Marine Australienne: modernisations, acquisitions et exercices navals.

[Patrick]

Il y a 10 heures, Titus K a dit :

https://www.jeumontelectric.com/actualites/le-projet-lote/

Le projet LOTE (Life of type extension) est le nom du programme visant à augmenter la durée de vie des six sous-marins australiens de la classe Collins.

JEUMONT Electric a été choisi pour réaliser le remplacement du système de propulsion des premiers sous-marins. Ce système est composé d’un moteur alimenté par des armoires de commande qui assureront une discrétion acoustique performante.

Plus de trois ans d’études ont été nécessaires pour concevoir ce système silencieux. La phase de fabrication du moteur et de ses armoires vient de débuter et le premier ensemble d’équipements sera livré à l’Australie en 2026 pour une intégration à bord du 1ersous-marin.

Un projet à suivre !

Il y a 10 heures, Ronfly a dit :

Du coup ça doit être le Megatronic de 2950 KW de Shneider-Jeumot prévu également pour le Blacksword dont un dérivé devait équiper le Shortfin... Marrant ça. 

Bon ,sans rire, entre ça et les arbres pour les Types 26, ils sont sûrs qu'ils n'en voulaient vraiment pas, de nos Shortfin Barracuda pour la classe Attack? 

[Ronfly]

Il y a 9 heures, Patrick a dit :

Bon ,sans rire, entre ça et les arbres pour les Types 26, ils sont sûrs qu'ils n'en voulaient vraiment pas, de nos Shortfin Barracuda pour la classe Attack? 

Il faut avouer que c'est original. Ils préferent s'équiper de SNA AUKUS de conception en partie UK. C'est vrai que vu la dispo qu'ils ont en plus, ca donne envie... 

N'importe quoi....

[Ardachès]

il y a 13 minutes, Ronfly a dit :

Il faut avouer que c'est original. Ils préferent s'équiper de SNA AUKUS de conception en partie UK. C'est vrai que vu la dispo qu'ils ont en plus, ca donne envie... 

N'importe quoi....

… ça c'était avant d'apprendre qu'ils viennent -enfin - de livrer / mettre à l'eau l'avant dernier de la classe Astute, le dénommé Agamemnon !

Ah ! Ils ont quand même un SNA qui flotte … Mauvaise langue 

Modifié le 9 octobre par Ardachès
Coquille

[HK]

20 hours ago, Ronfly said:

Du coup ça doit être le Megatronic de 2950 KW de Shneider-Jeumot prévu également pour le Blacksword dont un dérivé devait équiper le Shortfin... Marrant ça.

Bref les Australiens payent le developement des moteurs pour les Orka hollandais, ce qui permet a Naval Group d'offrir un prix ultra-competitif. Merci aux Aussies de subventionner nos exports!

[herciv]

Le 06/10/2024 à 17:26, Ronfly a dit :

Ben c'est pas simple quand un chiffre sur 2 n'a pas le type de dollars qui est donné... Apparemment le budget total de defense 2024-25 est de 55,7 Mds $ australiens soit 36,8 Mds $ US.

 https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/05/15/australia-unveils-record-37-billion-defense-budget/

Malgré tout ca brasse un sacré paquet de milliards.

Pour dire vrai, leur expression sur les coûts, c'est comme leur gestion de programme, c'est n'importe quoi....

https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/2024-25_Defence_PBS_00_Complete.pdf

Le doc officiel tout en dollars australiens.

Il y a plus d'une centaine d'occurences pout le mot "submarine" donc je vous laisse regarder.

Attention au piège, chez les australiens l'année budgétaire va de juillet à juin.

Modifié le 9 octobre par herciv

[Patrick]

Il y a 2 heures, HK a dit :

Bref les Australiens payent le developement des moteurs pour les Orka hollandais, ce qui permet a Naval Group d'offrir un prix ultra-competitif. Merci aux Aussies de subventionner nos exports!

C'est exactement ça en plus...

À n'y rien comprendre.

[pascal]

Le 01/10/2024 à 18:50, Sillage a dit :

Plus sérieusement, je suis étonné de l'appel à NG.

Quand on voit les emmerdes des QE et PoW avec leurs LA on se dit que pour une fois les Aussies ont eu le nez creux ...

[ARMEN56]

Le 08/10/2024 à 20:29, Titus K a dit :

https://www.jeumontelectric.com/actualites/le-projet-lote/

Le projet LOTE (Life of type extension) est le nom du programme visant à augmenter la durée de vie des six sous-marins australiens de la classe Collins.

JEUMONT Electric a été choisi pour réaliser le remplacement du système de propulsion des premiers sous-marins. Ce système est composé d’un moteur alimenté par des armoires de commande qui assureront une discrétion acoustique performante.

Plus de trois ans d’études ont été nécessaires pour concevoir ce système silencieux. La phase de fabrication du moteur et de ses armoires vient de débuter et le premier ensemble d’équipements sera livré à l’Australie en 2026 pour une intégration à bord du 1ersous-marin.

Un projet à suivre !

Donc un refite LOTE( life of type extension ) pour une rallonge durée de vie . Ce refite concernant l’appareil propulsif ; diesel alternateur , MEP ….expertise coque etc,  du lourd .

Quelques liens :

https://www.asc.com.au/what-we-do/collins-life-of-type-extension-lote/

Pendant le projet, ASC remplacera les systèmes de propulsion, les moteurs diesel, les générateurs et les systèmes de conversion et de distribution d'énergie. Il y aura également une mise à jour du système de refroidissement et une gamme d'évaluations de la coque. L'ASC intégrera le nouvel équipement dans le système de commandement et de contrôle existant. Le LOTE sera mis en œuvre sur les six sous-marins de la classe Collins.

https://www.defence.gov.au/about/locations-property/infrastructure-projects/submarine-rotational-force-west-infrastructure-project

Dès 2027, les partenaires d'AUKUS auront une présence de rotation à HMAS Stirling d'un Royaume-Uni et jusqu'à 4 sous-marins américains à propulsion nucléaire, armés de manière conventionnelle. Cette présence rotative de sous-marins nucléaires britanniques et américains à HMAS Stirling sera connue sous le nom de Submarine Rotational Force - West (SRF-West). En préparation de SRF-West, l'infrastructure de Stirling sera améliorée et améliorée pour répondre aux exigences des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire à armement conventionnel - à la fois pour les sous-marins de visite et de rotation et pour les sous-marins nucléaires de l'Australie à l'avenir.

https://strategicanalysis.org/what-role-should-the-collins-life-of-type-extension-play-in-australias-submarine-transition/

The plan to put all six Collins-class submarines through an extensive and risky life of type extension (LOTE) that could keep some in service well into the 2040s is an artefact of the previous submarine transition plan that aimed to reach a fleet of 12 Attack-class conventional submarines.

Plannings de transition tuilage pour être au bon RDV ?? ;

- Collins LOTE partiel ou total 

- Virginia

- Aukus

- SRF-West

 

Franchement des plannifs de dingue dans  un maelström infernal et personne pour leur dire stop !! UK et US amènent les « kangourous »  à l’abattoir là , les « marsupiaux » sont dopés au lexomil ou quoi ???

Immense risque côté Collins coques qui ont déjà pas mal cyclé et dont on connait les soucis de soudures à la construction.

extrait wiki

« Cependant, un an plus tard, à la suite de l'accident de l'HMAS Dechaineux, l’Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) rapporte qu'« au moins deux sous-marins de classe Collins ont des problèmes de soudure dans les joints de la coque ». John Moore, député et ancien ministre de la Défense australien, confirme qu'« il y a sans aucun doute des problèmes avec la soudure, mais si vous y dépensez suffisamment d'argent et remplacez suffisamment de soudure, je pense que ce sera hautement utile13. » L’ABC rapporte que la profondeur maximale de plongée de la classe Collins, bien que classée secret défense, a été limitée à 200 mètres14. Selon The Australian, ces problèmes étaient connus de la RAN depuis mai 2002, date de publication d'un rapport confidentiel énumérant « 67 risques importants de sécurité ».

Et maintenant de la corrosion , et puis sortie et entrée moteur diesel et bcq d’autres équipements à condition qu’il existe une brèche de maintenance étudiée pour sinon découpe

 

Bref du neuf dans du mauvais vieux ?? (*) , j’ai essayé de synthétiser les 2 pdf

 

https://www.witpress.com/Secure/elibrary/papers/FDM03/FDM03011FU.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA232543.pdf

Sinon corrosion = coque épaisse en danger ….

https://en.topwar.ru/243596-glubokaja-korrozija-zhestkogo-korpusa-avstralijskie-podlodki-tipa-collins-vyhodjat-iz-stroja.html

 

(*) rappel de la refonte des Narval à mi-vie 

- Modif du kiosque

- Changement diesel generator ….

Un volume de 560000 heures !!!!

https://www.netmarine.net/bat/smarins/narval/histoire.htm

je noircis ou pas ? ......

 

@Ronfly

Megatronic de 2950 KW , sauf incompréhension de ma part c'est plus , non ? le MEP d'origine c'est 5400 kw

 

[Titus K]

Il y a 4 heures, ARMEN56 a dit :

Megatronic de 2950 KW , sauf incompréhension de ma part c'est plus , non ? le MEP d'origine c'est 5400 kw

Il me semble aussi oui. 

En revanche il se pourrait bien que le prochain moteur du BlackSword Barracuda NL soit le même que celui des LOTE puisqu’on est à peu près sur le même déplacement non ? 
 

Super tes documents sur le tuilage … quelle galère ça va être pour eux 

Modifié le 16 octobre par Titus K

[Zalmox]

Le 08/10/2024 à 20:29, Titus K a dit :

Ce système est composé d’un moteur alimenté par des armoires de commande qui assureront une discrétion acoustique performante.

Qu'est-ce ce système "d'armoires de commande" ?

Une alternatives des armoires normandes ?

Désolé pour une question de néophyte, si quelqu'un avait la bonté de m'expliquer...

[mudrets]

Tout simplement des baies de commande électroniques qui permettent de mettre en forme les ordres 

[Ronfly]

Il y a 7 heures, ARMEN56 a dit :

 @Ronfly

Megatronic de 2950 KW , sauf incompréhension de ma part c'est plus , non ? le MEP d'origine c'est 5400 kw

 

Effectivement, merci et désolé du loupé, heureusement que les spécialistes sont là pour surveiller les néophytes... ;)

Jeumont fourni le magtronic pour les Scorpene. C'est un autre modèle pour le retrofité LOTE des 6 SSK Collins.

Modifié le 16 octobre par Ronfly

[vincenzo]

C'est du off mais un rapport du Congres US suggére que les Aussies devraient abandonner leur idée de construire des SSN...

 

[pascal]

Si on en croit le dernier Air Fan les Aussies pourraient remplacer l'acquisition de SNA par celle de B 21 Raider

[Ciders]

Il avait déjà été question de cette hypothèse il y a quelques temps.

Cela n'a évidemment rien à voir avec la complexité des ambitions australiennes en matière navale, et encore moins avec l'idée de détourner du budget australien vers des armements totalement américains qui ne seront ni produits ni assemblés ni même entretenus sur place.

[Titus K]

Bon le rapport fait plus de 100 pages et il y a seulement 16 mentions du B-21 --> https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418/285

J'ai sélectionné les 3 passages où le B-21 est mentionné ... c'est fait par IA et je ne corrige/traduis pas … je vous sépare juste les 3 passages 

C'est toujours mieux que des articles sensationnalistes :

 

Alternative of a U.S.-Australia Division of Labor

An alternative to Pillar 1 as currently structured would be a U.S.-Australia military division of labor under which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions while Australia invested in military capabilities for performing non-SSN missions for both Australia and the United States. Such a U.S.-Australia military division of labor might be broadly similar to military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO or other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-naval capabilit

Under a U.S.-Australia military division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions

• the forward rotations of U.S. and UK SSNs to Australia planned under Pillar 1 —SRF-West—would still be implemented;
• up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built, and instead of three to five of them being sold to Australia, these additional boats would instead be retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the five U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1 as SRF-West; and
• Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, build, operate, and maintain its own SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities—such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft—so as to create an Australian capacity for performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United States

...
...
...

 

Whether to Implement Certain Elements of AUKUS Pillar 1

Overview

Another issue for Congress is whether to implement certain elements of the AUKUS submarine (Pillar 1) project, specifically, the intention to sell three to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia and subsequently build three to five replacement SSNs for the U.S. Navy, and to have the United States and UK provide assistance to Australia for an Australian effort to build additional three to five SSNs of a new UK-Australian SSN design to complete a planned eight-boat Australian SSN force. The potential benefits, costs, and risks of implementing these elements of Pillar 1 can be compared with the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the alternative division- of-labor approach for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions outlined earlier, in which up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be procured and retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1, while Australia invested in military capabilities (such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft) for performing non-SSN missions.

In comparing the potential benefits, costs, and risks of these elements of Pillar 1 with the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the division-of-labor alternative, key factors that Congress may consider include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

• deterrence and warfighting cost-effectiveness—costs relative to resulting deterrence and warfighting capability; 
• technology security—the potential impact on the risk of China, Russia, or some other country gaining access to U.S. submarine or naval nuclear propulsion technology; and
• risk of accident and public acceptability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships—the risk of an accident involving an Australian-owned SSN that might call into question for third-party observers the safety of all U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and thereby affect U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make port calls around the world.

Of the three factors listed above, the first is one is typically involved in considering the merits of defense programs, while the second and third arose in connection with Congress’s consideration of the merits of a project that Canada began in 1987 and canceled in 1989 to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs (see Appendix G and Appendix I).

 

...
...
...

 

Arguments for Instead Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach

Supporters of the alternative division-of-labor approach for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions outlined earlier—in which up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be procured and retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1, while Australia invested in military capabilities (such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft) for performing non-SSN missions—can make various arguments, including those outlined below.

Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness

Arguments relating to deterrence and warfighting cost-effectiveness include the following:

• Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles in March 2023 reportedly confirmed that in exchange for the Virginia-class boats, Australia’s government made no promises to the United States that Australia would support the United States in a future conflict over Taiwan.76 Similarly, the chief of Australia’s navy in July 2024 reportedly stated that AUKUS agreement would not automatically pull Australia into a war to defend Taiwan.77 Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from boats that would be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict into boats that might not be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict. This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence and warfighting capability in connection with a U.S.-China crisis or conflict. The reduced certainty of whether boats sold to Australia would be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict would be, in effect, the flip side of the argument made by supporters of Pillar 1 about having Australia become a second allied decisionmaking center (along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific. Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia could also weaken deterrence of potential Chinese aggression if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that Australia might use its Virginia-class boats less effectively than the U.S. Navy would use them.
   
• Australian officials have stated consistently that, in line with Australia’s commitments as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 79 Australia’s SSNs would be armed only with conventional weapons. Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from boats that could in the future be armed with the U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) with an aim of enhancing deterrence80 into boats that would never be armed with SLCM-N. This reduction in the number of SLCM-N-capable Virginia-class boats could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence capability in connection with a U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia crisis or conflict.
   
• Some observers are concerned about potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan over the next few years, a period sometimes characterized as the Davidson window (the time between now and 2027) or decade of concern (the time between now and 2030).81 Pillar 1 as currently structured would not increase the total number of SSNs available for performing U.S., UK, and Australian SSN missions above what it otherwise would have been until sometime in the 2040s, when the first replacement SSN for the U.S. Navy or the first SSN AUKUS boat for the Australian navy (whichever comes first) enters service. Pillar 1 as currently structured would, however, absorb resources over the next few years that could instead be invested in Australian military capabilities that could be fielded sooner, and in some cases (e.g., drones and loitering munitions) soon enough to address the Davidson window or decade of concern.82 This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence within the Davidson window or decade of concern.
   
• More generally, the costs for Australia of Pillar 1 could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding within Australia’s military budget for other Australian military capabilities, particularly if SSN acquisition, operation, and maintenance costs turn out to be higher than expected. If this were to occur, there could be a net negative impact on Australia’s overall military capabilities for deterring potential Chinese aggression
   
• The U.S. Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan (like previous editions of the Navy’s annual 30-year shipbuilding plan) projects that there will be a shortfall of U.S. SSNs relative to the Navy’s 66-boat SSN force-level goal during the 2030s and 2040s. Selling three to five Virginia-class boats will reduce the size of the U.S. SSN force below the projected levels shown in the FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan (which does not account for sales of Virginia-class boats to Australia), increasing this projected shortfall until replacements for the sold boats enter service. This could reduce the Navy’s capacity to perform SSN missions of interest to the United States but not Australia, including potentially missions in the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean for countering Russia or other potential adversaries in those regions. This could weaken deterrence of potential aggression by Russia or those other potential adversaries. Given the challenges that the U.S. submarine industrial base is experiencing in achieving a construction rate of 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year to meet U.S. Navy needs, the ability of the submarine industrial base to achieve the higher target rate of 2.33 boat per year, so as to build replacement SSNs for the U.S. Navy, is uncertain. The duration of the impact of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia on the size of the U.S. SSN force is thus uncertain and could be longer than anticipated.
   
• There is little indication that, prior to announcing the AUKUS Pillar 1 project in September 2021, an analysis of alternatives (AOA) or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis was conducted to examine whether Pillar 1 would be a more cost-effective way to spend defense resources for generating deterrence and warfighting capability than potential alternative courses of action, such as a U.S.-Australian division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions.84 Such an AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis (or a summary of one) has not been released. Performing an AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis can test the validity of beliefs or presumptions about the cost-effectiveness of an envisioned course of action, and can produce unexpected or counter-intuitive results. Programs initiated in the absence of an AOA or an equivalent rigorous comparative analysis can lack a sound business case. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that “a program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be made,” and that “weapon systems without a sound business case are at greater risk for schedule delays, cost growth, and integration issues.” The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, for example, was initiated without a prior rigorous AOA. The LCS program subsequently became controversial, was widely criticized, and was ultimately truncated.85
   
• Some Australian officials have characterized Pillar 1 as “too big to fail.”86 Some observers argue that acquisition projects viewed as too big to fail can be at elevated risk of cost growth that can reduce their achieved cost effectiveness.87
   
• The enabling legislation for Pillar 1 that was included in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 of December 22, 2023) includes a provision (§1352(d)(2)) that was requested by the Administration as part of a package of requested legislative proposals for the FY2024 NDAA relating to the AUKUS agreement.88 The provision provides a waiver for a certification to be made by the Chief of Naval Operations under 10 U.S.C. 8678. The text of 10 U.S.C. 8678 is as follows: §8678. Chief of Naval Operations: certification required for disposal of combatant vessels Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no combatant vessel of the Navy may be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the Chief of Naval Operations certifies that it is not essential to the defense of the United States.
   
• Prior to the 2040s, Pillar 1 as currently structured will contribute to deterrence and warfighting capability primarily via the positional advantage of operating Virginia class boats from Australia, which is something can be done without selling the boats to Australia. Operating up to 12 U.S. Navy Virginia-class boats from Australia—the four boats that are to be operated there under Pillar 1’s SRF-West arrangement, plus up to eight additional U.S. Navy Virginia-class boats—would send a strong signal of U.S.-Australian alliance solidarity and resolve, in part because it would make Australia second only to Japan in terms of numbers of U.S. Navy forward-homeported or forward-operating ships.89 A 2002 CBO report on options for increasing the capability of the U.S. SSN force mentioned Australia as a potential site for forward homeporting additional U.S. SSNs in the Western Pacific. 90 Australian shipyards could perform maintenance, overhaul, and repair work on the up-to-eight additional U.S. Navy boats, as currently planned under Pillar 1 for the four Virginia-class boats that are to operate out of Australia as part of SRF-West.
   
• It would be more cost-effective to pursue a U.S.-Australia division of labor for SSN missions and non-SSN missions.91 Such a division of labor would follow the general model of military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO and other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non- naval capabilities such as (to name only some examples) nuclear weapons, space
  assets, and ISR capabilities. Pillar 1 would result in parallel SSN-related investments in the United States and Australia comparable to parallel investments in certain military capabilities among NATO countries that have been criticized by some observers for their collective inefficiencies.

 

Il y a ce tableau aussi :

Modifié le 18 octobre par Titus K

[emixam]

Il y a 17 heures, pascal a dit :

Si on en croit le dernier Air Fan les Aussies pourraient remplacer l'acquisition de SNA par celle de B 21 Raider

Cet été (remonte le fils vers le 13 août) on avait évoqué cette rumeur:

Le 13/08/2024 à 14:48, emixam a dit :

Le problème c'est que quand tu as déchiré le contrat pour des sous-marin Diesel-électrique en disant que les sous-marin de ce type ne répondent pas au besoin du pays. C'est compliqué d'avoir un plan B quand les sous-marin nucléaire sont à la bourre donc tu sort la moindre connerie qui claque pour détourner l'attention et là c'est tombé sur le B-21.

 

Après c'est tout bénèf pour les USA si ça se fait ça va se transformer en "au vu de la nature ultra sensible de l'appareil, l'Australie va acheté X appareil et construire une base pour ces appareils mais ils resteront sous responsabilité/entretien/pilotage US".

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Incredible, even the US Congress now admits that Australia will probably not get the AUKUS submarines. And they propose an alternative that achieves the feat of being even far worse than AUKUS (which was already a terrible deal).In a new report (which you can find here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418…) the US Congressional Research Service admits that the country's industrial base is very far from achieving the target of building 2.33 submarines per year needed to build replacement submarines for those sold to Australia: in fact the rate is currently only "1.2 to 1.4".

Given this, they actually propose to just forgo the sale of submarines entirely (!) and go for an alternative approach where the US deploys US submarines manned by the US Navy to Australia instead: "up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built, and instead of three to five of them being sold to Australia, these additional boats would instead be retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia.

"But since they don't want to miss out on the Australian money meant for the subs, they conveniently propose that Australia instead spends it on other US military products: "Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, build, operate, and maintain its own SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities—such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft".

All this for the purpose of "performing military missions for both Australia and the United States".So essentially, from Australia's standpoint, the new deal would mean:- Zero control over the submarines operated on its territory since it'd all be manned by the U.S. Navy- Australia still spends a similar eyewatering amount of money ($368 billion) on US military equipment that is mostly "long-range": "long-range anti-ship missiles", "B-21 long-range bombers", "long-range strike aircraft".

Meaning by definition not used for the defense of Australia but undoubtedly to attack China. Which is pretty clear: China is mentioned 44 times in the document...- This US military equipment is to be used, as per the document, to "perform military missions for both Australia and the United States" which is extremely unusual: militaries normally don't perform missions FOR another military. Allied countries might perform missions alongside each other or in support of each other, but not explicitly "for" each other.How could Australia possibly justify such a deal to its public?

AUKUS was already, according to former Australian PM Paul Keating the “worst deal in all history” because it'd "turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States", but this new proposal would strip away even the illusion of Australian sovereignty.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418

Modifié le 19 octobre par Picdelamirand-oil

[Ardachès]

il y a une heure, Picdelamirand-oil a dit :

Incredible, even the US Congress now admits that Australia will probably not get the AUKUS submarines. And they propose an alternative that achieves the feat of being even far worse than AUKUS (which was already a terrible deal).In a new report (which you can find here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418…) the US Congressional Research Service admits that the country's industrial base is very far from achieving the target of building 2.33 submarines per year needed to build replacement submarines for those sold to Australia: in fact the rate is currently only "1.2 to 1.4".

Given this, they actually propose to just forgo the sale of submarines entirely (!) and go for an alternative approach where the US deploys US submarines manned by the US Navy to Australia instead: "up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built, and instead of three to five of them being sold to Australia, these additional boats would instead be retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia.

"But since they don't want to miss out on the Australian money meant for the subs, they conveniently propose that Australia instead spends it on other US military products: "Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, build, operate, and maintain its own SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities—such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft".

All this for the purpose of "performing military missions for both Australia and the United States".So essentially, from Australia's standpoint, the new deal would mean:- Zero control over the submarines operated on its territory since it'd all be manned by the U.S. Navy- Australia still spends a similar eyewatering amount of money ($368 billion) on US military equipment that is mostly "long-range": "long-range anti-ship missiles", "B-21 long-range bombers", "long-range strike aircraft".

Meaning by definition not used for the defense of Australia but undoubtedly to attack China. Which is pretty clear: China is mentioned 44 times in the document...- This US military equipment is to be used, as per the document, to "perform military missions for both Australia and the United States" which is extremely unusual: militaries normally don't perform missions FOR another military. Allied countries might perform missions alongside each other or in support of each other, but not explicitly "for" each other.How could Australia possibly justify such a deal to its public?

AUKUS was already, according to former Australian PM Paul Keating the “worst deal in all history” because it'd "turn Australia into the 51st state of the United States", but this new proposal would strip away even the illusion of Australian sovereignty.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418

… Dans son immense sagesse, l'homme a un jour parfaitement décrit cette situation : Boire le calice jusqu'a la lie !

Ça doit bien se passer les réunions à l'état-major de la Navy … Comment ils doivent tous tordre leurs nez leurs amiraux !

Ah, tu voulais des SNA, ben t'auras des B-21 ! 

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Ensuite, Richie, nous avons dit à l'Australien que nous voulions stationner nos sous-marins d'attaque chinois dans son pays et QU'IL DEVRAIT PAYER 368 milliards de dollars pour ce privilège !

ET IL A ACCEPTÉ

Modifié le 19 octobre par Picdelamirand-oil

[Titus K]

In interviews with insiders with intimate knowledge of the process, the Financial Review can reveal : Australia’s pathway to a nuclear submarine capability was intended to be an exclusively British one [without direct U.S. involvement]; [Australia’s Department of the] Treasury and the Department of Foreign Affairs were excluded from the process; and serious risk and feasibility studies were largely sacrificed in the name of securing a politically symbolic deal….

As is now well known, the project to buy and build nuclear submarines for Australia under the AUKUS agreement arose from a crisis in the contract with France [for acquiring a new class of non-nuclear-powered submarines for Australia]….

As a result, the [AUKUS Pillar 1] project emerged hurriedly, almost on the back of an envelope, and in top secret. The lead was taken by politicians in the National Security Committee of cabinet and a closed group of officials and advisers in Scott Morrison’s office. For secrecy and political reasons, they could not draw upon the depth of strategic thinking in defence nor on experts knowledgeable of the serious issues in both the US and British submarine construction industries….

The Australian Labor Party, for fear of being [politically] wedged, bought into Scott Morrison’s AUKUS deal, but did not de-risk the proposals nor include new and essential strategic analysis.

[Brian]

Ce programme est mort né depuis le début. Et en réalité il l'était aussi pour le programme Attack. 

On a un pays qui a 6 vieux sous-marins diesel pas très performant et qui décide d'en construire 12 ! 12 putain, le double ! Même les Indiens vont moins vite, se contentent de faire une série de 6 avant de voir plus loin. 

Et ensuite ça bazarde le programme pour aller vers 5 bateaux, ce qui est plus raisonnable, mais nucléaires alors que le pays a même pas une seule centrale civile et d'un design qui n'existe pas. 

Leur sous-marinade va s'éteindre avant d'avoir vu les SSN-Aukus arriver. 

Tout le monde le sait. S'ils voulaient du Nuke, il fallait 4 Barracuda construits en France en partie et sinon 6 SSK (français, coréen ou Japonais). 

Bon courage les gars.

 

[Titus K]

Il y a 1 heure, Brian a dit :

Et ensuite ça bazarde le programme pour aller vers 5 bateaux, ce qui est plus raisonnable, mais nucléaires alors que le pays a même pas une seule centrale civile et d'un design qui n'existe pas. 

Le plan c'est 8 SSN :  3 à 5 Virginia + 3 à 5 SSN-AUKUS 

[Brian]

C'est encore pire que ce que je pensais.

[Picdelamirand-oil]