L'artillerie de demain

[g4lly]

Salut, je me demandais si le rempalcement du AMX 30 AuF1 était envisagé ? Ou alors celui ci va rester en service pour encore longtemps ? Ou bien le CAESAR va prendre sa place à long terme ?

Ils ont été mise a niveau ATLAS ... tout numérisé, centrale inertielle uptodate et chassis 30B2, enfin seulement une trentaine je crois, et oui il vont rester en service encore longtemps. Le programme complet d'upgrade a été abandonné, le canon aurait du etre remplacé par le 52 calibre du caesar entre autre.

[Service de semaine]

Et non aucun remplacant de prévus pour l 'instant . Mais bon ce n'est pas trop grave, puisque l'armée francaise ne pense pas faire la guerre dans les 50 ans qui viennent.

:lol:

Ouais, comme on a la meilleure armee francaise du monde, on s'en fout !

;)

[Gibbs le Cajun]

j'imagine bien une pensé venant d'en haut :

"en cas de gros pépin de type la chine débarque ,on pourra toujours acheter sur étagére ,et puis s'est à la mode l'achat sur étagére ,on achéte quand on a besoin ."

...

trés dangereux un 155 autoporté monté sur une étagére  :lol:

[move]je sors[/move]

[Philippe Top-Force]

Et non aucun remplacant de prévus pour l 'instant . Mais bon ce n'est pas trop grave, puisque l'armée francaise ne pense pas faire la guerre dans les 50 ans qui viennent.

Ce n'est pas l'armée française qui ne pense pas la faire, mais nos décideurs politiques et nos élaborateurs du LBDSN. ;) pilotés et téléguidés.

[Clairon]

Il est prévu une deuxième tranche de CAESAR vers l'horizon 2015-2020, portant le nombre total de CAESAR à environ 134 exemplaires.

Pour l'instant, il est prévu en tout 2 batteries Caesar pour les 2 régiments des 2 brigades mécas (1er RAMa et 68e RAA), pour les 4 autres régiments (3e et 11e RAMa, 35e RAP et 93e RAM) : 1 batterie Caesar et une Batterie TRF1.

Soit 64 Caesar et 32 TRF1. Le 40e RA regroupera lui 32 AUF1. Il y aura donc entout 128 bouches de 155 mm, donc en effet le projet de monter jusqu'à 134 Caesar se tient.

Clairon

[Davout]

A l'heure où l'on veut brader quelques uns de nos Leclerc, on ferait peut-être mieux de les conserver pour en réutiliser le châssis pour un nouvel automoteur avec un 155mm de 52 calibres, tout numérisé.

Cela permettrait une certaine cohérence dans l'utilisation du matériel et serait complémentaire des Caesar dans certaines circonstances pas assez protégés.

Les AUF1 ne sont pas éternels...

[pascal]

Oui mon cher Davout mais ceci a un coût ... et pas de chances à l'export

De plus un tel matériel sera transportable uniquement par moyens navals alors que le Caesat et sa logistique sont enlevables d'un coup d' A 400 M (oui je sais ...)

Ce n'est pas dans l'ère du temps ...

[Philippe Top-Force]

@Clairon, la cible de dotation CAESAR est de 141 engins.77+64  ;)

[g4lly]

Artillerie versus vehicule blindé

Myth #1—It requiresa direct hit with an artillery round to damage or destroy an armored vehicle. Not true; 155
mm rounds that impact within 30 meters cause considerable damage (Figure 5). Air bursts using VT or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) can strip away communications, sights, vision blocks and anything stored on the outside of the vehicle. These air bursts are especially effective against soft targets such as multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs). (See Figure 6.)

Myth #2—It takes 50 artillery rounds to destroy or damage a tank. Not true. It takes one round (Figure 7). If an artillery battalion engages an armored formation (54 rounds), more than one tank will be destroyed or damaged.

Myth #3—Artillery cannot engage moving targets It is
difficult, but it can be done. The issue is not lethality, but the tactics, techniques and procedures to hit the moving target. Units must train to shift fires.

Myth #4—Modern armor cannot be defeated by artillery. Tanks are designed to kill tanks, and most of the armor is designed to protect against direct fire. HE rounds with VT or delayed fuze and DPICM are very capable of defeating "modern" armor (Figure 8).

Myth #5—Armored vehicles can button up and drive through artillery fire. Yes, they can. But as soon as they button up, their ability to see is reduced by approximately 40 percent. And as they drive through the artillery fire, there is a high probability they will have mobility and firepower damage or that the formation will change its .direction of attack. The results are delay and suppression
of armor.

[collectionneur]

Concernant le test décrit dans le texte pdf contre une équipe d'infanterie mécanisé américaine mit HS avec 2 600 obus de 155, l'équipe équivaut a quoi ? une section, une compagnie ?

[g4lly]

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart/articles/20100428.aspx

U.S. Army Picks A 120mm Winner

April 28, 2010: After years of searching (and procrastinating), the U.S. Army has finally selected a GPS guided 120mm mortar shell. Recent tests of three such systems (two American and one Israeli) saw the U.S. ATK system win the contract. In development since 2006, ATK uses a guidance system that replaces the fuze (which is screwed into the front of the shell) with a larger unit containing the GPS and little wings that move to put the 120mm mortar shell closer to the target. Thus all you need to convert existing 120mm mortar shells to GPS guidance is the ATK fuzes (which handle the usual fuze functions, as in setting off the explosives in the shell, as well as the guidance functions.)

To use the ATK GPS system, you place each fuse into a device that transfers the target GPS coordinates, then screw the fuze into the shell, and fire the shell. It would also be possible to program each fuze once it is screwed into the shell, via a metal probe that would go into a hole in the fuze, transfer the data, and signal that that the transfer was accurately made. The GPS guided fuze will put the shell within six meters (and usually much less) of the coordinates entered.

Because of the GPS fuze, 120mm shells just got a lot cheaper and easier to use. This is particularly crucial for 120mm mortars, which are used by units close to the front lines, where not a lot of ammo can be carried, and resupply is riskier since the enemy is so close. Thus a guided 120mm shell means fewer shells getting fired to get the job done.

It’s about time, because the army has been working on a guided 120mm mortar shell for a long time. Three years ago, the U.S. sent laser guided 120mm mortar rounds to Iraq and Afghanistan for testing. The XM395 Precision Guided Mortar Munition had been in development for twelve years, and was almost cancelled at least once because of the delays. The 38 pound XM395 round has a range of 7.5 kilometers, and will land within a meter (three feet) of where the laser is pointed. This high accuracy is achieved because the XM395 uses laser guidance in addition to GPS. But this was more complex, expensive and difficult to use than the army required. What was needed was a mortar round that just provided consistent GPS accuracy (landing within 10 meters of the aiming point).

Unguided mortar shells cannot put the first round that close, and requires firing several rounds, and adjusting aim, before you get one on the target. A guided mortar round is very useful in urban warfare, where a miss will often kill civilians. The 120mm mortar round has about 2.2 kg (five pounds) of explosives, compared to 6.6 kg (15) pounds in a 155mm shell. The smaller explosive charges limits collateral damage to civilians. The XM395 was tested in Iraq and Afghanistan last year, but since it required someone nearby to use a laser designator, it was considered to have limited usefulness. Thus the push to get a GPS guided shell into service. Normally, an unguided 120mm shell will land anywhere within a 136 meter circle (on the first shot). The laser guided round will land within a one meter circle, and the GPS guided one with a ten meter circle. The GPS round is deemed the most useful, especially since the troops are satisfied with that degree of accuracy in GPS guided 155mm artillery shells, 227mm rockets and JDAM bombs.

Most U.S. infantry battalions are equipped with 120mm mortars. The army would like to get the GPS shell system into service by the end of the year. But the other two GPS shell manufacturers can challenge the results of the competition, and demand another opportunity to win. This can go on for a while.

[hadriel]

  Et c'est là que les systèmes d'extraction de coordonnées, de communication et de commandement des programmes de numérisation de l'infanterie prennent leur sens...

[Akhilleus]

Artillerie versus vehicule blindé

merci pour le doc G4lly

cela confirme la létalité et le pouvoir de destruction et de neutralisation d'une batterie de 152/155

je serais curieux de savoir si des etudes equivalentes existent pour les MLRS (calibre 122 à 240) et les calibres inférieurs (105 et mortiers de 120/107/87)

[g4lly]

merci pour le doc G4lly

cela confirme la létalité et le pouvoir de destruction et de neutralisation d'une batterie de 152/155

je serais curieux de savoir si des etudes equivalentes existent pour les MLRS (calibre 122 à 240) et les calibres inférieurs (105 et mortiers de 120/107/87)

Pour les rockets a sous munition on doit arriver au meme résultat que les obus a sous munition a priori, au moins pour la meme densité de sous munition. Apres pour les charge unitaire mystere ...

Pour les obus de plus petit calibre je suis plus sceptique, on perd rapidement en énergie souvent. Le mortier 120 et le canon de 105 c'est 3 fois plus léger que le 155 ... on passe d'un obus de 45kg a un obus de 15kg

[Serge]

Concernant le test décrit dans le texte pdf contre une équipe d'infanterie mécanisé américaine mit HS avec 2 600 obus de 155, l'équipe équivaut a quoi ? une section, une compagnie ?

En anglais, le mot "team" a deux niveaux d'application très différents:

- ce peut être "l'équipe". En infanterie 4 ou 5 hommes chez les US. Le chef est désigné "team leader"

- ce peut être le "Sous-Groupement Tactique Inter-Armes" (Ici le cas). C'est la "Combat Team". Chez les britanniques, on parle de "Battle Group".

A quoi ça correspond?:

Le SGTIA est un élément de combat "non-administratif" placer sous les ordres d'un capitaine. J'écris "non administratif" car il est constitué avant une projection en OPEX en prenant une compagnie et en la renforçant de moyens inter-armes. Peu d'armées maintiennent ce genre de structure de façon permanente (avec les Merkava-IV, Tsahal voulait faire des compagnies inter-armes. Quelqu'un a des infos?)

Pour les armes de mêlée, on a deux types de SGTIA: ceux à dominante infanterie et ceux à dominante cavalerie.

Leur formation se fait de la façon suivante: on prend une compagnie (pour l'infanterie) et on lui rajoute les éléments suivants:

- 1 peloton de chars,

- 1 section du génie,

- 1 équipe de mécanos avec son dépanneur,

- 1 équipe santé avec son ambulance,

- 1 observateur d'artillerie.

Dans la réalité, il y a des cas où on a pas tout ça, d'autres où on a plus.

Enfin, pour les tirs indirects, il y a toujours du mortier. En France, la compagnie d'infanterie a deux pièces mortier de 81mm. Aux EU, on va trouver du 120mm.

Ainsi, lors des tests US, on peut imaginer que les 2600 obus ont neutralisé au moins 30 M-113, 5 M-48, 2 véhicules PC, 10 camions plus d'autres choses. Avec environ 200 hommes.

PS:

1) Le SGTIA est la subdivision du GTIA, lui aux ordres d'un colonel. Il faut compter 4 SGTIA par GTIA.

2) L'artillerie peut travailler en SGTArt ou GTArt mais là, c'est au profit exclusif du GTIA ou de la brigade. Le capitaine peut avoir un élément d'artillerie en renfort pour une mission. Ce cas est exceptionnel: c'est le Détachement d'Artillerie d'Assaut. Il est mis en œuvre juste pour faire du tir direct en ville. Autant dire qu'on le fait pas tous les jours.

[P4]

Le marché prévoit notamment la démonstration en vol en 2012 d'un mortier de 120 mm pour hélicoptère

Vers de nouvelles munitions intelligentes pour l'artillerie 

 

[Chris.]

un mortier pour hélicoptère ?!?

[g4lly]

un mortier pour hélicoptère ?!?

C'était un classique de l'armée francaise, trimballer un MO120 dans un Puma ... le déposer a 4, faire feu une quinzaine de coup, rembarquer et dégager.

Ca permettait de faire des missions d'artillerie dans la profondeur ... Normalement la mission était préparé par des FS pour l'observation d'artillerie, escorté par des gazelle pour la protection, et les munition embarqué dans un second Puma.

Maintenant qu'on a des solution a base de missile de croisiere ou de missile ballistique, Scalp et rocket M31, cette capacité est annexe.

[Serge]

On appelle ça un "raid mortier".

[g4lly]

On appelle ça un "raid mortier".

Les images du raid ici http://servir-et-defendre.com/viewtopic.php?f=192&t=1261&p=29628 et d'autres par la http://alsacereserve.jeun.fr/presentation-de-l-armee-de-terre-2006-f105/pat-2006_bis-t1124.htm ou la http://www.flickr.com/photos/world_armies/4294474534/in/set-72157623130478923/

[Chris.]

ah vous me rassurez, j'ai cru que vous alliez développer un mortier capable de tirer en vol. :lol:

[g4lly]

ah vous me rassurez, j'ai cru que vous alliez développer un mortier capable de tirer en vol. :lol:

Les mortier de sabord c'est courant sur les C-130 mais je ne crois pas en avoir jamais vu sur helico ... trop risqué de taper le rotor :)

[g4lly]

http://www.army-guide.com/eng/article/article.php?forumID=1834

In the next few decades the use of tube artillery will not decrease, on the contrary, it is expected to grow. - writes Col. (res.) David Marciano, former Head of the Weapons Development in the IDF Ground Forces Headquarters, and currently CEO for Soltam Systems.

Artillery should remain a statistical weapon -by David Marsiano

Artillery should remain a statistical weapon -by David Marsiano

Despite this significant statement - categorically, he argues: "There is no need to invest resources in developing an accurate shell." In his opinion there are more worthwhile directions for artillery development and in the following article he elaborates. The universal and main question that keeps the force builders busy is the analysis of the operational needs and deriving from them the desirable solution. The main difficulty is the constant dissonance between the understanding of the existing operational needs and those that the armies are expected to meet in the future. This dissonance increases even more the moment one takes into account the technology aspects.

In this article I will try to examine the future of artillery - supposedly a weapon system that has been around for scores of years and that the physical principle of its operation has not changed at all – a system based on a free ballistic trajectory , and as such, a statistical weapon.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of casualties in the World Wars and other battles were caused by artillery weapons, there are ongoing processes that have led to the decline of the artillery's prestige. This phenomenon results from the introduction of exotic means of guided munitions such as the pinpoint PGM's,; the strengthing of air forces and their participation in the ground battle; the changing nature of conflicts that the world has experienced in the past few decades; low-intensity conflicts in which the weight of the fighting in built up areas has risen and that the fact that armies have "frozen up" on the development of artillery in directions and measures compatible with its potential.

It is still feasible to state that the scenarios in which a land maneuver is executed, the delivery of close , continuous and extended fire support is required and will continue to be so in the future . The only platforms suitable for this kind of fire support are tube artillery. In this regard I believe that "as long as in the future battlefield there will be statistical targets (infantry, antitank squads, and land-based maneuver forces) the requirement for statistical weapons will remain". Hence, it seems that in the next few decades the use of tube artillery will not decrease, on the contrary, it is expected to grow.

The starting point for examining the life expectancy of any weapon system depends on three basic questions:

1. What is the operational mission that the weapon system should fulfill?

2. Is there a better alternative in terms of cost against operational benefit?

3. What are the technological abilities available to upgrade the system best in order for it to be able to handle new operational objectives and tasks?

For tube artillery, the main task is, as noted, to provide close fire support to maneuvering forces in all forms of combat, and allow them freedom of operation by limiting the enemy's fighting ability. Additional tasks at the core of the artillery fire missions' effort are neutralizing enemy artillery and the participation in urban combat, which was not one of the core issues of occupation in the past, but looking at the nature of the clashes in the last three decades shows that the artillery was not ready to ideally support these conflicts. Artillery has additional tasks such as destroying armor, handling sporadic targets and covering large-area targets.

The answer to the second basic question," is there a better alternative?" is that some tube artillery tasks have more appropriate solutions. Such as destruction of armor, which should be done using Precision Fires or anti battery fire which is already handled effectively by rockets. On the other hand close fire support for the maneuvering forces which is a priority task is best done using the classic tube artillery units.

The answer to the third question, about technology, is that the tube artillery units hold enormous potential in terms of their operational capabilities and that their potential growth in terms of operational challenges will allow it to provide the much needed solutions for tomorrow's battlefield.

New challenges for the artillery

The challenges associated with the traditional requirements from artillery include:

    * Raising the effectiveness of the mission including increasing the accuracy.

    * Creating continuous fire support.

    * Providing a cycle of target engagements.

    * High target-artillery unit ratio.

    * Reducing the task cost in economic terms, flexibility in using force and more.

Among the new challenges that produce a wide range of new tasks are:

    * Increasing the range of fire.

    * Development of specialized capabilities to fight in low intensity conflicts.

    * Assistance in electronic warfare, intelligence, laying and removal of land mines.

The common mistake, made mainly by engineers whom also influence the "force builders" responsible for developing the weapon systems, is the development of weapons for point targets with a terminal effect of "destruction", ie a precision bomb. This phenomenon is derived from the simple fact of the available technology of PGM's (precision guided munitions). During the last two decades we have witnessed an unnecessary drift towards the development and requirements of systems using this technology.

It should be clear enough if we review the amount of weapons that are allocated to " hard" targets: tanks, air craft, ground based PGM's, air to ground PGM's, rockets, anti-tank missiles - all these without the development of an accurate artillery shell.

This article claims to reject this trend under two main arguments: First, there is no need for the development of an accurate shell s since there are enough weapons on the battlefield trusted with targeting armored forces. Second, that there is no need, since the nature and purpose of the artillery is to handle the targets of statistical nature.

This fundamental understanding should convince the engineers to develop tube artillery with a tendency which I have stated above. In order to improve the effectiveness for statistical "soft" targets such as infantry, antitank squads and light vehicles, one has to deal with several challenges: improvement of accuracy, increasing the terminal effect on the target and increasing the firing range.

In terms of precision we have to distinguish between the need for increasing the accuracy and on the other hand the development of a PGM artillery shell with pinpoint accuracy. In terms of the terminal effect on the target one should direct the R & D efforts to achieve an effective first volley without the need for correcting fire, as well as creating a surprise and an effective continuous effect.

In terms of increasing the range the move to 52 caliber cannons should be made.

Another increasing trend, that is buying a foothold among many armies in the world, is the wheeled based tube artillery. United States and NATO lean in this direction in light of the need for deploying forces around the globe. Other non- Western armies are attracted to this solution mainly due to cost considerations: The system is cheaper in procurement and maintenance and with virtually no limitations to the operational performance considering the fact that artillery is not operated from the front lines and has nearly no limits in movement.

The main reason that IDF is examining this system is largely due to the need to transfer forces between arenas without the dependency on large tank movers. That is added to the economic consideration; since tube artillery systems based on a wheeled platform will improve life cycle costs without compromising their operational benefits.

I do not deny this trend, but I definitely suggest considering it well.

[BPCs]

Je pense que tous ces articles du blog alliance stratégique sur l'artillerie n'ont pas du vous échapper mais je mets au cas où le lien :

http://www.alliancegeostrategique.org/2010/07/30/munitions-guidees-plus-petites-plus-precises-moins-cheres/

"La France n’échappe pas à cette tendance avec le programme DGA de “Munition guidée précise pour l’artillerie”, qui a pour objectif d’équiper des obus de 155mm d’un système de guidage de précision métrique. "

avec une interview  vidéo de la responsable étude Amont de la DGA

http://dai.ly/9HVqCC

[Lambert]

bonjour savez vous si certains AUF1 TA on été mis sous cocon ? et combien vont subsister du parc de 74 engins ?