Guerre Russie-Ukraine 2022+ : Opérations militaires

[olivier lsb]

Il y a 1 heure, Fanch a dit :

C'est quoi le concept de "ont déserté avec l'accord des autorités militaires françaises" ? 

Préparer les futurs partenariats avec l'Ukraine ? Partage de retex ? Agent pour plus tard ? Ce n'est que 14 bonhommes, surement autorisés dans des conditions spéciales, car à mon avis, sur les 700 Ukrainiens de la Légion ayant déjà signé pour mourir si besoin pour un drapeau, je suis pas loin de penser que les volontaires devaient plus nombreux à la base.

Un modeste investissement au pire pour rien, au mieux pour des retours prometteurs à plus long terme. On a le droit de voir grand, au même titre que je regrette la taille de nos dons matériels, même s'ils sont réels et tangibles. Quand les Brittons ne peuvent plus rien donner, ils se proposent de former 10K personnels / trimestre. Vous imaginez un peu les recrutements en cours au bénéfice des services de sa Majesté ? Et tout les retours d'ascenseur qui s'en suivront pendant des années, par des gens qui auront peut être survécu sur le terrain par la formation reçu la bas. 

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par olivier lsb
orthographe

[Gran Capitan]

Il y a eu des retours négatifs sur les bandes jaunes d'identifications du début de conflit ? C'est passé a du bleu ?

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par Gran Capitan

[olivier lsb]

il y a 2 minutes, Gran Capitan a dit :

Il y a eu des retours négatifs sur les bandes jaunes d'identifications du début de conflit ? C'est passé a du bleu ?

Faut que ça change régulièrement, pour éviter les infiltrations ennemies ou les ruses de la sorte. 

[hadriel]

Il y a 4 heures, Mangouste a dit :

Pourquoi ? Tu retires bien de ton unité ton  AMX 10  ancien lorsque tu reçois son remplaçant .

A tous les coups on avait prévu de cannibaliser ceux qui devaient sortir du service pour maintenir ceux qui restent. Donc ça entrainerait un impact sur la dispo.

[Clairon]

il y a 47 minutes, Gran Capitan a dit :

Il y a eu des retours négatifs sur les bandes jaunes d'identifications du début de conflit ? C'est passé a du bleu ?

Les stocks de ducktape jaune ont été épuisés par le nombre de prisonniers russes dont il fallait bander les mains et les yeux ...

Clairon

[Mangouste]

il y a 21 minutes, hadriel a dit :

A tous les coups on avait prévu de cannibaliser ceux qui devaient sortir du service pour maintenir ceux qui restent. Donc ça entrainerait un impact sur la dispo.

Aujourd'hui il y a 2 Ebrc au Rec. 18 dédiés à la formation à canjuers. 18 encore à livrer en 2022. Donc  on  libère  uniquement 20 rcr cette année pour un objectif proposé d'en fournir 50/60. Donc pour moi c'est également capacitaire et pas seulement la dispo.

il y a 8 minutes, Clairon a dit :

Les stocks de ducktape jaune ont été épuisés par le nombre de prisonniers russes dont il fallait bander les mains et les yeux ...

Clairon

A ce sujet, il y a des infos fiables sur le volume de pertes.

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par Mangouste
Orthographe

[xekueins]

il y a 9 minutes, Clairon a dit :

Les stocks de ducktape jaune ont été épuisés par le nombre de prisonniers russes dont il fallait bander les mains et les yeux ...

Clairon

Il y a eu aussi du vert. 

[Boule75]

Il y a 2 heures, Fanch a dit :

C'est quoi le concept de "ont déserté avec l'accord des autorités militaires françaises" ? 

C'est du Malbrunot, "la voix de Bachar" : à prendre avec recul...

[g4lly]

[Valy]

Un article intéressant du New York times : comment les US et les brits ont aidé l'Ukraine à bâtir la contre offensive de Kharkiv, notamment via des war games.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/13/us/politics/ukraine-russia-pentagon.html

Citation

Le moment critique derrière l'avancée rapide de l'Ukraine

 

ParJulian E. Barnes , Eric SchmittetHélène Cooper

WASHINGTON – La stratégie derrière les gains militaires rapides de l'Ukraine ces derniers jours a commencé à prendre forme il y a des mois lors d'une série de conversations intenses entre des responsables ukrainiens et américains sur la voie à suivre dans la guerre contre la Russie, selon des responsables américains.

La contre-offensive – révisée cet été à partir de sa forme originale après des discussions urgentes entre de hauts responsables américains et ukrainiens – a réussi au-delà de la plupart des prévisions. Les forces ukrainiennes ont dévasté le commandement et le contrôle russes et semblent prêtes à capitaliser sur leurs avancées dans le nord-est du pays et dans une autre campagne dans le sud.

Le travail a commencé peu de temps après que le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a dit à ses généraux qu'il voulait faire un geste dramatique pour démontrer que son pays pouvait repousser l'invasion russe. Sous ses ordres, l'armée ukrainienne a conçu un plan pour lancer un large assaut à travers le sud pour récupérer Kherson et couper Mariupol de la force russe à l'est.

Les généraux ukrainiens et les responsables américains pensaient qu'une attaque d'une telle envergure entraînerait d'immenses pertes et ne parviendrait pas à reprendre rapidement de grandes quantités de territoire. Les Ukrainiens subissaient déjà des centaines de victimes par jour dans ce qui était devenu un conflit acharné. Les forces russes subissaient des pertes similaires mais continuaient d'avancer, dévastant les villes ukrainiennes de la région orientale du Donbass.

Longtemps réticents à partager les détails de leurs plans, les commandants ukrainiens ont commencé à s'ouvrir davantage aux responsables du renseignement américains et britanniques et à demander conseil.

Jake Sullivan, le conseiller à la sécurité nationale, et Andriy Yermak, l'un des principaux conseillers de M. Zelensky, ont parlé à plusieurs reprises de la planification de la contre-offensive, selon un haut responsable de l'administration. Le général Mark A. Milley, président des chefs d'état-major interarmées, et les hauts responsables militaires ukrainiens ont régulièrement discuté du renseignement et du soutien militaire.

Et à Kiev, les responsables militaires ukrainiens et britanniques ont continué à travailler ensemble tandis que le nouvel attaché de défense américain, Brig. Le général Garrick Harmon a commencé à avoir des séances quotidiennes avec les meilleurs officiers ukrainiens.

Le temps presse, pensaient les responsables américains et ukrainiens. Pour monter une contre-attaque efficace, les Ukrainiens devaient se déplacer avant la première neige, lorsque le président russe Vladimir V. Poutine pourrait utiliser son contrôle des approvisionnements en gaz pour faire pression sur l'Europe.

Ce récit de la préparation de la contre-offensive est basé sur des entretiens avec plusieurs hauts responsables américains et d'autres informés des discussions confidentielles entre Washington et Kyiv qui ont aidé les commandants ukrainiens à façonner la bataille. Beaucoup ont parlé sous couvert d'anonymat en raison de la nature secrète des pourparlers.

Les responsables américains hésitaient à juger de l'impact total de la contre-offensive, anxieux de voir comment elle se poursuivrait. Pour l'instant, Kyiv a l'avantage.

 

Comment la stratégie s'est formée : Le plan qui a permis les gains récents de l'Ukraine a commencé à prendre forme il y a des mois  au cours d'une série de conversations intenses entre des responsables ukrainiens et américains.

Les luttes de Poutine à l'intérieur : Les revers de la Russie en Ukraine ont affaibli l'image du président Vladimir V. Poutine , ses détracteurs se sont enhardis  et ses partisans cherchent quelqu'un d'autre à blâmer.

Contre-offensive du sud : Les opérations militaires dans le sud ont été une bataille laborieuse de traversées de rivières, avec des ponts flottants comme cibles principales pour les deux camps. Jusqu'ici, c'est l'Ukraine qui a avancé .

Un moment critique cet été est survenu lors d'un jeu de guerre avec des responsables américains et ukrainiens visant à tester le succès d'une large offensive dans le sud. L'exercice, rapporté plus tôt par CNN , suggérait qu'une telle offensive échouerait. Armés du scepticisme américain, les responsables militaires ukrainiens se sont retournés vers M. Zelensky.

"Nous avons fait de la modélisation et des exercices sur table", a déclaré Colin Kahl, le chef de la politique du Pentagone, lors d'un entretien téléphonique. "Cet ensemble d'exercices suggérait que certaines pistes de contre-offensive étaient susceptibles de réussir plus que d'autres. Nous avons fourni ce conseil, puis les Ukrainiens l'ont intériorisé et ont pris leur propre décision.

Les enjeux étaient énormes. L'Ukraine devait démontrer que cela n'allait pas devenir juste un autre conflit gelé, et qu'elle pouvait reprendre du territoire, pour le moral de son peuple et pour renforcer le soutien de l'Occident.

Tout au long du mois d'août, à la demande des Ukrainiens, les responsables américains ont intensifié les flux de renseignements sur la position des forces russes, soulignant les faiblesses des lignes russes. Les services de renseignement ont également indiqué que Moscou aurait du mal à renforcer rapidement ses troupes dans le nord-est de l'Ukraine ou à déplacer des troupes du sud, même s'il détectait les préparatifs ukrainiens pour la contre-offensive.

"Nous avons vu le fait que les Russes ont en fait déplacé une grande partie de leurs meilleures forces vers le sud en préparation de l'autre contre-offensive lancée par les Ukrainiens", a déclaré M. Kahl. "Nous avions donc des raisons de croire qu'en raison des problèmes de moral persistants et de la pression des Ukrainiens, il pourrait y avoir des poches de l'armée russe un peu plus fragiles qu'elles ne le paraissent sur le papier."

Au lieu d'une grande offensive, l'armée ukrainienne en a proposé deux. L'un, à Kherson, prendrait très probablement des jours ou des semaines avant des résultats spectaculaires en raison de la concentration des troupes russes. L'autre était prévue près de Kharkiv.

Ensemble, la Grande-Bretagne, les États-Unis et l'Ukraine ont procédé à une évaluation du nouveau plan, essayant une fois de plus de le jouer à la guerre. Cette fois, les responsables des trois pays ont convenu que cela fonctionnerait – et donnerait à M. Zelensky ce qu'il voulait : une grande et nette victoire.

Ce que nous considérons avant d'utiliser des sources anonymes.  Les sources connaissent-elles l'information ? Quelle est leur motivation pour nous dire? Ont-ils fait leurs preuves par le passé ? Pouvons-nous corroborer les informations ? Même avec ces questions satisfaites, le Times utilise des sources anonymes en dernier recours. Le journaliste et au moins un éditeur connaissent l'identité de la source.

En savoir plus sur notre processus.

Mais le plan, selon un officier de l'état-major à Kyiv, dépendait entièrement de la taille et du rythme de l'aide militaire supplémentaire des États-Unis.

L'Ukraine, une ancienne république soviétique qui avait utilisé des armes soviétiques plus anciennes, a épuisé la plupart de ses propres munitions. Apprendre à utiliser de nouveaux systèmes d'armes au milieu de la guerre est difficile. Mais jusqu'à présent, cette décision risquée s'est avérée fructueuse. Plus de 800 000 obus d'artillerie de 155 millimètres, par exemple, ont été envoyés à Kyiv, contribuant à alimenter ses offensives actuelles. Les États-Unis à eux seuls ont engagé plus de 14,5 milliards de dollars d'aide militaire depuis le début de la guerre en février.

Avant la contre-offensive, les forces armées ukrainiennes ont envoyé aux États-Unis une liste détaillée des armes dont ils avaient besoin pour faire aboutir le plan, selon l'officier ukrainien.

Des armes spécifiques, comme le High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, ou HIMARS, ont un effet démesuré sur le champ de bataille. Les roquettes guidées par satellite tirées par ces lanceurs, appelées GMLRS, contiennent chacune une ogive avec 200 livres d'explosifs et ont été utilisées ces dernières semaines par les forces ukrainiennes pour détruire plus de 400 dépôts d'armes, postes de commandement et autres cibles russes, ont déclaré des responsables américains. a dit.

Plus récemment , les forces ukrainiennes ont placé des missiles à lancement aérien HARM fournis par les États-Unis sur des avions de chasse MiG-29 de conception soviétique, ce qu'aucune armée de l'air n'avait jamais fait. Les missiles ont été particulièrement efficaces pour détruire les radars russes.

"Nous constatons des gains réels et mesurables de l'Ukraine dans l'utilisation de ces systèmes", a déclaré le général Milley la semaine dernière en Allemagne lors d'une réunion de 50 pays qui aident l'Ukraine avec une aide militaire et humanitaire. "Ils ont de grandes difficultés à réapprovisionner leurs forces et à remplacer leurs pertes au combat."

Des responsables ukrainiens et américains ont déclaré que les annonces désormais hebdomadaires ou bihebdomadaires du Pentagone concernant de nouvelles livraisons d'armes et de munitions provenant des stocks américains ont donné aux commandants supérieurs de Kyiv la confiance nécessaire pour planifier des offensives simultanées complexes.

"L'importance du soutien militaire occidental ne réside pas seulement dans des systèmes d'armes spécifiques, mais dans l'assurance et la confiance que les Ukrainiens peuvent utiliser dans leur planification future", a déclaré Jack Watling, chercheur principal au Royal United Services Institute de Londres, qui récemment rentré d'Ukraine.

Alors que les soldats ukrainiens se déplaçaient dans les régions du nord-est au cours du week-end, les forces russes se sont effondrées. Dans certains endroits autour de Kharkiv, les troupes russes se sont éloignées de la bataille, laissant derrière elles du matériel et des munitions, selon des responsables américains de la défense.

L'attaque de Kherson n'a jamais été une feinte ou une diversion, selon des personnes informées du plan. Et il a réussi à forcer Moscou à retarder les votes fictifs sur la volonté de certaines parties de la région de Kherson de rejoindre la Russie. Mais, comme prévu, la contre-offensive avance plus lentement étant donné le nombre beaucoup plus élevé de forces russes là-bas par rapport à Kharkiv.

Finalement, les responsables ukrainiens pensent que leur succès à long terme nécessite des progrès sur les objectifs initiaux de la stratégie abandonnée, notamment la reprise de la centrale nucléaire de Zaporizhzhia , la coupure des forces russes à Marioupol et le refoulement des forces russes à Kherson de l'autre côté du fleuve Dnipro, des responsables américains. a dit.

La Russie est affaiblie. En ne détectant pas le renforcement de l'Ukraine autour de Kharkiv, l'armée russe a fait preuve d'incompétence et montré qu'elle manquait de renseignements solides. Son commandement et son contrôle ont été décimés et il a du mal à approvisionner ses troupes, donnant à l'Ukraine une ouverture dans les semaines à venir, ont déclaré des responsables américains.

Alors que l'Ukraine pourrait avoir la possibilité de reprendre plus de territoire à l'est, les responsables américains et ukrainiens affirment que le sud est le théâtre le plus important de la guerre.

"Kherson et Zaporizhzhia sont probablement des objectifs potentiels", a déclaré Michael Kofman, directeur des études sur la Russie au CNA, un institut de recherche sur la défense. "Nous pourrions voir d'autres opérations de l'armée ukrainienne pour y réaliser des percées à l'avenir."

Le plan qui a émergé des discussions du milieu de l'été s'appuyait fortement sur le renseignement américain et l'armement de haute technologie. Mais les responsables américains insistent sur le fait que le mérite de l'offensive revient entièrement à M. Zelensky et à l'armée ukrainienne, qui ont mené une force relativement petite à Kharkiv à une victoire démesurée.

"Personne ne fait encore grimper le football", a déclaré M. Kahl. Mais, a-t-il ajouté : "Je pense que cela démontre vraiment au monde que les Ukrainiens sont capables de mener des opérations complexes et offensives."

Andrew E. Kramer a contribué aux reportages de Kharkiv, en Ukraine, et Michael Schwirtz de New York.

 

[g4lly]

[vince24]

Moment historique:

1106 tank perdus selon Oryx.

Pour la première fois depuis le début de la guerre, les russes auraient perdu plus de chars que nous ne pouvons écrire de pages sur ce forum.

Là, ça sent vraiment mauvais pour Poutine ;)

[olivier lsb]

Cet article fleuve du WaPo est très bien documenté et regorge de détails intéressants, certains déjà connu et d'autres plus inédits. En résumé (flemme de faire la mise en page, les papiers Américains sont largement au dessus des notres en France, mais c'est à vous faire regretter le format expéditif de l'ORTF du Monde):

- Le FSB a largement failli à sa mission de renseigner l'état réel du pays (Ukraine). Sur la base de quoi, ont été construits les plans militaires initiaux, conduisant à la débacle que l'on connait. 

- Le FSB a conduit (ou commandité) des sondages, indiquant que de larges pans de la populations était prête à résister à une intrusion Russe et que Poutine était impopulaire en Ukraine. Beaucoup de "wishfulk thinking" de la part des services de renseignement Russes. Un sondage indiquait notamment que 48% des Ukrainiens étaient prêt à défendre leur pays en cas de guerre. C'est un nombre conséquent dans l'absolu, mais le FSB en a conclu que c'était une minorité (techniquement vrai). 

- L'Ukraine nettoie en permanence ses services des traîtres identifiés, mais la Russie n'a pas procédé à de pareilles réformes internes suite aux échecs rencontrés 

- Le SBU ont restitué à VZ tous les renseignements partagés par les Américains, mais a appliqué une pondération équivalente à ses propres renseignements

- Les renseignements collectés par le SBU sont de différentes natures, et contradictoires1. l'identification de contacts entre des agents du FSB et les VDV, procédure inhabituelle qui ne pouvait que suggérer une invasion imminente 2. une impréparation totale de l'armée Russe: mi février, des agents ukrainiens en mission en Russie, près de la frontière, ont constaté des parcs de douzaines de chars faiblement surveillés, sans équipage ni équipe de maintenance visibles, des troupes émêchées trocquant du carburant et des fournitures contre de l'alcool

- En conjonction avec les évaluations des différents services Européens, ainsi que les assurances politiques données (la Macron est cité.... pas dans son meilleur rôle et de loin) le consensus des responsables sécuritaires Ukr se rejoint sur un déploiement avant-guerre aux visées seulement psychologiques, avec au pire l'emploi de VDV pour faire tomber le gouvernement et des tirs de missiles. Cela se conjugue à une crise énergétique en Ukraine pré-conflit, qui a fait chuter la popularité de VZ à 26% et dont les responsables Ukr soupçonnent la Russie d'en être à l'origine.

- Les Ukrainiens ont été surpris par la résilience de leurs administrations aux premières heures du conflit, en dépit de croyances largement partagés sur la corruption, la bureaucratie et l'inefficacité des autorités. 

- Un officier de la CIA est détaché au SBU pour aider à démasquer les agents doubles au service de la Russie

- Bakanov, l'ami d'enfance de VZ, qui a été démis de ses fonctions de dirigeant du SBU, a promu Oleg Kulinich dans les hautes sphères du SBU. Si rien n'est dit de la compromission de Bakanov, Kulinich était lui un agent double des services Russes et chargé de dérobé des secrets opérationnels du SBU, présentant un intérêt pour la Russie. 

- Kulinich a bloqué la diffusion de renseignement la nuit du 23 février comme quoi les forces Russes en Crimée était en train d'envahir l'Ukraine.

- L'Ukraine détiendrait environ 800 personnes suceptibles de trahison ou sabotage au bénéfice de la Russie et s'attaquent également aux agents d'influence. 

- Ianoukovitch est définitivement compromis par le FSB. On ignore pourquoi les Russes avaient préparé deux groupes (dirigés par Ianoukovitch et Medvedchouk) politiques pro-Russes pour prendre potentiellement le pouvoir.

- Tous les services ont raté à un certain degré: les US pour avoir eu une mauvaise évaluation des capacités de résistance de l'Ukraine (ironique, quand on sait que ce sont eux qui les ont formé), l'Ukraine, pour avoir mal interprété les signes réels d'impréparation de l'armée de Russe et enfin les Russes, pour avoir entretenu des biais de confirmation au plus haut niveau du Kremlin

- Medvechouk, qui avait une ligne directe avec Poutine, a largement contribué à l'idée que VZ était politiquement faible. Il a employé ses émissions de télévision à diffuser de la propagande pro russe, a relayé sinon fabriqué les affirmations sur les laboratoires d'armes biologiques de la CIA en Ukraine et a utilisé ses entreprises dans le pétrole en Russie pour financer des mouvements pro-Russes et des opérations pro-Russes en Ukraine. Il était placé sous sanctions US à ce titre. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/?itid=sf_world_ukraine-russia_dont-miss

Citation

 

Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed

The Moscow headquarters of Russia's Federal Security Service, or FSB, which played a key role in President Vladimir Putin's war plans. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; AFP/Getty; Olga Maltseva/AFP/Getty; iStock)

By Greg Miller

 and 

Catherine Belton

 

Aug. 19 at 7:00 a.m.

KYIV, Ukraine — In the final days before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s security service began sending cryptic instructions to informants in Kyiv. Pack up and get out of the capital, the Kremlin collaborators were told, but leave behind the keys to your homes.

The directions came from senior officers in a unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) with a prosaic name — the Department of Operational Information — but an ominous assignment: ensure the decapitation of the Ukrainian government and oversee the installation of a pro-Russian regime.

The messages were a measure of the confidence in that audacious plan. So certain were FSB operatives that they would soon control the levers of power in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian and Western security officials, that they spent the waning days before the war arranging safe houses or accommodations in informants’ apartments and other locations for the planned influx of personnel.

5 things you need to know about Russia’s intelligence failures ahead of the invasion of Ukraine

“Have a successful trip!” one FSB officer told another who was being sent to oversee the expected occupation, according to intercepted communications. There is no indication that the recipient ever made it to the capital, as the FSB’s plans collapsed amid the retreat of Russian forces in the early months of the war.

The communications exposing these preparations are part of a larger trove of sensitive materials obtained by Ukrainian and other security services and reviewed by The Washington Post. They offer rare insight into the activities of the FSB — a sprawling service that bears enormous responsibility for the failed Russian war plan and the hubris that propelled it.

An agency whose domain includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in the former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, attempting to co-opt its institutions, paying off officials and working to impede any perceived drift toward the West. No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside Russia was more important than burrowing into all levels of Ukrainian society.

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And yet, the agency failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of a pro-Russian groundswell or interrupt President Volodymyr Zelensky’s hold on power. Its analysts either did not fathom how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or did understand but couldn’t or wouldn’t convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

[Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine]

The humiliations of Russia’s military have largely overshadowed the failures of the FSB and other intelligence agencies. But in some ways, these have been even more incomprehensible and consequential, officials said, underpinning nearly every Kremlin war decision.

“The Russians were wrong by a mile,” said a senior U.S. official with regular access to classified intelligence on Russia and its security services. “They set up an entire war effort to seize strategic objectives that were beyond their means,” the official said. “Russia’s mistake was really fundamental and strategic.”

Ukraine’s security services have an interest in discrediting Russia’s spy agencies, but key details from the trove were corroborated by officials in Western governments.

The files show that the FSB unit responsible for Ukraine surged in size in the months leading up to the war and was counting on support from a vast network of paid agents in Ukraine’s security apparatus. Some complied and sabotaged Ukraine’s defenses, officials said, while others appear to have pocketed their FSB payments but balked at doing the Kremlin’s bidding when the fighting started.

There are records that add to the mystery of Russian miscalculations. Extensive polls conducted for the FSB show that large segments of Ukraine’s population were prepared to resist Russian encroachment, and that any expectation that Russian forces would be greeted as liberators was unfounded. Even so, officials said, the FSB continued to feed the Kremlin rosy assessments that Ukraine’s masses would welcome the arrival of Russia’s military and the restoration of Moscow-friendly rule.

“There was plenty of wishful thinking in the GRU and the military, but it started with the FSB,” said a senior Western security official, using the GRU abbreviation for Russia’s main military intelligence agency. “The sense that there would be flowers strewn in their path — that was an FSB exercise.” He and other security officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence.

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Adhering to these erroneous assumptions, officials said, the FSB championed a war plan premised on the idea that a lightning assault on Kyiv would topple the government in a matter of days. Zelensky would be dead, captured or in exile, creating a political vacuum for FSB agents to fill.

Instead, FSB operatives who at one point had reached the outskirts of Kyiv had to retreat alongside Russian forces, Ukrainian security officials said. Rather than presiding over the formation of a new government in Kyiv, officials said, the FSB now faces difficult questions in Moscow about what its long history of operations against Ukraine — and the large sums that financed them — accomplished.

The FSB did not respond to requests for comment.

The FSB’s plans and the efforts of Ukraine’s security agencies to thwart them — with backing from the CIA, Britain’s MI6 and other Western intelligence services — are part of a shadow war that has played out in parallel to Russia’s military campaign. It is a conflict that was underway long before the Feb. 24 invasion, and its battle lines are blurred by the tangled, overlapping histories of Russian services and Ukrainian counterparts that began as offspring of the Soviet-era KGB.

Six months into the war, neither side appears to have a clear upper hand.

Ukraine’s security agencies have scored notable victories. Early on, a Ukrainian nongovernmental organization published what it described as a roster of FSB operatives linked to the war effort, posting the identities and passport numbers of dozens of alleged spies in a move meant to disrupt the agency’s plans and rattle its personnel. A person connected to the NGO, which is called Myrotvorets, or Peacemaker, said the data was obtained by Ukraine’s security services. The person spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing threats to his security.

Ivan Bakanov, who headed the SBU, Ukraine's main internal security service, at the start of the war. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Efrem Lukatsky/AP; iStock)

At the same time, Ukraine’s main internal security service, the SBU, has struggled to rid its ranks of Russian moles and saboteurs. Several senior officers have been arrested and branded traitors by Zelensky, who took the extraordinary step in July of removing SBU Director Ivan Bakanov — a childhood friend — from his post.

Putin is not believed to have taken comparable action against any of his spy chiefs, despite the scale of their misjudgments.

“If your security services put such a high priority on understanding Ukraine, and your military plan is based on that understanding, how could they have gotten it so wrong?” said William B. Taylor Jr., who twice served as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, including in an acting capacity in 2019. “How could they have assumed the Ukrainians wouldn’t fight, that President Zelensky would not resist so valiantly? The disconnect has to be somewhere between the FSB and the very top.”

II

Among those making plans to arrive in Kyiv in late February was Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer who had for years been a principal handler of some of the most prominent Ukrainian politicians and government officials secretly on the Kremlin’s payroll, including members of the opposition party co-chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin.

An exchange Kovalenko had with an FSB subordinate on Feb. 18 suggests that he had his eye on an apartment in Kyiv’s leafy Obolon neighborhood, overlooking the Dnieper River.

Intercepted communications show that Kovalenko asked for the address of the apartment and contact details for an FSB informant who occupied it. Ukrainian authorities said the resident was subsequently detained and questioned.

Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer, seemed to have his eye on an informant's apartment in a building in Kyiv's Obolon neighborhood. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Heidi Levine for The Washington Post; iStock)

Kovalenko’s subordinate sent back the address, phone numbers and code words used to communicate with the informant, who served in Zelensky’s government, Ukrainian officials said.

The officials declined to identify the informant but said he admitted that he had received FSB instructions days before the invasion to pack his belongings, leave his keys and get out of the capital to ensure his personal security during the war’s initial phase.

Other informants detained by Ukrainian authorities have provided similar accounts, one of the officials said. “They had been told, ‘When you return, it will all be different.’ ”

Details published by Peacemaker and confirmed by Ukrainian security officials describe Kovalenko as a 47-year-old veteran of the spy service who in recent years was responsible for managing the agency’s clandestine ties to Ukraine’s parliament and main pro-Russian party.

Kovalenko did not respond to requests for comment.

Ukrainian authorities believe that Kovalenko may have been just miles from the capital in March, accompanying Russian forces then outside the city. But the FSB team assigned to set up operations in Kyiv had to abandon that plan when Russia’s forces began their retreat, officials said.

The Obolon apartment was placed under surveillance by the SBU after the address surfaced in communications intercepts, officials said. Neither Kovalenko nor any other FSB officer ever turned up to claim the keys.

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III

Kovalenko is a senior officer in an FSB unit — the Ninth Directorate of the Department of Operational Information — whose main purpose has for years been to ensure Ukraine’s servility to Moscow.

The department is overseen by a senior FSB officer, Sergey Beseda, who started his career with the KGB in the late 1970s, according to Ukrainian officials, and was assigned to overseas posts including Cuba before returning to Moscow to head operations in Ukraine, Georgia and other former Soviet republics.

After protests erupted in Kyiv in late 2013 against the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych, Beseda turned up in the Ukrainian capital urging Yanukovych to use deadly force to put down an uprising that would come to be known as the Maidan Revolution, Ukrainian officials said.

When the protesters prevailed, Yanukovych fled to Russia with a group of senior advisers suspected of working with Beseda’s branch in the years that followed to bring a pro-Russian government back to power.

Anti-government protesters rally in Kyiv in December 2013 in what would become known as the Maidan Revolution. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Brendan Hoffman/Getty; iStock)

That project appeared to take on new urgency in the two years leading up to the February invasion.

In 2019, the FSB began a major expansion of its Ukraine unit, a group that grew from 30 officers to as many as 160 last summer, according to Ukrainian officials who cited intercepted communications and other intelligence.

To entice recruits from other branches, the FSB offered bonuses and free housing in buildings adjacent to the FSB training academy on Michurinsky Prospekt in Moscow, officials said. Arriving officers were assigned territories in Ukraine and tasked with developing lists of collaborators to work with, as well as adversaries to neutralize.

[In Ukrainian villages, whispers of collaboration with the Russians]

At first, the surge was seen as another venture aimed at “returning Russian influence in Ukraine,” said a security official in Kyiv involved in tracking FSB operations. But in retrospect, it may have been an early signal that Russia was shifting focus, the official said, from shaping events in Ukraine to plotting “its seizure.”

As Russia’s military mobilization accelerated last year, Ukraine’s security services were inundated with additional intelligence from Western spy services, officials said.

On Jan. 12, CIA Director William J. Burns arrived in Kyiv with a detailed dossier on Russia’s plans and a team of accompanying U.S. officials who sought to convince Zelensky and his inner circle that war was imminent.

Yet when the CIA team departed, Ukraine’s spy chiefs gathered with Zelensky to deliver a follow-on briefing that was far more equivocal.

“We relayed all the information that the Americans had shared without any changes,” said a participant. But at the same time, the official said, “our information said that the Russians are not planning war” on such a large scale, and that judgment was given equal weight alongside the CIA warnings.

The final weeks before the invasion were punctuated by a flurry of contradictory intelligence reports and confusing signals from European officials.

Ten days after Burns’s visit, the British government declared that it had “information that indicates the Russian government is looking to install a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv as it considers whether to invade and occupy Ukraine.”

The British file identified a pro-Russian former member of Ukraine’s parliament, Yevhen Murayev, “as a potential candidate,” a claim that Murayev dismissed as “ridiculous and funny” in a response to the Associated Press. The British statement also listed former members of Yanukovych’s cabinet, alleging that they had links to Russian intelligence and that officers they were in contact with were “involved in the planning for an attack on Ukraine.”

Russian Sergey Beseda, who oversees the FSB's Ukraine directorate. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Photo obtained by The Washington Post; iStock)

About the same time, Ukraine’s security agencies picked up indications that FSB operatives were in direct communication with Russia’s airborne forces, officials said. Such direct interaction between the FSB and military units was so unusual, officials said, that it was regarded as a worrisome sign of joint operational planning.

[The man who has Putin’s ear — and may want his job]

That concern seems to have been well-placed. Russia’s airborne forces played a pivotal role in the capture of an airport in Hostomel, on the outskirts of Kyiv, in the early hours of the invasion. It was a key node for the anticipated assault on the capital, and FSB officers were observed there before Russian forces were driven from the airstrip, officials said.

Other late-arriving intelligence, however, seemed to cast doubt on the idea that Russia was even prepared for, let alone planning, full-scale combat.

In mid-February, Ukraine’s foreign intelligence service, the SZRU, sent agents into Russia to carry out surveillance operations on military units. One team encountered a Potemkin village of Russian hardware, officials said, with dozens of parked tanks accompanied by a small security detail. No tank operators or maintenance crews were anywhere in the vicinity.

Elsewhere, Ukraine’s spies came upon a scene of disciplinary mayhem: lines of stranded Russian vehicles accompanied by troops who had bartered fuel and other supplies for alcohol. “A lot of them were drunk,” said a Ukrainian official who reviewed reports on what Ukraine’s spies had witnessed.

The scenes fed doubts among security advisers to Zelensky, some of whom were understandably disinclined to believe that their country’s days might be numbered. Even now, months later, many continue to express disbelief that Russia pressed ahead so poorly prepared.

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European officials also remained skeptical. In Kyiv on Feb. 8, French President Emmanuel Macron said he had received a personal assurance from Putin that Russia would not escalate the situation. Germany’s spy chief, Bruno Kahl, had said days earlier that Putin’s decision on whether to attack had “not yet been made.” (Kahl was in Kyiv on the day the invasion began and had to be evacuated by car to Poland.)

In the end, many Ukrainian security officials believed that Russia’s military buildup was largely a psychological ploy, but that Moscow might use missile strikes and incursions by airborne units and elite Spetsnaz troops to topple a government it saw as teetering. At the time, Zelensky’s approval ratings had plummeted to around 26 percent as Ukraine faced an energy crisis and pressure on its currency that officials attributed to Russian sabotage.

“We didn’t expect … some classic invasion in Second World War style with tanks, artillery and infantry,” a senior Ukrainian security official said. Ukraine was wrong about Russia’s intentions, he said, but even Moscow may not have envisioned a major land war.

“They expected somebody to open the gate,” the official said. “They didn’t expect any resistance.”

In an interview this month with The Post, Zelensky said that well before the invasion, Russia had been waging “a hybrid war against our state. There was an energy blow, there was a political blow.”

“They wanted a change of power from inside the country,” he said. “I had the feeling that [the Russians] wanted to prepare us for a soft surrender.”

IV

Ukraine’s SBU — like its Russian counterpart — is a direct descendant of the KGB. It occupies the former KGB headquarters in Kyiv, is organized around the same bureaucratic structure as its Soviet predecessor, and employs an undisclosed number of officers who trained at the KGB academy in Moscow or its FSB successor after the Soviet breakup.

The agencies’ entangled histories bring a hall-of-mirrors aspect to the conflict.

Current and former Ukrainian security officials said fear about the loyalties of even senior personnel is a source of constant anxiety. One official said he reached for his phone on the war’s second day to begin calling subordinates to relay orders. But he hesitated as he dialed, he said, worried that his calls would go unanswered or reveal that senior lieutenants had thrown their support to the Russians.

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He was stunned, he said, when those he called not only answered but followed orders with a precision and determination that were rare before the conflict.

“It’s a paradox of the Ukrainian state,” the official said. “It was believed, including by Ukrainians themselves, that there was a high level of corruption, inefficiency and infiltration of Russian agents in the Ukrainian government structures.” But after Feb. 24, he said, “they not only worked but also worked more efficiently than ever.”

He and others attributed much of that resilience to the example Zelensky set with his decision to remain in the capital. His ability to do so was due in part to the existence of a massive bunker complex under Kyiv’s government quarter that was designed by Soviet engineers and built to survive nuclear conflict.

A senior adviser described being taken to meet Zelensky in the first weeks of the war and descending into a disorienting warren of tunnels and command posts. “I still can’t say to you where [Zelensky’s base of operations] is exactly,” he said, because the complex is such a labyrinth.

Ukraine has made repeated attempts to cleanse its ranks of Russian assets, at one point even enlisting a CIA officer to serve as an internal adviser on rooting out FSB penetrations, according to former U.S. officials. But with an estimated 27,000 employees — making the SBU at least five times as large as MI5, its British equivalent — the agency has struggled to surmount the problem.

SBU and police personnel during July 2021 anti-terrorism exercises in Kyiv. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto/Getty; iStock)

“Is there treachery? What can I say?” Zelensky said. “With all my love for Ukraine, we are not without sin.” The number of those who are not loyal to their country “has fallen over the years,” he said. Still, when the war started, “there were people who were working for Russians for money, and some who from the inside always hated Ukraine and were waiting for the Soviet Union to return.”

Several senior SBU officers have been charged with treason. Among them is the former head of the agency’s directorate in Kherson, in southern Ukraine, who was accused of ordering subordinates to abandon their posts as Russian forces flooded the region.

[In Kherson, misery under Russian occupation, hope over Ukrainian gains]

Last month, Ukrainian authorities arrested another SBU officer, Oleg Kulinich, who had been installed in the service’s upper ranks by Bakanov, the SBU director and childhood friend of Zelensky. The allegations against Kulinich underscore the pervasiveness of Russian penetrations. Charges filed by Ukrainian authorities describe him as part of a cell of sleeper agents operated by Vladimir Sivkovich, a former deputy head of Ukraine’s security council who was placed under sanction by the U.S. Treasury Department in January for working “with a network of Russian intelligence actors to carry out influence operations.”

Two years before the war, Sivkovich “set a task for Kulinich” to begin stealing secret internal SBU files that would be “of operational interest” to the “special services of the Russian Federation,” according to the charging document.

Together, according to the document, they conspired to help promote another alleged Russian spy to take control of the SBU’s counterintelligence department. That figure, Andriy Naumov, was arrested in Serbia in June carrying cash and gems worth more than $700,000, according to information released by Serbian authorities.

On the night before Russia’s invasion, Kulinich “deliberately” blocked the dissemination of intelligence warning that Russian forces in Crimea were hours from launching an attack, according to the Ukrainian indictment.

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Zelensky’s decision to oust Bakanov as SBU director after Kulinich’s arrest was driven by exasperation with his failure to “cleanse” the agency of Russia sympathizers, said Andriy Smirnov, deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office. “Six months into the war,” he said, “we continue to uncover loads of these people.”

Bakanov did not respond to requests for comment. Kulinich, Sivkovich and Naumov could not be reached for comment, and none appear to have made any public statement about the allegations against them.

Overall, Ukraine has detained more than 800 people suspected of aiding Russia through reconnaissance or sabotage, according to Ukraine’s Interior Ministry. Authorities have also moved against suspected “agents of influence” in government, parliament and politics.

Chief among them is Medvedchuk, the opposition party chairman who has such close ties to Putin that the Russian leader is the godfather of his youngest daughter. Ukrainian officials described Medvedchuk, 68, as a savvy political operator who harbored ambitions of high office himself and probably would have served as puppet-master to any regime installed by the Kremlin.

Zelensky’s government had charged Medvedchuk with treason in May 2021 and placed him under house arrest. Medvedchuk denied any wrongdoing and said he would fight to clear his name. He then escaped during the early days of the war, but was recaptured in April and now awaits trial. Medvedchuk’s lawyer, Tetyana Zhukovska, declined to comment this month, saying she could not do so until a Ukrainian court ruled in the treason case against her client.

[In the Ukraine war, a battle for the nation’s mineral and energy wealth]

“When they began on Feb. 24, the task was to take Kyiv,” said a Ukrainian security official. “They expected it would lead to a domino effect” that would ripple across the country. “They would take first central power and then they would have strengthened presence in regions.”

As part of that plan, Ukrainian officials said, the FSB had lined up at least two pro-Russian governments-in-waiting — not just one as the British government had warned. Ukraine officials said it was unclear why Russia had mobilized two groups, though some speculated that Putin may have simply wanted options.

One, positioned in Belarus, centered on Yanukovych. On March 7, a plane that belonged to the former Ukrainian president landed in Minsk, its arrival treated as an indication that Russia might seek to reinstate a politician Kremlin officials still referred to after his 2014 ouster as the country’s “legitimate” leader.

Yanukovych then issued an open letter to Zelensky, broadcast by a Russian state news agency, in which he told the Ukrainian president it was his duty to “stop the bloodshed and reach a peace deal at any price.” Over the following week, Yanukovych’s security chief spoke three times with a senior officer from the FSB’s Ukraine unit, according to data intercepted by Ukrainian intelligence.

Yanukovych did not respond to requests for comment. His former prime minister, Nikolai Azarov, said in a telephone interview with The Post that any suggestion that Moscow was seeking to engineer Yanukovych’s return to power was “total nonsense.”

Oleg Tsaryov, a former leading member of Ukraine's pro-Russian Party of Regions. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Alexander Natruskin/Sputnik/AP; iStock)

A second group, which included former members of the Yanukovych government, gathered in southeastern Ukraine as territory there fell to Russian forces. Among them was Oleg Tsaryov, a former leading member of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, who declared his presence in Ukraine on a post to the Telegram messaging app, saying that “Kyiv will be free from fascists.”

In a telephone interview with The Post last month, Tsaryov said he had even moved into areas around Kyiv during the initial weeks of the war, traveling with “friends” he declined to identify. He wouldn’t answer questions about whether he was part of any plot to seize power, saying only that when he was outside Kyiv, “I didn’t have any agreements with anyone about a new government.”

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V

Nearly every intelligence service with a stake in the war made consequential misjudgments.

U.S. spy agencies were prescient on Putin’s intentions but underestimated Ukraine’s ability to withstand the onslaught — an error that contributed to the United States’ initial hesitation to send heavy and sophisticated weapons.

Ukraine’s services appear to have read too much into signs that Russian forces were ill-prepared for full-scale combat, resisting Western warnings of an invasion that came within miles of the capital.

Russia’s intelligence breakdowns in Ukraine seem more systemic, its work marred by unreliable sources, disincentives to deliver hard truths to the Kremlin, and an endemic bias that matched Putin’s contemptuous attitude toward the country.

The FSB fueled this dynamic, officials said, with assessments packaged to please the Kremlin and with sources who had their own reasons — political and financial — for encouraging a Russian takedown of the Kyiv government.

Confidential reports by a think tank with close ties to the FSB, the Moscow-based Institute of CIS Countries, prodded Moscow to reassert control over its neighbor. An early 2021 report obtained by The Post said that doing so was the only way to “rid Russia of the eternal threat … posed by the puppet state ready to carry out any order of the enemy forces of the West.”

The director of the institute, Konstantin Zatulin, insisted in a telephone interview that he had opposed the use of military force against Ukraine, and he blamed the Kremlin’s “inflated expectations” about what the invasion could accomplish on exaggerations by Kremlin allies in the country.

Viktor Medvedchuk, the Ukrainian oligarch and Putin friend whom Kyiv charged with treason in May 2021. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Sputnik/AP; iStock)

Foremost among them was Medvedchuk, who had served as presidential chief of staff in the early 2000s before amassing a business fortune and becoming co-leader of Ukraine’s main pro-Russian party.

Unlike other Ukrainian figures, Medvedchuk was in direct contact with Putin, according to officials who cited monitored communications. His was the most prominent voice in a chorus of Kremlin allies assuring Moscow that Zelensky was weak, that his government would collapse and that Russian forces would be welcomed by the Ukrainian people, officials said.

In recent years, Medvedchuk appeared to use his business empire to lay the groundwork for a Russian move against Kyiv. His TV stations routinely bashed Zelensky and aired pro-Russian propaganda, including discredited claims that the United States had biolabs in the country to help Ukraine develop biological weapons. His companies, which included a stake in an oil refinery in southern Russia, served as a conduit for money that flowed to pro-Russian forces and backed plots to destabilize the Kyiv government, officials said.

As his activities became more brazen, the United States and Ukraine moved against his network.

The U.S. Treasury Department, which had previously placed Medvedchuk under sanction, went after key party lieutenants in January, accusing them of collaborating with Russian intelligence on efforts to “take over the Ukrainian government and control Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with an occupying force.”

One of those sanctioned associates, Oleh Voloshyn, denied that he or Medvedchuk had any specific prior knowledge of Russia’s invasion plan or that they were seeking to overthrow the Zelensky government. In a telephone interview with The Post last month, Voloshyn blamed the war on Zelensky, saying the repression of Medvedchuk and his supporters forced Moscow to defend its allies.

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“The choice was always becoming neutral voluntarily, or made neutral through force,” he said. “I don’t say this is good or bad. It’s just the reality.”

Almost immediately, the war failed to live up to Medvedchuk’s forecasts. And it was his political network, rather than Zelensky’s, that ultimately folded, with as many as a dozen senior party officials leaving the country.

Moscow’s subsequent spurning of Medvedchuk has been one of the few visible signs of Putin’s pique.

After Medvedchuk was recaptured in mid-April, Ukrainian authorities proposed sending him to Moscow as part of a prisoner swap. But officials said the Kremlin has shown no interest in any deal that would free the oligarch.

Often pictured before the war wearing immaculately tailored suits in meetings with the Russian leader, recent images released by Ukraine show Medvedchuk in prison fatigues and handcuffs.

Images of Medvedchuk after his 2022 rearrest in Ukraine are seen at a Moscow news conference held by his wife to call for his release. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Anadolu Agency/Getty; iStock)

To the Kremlin, “he is a traitor because he took all the money and delivered no results,” said Kostyantyn Batozsky, who was an adviser to a Donetsk governor before the region was taken over by pro-Russian separatists.

Medvedchuk “is a played card; they will never use him again,” Batozsky said. “He doesn’t want to go to Russia now because he will be asked the most unpleasant question in the world: What about the money? Where did it go?”

VI

One of the more puzzling aspects of Russia’s miscalculation is that the FSB had received information suggesting that war with Ukraine would not be a walkover.

Recent polls conducted by an organization with close ties to the FSB showed that Putin was deeply unpopular in Ukraine and that the idea that Russian forces would be welcomed was fiction, according to copies obtained by Ukrainian intelligence.

An April 2021 poll by the firm Research & Branding found that 84 percent of Ukrainians would regard any further encroachment by Russian forces as an “occupation,” with just 2 percent seeing such a scenario as a “liberation.”

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A second poll, conducted in late January just weeks before the war, queried Ukrainians about invasion scenarios in extraordinary detail, according to a 26-page document reviewed by The Post. It was commissioned by and presented to Sivkovich, the former Yanukovich aide who is accused of running sleeper agents, Ukrainian officials said.

Was a “great war” between the countries possible? the poll asked. Were people “feeling concerned for themselves and their loved ones” about the buildup of Russian forces? Was Ukraine’s army capable of fending off an invasion?

The most salient question appears toward the end of the poll: “Are you ready to defend Ukraine in the event of such a necessity?” Overall, 48 percent answered in the affirmative.

Pre-war polls by an organization linked to Russia’s security service found that 48 percent of Ukrainians were prepared to fight to defend the country, and that only 2% would regard the “appearance” of Russian forces as a “liberation”. (Research & Branding)

Ukrainian officials said the number should have been interpreted as a sign of resolve, showing that millions of citizens were ready to take up arms against Russia. The FSB, however, may have drawn a different conclusion from the same data, believing that only a minority of Ukrainians were committed to defending their country.

It is unclear whether the results of these surveys were accurately relayed to the Kremlin.

When contacted by telephone, Eduard Zolotukhin, Research & Branding’s director, asked The Post to send written questions, but then did not respond.

VII

The fallout for the FSB has been difficult to ascertain amid the information blackout imposed on Russian media by Putin.

Early reports that Beseda, responsible for the FSB’s Ukraine directorate, had been demoted or even imprisoned are viewed skeptically by U.S. and other intelligence officials, who say they have seen no information to suggest that any of Russia’s spy chiefs has faced such consequences.

Russia's FSB chief, Alexander Bortnikov. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty; iStock)

“We have pretty good reason to believe that he’s still in the job,” a senior U.S. official said of Beseda. Nor, the official said, is there any indication that FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov has been held to account for his agency’s failures. A senior Russian politician with close links to the Kremlin and to the FSB also said in an interview that Beseda was continuing to carry out his duties.

[The West has imposed a barrage of sanctions on top Russian figures. See how they’re connected to Putin.]

Other reports indicated that Putin had sidelined the FSB because of its failures and given greater responsibility for Ukraine to the military-linked GRU. Ukrainian officials say otherwise.

“I don’t share this view,” one official said. The FSB “didn’t manage the task they were given. But they are continuing to work. Not with the same enthusiasm. But they continue.”

Ukrainian officials cited recent intelligence indicating that the FSB — like the Russian military — has regrouped, turning its focus to territories in the south and east that have been obliterated by Russian artillery.

“We can see it playing out now in Mariupol, Melitopol, Kherson” and other cities that have fallen to Russian forces, a Ukrainian intelligence official said. FSB officials swoop in to implement a version of the blueprint the agency originally had for Kyiv.

“The aim is political control, economic control, control over criminal groups — all spheres of activity on seized territory,” the intelligence official said. “The final aim is to install a pro-Russian power.”

An official adjusts a Russian flag before handing out Russian passports to residents of the southern Ukrainian city of Melitopol, now under Kremlin control. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Sergei Ilnitsky/EPA-EFE; iStock)

Kherson, the first major city to fall to the Russian army, now offers a chilling glimpse into what life might have been like if Russia had taken Ukraine’s capital.

The city’s mayor, Ihor Kolykhaiev, was arrested in June after repeatedly refusing to cooperate with the Russian occupiers, and his whereabouts are unknown, an aide to the mayor said. He has been replaced by Oleksandr Kobets, a former KGB officer who had also once worked for the SBU.

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The former mayor’s aide, Galina Lyashevskaya, said that at least 300 residents were unaccounted for when Kolykhaiev was ousted from his position in April. More recent estimates are at least double that.

Many more have been arrested, she said, and about half the city’s population of 300,000 has fled. In a recent report, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of cases of torture among Kherson’s residents.

“The FSB does not have any uniform, so you never know who is standing next to you,” Lyashevskaya said. “It is paradise for the FSB here. … They can force anyone to do what they want.”

Ukrainian officials said the FSB is involved in planning a referendum that would provide a pretext for incorporating the city and surrounding region into Russia. But Ukraine has begun staging forces for a major counteroffensive to retake Kherson.

VIII

With no end to the war in sight, FSB officials have begun operating on three-month rotations, according to Ukrainian security officials.

Kovalenko, the FSB operative who had inquired about a riverside apartment in Kyiv, retreated to Russia with a broken finger and apparent unease about Ukrainian penetrations of his directorate, according to Ukrainian security officials. In communications with relatives that were monitored by Ukrainian intelligence, he spoke about changing phones, switching addresses in Moscow and even selling family vehicles. Then, in late May, he revealed that he was being sent back to Ukraine for another assignment.

Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Photo obtained by The Washington Post; iStock)

One relative responded to the news with a Russian expletive.

Ukrainian officials said they have not been able to determine Kovalenko’s current whereabouts.

 

 

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par olivier lsb
Précision

[Banzinou]

Drone iranien comparaison

 

[olivier lsb]

il y a 4 minutes, Mangouste a dit :

Je ne comprends pas l'agent de la CIA détaché au FSB pour démasquer les agents doubles.

Bon ça va, je constate que ça suit un peu  Evidemment il fallait lire "officier de la CIA, détaché au sein du SBU pour démasquer les agents doubles du FSB ou autres".

Citation

Ukraine has made repeated attempts to cleanse its ranks of Russian assets, at one point even enlisting a CIA officer to serve as an internal adviser on rooting out FSB penetrations, according to former U.S. officials.

Je corrige, merci pour la coquille !

Les captures de matériels suite à l'offensive de Kharkiv représentent l'équivalent de deux brigades. Bon, on repassera sur l'état moyen des véhicules, mais ça reste colossal. 

 

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par olivier lsb

[herciv]

Le rumble : front stabilisé vers Kharkiv et Kherson. Préparatif Ukrainien pour attaquer au Sud avec leur troupe qui ont attaqué à Kharkiv en jouant sur leur ligne de ravitaillement désormais plus courte que celle des Russes pour consolider leur position. Les convois ukrainiens encombre les routes et sont des cibles attaqués par les drones russes.

https://rumble.com/v1jxud9-ukraine.-military-summary-and-analysis-13.09.2022.html

 

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par herciv

[Valy]

Un article de Pavel Luzin qui expliquerait la faiblesse de l'aviation russe par le fait qu'il y aurait dorénavant peu de pilotes expérimentés (soit ils sont descendus, soit ils démissionnent).

https://odessa-journal.com/the-expert-explained-why-russias-aviation-losses-in-ukraine-are-critical/

Citation

The aviation losses of the Russian Federation in the war with Ukraine are critical since middle and senior flight officers, the training of which takes years, are knocked out now.

Average and experienced pilots are kicked out, or they are fired, Pavel Luzin, candidate of political sciences, an expert on international relations and security, said on the air of the telethon.

The expert added that the losses among the average flight personnel are much more critical than the destruction of the generals.

“These are critical losses because the middle and senior officers are being knocked out. That is, such a generational lag is forming (delay) – yes, there are generals at the headquarters of the AF (Aerospace Forces), who sit at the helm, but they won’t do it, most likely, and there are young lieutenants who you won’t let into battle. And the average and experienced ones, they get out, they quit … “, Luzin explained.

 

Modifié le 13 septembre 2022 par Valy

[pascal]

Les meilleurs sont entrés en jeu au début de l'affaire ... Beaucoup de pilotes volent peu en unité

[Lame]

Le 06/06/2022 à 19:09, Alfredo a dit :

Envoyer des renforts à Severodonetsk, c’est aussi con que d’en parachuter à Dien Bien Phu ...

A priori non.

Dien Bien Phu était une cuvette perdue en territoire ennemi, loin d'une France lassée de la guerre.

Sievierodonetsk est en Ukraine, à proximité des zones sous contrôle de l'Armée ukrainienne. Les lignes adverses ne sont pas une barrière étanche et la ville est un point d'appui disputé par les deux camps. Pour preuve, l'Armée ukrainienne y a envoyé des renforts par voie de terre et la contre-offensive en cours ce mois de septembre lui a permis de reprendre pied dans la localité ce 10 septembre.

[olivier lsb]

Les CAESAR ont été de la partie à Kharkiv

 

[Claudio Lopez]

Donc les défenseurs de karkiv ont du déguster car apparemment, les Ceasars ne seraient pas dans une configuration de shoot and go. Mais en phase de pilonnage. 

[herciv]

Je ne sais pas de quand date la video (LE 14/09 étant le plus probable) mais le temps est encore clair.

La météo va commencer à se charger maintenant ce qui va compliquer les actions offensives en particulier celles de grande ampleur. Les Ukrainiens ne peuvent pas être passés à coté de ce facteur ce qui implique soit une dernière offensive dans le sud dans les prochains jours, soit un ralentissement dès maintenant.

 

[Boule75]

il y a 15 minutes, Claudio Lopez a dit :

Donc les défenseurs de karkiv ont du déguster car apparemment, les Ceasars ne seraient pas dans une configuration de shoot and go. Mais en phase de pilonnage. 

Ils ont harcelé tout ce qui retraitait à toute vitesse je pense...

Du côté de Kherson, et de la part des ukrainiens, toujours une combinaison entre censure (très peu de détails vraiment...), propagande de déstabilisation ("des unités se rendent") et pré-annonces d'avancées ("avancées de plusieurs km", "plusieurs dizaines de km", etc...).
En attendant, j'ai vu passer ça hier (ce qui serait la prise d'un véhicule de commandement des troupes aéroportées russes) :

 

 

[Paschi]

Il y a 9 heures, Valy a dit :

Un article de Pavel Luzin qui expliquerait la faiblesse de l'aviation russe par le fait qu'il y aurait dorénavant peu de pilotes expérimentés (soit ils sont descendus, soit ils démissionnent).

https://odessa-journal.com/the-expert-explained-why-russias-aviation-losses-in-ukraine-are-critical/

 

Pour faire un HS : l'US Air Force a un peu le même problème. Départ des pilotes experimentés dans l'aviation civile (salaires plus élevés mais également problèmes de RH) et difficultés à recruter en quantité et qualité.

[g4lly]

45 minutes ago, Claudio Lopez said:

Donc les défenseurs de karkiv ont du déguster car apparemment, les Ceasars ne seraient pas dans une configuration de shoot and go. Mais en phase de pilonnage. 

C'est juste un canon avec des obus dedans ... Et il ne tire pas plus que les autres.

En lisant ce topic je me demande toujours si on est sur un fil Marvel ou PSG.