Polybe

Hmm j'apporterai une énorme nuance. Ce que tu dis est vrai vis à vis..."de nous" ! Pour les transnistriens et la part la plus pauvre/la moins éduqué des moldaves, là ça prend. C'est crédible, c'est entendable et souhaité. Il y a une carte à jouer, et c'est pour ça que les russes le font. Il y a une subtilité : la Transnistrie (ses "vrais" chefs surtout) a besoin de l'Occident pour exporter à bon prix et faire vivre son État maffieux. Ce dont les dirigeants de la Transnistrie ont besoin, c'est une Moldavie qui ne coupe pas les ponts avec elle. La passerelle vers l'Occident. Et ce aux tarifs avantageux d'avant. Pas aux taux de douane européens, désormais en vigueur en Moldavie. Or justement, si ces avantages n'ont plus court, la Russie est la seule porte de sortie. Les maffieux transnistriens sont en train de tenter un chantage, contraint à la fuite en avant. Désespérés, je pense qu'ils sont prêt à aller très loin. Rien à perdre. Pour mémoire ce monsieur : https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Gushan est considéré par beaucoup comme le vrai dirigeant de la Transnistrie (quand le président de la Transnistrie descend dans la rue pour manifester avec la population, lui reste au chaud). Ex-KGB (les SR transnistriens sont considérés comme un sous-service du FSB), il a il me semble travaillé dans le même service que Vladimir Poutine (le 5e bureau, dédié aux Mesures Actives). La Moldavie elle, appuyé par l'UE (et la France...) et en bonne intelligence avec la Roumanie ( @Zalmoxtu as peut-être un commentaire utile sur le sujet ?), ne semble plus trop vouloir jouer le jeu du chantage transnistrien qui pourrit sa société.

Le Tchad est une situation un peu particulière. Les mines au Nord sont importantes certes, mais entre la Libye et Tchad, ou le Soudan et le Tchad, c'est basiquement un nombre d'axes que l'on peut compter sur les doigts d'une seule main avec rien autour et de grandes distances qui interdisent toutes surprises stratégiques. Autrement dire, quelques moyens aériens et on interdit le pays. C'est ce que fait la France depuis des années. Je vois mal les russes, si "nuls" soient-ils, ne pas parvenir à faire pareil. Je présume que dans le cas du Mozambique et de la RCA, il y a une donnée en plus qui fait toute la différence (#Vietnam...) : la jungle et son couvert !

Point ISW du 27/04 : "The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to intensify its hybrid operations against Moldova. Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia Yevgenia Gutsul told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 26 that Moldovan law enforcement officials detained her and three of her advisors for several hours when the group arrived at the Chisinau airport after a series of recent meetings in Russia and Turkey.[53] Gutsul claimed that Moldovan law enforcement inspected her luggage and detained her for an hour before releasing her, and one of Gutsul’s advisors told TASS that Moldovan authorities interrogated the three advisors for an additional two hours.[54] It is unclear if Moldovan authorities formally detained Gutsul and her advisors. TASS reported that a group of 100 people gathered outside the airport to welcome Gutsul and chanted “Victory” when Gutsul exited the airport, likely referring to Gutsul’s position as the newly formed pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc’s executive secretary.[55] Gutsul claimed that Moldovan authorities are making every effort to humiliate her and other pro-Russian Moldovans and framed Moldovan authorities’ recent confiscation of over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians as a “biased” effort to humiliate innocent Moldovans.[56] Gutsul and other pro-Kremlin actors will likely continue to seize on short-term detentions and legitimate efforts by the Moldovan government to defend itself against Russian hybrid operations to justify further Russian aggression towards Moldova." Cette notion "d'humiliation" est vraiment ridicule, et ne peut marcher qu'à destination des prorusses déjà convaincus ! Au moins ça assume être téléguidé/financé depuis Moscou. Je retiens donc que c'est vrai et assumé. Si on prend deux minutes, vu le pognon qu'ils ont choppé les jours avants venant du même endroit, il est légitime de se poser des questions... "The Moldovan government is also taking steps to address known Russian information operations aimed at Gagauzia. The Moldovan Audiovisual Council announced on April 26 that it fined two regional and local television (TV) stations in Gagauzia, “TV-Gagauzia” and “ATV,” 100,000 Moldovan lei ($5,627) for spreading disinformation, hate speech, and not ensuring “information security” with their broadcasts.[57] The Audiovisual Council determined that the TV stations provided a platform for public figures to spread symbols and messages intended to “fortify a divergence” between Gagauzia's connection to Moldova and its alleged proximity to the Russkyi Mir (Russian World). The Audiovisual Council reported that the TV stations amplified narratives justifying Gagauzia’s theoretical future secession from Moldova, accusing Moldova of losing its sovereignty and traditional family values, and equating Moldova’s future accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO with “war.” ISW has extensively reported on the Kremlin’s use of its Russian World framework — an intentionally vague ideological and geographic idea that includes any former territory of the Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation and the inhabitants of those territories - to justify Russian aggression under the guise of ”protecting” Russian “compatriots abroad” in Russia’s “historical territories.”[58] Russian President Vladimir Putin noted during his annual New Year’s address on December 31, 2023, and has since reiterated that 2024 is the “Year of the Family” for Russia and has since pursued domestic policies aimed at strengthening Russia’s “traditional family values.”[59] The Gagauzian TV stations’ efforts to equate the EU and NATO with “war” are also in line with the Kremlin’s informational efforts to justify Russia’s ongoing military reforms and invasion of Ukraine as a response to inherently escalatory actions by NATO and the EU and in preparation for the Kremlin’s envisioned long-term existential conflict with the West.[60] The Kremlin will likely continue to disseminate known narratives in Moldovan society through a variety of means and may intend to use the newly-formed Victory electoral bloc to amplify its narratives." "Russian peacekeeping forces conducted another undisclosed training exercise in the Russian-backed Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria, likely aimed at creating unease in Moldovan society and increased tension in the already fraught relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The Moldovan Bureau of Reintegration reported on April 23 that Russian peacekeeping forces violated the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Joint Control Commission (JCC) protocols by conducting training exercises to “repel attacks on the positions of peacekeeping forces” near four settlements in Transnistria on April 23 without coordinating with Moldovan authorities.[61] Moldovan authorities called the incident a “provocation” and a violation of the founding acts of the peacekeeping mission and stated that the incident would be discussed at the next JCC meeting. Transnistrian Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev claimed on April 25 that the peacekeeping exercises were “justified” and “necessary” to ensure the combat readiness of Russian peacekeeping units.[62] Moldovan authorities previously urged the JCC to conduct an investigation into Russian peacekeepers’ use of undisclosed drones and weapons during a December 2023 training exercise, another violation of JCC protocols.[63] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations in Moldova and intends to use pro-Russian actors in Gagauzia and Transnistria to destabilize and degrade Moldovan democracy and ultimately prevent Moldova’s accession to the EU.[64]"

Point ISW du 27/04 : "The Russian federal government continues efforts to codify increased control over migrant communities living in Russia. The Russian State Duma introduced a bill on April 27 that “proposes a number of innovations that will help modernize Russian legislation and resolve certain issues of ensuring national security in the field of migration.”[46] The proposed bill also includes provisions to introduce a deportation regime for migrants who “have no grounds” to be in Russia, including those who commit certain crimes.[47] The proposed bill will also prevent foreigners who are subject to the deportation regime from purchasing real estate, opening bank accounts, or getting married.[48] The deportation bill will allow the Russian federal government to define whichever foreign individuals or communities it chooses as subject to deportation—a move that will likely allow the government to extend more oppressive control over migrant communities and cater to Russian ultranationalists who have frequently called for such harsh policies.[49] The Russian Ministry of Education and Science similarly announced on April 27 that the 12 Russian universities that are authorized to conduct Russian-language certification exams have terminated their contracts with commercial partners, meaning that only the universities and state and municipal organizations can administer Russian language certification testing.[50] This development will significantly complicate the process of obtaining Russian language certification for migrants, which will likely limit their access to certain jobs or even social services and provide the Russian government with greater control over migrant communities. The Russian government appears to be selectively empowering some migrant communities as it further disenfranchises others, however. A joint project run by Russian state media source RT and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) called “Not One on One” sends requests to the MVD to help foreigners obtain Russian citizenship in certain limited cases.[51] The RT project reported that it sent a request to the MVD regarding the citizenship of a migrant from Kyrgyzstan who fled Kyrgyzstan for Russia after being convicted for fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine.[52] Russian authorities have increased crackdowns against Central Asian migrants living in Russia, particularly after the wake of the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack, and the RT project emphasizes the fact that the Russian government is interested in selectively protecting some migrants from Central Asian communities as long as they are ideologically useful in the context of the Russian war effort." Les soubresauts de l'attentat semblent bien plus désigner l'immigration que les occidentaux dans les actes... Toujours cette idée malgré tout que pour venir combattre, ça ira.

C'est un peu HS, mais on a une idée de la réelle activité/efficacité des ukrainiens là-bas ?

...ouais enfin à chaque rezzou, y a l'aide de la France... Mon propos c'est d'étudier le "pourquoi" virer les US et pas les français (c'était l'inverse jusqu'à présent), puis le "comment" faire sans les français.

Un SGTIA Wagner et quelques Su-25/Mi-24 et N'Djamena sera tenue. Et c'est tout ce qui compte.

Je ne sais pas non plus, mais quand on regarde sur une carte ce qu'il y a autour, je me dis que l'agenda US n'est pas celui des acteurs de la sous-région. Pour ces derniers, négocier avec les djihadistes n'est pas du tout un tabou, voir souhaitable. Forcément en partant de là... Ajoutons que si les acteurs économiques deviennent turcs, iraniens ou chinois, les présences militaires occidentales peuvent gêner. Maintenant @Ciderstout à fait d'accord pour dire que ça pose des questions. Dans le cas du Tchad, il faut toujours un dispositif anti-rezzou. Je suppose que la France suffit, sans aide US. Pour l'instant. Parce que ça les russes pourraient parfaitement le fournir aussi.

Pas dans l'économie du pays. Et il existe des intérêts autres qu'économiques. Les relations du Tchad (politiques, diplomatiques et ethniques) avec ses voisins ne sont par exemple pas du tout compatibles avec une puissance comme celle des USA. La France a peut-être un jeu un peu plus subtil sur ce plan.

Pas foutu dehors..."les premiers" ! Ne présageons pas de l'avenir. ^^ Après si les US ont fait comme partout, c'est à dire "balec, je paye donc je fais ce que je veux !", possible que ça n'est pas fait plaisir chez les tchadiens. Je me demande aussi quels intérêts les US ont là-bas, et à quel point ça vient à l'encontre des intérêts tchadiens. Le djihadisme et les intérêts de pays musulmans, de la Russie ou de la RPC ne sont pas nécessairement un problème pour les locaux ! Là où les US ne semblent pas montrer une grosse envie d'investir localement. Cela peut expliquer des choix logiques et cohérents des tchadiens.

En général, c'est que l'adversaire a repéré la même chose de ta part, sur son territoire. ^^ Ou qu'en terme de politique intérieure, il faut démontrer quelque chose à tes dirigeants/à ta population, voir à tes alliés ("Regardez à quel point ce que je vous dis est vrai"). Plus subtil, ça peut indiquer une source commune aux trois affaires...

C'est je pense, outre le terrorisme, le danger principal au Niger. Et la junte ne me parait pas très prompt à jouer l'unité inter-ethnique.

Oui enfin les locaux peuvent vite s'énerver...le toubou moyen est sanguin si je puis dire. ^^ Après honnêtement, si on paye, oui ils se tairont. Moi ce dont je doute, c'est la volonté de cette junte, très "nationaliste du Sud-Ouest" du Niger, à vouloir partager avec les ethnies "du Nord" (touaregs et toubous).

Satisfaire l'aile droite russe en sacrifiant un pion qui perd de l'intérêt ? Ivanov, c'est la team Shoïgou. Peut-être contrebalancé le pouvoir.

...y aussi la question de "qui" va voir l'argent. Vu la zone, les ethnies du coin ne sont pas trop représenté au gouvernement.

Concernant la Russie, on a les résultats du sondage dans les région de Moura et d'Hombori ?

Point ISW du 24/04 : "The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced on April 23 that he would not participate in the International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in St. Petersburg on April 24 and 25.[47] Grigoryan’s refusal to participate in a Russian-led multilateral meeting is likely part of a continuing Armenian effort to distance Armenia from political and security relations with Russia by freezing its participation in the CSTO and refusing to participate in multilateral political and security engagements.[48] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) board meeting on April 23 to discuss promoting Russian interests in the South Caucasus, in which he claimed that the West is attempting to strategically defeat Russia by destabilizing ”other parts of the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus.”[49] Lavrov blamed the West for allegedly attempting to undermine and destroy Russian security and economic relations with countries in the South Caucasus. Lavrov is likely attempting to portray Armenian efforts to deepen relations with the West as a deliberate hostile Western effort against Russia to set information conditions to justify any potential future Russian efforts to coerce or force Armenia to resume its pro-Russian alignment. The Russian MFA also explicitly threatened Armenia by claiming that the West is attempting to “drag the South Caucasus into a geopolitical confrontation” between Russia and the West and warning that Armenia could “go down the wrong path,” following Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s April 5 meeting with senior EU and US officials.[50] CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov (a Kazakh official) also directly threatened Armenia if it did not resume active engagement in the CSTO. Tasmagambetov stated in an interview published on April 24 that the CSTO is aware of NATO’s activity in the South Caucasus and that the CSTO Secretariat’s analysts indicate that the balance of power in the South Caucasus may change if Armenia leaves the CSTO.[51] Tasmagambetov stated that he hopes that the likelihood of a “confrontation” between the CSTO and Armenia is “no more than hypothetical” but that such a confrontation would require all parties to consider their resources and capabilities. Lavrov’s and Tasmagambetov’s threats against Armenia were made around the April 24 Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day indicating that Russia likely intended to tie a tragedy in Armenian history with Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia." Le caïd de la cité d'à côté se joint au caïd local pour taper le mec à terre... Après ça à le mérite d'être clair. L'Arménie, avec l'Azerbaïdjan, la Turquie et la Russie pas en sa faveur doit serrer très fort les fesses. Je me demande si la France espère vraiment faire quelque chose dans le coin.

Extrait du point ISW du 23/04 : "Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters. Moldovan law enforcement officers conducted over 150 searches mostly at the Chisinau airport and in some personal homes after receiving a tip that opposition politicians who were returning from the April 21 meeting of Moldovan opposition politicians in Moscow, which resulted in the creation of the pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, were smuggling money into Moldova.[22] Moldovan authorities reported that they confiscated about 62,000 rubles (about $660), 3,000 euros (about $3,200), and over $1.1 million during the searches. The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Chief Viorel Cernauteau stated on April 23 that the money was meant to finance Moldovan political parties led by affiliates of US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor. Unspecified actors reportedly used “couriers” to transport the money from Russia to Moldova and promised them compensation ranging from 300 to 500 euros (about $320-520). Cernauteau noted that the “couriers” carried under 9,000 euros (about $9,600) of cash to avoid customs laws which require people to declare amounts over 10,000 euros (about $10,700). Shor reportedly paid demonstrators to protest Moldovan President Maia Sandu in 2022, and Moldovan authorities are investigating the Shor Party for bribing voters during the 2023 Gagauzia gubernatorial election.[23] Moldovan authorities have also detained members of Moldovan parliament who reportedly took bribes from Shor affiliates.[24] ISW previously assessed that the creation of the Victory electoral bloc would allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort as part of its efforts to destabilize Moldovan society, attack Moldova’s democratic government, and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).[25]" Cela commence à riposter aux manoeuvres du camp d'en face. Je subodore que la Moldavie a vu des alliés très interessés lui présenter des dossiers de renseignement bien remplis, gratuit. Je me demande si quelque part ils tapent pas "juste" dans un système en place de longue date. Extrait du point ISW du 24/04 : "Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova. Moldovan media reported on April 24 that the Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office completed its criminal investigation into Gutsul’s connections with the Shor Party, a political party that sanctioned pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor founded and financed, and filed a criminal case against Gutsul on two counts of knowingly accepting financial support from an organized criminal group.[57] The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office determined that Gutsul knowingly transported unaccounted funds from an organized criminal group likely based in Russia to Moldova and used those funds to support the Shor Party’s activities in Moldova while Gutsul worked as a secretary for the Shor Party from 2019 to 2022. The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office also charged Gutsul with knowingly organizing and paying anti-government protesters over 42.5 million Moldovan lei ($2.39 million) in illicit funds in October and November 2022. Gutsul denied the Moldovan government’s allegations and claimed that the Moldovan government fabricated the case against her.[58] The new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, which is also affiliated with Shor, responded to the case and demanded that the Moldovan government end its “groundless” and politically-motivated prosecution of Gutsul.[59] The Victory electoral bloc threatened that “provocations” by the Moldovan government could “destabilize the situation in Gagauzia.” Pro-Kremlin actors may seize on and spin the legitimate criminal charges against Gutsul to justify Russian intervention and aggression in Moldova as necessary to protect Russia’s “compatriots abroad.” Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi stated during an interview with Bloomberg published on April 23 that Moldova is a “petri dish” of Russian hybrid warfare and election meddling.[60] Popșoi stated that Russia is using a range of covert and informational tactics to destabilize Moldova, including smuggling money into Moldova to bribe voters and protestors, creating deep fake videos of Moldovan politicians, and conducting cyberattacks against Moldovan infrastructure. Russia reportedly conducted a significant cyberattack against the Moldovan postal service and temporarily disrupted postal services in February 2024, and Moldovan authorities notably confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23.[61] Popșoi, citing Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, noted that Russia is conducting daily rhetorical attacks against Moldova and Moldovan officials and that Moldovan officials are monitoring the possibility of a future Russian military threat to Moldova. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldovan society, degrading Moldova’s democracy, and preventing Moldovan’s accession to the EU.[62]" ...et la suite de l'affaire !

Si ça vient de l’extérieur et que c'est illégal d'écouter, ça n'est pas la raison d'être de la DGSE ? Là on parle de la police...

Oui alors la dernière partie je pense que l'on peut oublier. ^^

M'ouais...la cause palestinienne c'est souvent de la façade, ou une utilité de circonstance. Particulièrement dans les pays de cette sous-région, qui s'estime plus défavorisés.

C'est surtout les cadres d'EM que ça concerne. Et j'imagine qu'avec le jeu des mutations, ça va vite se répandre et être transférable d'une division à l'autre, puis pérenniser dans le temps. Non ?

Bah pour le coup avec cette logique zonale, ça me parait effectivement plus réaliste.

...c'est l'autre truc surprenant : ils ne s'entrainent pas au temps de guerre avec les armées. Du moins pas à ma connaissance (je pense à Orion). Du coup un concept sans s'entrainer, sans le confronter et l'intégrer aux autres services, je suis un peu dubitatif.

Et donc avec leurs canassons ils peuvent intervenir rapidement ? Partout ? Combien de couple cavalier/cheval peut aligner la GR ? Si comme me le dit Google, c'est 550 paxs/460 chevaux en IdF, j'ai vraiment un doute sur le fait de couvrir le TN. On prépositionne où ? Combien ? Qui reprend les missions (je les imagine déjà bien occupé...) en IdF ?