Titus K

Pour le projet de "croiseurs" 4 FuAD, en remplacement des 4 LCF, les dernières rumeurs font état de : "Pour l'instant, la famille Aster de MBDA et les missiles des fabricants israéliens semblent faire partie des possibilités. La famille Standard Missile semble être écartée, car le nouveau SM-2 Block IIICu n'est disponible qu'en combinaison avec l'Aegis américain, tandis que les Pays-Bas choisissent un système de Combat et des Radars Thales."

Petit retour en arrière sur les sous-marins nucléaires FR/UK au canada et les pressions du congres américain ... On voit aussi bien a quel point les britanniques étaient dépendants de la technologie américaine pour la propulsion nucleaire de leurs sous-marins. C'est dans les appendix G ( page 86 ) , et l'appendix I ( page 97 ) de ce document --> https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418/285 Quelques citation --> "Another is the danger of compromise of our nuclear [propulsion] technology, one of our most prized achievements." I have recently learned that the Government of Canada is seeking access to U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology via the United Kingdom. Apparently Canada wants to develop its first nuclear submarine. Since Congress and previous administrations have considered similar proposals in the past from other countries, I believe it is important that I convey to you the thoughts expressed in this letter. It is important to appreciate that there is nothing new about an ally wanting our naval nuclear propulsion technology—or about the consistently strong U.S. policy against its releases. Over the years, we have turned down requests from a number of countries, including France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Heretofore, the United States’ position has been clear and firm. As you know, applicable law tightly controls any disclosure of naval nuclear propulsion technology. Congress authorized the 1958 DREADNOUGHT agreement with Great Britain only because of special circumstances. The British, having already embarked in developing their own naval nuclear propulsion plant, encountered problems and requested the assistance of the United States. The United States decided to help in nuclear propulsion and provide nuclear weapons technology because we needed to have British nuclear submarines and weapons on line in a strategic location at the earliest date. We also took into account the special relationship we had with the British and our close cooperation on nuclear matters during the war [i.e., World War II], including the Manhattan project. Technical data alone did not prove to solve Britain’s problems, so the United States ended up providing an entire U.S. nuclear propulsion plant. U.S. assistance, however, was limited to the propulsion plant on the lead ship to help ensure that the United Kingdom would not become dependent on the United States. We considered the requirement for self-sufficiency to be essential for the establishment of the type of discipline necessary for the safe application of naval nuclear propulsion. In addition to strict security precautions, the agreement provides that this technology may not be transferred to third parties without prior U.S. approval. Over the years, earnest diplomats have urged that we share our sensitive nuclear submarine technology for purposes of worthwhile objectives. Congress rejected those proposals, recognizing the significant differences between exporting sensitive nuclear propulsion and exporting airplanes or tanks. It is one thing to share very sensitive intelligence between two allies; quite another to expose in a commercial environment the technology that has enabled us to hold a military advantage over a much larger Soviet submarine fleet. Your decision to authorize the United Kingdom to release certain naval nuclear propulsion information to Canada is a softening of U.S. policy and invites further interest by Canada and similar propositions from other nations. The considerations that persuaded us to grant an exception for the British simply do not exist today with respect to Canada or other allies. Indeed, I personally welcome the recent acknowledgment by the Canadians that they should be doing more for their own defense and in contribution to NATO. The concern of the United States should focus, in my opinion, on whether or not we wish to transfer nuclear submarine technology to another nation. We have done so only once in the past, to the British, who now operate 19 nuclear submarines of their own. Great Britain is a special friend and ally with whom we have very close defense ties. We enjoy similar ties with the Canadians. "I would rather see them go to the French than take the risk associated with transfer of [U.S.-derived] Trafalgar technology." In 1987-1988, some observers argued that an accident with a Canadian-owned, British-designed SSN whose propulsion plant employed technology derived from the U.S. nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958 could affect U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered shipsand/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make port calls around the world. A 1990 National War College report stated that the strongest opposition to the U.K.-Canadian SSN deal within DOE [the Department of Energy] came from Naval Reactors, which wanted no part of any nuclear propulsion transfer deal. For DOE the issues were simple. For Canada to build SSN’s, large amounts of sensitive classified nuclear propulsion technology would have to be transferred to the Canadian government and industry. “We would like the Canadian submarine program to be autonomous,” he said. Assuming Canada awards the contract [for its then-planned SSN acquisition program] to the British, any nuclear accident “would reflect on the United States and could very easily put our programs into jeopardy. We don’t want that to happen because we realize the strategic value of the [American] submarine and the submarine program.” Captain Hofford said that concerns about the Canadian submarines, which would be built in Canadian shipyards, could cause Congress to delay granting permits for the use of American reactor technology beyond the March 1988 deadline set by the [Canadian Government for a choice between contending [UK and French] designs…. So before we either transfer nuclear power technology or allow the British to transfer the technology we initially provided to them, I will pursue this matter very carefully in the hearings in the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence. Following the ellipse in the above-quoted passage, the subcommittee Chairman, Representative Tom Bevill, stated: “Then maybe you ought to let them get their submarine from the French.” Admiral McKee replied: “That is what I have said. The French thing raises all kinds of ghosts in the British mind, as you can well imagine. The French alternative has been used as a hammer—the Canadians emphasize that we have to help them or they will go to the French. I would rather see them go to the French than take the risk associated with transfer of Trafalgar technology.”

Bon le rapport fait plus de 100 pages et il y a seulement 16 mentions du B-21 --> https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418/285 J'ai sélectionné les 3 passages où le B-21 est mentionné ... c'est fait par IA et je ne corrige/traduis pas … je vous sépare juste les 3 passages C'est toujours mieux que des articles sensationnalistes : Alternative of a U.S.-Australia Division of Labor An alternative to Pillar 1 as currently structured would be a U.S.-Australia military division of labor under which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions while Australia invested in military capabilities for performing non-SSN missions for both Australia and the United States. Such a U.S.-Australia military division of labor might be broadly similar to military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO or other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-naval capabilit Under a U.S.-Australia military division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions the forward rotations of U.S. and UK SSNs to Australia planned under Pillar 1 —SRF-West—would still be implemented; up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built, and instead of three to five of them being sold to Australia, these additional boats would instead be retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the five U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1 as SRF-West; and Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, build, operate, and maintain its own SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities—such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft—so as to create an Australian capacity for performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United States ... ... ... Whether to Implement Certain Elements of AUKUS Pillar 1 Overview Another issue for Congress is whether to implement certain elements of the AUKUS submarine (Pillar 1) project, specifically, the intention to sell three to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia and subsequently build three to five replacement SSNs for the U.S. Navy, and to have the United States and UK provide assistance to Australia for an Australian effort to build additional three to five SSNs of a new UK-Australian SSN design to complete a planned eight-boat Australian SSN force. The potential benefits, costs, and risks of implementing these elements of Pillar 1 can be compared with the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the alternative division- of-labor approach for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions outlined earlier, in which up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be procured and retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1, while Australia invested in military capabilities (such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft) for performing non-SSN missions. In comparing the potential benefits, costs, and risks of these elements of Pillar 1 with the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the division-of-labor alternative, key factors that Congress may consider include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: deterrence and warfighting cost-effectiveness—costs relative to resulting deterrence and warfighting capability; technology security—the potential impact on the risk of China, Russia, or some other country gaining access to U.S. submarine or naval nuclear propulsion technology; and risk of accident and public acceptability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships—the risk of an accident involving an Australian-owned SSN that might call into question for third-party observers the safety of all U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and thereby affect U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make port calls around the world. Of the three factors listed above, the first is one is typically involved in considering the merits of defense programs, while the second and third arose in connection with Congress’s consideration of the merits of a project that Canada began in 1987 and canceled in 1989 to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs (see Appendix G and Appendix I). ... ... ... Arguments for Instead Implementing Alternative Division-of-Labor Approach Supporters of the alternative division-of-labor approach for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions outlined earlier—in which up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be procured and retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1, while Australia invested in military capabilities (such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft) for performing non-SSN missions—can make various arguments, including those outlined below. Deterrence and Warfighting Cost-Effectiveness Arguments relating to deterrence and warfighting cost-effectiveness include the following: Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles in March 2023 reportedly confirmed that in exchange for the Virginia-class boats, Australia’s government made no promises to the United States that Australia would support the United States in a future conflict over Taiwan.76 Similarly, the chief of Australia’s navy in July 2024 reportedly stated that AUKUS agreement would not automatically pull Australia into a war to defend Taiwan.77 Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from boats that would be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict into boats that might not be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict. This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence and warfighting capability in connection with a U.S.-China crisis or conflict. The reduced certainty of whether boats sold to Australia would be available for use in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict would be, in effect, the flip side of the argument made by supporters of Pillar 1 about having Australia become a second allied decisionmaking center (along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific. Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia could also weaken deterrence of potential Chinese aggression if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that Australia might use its Virginia-class boats less effectively than the U.S. Navy would use them. Australian officials have stated consistently that, in line with Australia’s commitments as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 79 Australia’s SSNs would be armed only with conventional weapons. Selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would thus convert those SSNs from boats that could in the future be armed with the U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) with an aim of enhancing deterrence80 into boats that would never be armed with SLCM-N. This reduction in the number of SLCM-N-capable Virginia-class boats could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence capability in connection with a U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia crisis or conflict. Some observers are concerned about potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan over the next few years, a period sometimes characterized as the Davidson window (the time between now and 2027) or decade of concern (the time between now and 2030).81 Pillar 1 as currently structured would not increase the total number of SSNs available for performing U.S., UK, and Australian SSN missions above what it otherwise would have been until sometime in the 2040s, when the first replacement SSN for the U.S. Navy or the first SSN AUKUS boat for the Australian navy (whichever comes first) enters service. Pillar 1 as currently structured would, however, absorb resources over the next few years that could instead be invested in Australian military capabilities that could be fielded sooner, and in some cases (e.g., drones and loitering munitions) soon enough to address the Davidson window or decade of concern.82 This could weaken rather than strengthen deterrence within the Davidson window or decade of concern. More generally, the costs for Australia of Pillar 1 could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding within Australia’s military budget for other Australian military capabilities, particularly if SSN acquisition, operation, and maintenance costs turn out to be higher than expected. If this were to occur, there could be a net negative impact on Australia’s overall military capabilities for deterring potential Chinese aggression The U.S. Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan (like previous editions of the Navy’s annual 30-year shipbuilding plan) projects that there will be a shortfall of U.S. SSNs relative to the Navy’s 66-boat SSN force-level goal during the 2030s and 2040s. Selling three to five Virginia-class boats will reduce the size of the U.S. SSN force below the projected levels shown in the FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan (which does not account for sales of Virginia-class boats to Australia), increasing this projected shortfall until replacements for the sold boats enter service. This could reduce the Navy’s capacity to perform SSN missions of interest to the United States but not Australia, including potentially missions in the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean for countering Russia or other potential adversaries in those regions. This could weaken deterrence of potential aggression by Russia or those other potential adversaries. Given the challenges that the U.S. submarine industrial base is experiencing in achieving a construction rate of 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year to meet U.S. Navy needs, the ability of the submarine industrial base to achieve the higher target rate of 2.33 boat per year, so as to build replacement SSNs for the U.S. Navy, is uncertain. The duration of the impact of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia on the size of the U.S. SSN force is thus uncertain and could be longer than anticipated. There is little indication that, prior to announcing the AUKUS Pillar 1 project in September 2021, an analysis of alternatives (AOA) or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis was conducted to examine whether Pillar 1 would be a more cost-effective way to spend defense resources for generating deterrence and warfighting capability than potential alternative courses of action, such as a U.S.-Australian division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions.84 Such an AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis (or a summary of one) has not been released. Performing an AOA or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis can test the validity of beliefs or presumptions about the cost-effectiveness of an envisioned course of action, and can produce unexpected or counter-intuitive results. Programs initiated in the absence of an AOA or an equivalent rigorous comparative analysis can lack a sound business case. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that “a program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be made,” and that “weapon systems without a sound business case are at greater risk for schedule delays, cost growth, and integration issues.” The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, for example, was initiated without a prior rigorous AOA. The LCS program subsequently became controversial, was widely criticized, and was ultimately truncated.85 Some Australian officials have characterized Pillar 1 as “too big to fail.”86 Some observers argue that acquisition projects viewed as too big to fail can be at elevated risk of cost growth that can reduce their achieved cost effectiveness.87 The enabling legislation for Pillar 1 that was included in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 of December 22, 2023) includes a provision (§1352(d)(2)) that was requested by the Administration as part of a package of requested legislative proposals for the FY2024 NDAA relating to the AUKUS agreement.88 The provision provides a waiver for a certification to be made by the Chief of Naval Operations under 10 U.S.C. 8678. The text of 10 U.S.C. 8678 is as follows: §8678. Chief of Naval Operations: certification required for disposal of combatant vessels Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no combatant vessel of the Navy may be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the Chief of Naval Operations certifies that it is not essential to the defense of the United States. Prior to the 2040s, Pillar 1 as currently structured will contribute to deterrence and warfighting capability primarily via the positional advantage of operating Virginia class boats from Australia, which is something can be done without selling the boats to Australia. Operating up to 12 U.S. Navy Virginia-class boats from Australia—the four boats that are to be operated there under Pillar 1’s SRF-West arrangement, plus up to eight additional U.S. Navy Virginia-class boats—would send a strong signal of U.S.-Australian alliance solidarity and resolve, in part because it would make Australia second only to Japan in terms of numbers of U.S. Navy forward-homeported or forward-operating ships.89 A 2002 CBO report on options for increasing the capability of the U.S. SSN force mentioned Australia as a potential site for forward homeporting additional U.S. SSNs in the Western Pacific. 90 Australian shipyards could perform maintenance, overhaul, and repair work on the up-to-eight additional U.S. Navy boats, as currently planned under Pillar 1 for the four Virginia-class boats that are to operate out of Australia as part of SRF-West. It would be more cost-effective to pursue a U.S.-Australia division of labor for SSN missions and non-SSN missions.91 Such a division of labor would follow the general model of military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO and other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non- naval capabilities such as (to name only some examples) nuclear weapons, space assets, and ISR capabilities. Pillar 1 would result in parallel SSN-related investments in the United States and Australia comparable to parallel investments in certain military capabilities among NATO countries that have been criticized by some observers for their collective inefficiencies.

Viseur Jaguar

Je sais pas s'il y a beaucoup de pays qui avaient autant de batteries de défense aérienne que l'Ukraine au moment ou les Shahed ont commencé à pleuvoir ... certainement pas en Europe. Certes il reste la chasse, mais si elle passe sont temps a devoir abattre des drones c'est pas forcement idéal non plus.

Malheureusement je pense que les 10 milliards du PANG n'existeraient tout simplement pas sans le PANG ...

Presque 5h de vol par jour par hélicoptère dans l'Oil&Gas https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/airbus-helicopters-le-programme-h160-monte-en-puissance Les H160 de PHI devront, ainsi, soutenir 1500 à 1700 heures de vol par an, voire jusqu’à 1800, quand des hélicoptères comme ceux de la marine effectuent jusqu’à 500 heures de vol par an. Sur les cadences : La FAL de Marignane a attaqué au printemps l’assemblage d’une 60ème machine. Avec un enjeu important concernant l’augmentation de la cadence de la production, « En 2023, nous en avons réalisé 20, l’objectif est maintenant de monter à une cadence proche de 40 par an. Cette montée en cadence constitue un vrai défi car au-delà de notre outil industriel, il faut composer avec les problèmes de main d’œuvre que rencontrent actuellement les fournisseurs aéronautiques et avoir la disponibilité des pièces à un rythme suffisant. L’enjeu est de faire en sorte que les délais ne soient pas trop longs, notamment pour de nouveaux clients ».

Si c'est le cas, les grecs devraient sauter sur l'occasion au lieu de se lancer dans l'aventure du radeau constellation ... 4 FDI + 4 FREMM EVO ca aurait de la gueule. 750 M c'est environ le prix des FDI françaises ... Kronos Dual, 32 VLS, 2x76mm, brouilleurs etc ...

Le K22 est spécifique au PANG, trop gros pour les soums (et trop puissant aussi) C'est une évolution du K15 qui équipera les SNLE 3G

@mudrets C'est quoi cet echappement sur le flanc a ton avis ?

C'est dommage, je pensais que ce MDCN Sol-Sol aurait pu être l'occasion de redonner une seconde vie au MDCN de nos FREMM au moment la marine pourra passer au FMC subsonique à partir de la fin de la décennie 2020.

Entretient et modernisation des derniers Walrus, il doivent tenir encore 10 ans !

Le prospect norvégien pour les FDI

On a une premiere idée des sommes engagées pour le PANG -->

C'est donc bien 26 tonnes pour le Caesar 6x6 Mk2

Article très complet sur les FDI Grecques --> https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/euronaval-2024/2024/10/on-board-kimon-greeces-first-fdi-frigate/ Impressionant quand même

En parlant de Bouées

Il y a là quelque chose qui me chiffonne, c'est qu'on a justement aucune idée des exigences Allemandes et Espagnoles sur le design du NGF ... Or j'imagine que leurs états majors DE/ES ont bien du spécifier aux moins quelques points, à l'image de la navalisation et de l'emport nucléaire français ?? Ca donne une impression dans le debat public d'un coté Francais très exigent et difficile à satisfaire, et de l'autre coté l'Allemagne et l'Espagne qui en "subissent" les conséquences ...

Il me semble que depuis bientôt 4 milliards d'années la terre s'en sort pas mal de ce point de vue ... pourtant elle en prend dans la gueule

Ca a l'air de bien arroser l'artillerie ?