Patrick

"Voldemort Palpatine". Ou quelque chose comme ça. Et quel serait donc ce mystérieux "certain pays"?

Aucun risque, Pic est l'homme à la cigarette.

Pour @Tancrède si pas déjà vue, et si ça intéresse quelqu'un d'autre. Grosse poilade sur deux tweets de shaun king à l'intérieur, mais pas seulement.

"Américains"? Pourquoi seulement "américains"? Sur les faits. Pour les obtenir tu vas regarder toutes les sources, tu amalgames ce qui a été dit ou occulté, tu reconstruits l'image de la situation en fonction, et tu as une assez bonne idée de qui dit quoi et de qui ne dit pas quoi. C'est long et ennuyeux. Et tu finis par pas mal élaguer. Mais s'informer décemment est à ce prix. ...Curieusement depuis que j'ai commencé à faire ça j'ai rabaissé les MSM au rang de blogs d'activistes dans ma grille de lecture, vu le niveau de ce qui y est proposé. C'est pas déjà ce qu'a fait trump? ...Généraux qui étaient contre le retrait, donc du coup pas de retrait? Ou un retour? La base électorale démocrate se réjouit. Ou pas. Voir AOC et ses propos pas du touuut polémiques sur le sujet. Dont les israéliens au pouvoir ne veulent pas. C'est à dire ce qu'a fait trump puisque par définition les USA ne peuvent pas être isolés diplomatiquement et peuvent se permettre n'importe quoi, et que les sanctions commerciales à l'encontre d'alliés (au hasard la France) qui auraient commercé avec l'Iran alors que c'est paaas biiieen sont le seul moyen de coercition que les USA ont pour mettre la pression à un Iran nucléaire. C'est génial messieurs. C'est proprement génial.

Les frères Lisoir dont on ne présente plus la chaîne youtube, ont interviewé les membres d'une petite entreprise française appelée Hybrid Propulsion, qui travaille comme le nom l'indique sur la propulsion hybride (ergol solide + gaz). 1 heure d'entretien pendant laquelle on apprend plein de choses sur l'intérêt de ce mode de propulsion.

Les données concernées ne seront que de la localisation et du transfert de pistes? Pas de transmission d'images SAR ou visible? Ces dernières passeraient par SATCOM si le besoin de les transmettre se faisait jour? Je me demande en effet dans quelle mesure la fusion des données des capteurs pourrait, surtout dans un rôle anti-furtifs, bénéficier du traitement de plusieurs "images" d'une même scène, très lourdes en données, par des calculateurs différents et/ou distribués, avant que les données recompilées soient ré-injectées dans le réseau pour offrir non pas une superposition de pistes mais une superposition des données du traitement de l'environnement par les capteurs d'effecteurs différents. Je ne trouve pas cette info non plus. J'ai lu ça aussi. Une augmentation de la sorte de la fréquence utilisée actuellement par ce prototype d'Airbus s'accompagnera-t-elle d'une augmentation drastique de la taille des antennes/boitiers électroniques? Ok ça expliquerait beaucoup de choses en effet. Je pense qu'il s'agit pour Airbus de placer ses pions. Maintenant j'espère que ça ne va pas impacter le développement des liaisons de données du F4.

1 méga octet par seconde, c'est peu non?

Une puissance nucléaire qui siège au CS n'est pas une puissance moyenne. En revanche il est rigoureusement exact que la France a été pulvérisée à de multiples reprises au cours des deux siècles derniers. Et que sans ces funestes développements elle serait aujourd'hui infiniment plus puissante. Nos voisins le savent, les grandes puissances le savent.

C'est l'équivalent d'un "pinsut" en corse. Donc heu... Si on veut oui! Voilà c'est ça! C'est un client. Un bon client. Héhé.

Yes I know, my question was how this would specifically help during first-entry missions.

Can you be more specific?

Surtout, si ils sont si essentiels à des activités hyper-stratégique, pourquoi même envisager de vendre? Et s'il faut du financement, on entend dire que la France emprunte à taux négatifs sur les marchés... Donc bon. Les laboratoires Sandia sont à vendre? Les skunk works de Lockheed Martin sont à vendre? Northrop Grumman sont à vendre? Microsoft est à vendre? J'ai pas l'impression. Donc mettre des clauses type "french eyes only" et pas de licenciements (pendant 5 ans, après c'est moins sûr, et à ce moment que deviennent les activités stratégiques?) c'est très bien, mais les US n'en auront rien à faire ils espionneront encore plus qu'avant, et ils nous ont habitué à leurs méthodes de patrons voyous ces dernières années à venir "investir" en France pour se barrer avec la caisse. Ça ressemble donc bel et bien à une opération paperclip. Ou au débauchage de scientifiques soviétiques à la fin de la guerre froide. Ils ont la trouille de ce que la France pourrait accomplir si elle portait ses gonades et avait un projet national intégré, c'est certain. Mais contrairement à d'autres cas où ils ont proposé des alliances, des partenariats (n'oublions pas que CFM entre autres a été créé pour remercier la France après l'affaire Farewell) ici il s'agit de vassalisation pure et simple. Je ne comprends toujours pas pourquoi Thalès n'a pas racheté Photonis.

Voir ce que dit Pascal plus haut pour la durée de vie. Et surtout rien ne dit que les anciens Rafale ne peuvent pas repasser en usine pour devenir F4.2 ready. Le passage F1 > F3 étant d'ailleurs de nature à le laisser supposer, alors que c'était des chantiers lourds (recâblage, nouveaux EMTI...)

It's the M8 AGS all over again!

Merci du tip ça fonctionne nickel! Pour la peine et parce que j'aime être mesquin, voilà le .pdf ré-exporté en non protégé pour que n'importe qui puisse piocher dedans et faire du copier-coller. C'est un document de 2018 mais il est intéressant parce que confirmant certaines pistes entreprises au début du FCAS franco-allemand. Source originale (protégé contre la copie) https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/noel_paglia_tenenbaum_armees_menaces_2018.pdf Fichier réexporté (non protégé contre la copie) https://www.mediafire.com/file/gufjg25lreqvq5e/noel_paglia_tenenbaum_armees_menaces_2018.pdf/file *** So, @DrSomnath999 here is the DeepL translate of the parts you wanted, with a few corrections here and there. I added some cross-translations for acronyms to make the whole thing easier to understand. After a bit of proof-reading, the text should make some sense at least (you can never be sure I've been told I wasn't capable of translating english recently, so I'm extra cautious now ). What impact for France? Limitations of the French SEAD model Like the White Papers on Defence and National Security of 2008 and 2013, the 2017 Strategic Review reaffirmed France's ambition to have the capacity to "go in first", i.e. to "penetrate these disputed areas and reduce the threat level in order to conduct military operations". In order to achieve this, it is imperative to upgrade capabilities for the reduction, neutralisation or destruction of enemy air defences (SEADs), a field that has been largely disinvested by France and its European partners since the end of the cold war, leading to major capability shortfalls. With the withdrawal of the AS-37 Martel from service in 1999, France no longer has any resources dedicated to SEAD. This loss of dedicated assets does not mean that the French Air Force is today unable to carry out such missions. A relatively original model based on a combination of survivability, precision strikes and tactical manoeuvres has enabled the French forces to ensure a form of "poor man's SEAD" that is sometimes innovative but whose sustainability in the face of a changing environment is open to doubt. The absence of anti-radar means and offensive jamming does not leave the pilot completely helpless in the face of ground-to-air defence. Low altitude flights, below the minimum threshold of the engagement radar and the use of terrain masks are usual methods that allow missions to be carried out within the theoretical envelope of a ground-to-air defence that would be devoid of air surveillance aircraft. Similarly, diversionary tactics exist to reduce the predictability of raid trajectories. Finally, signals intelligence allows the threat to be nuanced by indicating the inactivity of a ground-to-air system. During the operation in Libya, the French forces (combat aircraft and helicopters) thus sometimes decided to operate close to enemy ground-to-air systems considered inactive with regard to the Electronic Order of Battle (OdBE), a risk that their American counterparts would have refused to take. However, this risk-taking quickly reaches its limits when faced with integrated and multi-layered systems that make evasive manoeuvres extremely risky. The recent case of the destruction of an Israeli F-16I is an illustration: caught in the chase by 27 ground-to-air missiles fired by the Syrian air defence (SA-3, SA-5, SA-17), the crew chose to continue its mission, wrongly judging that it could avoid the threat. The propensity of the French model to take risks is partly reinforced by the attention paid to survivability. The latter is now based on the advanced measures of the Système de Protection et d'Évitement des Conduite de Tir du Rafale (SPECTRA). The electronic suite developed by Thales and MBDA operates on a combination of multispectral detectors (radar, laser and infrared) and countermeasures (defensive jammers with a wide active antenna, modular decoy launchers and intelligent Spiral chaff launchers). The ability of SPECTRA to ensure the survivability of the Rafale in the face of an advanced ground-to-air threat was debated. Indeed, while the echoes of exercises MACE XIII (2012) and MACE XIX (2018), which took place in Slovakia and during which the fighter and experimental squadrons (FETS) and electronic warfare programming and training squadrons (EPIGE) were able to rub shoulders with an S-300P (SA-10), seem to reveal the Rafale's good performance, caution is called for. First of all, the Slovakian SA-10 is a fairly old version that is not equivalent to an SA-20 or SA-21 such as those deployed by Russia in Syria or the Crimea. It should also be borne in mind that in joint exercises participants are often reluctant to show the full performance of their systems. In any case, it remains clear that despite its qualities SPECTRA is not intended to be an instrument for penetrating a sophisticated ADSL envelope and cannot offer a sustainable SEAD solution. In addition to self-protection, the French model has precision strike capabilities that allow, in the absence of SEAD, the destruction of air defence sites (DEAD). The most appropriate means of doing so, given its range, is the SCALP-EG cruise missile and its navalised version, the MdCN. Both, however, suffer from extremely small stocks which make it impossible to envisage an autonomous "first entry". Of the 500 SCALP-EGs ordered in the 2000s, only 250 are concerned by the mid-life refurbishment, suggesting that by 2025 there will be an extremely limited stock of ammunition for use against a SDAI (typically the 200 or so Tomahawks fired by the Americans in the first 24 hours of Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya). This weakness would be partly compensated qualitatively by the superior accuracy of the SCALP-EG, which allows a smaller number of missiles to be fired at each target than the Tomahawk. Finally, the non-renovation of half of the SCALP-EG stock should be partly compensated for by the gradual arrival of the 200 billion CNN which finally came to equip the FREMM (with a baptism of fire in April 2018 off the coast of Syria) and should soon join the Suffren class SNAs. Finally, it should be recalled that cruise missiles are not the only precision strike means available to the French forces to deal with the ground-to-air threat. In particular, the Libyan experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of modular air-to-ground weaponry (AASM) against relatively old systems (SA-3 and SA-8). The latter is particularly effective when combined with SPECTRA, which detects, triangulates and refines the coordinates of the threat before transmitting them to the optronic front sector (OSF), which can guide the strike discreetly without switching on the RBE2 radar. Again, however, one must be careful not to conclude that this mode of action is feasible in the face of high-performance ADSI. The extension of the AASM is thus 70 km at high altitude and up to 20 km at low altitude, which would imply, depending on the flight profile, entering the SAM envelope - even when faced with short- or medium-range systems if we consider the most recent models (SA-17, SA-22, HQ-16, etc.). This brief table of French capabilities to deal with opposing surface-to-air defences shows that our armies are far from having a range of means guaranteeing them strategic autonomy for first-entry operations, even against a "second-tier" adversary with a relatively solid SDAI. The consequences of this capability shortfall are increased dependence on American assets, which could one day prove problematic as transatlantic disagreements multiply and the ground-to-air threat spreads to theatres where France used to act autonomously. In operational terms, failure to confront anti-aircraft threats would have dire consequences, obviously for air, naval and air combat forces, but also for all surface units, naval or land. Having long taken Western air superiority for granted, Western air forces have since adopted modes of action and even force models that make them largely dependent on it. Whether it be intelligence and surveillance missions, support for strategic (inter-theatre) or even tactical (intra-theatre) mobility, tactical communications, fire support and health support, naval and land forces are today structurally threatened by the modernisation and spread of surface-to-air systems. *** Air Force The air forces are logically the most directly concerned by the surface-to-air threat. With a view to increasing and sustaining the ability to enter first, it will be important to upgrade air superiority missions in general, and SEAD in particular, which should be at the forefront of the capabilities of the Future Air Combat System (FCAS). In this context, the development of a reduced SER combat UAV combining advanced manoeuvrability and data link capabilities should play a role in the penetration of high-performance SDAI. Such a system could have the function of acquiring targets within the surface-to-air threat envelope, retransmitting them to manned platforms at a safe distance. Another option would be to turn it into a fully-fledged strike system capable of carrying a sufficient quantity of ammunition in the hold. Before such a system is available, other more or less long-term steps can be taken by the air force. One of the first qualities of an air force is its level of training for a given type of mission or threat. However, even before mentioning the material shortcomings of SEAD, it has to be said that training in a degraded ground-to-air environment does not seem to be satisfactory within the French air force. The Franco-German Electronic Warfare Range (PGE) specifically dedicated to this type of mission is only equipped with a SA-8 system and SA-6 and ZSU 23/4 simulators, three threats that are now largely outdated. The disbanding in 2014 of the 48.530 Electronic Warfare Squadron, which was contributing to the PGE, was not good news in this respect. While a renovation of the PGE seems to have been initiated recently with a modest budget of $16 million from NATO funds, it would be appropriate to continue it with a view, for example, to acquiring certain Chinese or Russian ground-to-air systems from third countries, thereby using threat dissemination for the benefit of force preparation. In the longer term, the identification of a new training area (in mainland France or elsewhere) with dimensions large enough to accommodate real or simulated long-range systems would be a real added value for force preparation. Such a facility would have to be adapted to the organisation of large-scale complex (possibly combined) exercises to simulate a first-entry operation involving a number of different types of aircraft. Another key factor in the success of a mission to reduce ground-to-air defences is the availability of high-quality electronic intelligence (EOD) enabling a complete OdBE (Ordre de Bataille Electronique) of potential adversaries to be established in advance of an operation and the libraries of combat aircraft self-protection systems to be kept up to date. In this respect, the acquisition planned by the LPM of three strategic reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a universal electronic warfare charge (CUGE) must be top priorities for the French Air Force with a view to replacing the Gabriel C-160 Transall C-160s and the ASTAC pods adapted in 2016 for the Mirage 2000Ds. Similarly, the adaptation of a ROEM payload on Reaper and, eventually, on the EuroDrone MALE seems entirely appropriate, as the persistence of UAVs makes them particularly well suited to this collection function. The acquisition of a HALE UAV system could in this respect prove very useful for a strategic intelligence gathering capability at a safe distance. Once the operation is triggered, the need for ISR, not only radar but across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, will be even greater. It is thus estimated that the need for ISR is three times greater in the case of a first entry operation (30% versus 10% for operations in a more permissive environment). In addition to the strategic and tactical ROEM (Renseignement d'Origine Electro-Magnétique, SIGINT in english, SIGnal INTelligence) assets already mentioned, the implementation of SAR/GMTI sensors to detect dynamic targets are critical capabilities in the face of an increasingly mobile surface-to-air threat. Here again, UAVs should prove to be suitable platforms for carrying out these dangerous missions in a contested environment. Once the force has been trained and the information collected, the means must be available to strike surface-to-air systems. As described above, the French Air Force has several means at its disposal in this respect that should be modernised to meet France's stated ambition of a first-in-first-out capability. The revival of the production of the renovated SCALP-EG appears in this respect to be the most important point and probably the easiest to implement given the existence of the technology. As a second step, other measures can be taken, particularly in the face of the modernisation of short- and medium-range threats (SA-17, SA-22), consisting of further increasing the length of the AASM in order to sustain the DEAD capacity. In the longer term, research on hypervelocity, already initiated in the context of the renovation of the nuclear deterrent, should be continued and accelerated. The development and acquisition, even in small numbers, of hypersonic missiles should then profoundly call into question the dangerousness of ground-to-air interceptors. Finally, it would be legitimate to explore the advisability of developing an anti-radar missile, possibly based on existing armaments, such as the Meteor air-to-air missile, whose range, terminal guidance system and interoperability already correspond in part to the need. Another area to be explored for the air force concerns electronic attack means. While multiple PEA (Plan d'Étude Amont, or "upstream study plan") have been launched several times in the past with a view to developing an offensive jamming pod on Rafale, none of them have led to equipment programmes. In view of the know-how of French manufacturers in this area, and capitalising on the encouraging results of SPECTRA in terms of self-protection and the potential of the AESA RBE2, it would seem appropriate to look into such an opportunity, possibly jointly with European partners. Finally, the FCAS development framework should imperatively include a reflection on the acquisition of a saturation capacity for surface-to-air defences, in particular through the use of unmanned platforms. The aim here would be to regain a numerical advantage that the current balance between the small fleets of combat aircraft and munitions on the one hand and SAM systems on the other no longer allows. This approach would be based, among other things, on the use of air-launched mini-UAVs operating in collaboration with manned aircraft or in swarms from "mother ships" outside the SDAI bubble. The challenge is to maintain the UAV at a reasonable cost while providing it with sufficient capabilities (range, autonomous guidance, various types of decoy, GE or explosive payloads), which argues in favour of modular devices. These concepts, which have already inspired experiments such as DARPA's Gremlins, should be a source of inspiration for SCAF. In the shorter term, France could consider the off-the-shelf purchase of a fleet of ADM-160 MALDs. These consumable UAVs benefit from a SER augmentation system to simulate a fighter or bomber squadron in attack formation. Developed by Raytheon and ordered in more than 3,000 units by the US Air Force, this device would make it possible to saturate the radars, thus acting as a "smoke screen", or even exhaust enemy missile stocks. *** Hope you will enjoy! Cheers.

The pdf is protected meaning instead of copy paste it to DeepL or google translate, it would take a while to recopy and translate the content by hand. What particular themes or passages are you interested about? There's a lot of info.

Thanks @DrSomnath999, I don't recall reading this before.

Ce pauvre Nimrod n'avait pas mérité un tel sort.

On négocierait un deal du genre: "on vous aide contre daesh en échange faites des concessions sur la fin des opérations de combat" afin de figer la situation et empêcher erdo de mener son projet néo-colonial à bien? Ou alors il s'agit juste de faire en sorte de stabiliser une situation qui sinon mènerait à une nouvelle crise des réfugiés?

Quelle surprise. Et on envoit le COS auprès du GNA...

Sauf si leurs branches US sont reprises par des entreprises américaines. Ce qui est sur la table. Mais je pense qu'on va aussi entendre parler de Tencent prochainement.

Par principe on engage que ce qu'on peut se permettre de perdre. Si on a peur de perdre des engins technologiquement avancés: - il fallait pas les construire - il fallait pas les utiliser - il fallait les bourrer de systèmes d'autodestruction redondants les transformant en chaleur lumière et poussière

Situation: Le pont s'est effondré. - Le Gad'zar vous dira pourquoi le pont s'est effondré. - L'ingénieur des ponts vous expliquera ce qu'il aurait fallu faire pour que le pont ne s'effondre pas. - Le polytechnicien vous démontrera scientifiquement, que le pont ne s'est pas effondré.

RULE Britannia.

Et pas que les égyptiens.