmag.com/news/articles/19534-rafale-and-f-35.html

 

Editor’s Note: No one disputes the fact that Canada needs to procure new fighter jets, but that’s where universal agreement ends. Several aircraft types are competing to be Canada’s next fighter jet. In this ongoing series, defence analyst Richard Shimooka examines the pros and cons of each contender. He wraps up the final installment with a look at the Dassault Rafale and the Lockheed Martin F-35.

 

 

 

 

  On note dans les commentaires, qu'a peine 10% des anglosaxons qui réagissent ont vraiment envie de parler du Rafale ... Pour 90% des autres com' même si une énorme majorité dénigrent le F35 on voit grosso modo qu'ils n'ont guère envie de parler du Rafale ... Et beaucoup se cachent derrière les concurrents du Rafale pour l'alternative au F35 et surtout pas au Rafale et uniquement "lui" ... (ils préfèrent citer les 4 autres concurrents : F18SH, EF, Grippé du bulbe et Rafale ...)

 

   On note quand même que la masse a dénigrement du Rafale des périodes précédentes a encore de l'effet aujourd'hui ... Sinon il y aurait belle lurette d'une unanimité sur le seul concurrent sérieux du F35 dans cette affaire : étant le Rafale ...

 

   Et comme cela s'adresse pour beaucoup au public canadien, il serait pas mal d'éditer un article comme celui en français ... Ou alors on considère que les quebecquois ce n'est pas leurs oignons de causer défense et leur donner cette impression ... Grand bien leur face, mais ça n'arrange pas la fracture politique au final entre anglophones et francophones au Canada ...

 

  Et c'est d'autant + important pour un média comme Skyes qui se dit "canadien" : Ok, mais alors traite la minorité francophone a sa valeur ...

Modifié le 28 août 2013 par alpacks

[syntaxerror9]

C'est pas du matos US, et c'est du matos français: Cela ne vaut pas la peine d'être commenté car c'est de la merde.

Voila là logique anglo-saxonne.

Impossible à combattre!

[glitter]

Ce que je note de l'article, c'est plus le cote:

- Probleme pour l'utilisation des munitions americaines alors qu'a priori, cela peut se regler avec un surcout pas si eleve (sauf si probleme technique)

- Cette histoire d'evolution du produit qui serait forcement meilleur avec le F-35, alors que si les evolutions ne vont pas dans le sens espere du Canada, ils pensent que ca va se faire gratuitement ?

[Chobham]

Plus simplement même le Canada n'est pas à l'abrit d'un refut de modernisation de leurs avions par les USA.

[fox49]

heu... il y a vraiment de tout dans ces commentaires :

 

5 top notch Rafale went against 5 top notch F-35...conclusion; DRAW! Best Plane for price, maintenance; RAFALE...Wake up Smart Arss!

 

je ne savais pas qu'il y avais eu des exercice entre les f-35 de flight test et des rafales...

ça as juste un fumet de polémique qui ne me donne pas envie de lire le doc.

[zx]

Lockheed Martin says $10.5 billion of Canadian work on F-35 at risk without order

 

http://ca.news.yahoo.com/lockheed-martin-says-10-5-billion-canadian-f35-163044963--finance.html

 

Ca "menace", ca va vous  coûter cher  si vous n'achetez pas mes avions.

 

 

edit: en français

 

http://quebec.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/09/13/le-canada-perdrait-105-g--en-contrats-sans-la-commande-de-f35_n_3921854.html?utm_hp_ref=canada-quebec&ir=Canada+Quebec

Modifié le 13 septembre 2013 par zx

[FATac]

ca va vous  coûter cher  si vous n'achetez pas mes avions.

On peut aussi le comprendre comme "si vous n'achetez pas mes avions, il n'y a pas de raisons que j'honore les 10,5 Milliards de contrats promis en contre-partie".

Et l'argument de la concurrence devient alors : nous on vous en offre 10 ou 11 si vous n'achetez pas chez eux. :D

L'argument est boiteux. Les gouvernants canadiens le savent bien qu'il y aura des contre-parties, quel que soit le fournisseur, et que celles de LM seront perdues s'ils changent d'avis ...

[prof.566]

Et hop, on sort le baton!

 

Lockheed Martin says $10.5 billion of Canadian work on F-35 at risk without order

 

http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/09/13/lockheed-martin-says-10-5-billion-of-canadian-work-on-f-35-at-risk-without-order/